Huddleston to support the rule.-The question turns upon the validity of the warrant of commitment alone. The warrant is invalid, on the ground that it does not shew that the justices by whom it was made had jurisdiction. The 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, under which the defendant was charged, gives jurisdiction to two justices of the peace "sitting at a place where the petty sessions are usually held." This ought to appear affirmatively upon the face of the instrument itself. In Rex v. York (a), Lord Mansfield, C. J., said, that "it ought to be shewn that the person convicting had authority to convict." In Paley on Convictions, page 236, it is laid down, that it is not necessary that a warrant should state the conviction in a precise or technical form, "but only so as to shew that the party has been convicted of some specific offence, and by a person having authority for that purpose." [Parke, B.—Rex v. Walter (b) is cited for that position, but I do not see that the case is any authority for it.] The following decisions may be referred to for the purpose of shewing how the Courts have regarded these instruments: Regina v. Cavanah (c), Regina v. Chaney (d), In re Peerless (e), Lindsay v. Leigh (ƒ). [Scotland referred to the 24th section of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, which enacts "that where a conviction does not order the payment of any penalty, but that the defendant be imprisoned, or imprisoned and kept to hard labour, for his offence; or, where an order is not for the payment of money, but for the doing of some other act, and directs that, in case of the defendant's neglect or refusal to do such act, he shall be imprisoned, or imprisoned and kept to hard labour, and the defendant neglects or refuses to do such act; in every such case it shall be lawful for such justice or justices making such conviction or order, or for some other justice of the peace for the same county, riding, divi

(a) 5 Burr. 2684.

(b) 8 Mod. 5.

(c) 1 Dowl. N. C. 546.

(d) 6 Dowl. P. C. 281.
(e) 1 Q. B. 143.

(ƒ) 11 Q. B. 455.

1854.

In re ALLISON.

1854.

In re ALLISON.

sion, liberty, city, borough, or place, to issue his or their warrant of commitment (P. 1, 2,) under his or their hand and seal, &c." This warrant follows the form given in the schedule (P. 1).] That form does not apply to an offence under the later statute. The commitment given by the form (P. 1) has reference to commitments made by justices acting in and for the county, &c. The hearing in this case must be before justices in petty sessions. And therefore the form suggested by the prior Act ought to be remodelled to meet the law as enacted by the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30. In Geswood's case (a), which is a recent decision, it was held, that, although a commitment of a servant under the 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, for absenting himself need not set forth the evidence on which the conviction proceeded, still it must shew on the face of it, that the prisoner has been convicted of what is an offence within the Act. [Parke, B.-There the statement of the offence was defective, but the place where the justices sit is no part of the offence with which the defendant is charged. That case, therefore, does not apply.]

POLLOCK, C. B.—We are all of opinion that this rule must be discharged. From what has fallen from the Court, it is clear that the justices had jurisdiction to make the conviction, and that it is perfectly good. I make this statement, as it would be unsatisfactory if it were supposed that this unfortunate person is detained in custody under a conviction that is invalid. With respect to the commitment, I abstain from going generally into the law upon the subject, although it would seem, from the elaborate argument of Mr. Huddleston, that it may be difficult to reconcile all the authorities which have been cited, and that the propositions expounded by certain text writers are not fully supported by authority. If we had to decide the matter independently of the statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, we

(a) 2 E. & B. 952.

might feel it necessary to take time to consider whether
some rule ought not to be laid down upon the subject.
But this is a consideration which becomes altogether im-
material. The statute was passed for the express purpose
of giving magistrates certain forms to be used in particular
cases, by the adoption of which they might protect them-
selves, and render their proceedings free from all objection.
The 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, according to its title, is "An Act
to facilitate the performance of the duties of Justices of the
Peace out of Sessions within England and Wales with re-
spect to summary convictions and orders."
And upon
comparing the warrant of commitment in this case with
the form given in the Schedule (P. 1.), it is found to cor-
respond with it precisely. But Mr. Huddleston contends,
that, at the time this statute passed, it was sufficient if the
magistrate acting was one in and for the county, and there-
fore that the statute was framed for that particular state of
things; but that since it came into operation a statute has
been passed of a highly penal character, empowering two
justices to inflict most severe punishment; and that, in
order to guard against abuse in the exercise of such au-
thority, the hearing must take place before two justices in
petty sessions; and the learned counsel contends, that the
warrant should state these facts. But I do not think
that there is any weight in that argument. The statute
gives a form to be adopted by magistrates, and they
are not called upon to reason upon the matter, and to
argue, that, because the law in some respect has been
altered, therefore they must alter the form. The sta-
tute expressly enacts, that, where a warrant is required, it
may be drawn up in the form given in the schedule. Here
the justices have adopted the form given, and the commit-
ment is good.

PARKE, B.-I am of the same opinion. I think it unnecessary to say anything as to the grounds on which the

1854.

In re ALLISON.

1854.

In re ALLISON.

Court of Queen's Bench disposed of this case when it was before them; and I entirely agree with the Lord Chief Baron, that, if justices substantially adopt the forms given by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, they do all that is required of them. If this were not so, the Act itself would prove only a snare to entrap persons. Now, this warrant of commitment corresponds precisely with the form given by the Act, and sets out all that is required. It is, therefore, valid. I do not quarrel with an enactment which affords protection to magistrates by removing technical objections to formal proceedings.

ALDERSON, B.-I am of the same opinion. Since the passing of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, all that magistrates have to do in drawing up warrants and convictions is to follow the forms given, and that they have done. There is no actual hardship here; for, if the conviction was made. without jurisdiction, the prisoner may remove and quash it. The objection to the form of this commitment is purely of a technical character.

PLATT, B.-If the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, had been brought before the attention of the Court when the rule was moved, it would not have been granted. The learning of the cases prior to it has been swept away by the 24th section, which enacts that it shall be lawful for the justice to issue his "warrant of commitment (P. 1)." The warrant here follows the form, and is, therefore, good. We have no power to repeal an Act of Parliament; and there is no rule more wholesome than that which prevents technical objections from interfering with the administration of justice.

Rule discharged (a).

(a) See Reg. v. Hyde, 21 L. J., M. C., 94.

MICHAELMAS VACATION, 18 VICT.

1854.

WILLIAMS V. THE LONDON COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE

COMPANY.

THE first count of the declaration stated, that the plain

Dec. 4.

Several mat

ters in differ

some of which

tween them,

that, in consi

deration that

the defendants would consent

matters of the

plaintiff would accept such

agreement

satisfaction of

tiff employed the defendants in the way of their business ence existing as share-brokers, for commission to be paid by the plaintiff between the plaintiff and to the defendants in that behalf, to purchase for the plain- defendants, tiff, when and as soon thereafter as the defendants could, were the subone hundred shares in the Great Northern Railway Com- tion, it was pany, at the market price of such shares for the time agreed bebeing; and although the defendants then could and ought to have purchased for the plaintiff such shares, at the then market price thereof, the defendants did not then purchase such shares, or any part of them, but fraudulently and bitration the wrongfully neglected and omitted to do so, &c.-There action, the were other counts in respect of other shares. Plea-That, after the accruing of the causes of action in the declaration mentioned, and before the making of the agreement hereinafter mentioned, disputes and differences were existing between the plaintiff and the defendants touching and concerning divers dealings and transactions which had taken place between them, and touching certain matters of account arising out of those dealings and transactions; and that some of the said matters consisted of the several transactions in the declaration mentioned as to the direction to purchase shares for the plaintiff, and others of such matters were the subject of an action then depending in this Court by the plaintiff against the defendants for damages claimed by the plaintiff in respect of certain other dealings between the plaintiff and the defendants,

all damages sustained by him in respect of the other

matters :

Held, that the

agreement and

its performgood bar to an action in respect of the last-mentioned

ance was a

matters.