Opinion, per ROBINSON, J.

case, of a district from one entire district and a portion of an adjoining district, giving to such created district a new name and appointing a new board, under Section 4736, General Code, and the "transfer [of] a part * ** of a school district *

**

to an adjoining district," retaining the name and board of the adjoining district, under Section 4692, General Code, yet we know of no inhibition upon the power of the legislature in that respect; and if it in its wisdom has seen fit to make a distinction by name and board only, and has failed to indicate a difference in any other respect, that of itself does not vitiate the legislation, nor make the one section conflict with the other. If, however, such conflict did exist we would still be obliged to hold that Section 4736, being the last expression of the legislature upon the subject, would control.

Nor are we able to find that Sections 4735-1 and 4735-2, General Code, enacted in 1914, qualify Section 4736, General Code, enacted in 1919, and are of opinion that even though they were of concurrent enactment Sections 4735-1 and 4735-2 are only effective to dissolve and transfer an entire existing district to another existing district upon the initiative of the electors of the district seeking dissolution and union with another district, or upon the initiative of the board of such district seeking dissolution and union with another district, thereby enabling such district to accomplish such a union with an existing district without the aid of and probably in spite of the county board of education, and in no way limit the power or the discretion

Opinion, per ROBINSON, J.

vested in the county board to accomplish the same or a similar result by its own action, and that the only limitation upon the power and discretion vested in the county board of education by Section 4736, in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or the taking of such arbitrary, whimsical and unreasonable action by the board as amounts to an abuse of discretion, is the limitation expressed in the section itself.

Having reached this conclusion it follows that a remonstrance signed by less than a majority of the qualified electors residing in the territory affected by the order creating the school district is not effective to defeat the action of the county board in the creation of such district.

The judgment of the court of appeals, affirming the judgment of the common pleas court overruling the demurrer to the petition, is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

JOHNSON, WANAMAKER, JONES and MATTHIAS,

JJ., concur.

Syllabus.

WILLIAMS ET AL. V. SCUDDER ET AL.

Constitutional law-Police power - Legislative discretion and judicial review-Conservation of public health - Regulation of art of healing - Qualifications, examination and registration of practitioners-Section 1270, General Code -State medical board-Practitioners in limited branches-Sections 1274-1 to 1274-7, General Code - Chiropractors.

1. The measure of the police power of the state is the measure of the public need, limited only by the state and federal constitutions.

2. Public health is one of the most vital subjects for the exercise of that power.

3. Primarily, the state legislature is the judge of that need, and in the exercise of that judgment must be given wide discretion.

4. The legislative judgment in this behalf will not be nullified except when it clearly appears that there has been a gross abuse of such discretion in undoubted violation of some state or federal constitutional provision.

5. In the conservation of the public health, the legislature may require all those who may desire to practice the art of healing, to furnish some substantial evidence, by public examination or otherwise, of qualifications to practice such art, as a whole or in any of its branches.

6. The statutory qualifications defined by Section 1270, General Code, as preliminary to taking an examination of persons desiring to secure a license to practice the art of healing in Ohio, are reasonable and valid statutory provisions, and are in full force and effect in the Limited Practice Act, until lowered by any rule or regulation of the Ohio state medical board, pursuant to the

statute.

7. The act of the general assembly, passed April 27, 1915 (106 O. L., 202-204), now Sections 1274-1 to 1274-7, General Code, further regulating the practice of medicine and surgery by authorizing the examination and registration of practitioners in the limited branches thereof, is a constitutional and valid exercise of legislative power.

(No. 16841 Decided April 26, 1921.)

Counsel for Plaintiffs in Error.

ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.

This is an action in injunction, brought by D. A. Williams and others, for themselves and all others similarly situated, some three hundred in number, in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, Ohio.

The petition in substance declares that the act of the general assembly of the state of Ohio, known as the Platt-Ellis Law, enacted April 27, 1915 (106 O. L., 202-204), likewise the so-called Talley Law, known as Sections 12694 and 13423, General Code, enacted March 11, 1919 (108 O. L., pt. 1, 40-42), are both violative of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Ohio. And in addition to the challenge made as to constitutionality, it is further alleged in the petition, that certain arbitrary discriminations were made against the practitioners of chiropractic by the defendants.

Upon issue joined, a hearing was had upon the merits before his honor, Judge Powell, of the court of common pleas, who granted the injunction.

An appeal was taken to the court of appeals. Upon hearing on the merits in the court of appeals the injunction was dissolved and the petition dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs.

Error is now prosecuted to this court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

Mr. Smith W. Bennett and Mr. Wm. H. Boyd, for plaintiffs in error.

Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J.

Mr. John G. Price, attorney general; Mr. Ray Martin; Mr. P. A. White and Mr. O. A. Dickey, for defendants in error.

WANAMAKER, J. Notwithstanding this court has sustained the constitutionality of the Medical Practice Act, both general and limited, in Nesmith v. State, 101 Ohio St., 158, and Shaw v. State, Id., 507, we have decided upon another review of these constitutional questions, as though they were originally before this court.

ness.

Public health is the very heart of public happiThe constitutional guaranties of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are of little avail unless there be clearly implied therefrom the further guaranty of safeguard of the public health, in order that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, shall be made practical and plenary.

The legislative power of the state, which is here called in question, is limited only by the constitution of the state and the constitution of the nation; and before any legislative power, as expressed in a statute, can be held invalid, it must appear that such power is clearly denied by some constitutional provision.

It is likewise conceded that the Medical Practice Act must be justified, if at all, under the police power of the state.

The dimensions of the police power of the state are the dimensions of the public need, save only such limitations as are imposed by our written constitu