waters, we should seek to obtain the right of search which under former treaties we possessed. It would also be desirable to obtain some modification of the treaty with Madagascar.

Some of these matters are perhaps beyond the strict limits of the inquiry for which this Commission was appointed, but the release of a few fugitive slaves would have little effect on slavery or the slave trade, unless measures were also taken to block the larger channels through which the slave dealer can still conduct a lucrative trade in African captives.

In concluding this Report we must express the great obligations under which we are to Foreign Governments, and to Your Majesty's officers, both at home and abroad. for the valuable assistance and information they have afforded us in our inquiry.

SOMERSET.

A. E. COCKBURN.
*ROBERT PHILLIMORE.
MOUNTAGUE BERNARD.
T. D. ARCHIBALD.

ALFRED HY. THESIGER.

H. T. HOLLAND.

L. G. HEATH.

H. S. MAINE.

J. F. STEPHEN.
H. C. ROTHERY.

HENRY HOWARD, Secretary.
May 30, 1876.

* I agree with the Report except on one point. I do not approve of the last sentence of Section III. (p. xviii) of the Recommendations.-ROBERT PHILLIMORE.

Reasons given by Sir George Campbell, K.C.S.I., for dissenting from the Report.

I most entirely defer to my colleagues on all questions of law, fact, and obligation; and have only to express my concurrence in their report so far as the first three heads of our inquiry are concerned. But I am unable to sign the Report, because, when we come to the fourth head, viz., the steps which should now be taken with a view to the maintenance by our ships and officers of the right of personal liberty, and to secure to our officers greater freedom of action in that respect, I feel that the question is no longer a legal one, but one of political and social morality on which I am bound to form the best opinion I can, and to maintain it. I find myself unable to assent to some passages in the Report, which to my mind involve a vitally important principle. It seems to me that the Recommendations of my colleagues would render it necessary for our officers to some extent to recognise and enforce slavery, while taking precautions against abetting any excessive abuse of that institution. I, on the other hand, think that the time has come when this country may fairly say, "we will under no circumstances aid in the enforcement of slavery, we will have nothing to do with this nefarious and accursed thing."

I quite agree that, under present circumstances, and especially with reference to the peculiar character of eastern slavery, we cannot actively interfere to release all slaves; we cannot direct officers, who accept for our ships of war the use of the ports and harbours of slave-holding powers, to offer an asylum to all slaves who may desire to seek their protection in those waters. I do not think that we could take such a course, even in respect to the rare western countries which still maintain the more revolting form of slavery, without the concurrence and assistance of other civilised powers. But I do think that when any person has been admitted into a British ship of war, no British officer should be

the instrument of handing him back to slavery. I would give naval officers only the discretionary power to receive slaves in the territorial waters of slave States, for special and sufficient reasons, which my colleagues have recommended; but once admitted on board, I would hold those officers to be in no case bound to surrender any slave; on the contrary, I would prohibit their doing so. My view is very much that taken by the Government of Bombay, viz., "The commander of a British ship of war is "not bound to receive fugitive slaves on board his vessel; yet if he does receive them they become free." That instruction I would apply to territorial waters. On the high seas I think that our officers should receive and rescue all persons flying from slavery whenever they can.

66

I believe that I am entirely fortified by the opinions of my colleagues in the belief that there are no existing no existing obligations to prevent the adoption of the course which I recommend. It appears that there are no well established and generally received rules of international law making it obligatory on the commanders of ships of war to surrender slaves found on board their vessels; also that there are no treaties by which they are bound to do so. On the other hand, the traditions of the navy and the belief of the people of this country that the deck of a British man of war is a soil consecrated to freedom, and that there is no power to demand the rendition of a slave once there, are in a great degree supported by all the documents bearing on the subject which we have found prior to the year 1870. Even before the claims of the negro to the treatment of a man were recognized by England, we find that the principle of the inviolability of a British man-of-war to the slave-owner was set forth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries both in the treaties with slave-holding powers and in the orders of Lord St. Vincent and the presiding authorities of the British Admiralty. We find the same principle very distinctly asserted by the British Foreign Office in the year 1856, both as a present instruction and as being the practice heretofore, thus: "it should be borne in "mind that if a slave were to take refuge on board a British ship of war, it will still, as heretofore, be the duty of the captain to refuse to surrender such slave." This it should be observed was expressly issued for the guidance of officers in the waters of Brazil, and to distinguish ships of war from "merchant vessels which are subject to "the law and jurisdiction of the country."

Up to 1870 it appears that British naval officers considered that they were under no obligation to surrender slaves, and if in any case they did so it was only when it seemed to the individual officer that the retention of the slave would be a breach of faith and justice on his part in the particular case.

It was in 1870 that the first order limiting the power of naval officers to retain slaves on board their ships was issued. From that time the instructions issued have, as stated by my colleagues, limited the discretion previously exercised by the officers of the navy My opinion is, that as the world has advanced, as public opinion not only in our own country but in other countries has advanced, as all the most civilised and powerful nations have abolished slavery, we should certainly not go back in this matter, but should advance with the times. I would on no account place British officers in a position less favourable to giving liberty to the slave than that which they held before 1870, but would rather advance a step farther (if advance it be) to the general application of the principle which I humbly recommend, viz., that no British officer should by any act of his enforce slavery upon any human being.

I am the more confirmed in this view because I find that it is that which is indicated by the great majority and weight of opinion of the most important foreign countries, as shown in the replies to our inquiries on the subject. While the representatives of only two minor States think that the slave should be surrendered, those of the United States, Italy, Germany, France, and Russia indicate a contrary opinion. The United States Secretary of the Navy says, "no officer would for a moment think "of giving up a slave who had taken refuge on board his vessel in order that he might return to his condition of slavery." The Italian minister says, "a slave who "might take refuge on an Italian ship must be considered as perfectly free." The legal opinion obtained from France is decidedly in the same sense, and the French minister only qualifies that opinion by stating that a very wide discretion is left to the naval officers.

I venture to think that while these opinions are held by the greatest foreign nations it is neither desirable nor justifiable that the British Government should so far take lower ground as in any case to compel a British officer to render back into slavery any person who has once obtained a refuge on his ship.

The course which I recommend is non-interference but refusal to aid in enforcing slavery, and this has been very much suggested to me, especially as regards the Eastern form of slavery, by my experience in India. In the year 1843 the Indian Legislature declared that no claim arising out of an alleged right in the property of another as a slave should be recognised or enforced by any British officer, magistrate, or court. This involved no active interference to break up any domestic relations, but only that the arm of the British officer should not be used to compel any person, who had for a time put an end to relations involving slavery, to return to a state of slavery. My experience is highly favourable to this Indian system. I entered the Indian service just when it was adopted, and during my whole service I have scarcely known any complaints of its operation.

If we apply such a rule to our ships of war it would be necessary that notice should be given to slave-holding countries that commanders of British vessels of war entering their ports can take no cognizance of any demand founded on the alleged slavery of any person.

We should let such countries understand that our ships will not, when admitted into their waters, offer a general asylum to their slaves; but we must firmly tell them that British officers have orders in no way to aid the maintenance of the institution of slavery by any acts of theirs, and that if those officers have seen sufficient reason to admit any person to their ships they cannot surrender him only because he is a slave. We need not suggest to them that they may exclude our ships, but, if in any case any power does so, our Government will no doubt act according to the circumstances.

I apprehend, however, that the cases in which my recommendation would go beyond those of my colleagues, would be in practice so few, that serious difficulty would not arise. It is only in regard to the principle involved that the difference is somewhat wide. While seeking to maintain the most friendly relations with al foreign countries, I would not surrender the principle in order to conciliate and satisfy those which still maintain slavery. It would be enough, I think, to maintain complete good faith in our relations with them.

I would not permit our officers to receive slaves on board our ships of war on visits of ceremony or the like on any understanding that they should be compelled to return. And commanding officers should be instructed to avoid, wherever it is possible, accepting the services of slaves on board. In the case of pilots and others, nominally slaves in the eastern form, and whose employment may be on some few occasions unavoidable, it seems probable that they will not seek the protection of our flag. In any very rare case in which when on board they do so, it may be necessary to guarantee the master against pecuniary loss arising from the acts or agreements of our officers.

If I were to formulate the instructions to naval officers which I venture to recommend, I would put them somewhat as follows:

I. On the high seas fugitive slaves may be received and set free.

II. In the territorial waters of foreign states where slavery is legal, a fugitive slave is not to be received on board unless the commanding officer is satisfied, in the particular case, that his life is in danger, or that he is in danger of being cruelly used, or that there is reasonable ground for believing that he has been kept in a state of slavery contrary to treaties, or that there is some other special and sufficient reason for receiving him.

III. No slave who has been admitted on board is to be surrendered to those who claim him as a slave or compelled to leave the ship under circumstances which would necessarily involve his return to slavery, unless the commanding officer is satisfied that he has committed some criminal offence on account of which he would have been surrendered or expelled if he had been a free man.

As respects all matters mentioned in the report of my colleagues other than the surrender of slaves, I concur in the report.

GEORGE CAMPBELL.

Papers referred to in the last paragraph of page vii. of the

Report.

I.

Statement of Opinion as to Principles of International Law applicable to reception of Fugitive Slaves, by the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Archibald, Mr. Thesiger, Sir Henry T. Holland, Mr. Stephen, and Mr. Rothery.

The Report states that a difference of opinion exists in the Commission with reference to the principles of international law applicable to the reception of fugitive slaves who may take refuge on board British ships of war lying in the territorial waters of a foreign state in which slavery exists by law.

We, the undersigned members of the Commission, whilst concurring in the Recommendations of the Report, think it our duty to express our opinion upon this question. Our views are summed up in the following propositions.

1. A slave who gets on board a British ship of war in foreign territorial waters does not acquire any right whatever to be retained by the mere fact of his presence there. 2. The established principle of international law, that no state is justified in encouraging its subjects to violate the law of other states, ought to be observed with special care by officers who, in virtue of their public employment, are enjoying the hospitality of foreign states. Any exemption from the coercive power of the local law, to which such officers may be entitled by reason of their position, affords no reason why they should disregard this principle, but, on the contrary, an additional reason why they should respect it. This country has no right to force its own law on an independent state, nor (except in such extreme cases as those herein-after referred to) to authorise its subjects to violate the law of the latter because it disapproves of that law.

3. This principle extends to countries in which slavery is established by law, and to the conduct of naval officers towards slaves found on board their ships in the territorial waters of such countries.

4. Although slavery has happily become abhorrent to the British nation, and has been abolished in British territories, yet the rights conferred upon the owners of slaves by the laws of their own countries have been, on more than one occasion since the abolition of slavery by this country, recognised and enforced by English courts of justice. Upon this fact, as well as upon the principles of international law, we think that the commanding officers of British ships of war in foreign territorial waters would do wrong if they afforded protection to all slaves indiscriminately who might be found on board their ships.

5. Respect for the local law ought not, however, to be carried to such an extent as to make British naval officers accessory to acts of cruelty; and in cases in which they have reason to believe that such acts have been, or, unless protection is afforded to him, probably will be, practised upon a slave found on board their ships, or asking permission to come on board, they ought to be authorised to afford protection to the slave, although such conduct may be opposed to the strict theory of international law. A rigid adherence to that theory by the commanding officers of British ships in foreign territorial waters, in all cases whatever, would be neither practicable nor desirable;