neously executed to plaintiff a bond conditioned that he would remove the house from the street; or in the event of his failure to move the house that he would pay the plaintiff $500 as damages. On final hearing of the cause, the court decreed specific performance of plaintiff's contract and plaintiff has appealed to this court.

It is insisted, in the first place, that the contract is not sufficiently definite as to the description of the property to justify a decree for specific performance. Counsel rely upon the case of Fordyce Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 85 Ark. 3, where it was held that a contract for the sale of land, describing it as "section 16-7-4," without any other description, and without specifying the county in which it is situated, was insufficient and unenforceable. The contract exhibited in this case standing alone is too indefinite, but the proof in the case is sufficient to supply the defect. The testimony adduced by defendant is to the effect that he and plaintiff went upon the land and the plaintiff stepped off the lines and pointed it out to him and then wrote the description into the contract. Pursuant to the contract, he took possession of this particular land and moved the house, at considerable expense pursuant to the terms of his bond, which formed a part of the consideration for the contract of sale. It appears further from the testimony that the house which was moved was partly on the land in controversy and had been erected by another party several years ago under contract with the plaintiffs grantor, whereby he was to have the right to remove the house or to purchase the lot on which it was situated. Subsequently, defendant acquired the rights of the person who built the house, and plaintiff purchased these lots, together with considerable other property in that locality, from one Greenwood, who owned the property at the time the house was built. Defendant asserted his right to compensation for the value of the improvements or his right to purchase the property; and it was this controversy which led up to the contract of sale for the lots in controversy.

(1) Defendant testified, as before stated, that when he and the plaintiff went upon the property to discuss the differences with respect to the defendant's right to have compensation for the house, the proposition was made to sell him these three lots, and the contract was thereupon made. While the writing affords an insufficient description of the property, we are of the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to establish a state of facts which takes the case out of the statute of frauds and supplies the proof of description so as to justify the court of equity in decreeing a specific performance of the contract.

(2) Plaintiff is a married man and insists that he is unable to perform the contract by reason of the fact that his wife refuses to join in the conveyance, and for that reason the court of equity should not compel performance. The contention of counsel for the plaintiff is that a husband will not be compelled to perform his contract for the sale of land where his wife refuses to join, and that the vendee is remitted to a court of law for his damages resulting from the breach of the contract. The authorities are not altogether in accord, but according to the great weight of authority, the refusal of the wife to join in the deed does not afford sufficient grounds to deny the vendee the right to compel a specific performance of the contract. He may elect to refuse to accept the conveyance on account of the outstanding inchoate dower right and sue to recover damages for the breach of the contract, or he may accept the conveyance of such interest as it is within the power of the vendor to give. 36 Cyc., 744. The authorities are not altogether in accord on this question, and Judge Story, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, expresses some doubt as to the justice of that rule. 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 734. But we are of the opinion that such is the established rule, and that it is the just and equitable one. The real division between the authorities is concerning the question whether if the vendee elects to accept the conveyance he can require an abatement of the price to the extent of the value of the outstanding dower interest.

Upon that question this court is committed to the rule that the vendee may require a deed and have an abate. ment to the extent of the value of the contingent interest of the wife. Vaughan v. Butterfield, 85 Ark. 289. In that case we followed the Iowa decisions on this point, which hold unqualifiedly that the vendee may require specific performance of his contract and an abatement of the purchase price. Troutman v. Gowing, 16 Ia. 415; Leach v. Forney, 21 Ia. 271; Zebley v. Sears, 38 Ia. 509. This disposes of the questions presented in the case, and our conclusion is that the decree of the chancellor is correct and it should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

1.

2.

STATE BANK OF DECATUR v. SANDERS.

Opinion delivered October 19, 1914.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-COMPLETED SALE-RELATION BETWEEN PARTIES CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.-A. entered into a contract with B. by which he sold land to B. for $900, B. paying $200 of the purchase money and agreeing to execute a note for the balance when the deed was executed, and that A. have either a vendor's lien in the deed or a mortgage on other land, and in pursuance thereof B. entered into immediate possession and made substantial improvements on the land. Held, the contract and acts of the parties established the relation of vendor and vendee between the parties, and from the time the sale was consummated A. became a constructive trustee for B.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SALE OF LAND-VENDOR AS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE-The moment that a contract for the sale and purchase of land is entered into, and the relation of vendor and vendee is constituted, the vendor becomes a constructive trustee for the purchaser.

3. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SALE OF

4.

5.

LAND-PAYMENT-POSSESSION

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-An oral contract of sale of land is completed and taken out of the statute of frauds, by the vendee's paying part of the purchase price, and entering into the possession of the property.

LIENS JUDGMENT-LIEN-ATTACHES TO WHAT ESTATE. A judgmentlien may attach only to an estate in land, and not to a lien on land. LIENS-VENDOR'S LIEN-EXECUTION-JUDGMENT-CREDITOR.—A. sold land to B. retaining a vendor's lien, held, a judgment-creditor of A. can not levy execution upon A's. lien on the land sold B.

Appeal from Benton Chancery Court; T. Haden Humphreys, Chancellor; affirmed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

Appellee instituted this suit against appellant in the Benton Chancery Court, stating, in substance, that on the 4th day of April, 1910, William Frazer was the owner of certain lands which were on that day sold to P. J. Sharpe in consideration of $900; that at that time Sharpe paid $200 in cash and agreed to give a mortgage on other lands or a vendor's lien on the land purchased for the balance of $700, which was evidenced by a note; that on the day the sale was consummated as aforesaid Sharpe took possession of the land; that Frazer investigated the other land which was offered by Sharpe as security for the $700, and that same was unsatisfactory. He, therefore, on the 1st day of April, 1911, executed a warranty deed to Sharpe, reserving therein a vendor's lien for the balance of the purchase money, towit: $700, as formerly agreed; that Sharpe continued in possession of the land until January, 1912, when, for a valuable consideration, he sold the same to appellee Sanders, who went into possession and continues to hold the same as the owner thereof; that Sharpe and Sanders both made valuable improvements on the land. It is further alleged that appellant bank, on the 28th of March, 1911, recovered a judgment for more than $1,000 against Frazer; that the equities and rights of appellee are superior to the claim of the appellant by virtue of its judgment, and that such claim of appellant was a cloud upon appellee's title. Appellee prayed that his title be quieted.

Appellant bank filed a combined demurrer, answer and cross-complaint, in which it was alleged that Frazer was the owner of the land at the time the bank's judgment was obtained against him, and denying, on information and belief, that Sharpe and Sanders had made any improvements on the land, and alleged that if any one did that it was done after the rendition of the judgment in appellant's favor. The appellant prayed that appellee's

complaint be dismissed for want of equity and that the land be sold to satisfy appellant's judgment.

Frazer testified, in substance, that in December, 1910, and for some time prior thereto, he was the owner of the land in controversy; that in December, 1910, he sold the land to Sharpe in consideration of $900; that a cash payment of $200 was made at that time, and it was then agreed that at Frazer's election he might thereafter take a mortgage on other property or reserve to himself a vendor's lien on the property for the balance of the purchase money; that on the 1st of April, 1911, he executed a warranty deed to Sharpe to the land and reserved in the deed a vendor's lien; that the lien was paid off and satisfied on April 16, 1912, by Sanders. On the day he (Frazer) sold the property to Sharpe, Sharpe took the actual control, possession and management of the farm and so continued until January, 1912. Improvements were made right away after Sharpe bought the land. He asked permission the day he made the deal to go to work on the place, saying that he wanted to fence the place. Witness thought he went to work immediately. The improvements were made before Sharpe got the abstract. At the time witness sold and contracted the land to Sharpe he did not advise him anything about the bank having a judgment against him (Frazer) because at that time they did not have a judgment or a suit pending. Neither did witness advise Sharpe at the time witness made the deed to him or when the note was finally paid off that a judgment had been rendered against the wit

ness.

Witness further said, on cross-examination, that Sharpe went in possession of the land as soon as he bought it, but that he did not move on the farm. He made posts and fenced the land and cleared up some of the land and fixed up a spring on the same. He further testified that Sanders discovered that the bank had a judgment against him (Frazer) from the abstract. The deed which witness executed to Sanders bears the true date.