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The majority hold that the agricultural school is a State institution, and that the Legislature had no power to localize it or to determine that any part of the benefits were local, so as to place the expenses or a portion of it on the county. With this conclusion, we are unable to agree. There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents the Legislature from classifying matters which may be the subject of local or county expenses. The numerous authorities cited in the brief of appellant abundantly sustain that proposition. The Legislature could, we think, extend authority to the county to use funds for the establishment of an agricultural school; and that being true, it could determine that a State institution was of sufficient local benefit to be treated as the subject-matter of appropriation of county funds for county purposes. The provision of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction upon the county court in matters "relating to county taxes, the disbursement of money for county purposes, and in every other case that may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties," does not limit the power of the Legislature with respect to determining what shall constitute internal improvements. It does not take away the power of the Legislature to determine what shall constitute, in whole or in part, a matter of local concern. The county court is as much subject to the legislative will as any other functionary, except to the extent that the control may be limited by the express terms of the Constitution.

It seems clear to us that the Legislature has determined that the agricultural school is a matter of local concern in the county, to the extent of the appropriations made by the county court, and that it was within the power of the Legislature to do this.

SEITZ V. MERIWETHER.

Opinion delivered October 5, 1914.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR-CHANCERY-FINAL ORDER.-A decree which disposes of all the matters in issue between the parties and gives all consequential directions necessary to carry it into execution, is a final decree; but if such consequential directions be not given, though the decree may adjudicate as to the interest or right in controversy, it is not final.

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APPEALS-REFERENCE TO A MASTER-PREMATURE APPEAL.-An appeal from a decree of the chancery court, referring to a special master, the accounts between the litigants, with instructions to report in accordance with the directions of the court, is taken prematurely, if taken before the master makes his report.

3. APPEALS-DECREE IN CHANCERY-FINALITY.-In an action by a levee district against the contractor, attorney and engineer, a decree against the attorney for a definite sum of money, being enforceable, is final, and a decree against the engineer enjoining him from serving any further as engineer, and enjoining the levee board from employing him, is also final, and the parties may appeal from the

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APPEALS CHANCERY-REFERENCE TO A MASTER-FINAL ORDER.-A decree against a defendant, referring his accounts to a master for an accounting is not final, and can not be reviewed on appeal. ATTORNEY'S FEES-ST. FRANCIS LEVEE DISTRICT.-Under section 21, Act 172, p. 444, session of 1905, the Board of Directors of the St. Francis Levee District was authorized to employ an attorney and provided that "* * fees to be paid such attorney shall not exceed in any one year the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars;" held, the manifest intention of the Legislature was to limit the sum to be paid the district's attorney to two hundred and fifty dollars per annum, and when the board paid an attorney more than that amount, the district may recover back the same. 6. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS-PUBLIC AGENCY-RIGHT TO RECOVER BACK.Where a public agency, like a municipal corporation or improvement district, pays an officer or servant more than is authorized by the statute, the public corporation or district may recover back the said excess from the said officer or servant.

7. PUBLIC AGENCIES-PAYMENT OF EXCESSIVE FEES-RECOVERY-DEFENSE.— The officers and employees of public agencies are compelled to take notice of the limitations upon the authority of the governing body; and when they receive fees in excess of the amount authorized by statute, they can not defend a suit for recovery thereof on the ground that the payment was voluntary.

8. EQUITY JURISDICTION-IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS-TAXPAYERS.-Equity will take jurisdiction of an action by taxpayers or dissenting di

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rectors of an improvement district, against the district to recover excessive fees paid employees of the district, where the directors refuse to bring suit to recover the excessive sums paid. IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS-SUIT BY TAXPAYER-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION.-Section 13, art. 16, Const. of 1874, giving a citizen the right to prevent the enforcement of any illegal exaction, held not to include improvement districts, but it is the duty of equity to provide a remedy for a taxpayer whose interests are involved in the operation of improvement districts.

10. IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES-REMOVAL-JURISDICTION OF COURTS.-The statute creating an improvement district authorized the election of an engineer, and definitely fixed his term, held the power of appointment and removal being reposed in the board of said district, the courts will not attempt to exercise the power of appointment or removal.

11. IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS-ILLEGAL ACTS-JURISDICTION OF COURTS.The courts have power to prevent illegal acts of the board or engineer, but not the power to oust either from office. Act 172, p. 444, Acts 1905.

Appeal from Greene Chancery Court; Charles D. Frierson, Chancellor; reversed as to Mitchell; affirmed as to Spence; appeal of the contractors dismissed.

R. H. Dudley and R. E. L. Johnson, for appellants. 1. On behalf of appellant Spence, we contend: (1) The act contemplates two separate attorneys, or one attorney to act in two separate and distinct capacities. Acts 1909, p. 429, § 21.

(2) The payment of $500 to him was voluntary, with full knowledge of the law and facts connected therewith, and, there being neither allegation nor proof of fraud, can not now be recovered back. 46 Ark. 167; 49 Ark. 70; 70 Ark. 5; 72 Ark. 552; 92 Ark. 309; 102 Ark. 159. (3) The board, in making the allowance and payment to the attorney, acted clearly within their discretion, and the courts have no jurisdiction of the subjectmatter.

2. On behalf of the appellant contractors, it is urged:

(1) Under the averments of the complaint, the chancery court had no jurisdiction to wrest the management, control and construction of the ditch and levee

from the board of directors and lodge the same in the chancery court. 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jur., §§ 342-346.

Fraud will not be inferred against the majority of the board, because they refused to discharge the engineer on the demand of one member. Moreover, there is no allegation that his report was not true, nor that the members of the board had any knowledge of any irregularity or impropriety charged against either the engineer or the contractors. 153 S. W. (Ark.) 259.

(2) The decree deprives the contractors of their right to perform their contract under the direction of the board, and orders an accounting before a special master, when the proof fails to establish, and the court does not find, that either the board or the contractors were acting illegally, wrongfully or fraudulently. 168 Fed. 756; 115 S. W. 1090; 83 Ark. 554; 160 U. S. 1, 40 L. Ed. 319-337; 228 U. S. 610, 57 L. Ed., 989; 114 N. Y. S. 689; 118 N. W. 712; 49 So. 317; 201 Mass. 596; 88 N. E. 348; 76 N. E. 529; 208 Ill. 623.

(3) The decree as to the contractors is final in that it adjudicates adversely to them, that the complaint states a cause of action against them; that the court had jurisdiction to render the decree; that they are not entitled to pay for the refill of the muck ditch, and that they be required to render an account to a special master. 80 Ark. 513; 104 Ark. 379; Id. 641.

3. For appellant Mitchell:

(1) The chancery court was without jurisdiction to render the decree ousting him as engineer and restraining the board from continuing him in that position. Chancery has no jurisdiction to interfere by injunction with the acts of the board done in the exercise of the grant of power conferred by the legislative enactments, where there is no allegation nor proof of fraud on the part of the board in the selection of the engineer. 96 Ark. 424, and authorities cited; 160 S. W. (Ark.) 240.

The board proceeded in accordance with the power conferred by the acts of the Legislature. The board's

acts were therefore legal, and injunction did not lie. 22 Cyc. 880, and authorities cited.

M. P. Huddleston and Block & Kirsch, for appellees.

1. The St. Francis Drainage District is a public quasi-corporation, having no powers other than those expressly conferred by statute. 94 Ark. 380; 79 Ark. 229; 67 Ark. 413; 93 Ark. 491; 71 Ark. 4.

Where there is any doubt as to the existence of any of its powers, the doubt must be resolved against the district. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4 ed.), § 89. Its governing officers or board of directors are mere trustees of the funds and property of the taxpayers of the district, and accountable as such in equity for any abuse of their trust. 52 Ark. 541; 33 Ark. 704; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp., § § 915919. And taxpayers of the district may maintain a suit against such officers or board of directors to correct abuses and prevent misapplication of the funds. 54 Ark. 645; 101 U. S. 601; 121 Ill. 290; 103 Ind. 449; 23 C. C. A. 631. Equity has the power in such cases not only to grant relief by injunction, but also to compel restitution of funds unlawfully paid out. 61 Neb. 882; 85 Ark. 89; 75 N. W. (Wis.) 245; 101 N. W. (Ia.) 1055; 80 N. W. (Minn.) 694; 102 Wis. 181.

2. The statute, section 21, of Act 172, Acts 1905, under which appellant Spence was employed, contemplates the employment of but one attorney, and limits his compensation to the sum of $250 per annum. Even if the act contemplated the employment of two attorneys, the language of the act is sufficiently clear to limit their aggregate compensation to the sum of $250. Chancery was the proper forum in which to bring the suit, and had jurisdiction to order Spence to refund the five hundred paid to him without authority of law. Const. 1874, art. 17, § 13; 90 Ark. 219; 85 Ark. 89; 88 Ark. 353; 173 Ill. 331; 51 Ind. 325.

The rule as to voluntary payments, has no application to the facts presented here. 83 Ark. 275.

3. Under the provisions of section 15 of the act (Acts 1905, p. 442), it was the duty of the board of di

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