But supposing they did, was it not competent by the acts of Congress the register and receiver for Spain to have relinquished this forfeiture, were to direct the manner in which the loca and may not this government, the successor of tions were to be made, and the survey was made Spain, do the same thing? The admission without their authority. The survey contained of the premises of the decision does not at all 25,312 superficial feet, while the act of Conjustify its conclusion, “that the lessor had no gress under which the claim is set up expressly right to recover, although no opposing evidence provides that, where the quantity claimed is had been offered by defendant." not ascertained, it shall be for 7,200 square feet, or 60 by 120. This survey, then, was not only made without due warrant, but in face of the act, and has never been recognized by this government. The survey should, therefore, have been rejected by the court.

These words are too emphatic and too general to justify the distinction which was taken; 1st. By the terms of the concession itself. for, whether the deeds were introduced as con2d. By the eighteeth section of the Regula-stituting of themselves title, or for the purpose tions of Morales, which declares, "that no one of those who have obtained the first decree by which the surveyor is ordered to measure it, and by virtue of which they have been put in possession, can be regarded as owners of the land until their real titles are delivered, completed with all the formalities before recited."ant is without a legal title. (Land Laws, 984.)

The Act of 1822 does not purport a convey3d. By the repeated adjudications of the ance of title. While its first section in refer court, commencing with the case of De la Croix ence to complete grants recognizes them as valv. Chamberlain, in 12 Wheaton, that such id, its other sections, which affect the defendclaims did not sever the land from the publicant's claim, look to future action-"they shall domain, and that upon the change of government a political obligation alone existed, which the court could not enforce.

for defendant, it shows that Farmer and Eslava both held claims to the lot in controversy derived from former governments; but these claims gave no title. They have both urged 438*] their suits before the *new forum, and Farmer's title has been perfected, while Eslava's remains incomplete.

From 1822 to 1837, when the patent issued which devested the government of its title, there was a special tribunal organized by the act of Congress for the adjudication of this conflict. The defendant has appealed to that tribunal and been defeated, or he has abstained for fifteen years from prosecuting his suit where by law he was directed to do it. The record does not authorize us to say upon which horn he is suspended, but his dilemma is the same in ei

ther event.

That this court has jurisdiction of this cause under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, reference is made to Matthews v. Zane (4 Cranch, 382), Ross v. Barland (1 Pet., 662), Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe (14 Pet., 354).

Mr. Campbell, for the defendant in error,contended

the third section of the same act, this disavowal operates in favor of the plaintiff. The question, then, is controlled by the decision of this court in 9 Peters, 224. The court there says: "The controversy in the State court was between two titles; the one originating under the French, the other under the Spanish government. It is true, the successful party had obtained a patent from the United States acknowledging the validity of his previous incomplete title under the King of Spain. But this patent did not profess to destroy any previous existing title, nor could it so operate, nor was it understood so to operate by the State court." The court proceeds to show, that the confirmation of the plaintiff's claim could not operate upon a pre-existing title; that the solution of the controversy between the parties depended upon the opinion that the State court held as to the rights under the titles derived from the crowns of France and Spain respectively; and that the Supreme Court was not entitled to review the opinions of the State court on such a title.

The parrallelism between the two cases is 1. That these two claims fell within differ- perfect. The controversy in the present case ent sections of the confirmatory Act of 1822; is between titles having complete evidences of that of Farmer being provided for in the fourth authenticity. The land in dispute had been section, which merely conferred donations, severed from the national domain for more than whilst that of Eslava was comprehended with-half a century before the occupancy of Mobile in the third section, which recognized pre-ex-under the title produced by the lessors of the isting rights; and that claims founded upon do- plaintiff. The measures of a public character nations must give way to rights already estab-by which it had reverted, and the acts under lished. which it had subsequently become private prop erty, were all antecedent to the American ac

The United States had interfered between the parties only so far as to disclaim all estate in the property, and to furnish the highest evidence of that in an act of Congress. The settlement of the controversies under the pre-existing claim could be of no interest to the United States, nor can the mode of settlement of the question call for the interposition of the national tribunals.

2. After showing that the Supreme Court of Alabama considered that both parties were pro-quisition. tected by the act of Congress, and that, in order to decide between them, the antecedent conditions of the title had necessarily to be considered, Mr. Campbell proceeded: In this posture of the case, the Supreme Court were led to the inquiries, first, whether the title of the lessors of the plaintiff was not forfeited before the action of Congress upon it; and second, whether the possession of the defendant had not perfected his title under the Spanish laws of prescription and the Alabama Act of Limitation.

We contend that the settlement of the contest between these parties is within the competency of the local tribunals, and that a writ of error does not lie to the Supreme Court of the United States upon their judgments. A solation of this question must be found in the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, and the interpretation given to it by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The title of the lessors of the plaintiff rests upon the authority of no clause in the Constitution, nor is it protected by any treaty. The title was forfeited by the laws of Spain, when it had unquestioned sovereignty over the country, and was not restored by the act of cession 439* of Spain to the French government *nor by any act of the French government. The ttle of the defendant was valid and operative at the date of the cession to the United States, and is within its protection.

The title of the plaintiff is not held under a statute of the United States. The United States, in the Act of 8th May, 1822, disavow in favor of the defendant all title to the lot, and if the plaintiff is to be held as comprehended within

The State court gave to the Act of Congress of 1822 all the effect that could be derived from it in favor of the lessors of the plaintiff. It did not pretend that the United States could not waive the forfeiture in so far as it affected its own interests, but that it had not attempted to impair any other title.

*The decision was, that the disavow [*440 al or relinquishment of the United States, in 1822, did not destroy the rights that had vested after the forfeiture of the British grant; and before the passage of the subsequent act of the United States in 1822. This opinion receives full confirmation from the plain declaration in the Act of 1822. Congress expressly declares that it is not to be construed so as to affect any other title, but simply to amount to a relinquishment of the title of the United States. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held thata confirmation in such terms had no relation so as to affect the vested rights of other persons, (Les Bois v. Bramell, 4 Howard,459; Barry v. Gamble, 3 Howard, 32.)

The decision of the State court upon the effect of the Act of Limitations is clearly not revisable by the Supreme Court of the United States. The State court held that the laws of prescription ran in favor of the defendants,

This view of the statute, reasonable as it appears, was not adopted by the State court. The court allowed the Spanish documents of title as evidence of the claim of the defendant, and those under whom he derived title, and of the date of the claim. The admissibility of the

from the time they entered into possession, | When the Spanish claimant had adduced his claiming title. The Supreme Court has ac- claim, supported it by competent evidence, knowledged in several instances the effect of and it had been confirmed, there was no motive the statutes of limitation upon French titles, for applying a penalty to him, and his case is and that those acts are not obstructed by the clearly not within the purview of the statute. statutes of the United States proposing inquiries into the character and validity of titles. That court held that a party, whose claim had not been forfeited by neglect to present it, was en titled to the benefit of the possession held under the Spanish laws of prescription before the cession, and to the benefit of the local laws of pre-evidence was confined in its operation to its efscription. (Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 456, 461; Judge Catron's Opinion, 468, 469, 470.) Had the United States set up a claim to this land as its own, and it had been held under that title, we concede that no local act of limitations could interfere with its supreme power of control. This has been fully recognized by the Su preme Court. (4 Howard, 169.)

fect in establishing a prescription under the statutes of limitation.

The same question arises here which has been discussed in another branch of this cause. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the ques tions of evidence decided in this case? The act in question prescribes a rule of evidence for the courts of the United States.

The United States made no claim. The claim Granting the act of Congress to be operative of the defendant was recognized, because he as enacting a barrier against the introduction of had adduced proof of title. The United States any title paper as evidence which has not been withdrew all claim to the land, and simply re-registered according to the act, does it apply to served a power to survey it to ascertain its location This statement of the case shows that the opinions of the State court upon the statute of limitations do not operate to deny a title held under the United States.

The remaining question upon the bill of exceptions, relating to the construction of the act of Congress, arises upon the admissibility of the Spanish title papers of the defendant.

*a State court? Can Congress undertake [*442 to decide what evidence shall be admitted to support a plea of the statute of limitations in a State court? Can Congress undertake to deter mine what deeds shall be evidence of title in controversies similar to that now offered to the court? Congress has abandoned all claim to the land, and has conceded that both of the claimants have a superior right to theirs. Is it competent for Congress to dictate the form of evidence by which the title of these parties shall be established in the State courts? The language of the act requires the sanction of no such pretension on the part of the govern ment.

The defendant, at the time (1814) the commissioner appointed under the Act of 1812 (1 Clarke's Land Laws, 606) called for evidences of claim, had in his possession only the deed to himself from Orsono. This deed was exhibited, 441*] and a fourteen years' occupancy under it was established. The original grant, and the We contend that, when Congress established intermediate conveyances, were not produced, the title of the defendant, as founded on a grant The confirmation of the United States was pro- lost by time or accident, it could never aftercured upon this statement of the title of the de- wards have designed to contest, or to furnish its fendant. citizens with the means of contesting, the exist It is a public fact, that, at the time the Span-ence of their title. The objects set forth in the iards left the country, many of the title papers were carried away. The archives were left in great confusion. In the State of Alabama no order was made respecting the Spanish records until 1821. The act of the General Assembly of that year indicates the disorder which prevailed. (Toulmin's Digest, 699.)

adjudications of the Supreme Court, as the landmarks of the national policy, forbid such a conclusion. Such a course would have produced confusion, embarrassment, and litigation, when the policy of the government was to promote peace, order, and security.

Mr. Coxe, for the plaintiff in error, in conclusion, made the following additional points: 1. That the patent from the United States to the plaintiff must prevail against defendant, who exhibits none.

In the translation of the records, those papers which Eslava had supposed to be lost were found. They show a connected title to Orsono, from whom Eslava claims. The question then arises, Has the act of Congress prohibited the use of these papers in the maintenance of his right? The object of the act was to compel the production of title papers to the commissioner for the examination of claims. The failure to produce such muniments of title was visited by 3. That under said Act of May 8, 1822, and à prohibition against their introduction sub-other acts of Congress, the lines and boundaries sequently as evidence in the courts of the Unit

ed States.

This section could not have been designed to apply to the case of a claimant whose claim was substantiated to the government, independently of a paper title, and whose claim had been afterwards recognized by the government. The object of the statute was to protect bona fide purchasers, or claimants under the government, who had no notice of the dormant Spanish titles. I

2. That the report of the commissioners, January 1, 1823, being prior to the patent certificate of defendant, September 3, 1824, confers a prior title of confirmation by the United States.

established by the register and receiver, and em bodied in the patent, are conclusive as to title as well as to boundary.

4. That, according to defendant's showing, the register and receiver never did authoritatively fix the lines of his lot, and the conveyance annexed to the warrant, and to which the surveyor refers in his plat of survey, had calls which could not be complied with without coming into conflict with other claims.

5. The petition, the foundation of defendant's title, calls for a lot 10 toises (60 feet) in breadth, 26 toises (156 feet) in length. The deed, pur porting to be from Elizabeth Fonnerette, appears to be signed by Isabella Fonnerette, and this calls for 60 feet front, 126 feet deep. Francisco Fontanella, not Francis, the previous grantee, conveys to Orsono 114 feet in front and 126 feet in depth; and Orsono, in his conveyance to Eslava, without indicating boundaries, sells the lot which he had purchased from Don Francis Fontanella.

443*] *6. Elizabeth or Isabella Fonnerette's deed calls for John Joyce's lot as the northeastern boundary; and Dinsmore, the surveyor, in his return, says the front of 114 feet could not be found without interfering with Joyce's

lot.

7. The original petition of Elizabeth Fonnerette recognizes the claim of Farmer as a prior

one.

8. The return of the surveyor gives the lines as surveyed 226 feet by 112, adding one hundred feet to the call of Fontanella's deed.

9. The superficial contents, according to the petition, 10 toises (60 feet) by 26 (156), would be 9.360 square feet; according to Fonnerette's deed to Fontanella, 68 feet by 126, 7,560 square feet; by Fontanella's deed to De Orsono, 114 by 126, 14,364 square feet; by Dinsmore's survey, 226 by 112, 25,312; by the register of location, 7,200 square feet. These various documents of title are thus incongruous and inconsistent.

10. The deed from De Orsono to Eslava does not purport to convey the entire property which he had purchased from Fontanella, but uses this language as describing the property conveyed: "the house pertaining to me, wherein I dwell, upon the lot of ground that I bought of Don Francis Fontanella, &c., I yield the right of action and ownership in the house I had and held."

*So we are confined in our inquiries [*444 in a writ of error like this, under the twentyfifth section, to what appears on the record in some way or other, not only to have been set up under the United States, but decided against by the court. (Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat., 129; Crowell v. Randell, 10 Peters, 392; McKinney v. Carroll, 12 Peters, 66; Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 14 Peters, 353, 360; Coons v. Gallaher, 15 Peters, 18; 16 Peters, 281; 7 Howard, 743.) It must, too, be overruled improperly; otherwise there is no grievance to be redressed.

As the plaintiff asserts, that such a right or title has in this case been overruled, and that improperly, the burden to show it devolves on him (Garnett et al. v. Jenkins et al., 8 Peters, 86); and as the State tribunals are presumed to do their duty, we should not disturb their decisions, even on matters connected with the general government, unless very manifestly improper or erroneous. (Carroll v. Peake, 1 Peters, 23; 13 Peters, 447; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 727; 12 Peters, 435, 436.) From the record in this case, it appears that both parties claimed the land in controversy, by titles confirmed by the United States, as well as by long possession at different periods. The possession by those under whom the plaintiff claims had continued from 1757 to 1787; while that of the defendant and his grantors had remained from the last date to the present time, with no interruption except by some legal proceedings between 1819 and 1826, which in the end terminated favorably to the defendant, and left him in the actual occupation of the premises.

The British power, under which Farmer was an officer, ceased a short time before Farmer's heirs left the country, in 1787, and the Spanish power ceased just before their return, in 1819, and for this or some other cause there seems to have been an entire abandonment of the coun11, It will be observed that the register says try and of this lot by Farmer's heirs during that Eslava's claim is allowed to the extent of that period of over thirty years; and a new 7,200 feet. By the fourth section of the Act of license by the Spanish government was, thereMay 8, 1822 (Land Laws, 349), it is provided, fore, soon given to those under whom Eslava "that in all such claims where the quantity claims, to enter upon it as a vacant lot; and an claimed is not ascertained, no one claim shall exclusive occupation and building on it, as if be confirmed for a quantity exceeding 7,200 their own, followed by them and Eslava dursquare feet. It is contended that this is an ading the same period of thirty years, as well as judication by the register and receiver, that this most of the time since. was such a claim as was thus restricted as to quantity.

12. That therefore the court erred in refusing, as it appears was done, all the prayers for instructions on the part of plaintiff.

Mr. Justice WOODBURY delivered the opinion

of the court:

This was a writ of error on a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of Alabama.

Our jurisdiction to revise such a judgment is very strictly limited to cases where some right or title was set up by a party under the general government-its constitution, treaties, or laws, and was overruled. It is this federal character of the claim decided against which furnishes some justification for a revision of a State judgment in a federal court; and unless it be clearly of that character, the foundation as well as the policy for our interference entirely

fails. HOWARD 9.

U. S., Book 13.

The principles of law applicable to these possessions, as existing in Alabama, and as to land held under ancient French and Spanish permits and grants, we do not propose to consider; nor to revise the correctness of the rulings of the State courts concerning them, because they are matters clearly within their *sole [*445 jurisdiction. But with the other branch of the case, so far as title was attempted to be proved by the plaintiff from or through the United States, and was decided against, the course should be otherwise, and our jurisdiction must be good to ascertain whether the decision made