the preliminary proofs were furnished on the 24th of November, 1845. This would have been too late, but that the company must be considered to have waived their being furnished, by refusing to issue a policy, and denying their responsibility altogether. Id. (lb.) 187 7. The cases in 2 Peters, 25, and 10 Peters, 507, examined. Id. (Ib.) 187 8. A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction to enforce a specific performance of the contract by compelling the company to issue a policy, can proceed to give such final relief as the circumstances of the case demand. Id. (Ib.) 187 9. A prayer for general relief in this case covers and includes a prayer for specific performance. Id. (Ib.) 187 INJUNCTION BOND-12. 1. A statute of the State of New York provides, that, where joint debtors are sued and one is brought into court on process, if judgment shall pass for plaintiff, he shall have judgment and execution not only against the party brought into court, but also against other joint debtors named in the original process, in the same manner as if they had all been taken and brought into court by virtue of such process; but it shall not be lawful to issue or execute any such execution against the body or against the sole property of any person not brought into court. Stockton v. Ford, (232) 676 5. It was not necessary for an assignee of this recorded judgment, who was defending himself in chancery, by claiming under the assignment, to notice in his pleading an allegation in the bill that a release of the judgment was improperly entered upon the record. His assignment was not charged as fraudulent. Id. (Ib.) 676 6. The attorney who had recovered the judgment which was thus recovered and assigned, was not at liberty to purchase it when his client became sued and execution was issued against him. Id. (lb.) 676 7. According to the practice in Pennsylvania, where a defendant pleads set-off, the jury are allowed to find in their verdict the amount that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant, and according to their mode of keeping records this result is entered by way of note; e. g.: new trial refused and judgment on the verdict." (272) 693 8. Although this may be a good record in the Reeside v. Walker, courts of Pennsylvania, it does not follow that it is so in the courts of the United States. Id. (Ib.) 693 9. The effect of such a judgment, that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant, is merely to lay the foundation for a scire facias to try this new cause of action. Id. (lb.) 693 10. Where the United States were the plaintiffs, and a verdict was rendered that they were indebted to the defendant, and an application was made for a mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to credit the defendant upon the books of the Treasury with the amount of the verdict, and to pay the same, the mandamus was properly refused by the Circuit Court. For a mandamus will only lie against a ministerial officer to do some ministerial act where the laws require him to do it and he improperly refuses to do so. Id. (lb.) 693 11. Besides, there was no appropriation made by law, and no officer of the government can pay a debt due by the United States without an appropriation by Congress. Id. (Ib.) 693 12. To sanction a judgment under a plea of set-off would virtually be allowing the United States to be sued, which the laws do not allow. Id. (lb.) 693 13. It is the uniform practice of the federal and State Courts in Tennessee to test executions as on the first day of the term; and as between creditors, the lien attaches equally to all the judgments entered at the same term. Clements v. Berry, (398) 745 14. Where a judgment by default, in an action upon a promissory note, was entered upon the 8th day of the month, but not fully entered up as to the amount due until the 10th, and upon the 10th, a few minutes before the court opened, the debtor recorded a deed of trust conveying away all his property, this deed cannot defeat the lien of the judgment. Id. (Ib.) 745 15. The judgment by default created the lien; it was a mere clerical duty to calculate and enter up the amount due. Id. (Ib.) 745 16. To note the precise time when deeds are left for record is attended with no difficulty as between deeds; but to settle the exact comparative creation of a lien between a recorded deed and a judgment by a court is attended with much embarrassment. The timepiece of the register cannot settle the validity or invalidity of a judgment lien. ld. (Ib.) 745 17. The Process Act of 1828, passed by Congress, refers to state laws for the creation and effect of liens; but the preparatory steps by which they are created depend upon the rules adopted by the United States courts. la. (lb.) 745 18. Where the Legislature of the Territory of Iowa directed that suits might be instituted against "the Owners of the Half-breed Lands lying in Lee County," notice thereof being given through the newspapers, and judgments were recovered in suits so instituted, these judgments were nullities. Webster v. Reid, (437) 761 19. There was no personal notice to individuals, nor an attachment or other proceeding against the land, until after the judgments. (lb.) 761 Id. 20. The law moreover directed that the court should decide without the intervention of a jury to determine matters of fact. This was inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. Id. (lb.) 761 21. The court below erred in not permitting evidence to be offered to show that the judgments were fraudulent. It erred also in not allowing the defendant to give his title in evidence. Id. (lb.) 761 22. The defendant ought also to have been allowed to give evidence that the judgments had not been obtained in conformity with the law which required certain preliminary steps to be taken. are brought up from the courts below; and when it reverses a judgment upon either ground, it gives the judgment which the inferior court ought to have given. Parks v. Turner et al., (39) 883 2. But when a case is brought before this court by a writ of error, it can only review questions of law; and, therefore, where the validity of a verdict of a jury is brought into question, the practice which prevails in the State Courts of Louisiana is inapplicable in the courts of the United States. Id. (lb.) 883 3. Hence, where the jury found a verdict in general terms for the plaintiff in a suit upon a promissory note, without finding the amount due, which the laws and practice of Louisiana require them to do, and the court then gave judgment for the amount of the note, this would have been adjudged to be a cause of reversal of the judgment by the Supreme Court of the State, but cannot be so held by this court. Id. (lb.) 883 4. The sufficiency of the verdict must be judged by the rules of the common law and the statutes of the United States, and not by the laws and practice of Louisiana. The Act of 1824 (4 Stat. at Large, 62) does not include such a case. Id. (Ib.) 883 5. By the common law, although a judgment in such a case might not have been strictly proper, yet under a power of amending the verdict, the judgment can stand, because the plea having been that no consideration was given for the note, and the verdict being for the plaintiff, it necessarily found that the whole amount was due. ld. (lb.) 883 6. The 32d section of the Judiciary Act provides for this case by enjoining upon this court to disregard niceties of form, and so it was decided in 16 Peters, 321. (lb.) 883 7. The Constitution of Louisiana requires the State judges to give reasons for their decisions; but this is not operative upon the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States. On the contrary, their reasons form no part of the record when the case is brought up to this court. Id. Id. (lb.) 883 8. Prior to the revised code of Virginia in 1819, the lien created upon land by a judgment was the same as in England. In both countries the following rules prevailed: 1. That the lien of the judgment resulted entirely from the right of the plaintiff to sue out an elegit, and charge the goods and the moiety of the lands of the debtor. 2. That the election so to charge them by an elegit executed, discharges from liability the body of the defendant and the remaining moiety of the lands. 3. That the capias ad satisfaciendum executed, is, pro tanto, a satisfaction of the judgment which releases proprio vigore any previous lien upon the lands and inhibits all recourse against the goods and chattels or lands of the debtor, with the exceptions of the instances of death whilst charged in execution, or of an escape from prison, or a rescue. Snead v. McCoull, (407) 1043 9. A discharge under the Act of Congress for the relief of persons imprisoned for debt (2 Stat. at Large, 4, sec. 2) did not restore the lien originally created by the judgment, and waived by issuing a ca. sa. Id. (.) 1043 10. In 1819, the State of Virginia revised her code. By a part which went into operation on the 1st of January, 1820, it was enacted that, thereafter the issuance of a ca. sa. should constitute a lien upon lands. Id. (lb.) 1043 11. But as it did not relate to past liens, the purchaser of a lien created under the Revised Code had a good title when compared with a claimant under the lien which existed in 1817, but which had been waived by issuing a capais ad satisfaciendum. Id. (lb.) 1043 12. Where an appeal was taken in a common law case instead of a writ of error, and after the lapse of ten days the plaintiff issued an execution upon his judgment, and the defendant then sued out a writ of error to bring the case up to this court, it was error in the court below to quash the execution and supersede the judgment. Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, (387) 1034 13. The appeal did not remove the case, and the writ of error was sued out too late to stay execution. It is immaterial whether it was a mistake of the party or the court. 14. The question reserved is whether this court has the power to issue a mandamus to the judge below, commanding him to set aside the supersedeas and order the clerk to issue an execution. Id. (lb.) 1034 JURISDICTION-10. 1. Where it appears that the whole case has been certified pro forma, in order to take the opinion of this court, without any actual division in the Circuit Court, the practice is irregular, and the case must be remanded to the Circuit Court to be proceeded in according to law. Webster v. Cooper, (54) 325 2. The decision of this court in the case of Nesmith and others v. Sheldon, & Howard, 41, affirmed. (lb.) 325 Id. 3. By a statute of Pennsylvania, passed in 1836, "assignees for the benefit of creditors and other trustees" were directed to record the assignment, file an inventory of the property conveyed, which should be sworn to, have it appraised, and give bond for the faithful performance of the trust, all of which proceedings were to be had in one of the State courts. Shelby v. Bacon, (56) 326 4. This court was vested with the power of citing the assignees before it, at the instance of a creditor who alleged that the trust was not faithfully executed. Id. (lb.) 326 5. The assignees of the Bank of the United States chartered by Pennsylvania recorded the assign ment as directed, and filed accounts of their receipts and disbursements in the prescribed court, which were sanctioned by that court. Id. (lb.) 326 6. A citizen of the State of Kentucky afterwards filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against these assignees, who pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court. Id. (Ib.) 326 7. The principle is well settled, that where two or more tribunals have a concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter and the parties, a suit commenced in any one of them may be pleaded in abatement to an action for the same cause in any other. ld. (lb.) 326 8. But the proceedings in the State Court cannot be considered as a suit. The statute was not complied with, and even if it had been, the Circuit Court would still have had jurisdiction over the matter. ld. (lb. 326 14. Under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, this court has no jurisdiction over the following ques tion, viz.: "Whether slaves who had been permitted by their master to pass occasionally from Kentucky into Ohio acquired thereby a right to freedom after their return to Kentucky." The laws of Kentucky alone could decide upon the domestic and social condition of the persons domiciled within its territory, except so far as the powers of Strader et al. v. Graham, (82) 337 Id. (Ib.) 337 (lb.) 337 decided adversely to the claim of the Marshal, it is 7. Where the Admiralty Court decreed that a ves- Spear v. Place, (522) 796 Id. Id. (lb.) 796 (lb.) 796 10. The master, therefore, cannot appear for 11. Neither the salvage upon the vessel or cargo, 9. The master could not properly represent Henderson v. Tennessee, (311) 434 JURISDICTION—11. 1. Where a vessel was libeled in the District Court Gruner v. United States, Id. (Ib.) 647 4. Where this error occurs, the practice of this Id. (lb.) 587 Id. (Ib.) 796 Gill v. Oliver's Executors, 1. Where a bank was chartered and its charter re- Miners' Bank v. State of Iowa, 2. The power of review is confined by that section 3. Where the highest court of a state affirmed the cial transaction, was within the prohibition of the Statute. United States v. Bromley (88) 905 6. Under the Act of Congress passed on the 31st of May, 1844 (5 Stat. at Large, 658), directing the final judgments in a circuit court in any civil action brought by the United States for the enforcement of the revenue laws may be reviewed in this court without regard to the sum or value in controversy, this court can exercise jurisdiction. The revenue of the Postoffice Department is a part of the revenue of the government. Id. (lb.) 905 7. The Act of Congress, passed on the 1st May, 1820 (3 Stat. at Large, 568), enacts, "That no land shall be purchased on account of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase." Neilson v. Lagow, (98) 909 8. Where land was conveyed to trustees, for the purpose of paying a debt due to the United States, and the highest court of a state decided against a title set up under that deed, upon the ground that the deed was in violation of the Act of Congress, this court has jurisdiction, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, to review that decision. Id. (lb.) 909 9. Where the grounds of the decision of the Supreme Court of the State are not stated in the record, this court will look into the bill of exceptions taken in the court of original jurisdiction, to see what points were carried up to the Supreme Court, and whether they were necessarily involved in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Id. (Tb.) 909 10. In 1839 a treaty was made between the United States and Mexico, providing for the "adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Mexican Republic." Williams's Trustee v. Oliver, (111) 915 11. Under this treaty a sum of money was awarded to be paid to the members of the Baltimore Mexican Company, who had subscribed money to fit out an expedition against Mexico, under General Mina, in 1816. See the case of Gill v. Oliver's Executors, 11 Howard, 529. Id. (lb.) 915 12. The proceeds of one of the shares of this company were claimed by two parties; one as being the second permanent trustee of the insolvent owner of the share, and the other as being the assignee of the first permanent trustee. Id. (lb.) 915 13. The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided that the plaintiff, viz.: the second permanent trustee, did not take the claim under the insolvent laws of Maryland. Id. (Ib.) 915 14. This decision is not reviewable by this court, under 25th section of the Judiciary Act; and the case is similar to that of Gill v. Oliver's Executors, 11 Howard, 529. Id. (lb.) 915 15. Nor does jurisdiction accrue in this case in consequence of the additional fact that the Legislature of Maryland passed a law curing certain defects in the assignment to Oliver, the validity of which law was drawn into question, as impairing the obligation of a contract; because, if there had been no such law, the decision of the State Court would have been the same. Id. (lb.) 915 16. The former decisions of this court respecting its jurisdiction under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, examined and explained. (lb.) 915 Id. (lb.) 990 24. Where several owners of a cargo filed libels in rem against the vessel for damages done to the goods, and these libels were consolidated by order of the court, which afterwards decreed damages in favor of the libelants, in some cases to more and in some to less than $2,000, those cases where the damages are less that sum must be dismissed, on an appeal to this court, for want of jurisdiction. Rich v. Lambert, (347) 1017 25. Where the highest court of a state decided in favor of a defendant who pleaded his discharge under the bankrupt law of the United States, and the case was brought to this court under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, this court has no jurisdiction. (423) 1050 Linton v. Stanton, 27. Promises alleged to have been made by the bankrupt after his discharge are not the subject of jurisdiction under the 25th section. The decision of a state court upon their effect cannot be reviewed by this court. Id. 1. State courts have a right to decide upon the true running of lines of tracts of land, and this court has no authority to review those decisions under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. Almonester v. Kenton, (1) 21 2. Where the decision was that the true lines of the litigants did not conflict with each other, but the losing party alleged that her adversary's title was void under the correct interpretation of an Act of Congress, this circumstance did not bring the case within the jurisdiction of this court. ld. (lb.) 21 3. Nor is the jurisdiction aided because the State Court issued a perpetual injunction upon the losing party. This was a mere incident to the decree, and arose from the mode of practice in Louisiana, where titles are often quieted in that way. Id. (lb.) 21 17. In order to bring a case within the reviewing 4. Where the defendant pleaded his discharge unpower of this court, as prescribed by the 25th sec-der the Bankrupt Act of 1841 passed by Congress,and tion of the Judiciary Act, it is necessary that the the plea was allowed, the plaintiff cannot bring the record should show that the point, giving jurisdic- case to this court to be reviewed, under the twentytion to this court, was raised and decided in the fifth section of the Judiciary Act. State Court. (261) 130 5. The defendant pleaded a privilege or exemption under a statute of the United States, and the decision was in favor of it. Id. (lb.) 130 6. The case must, therefore, be dismissed, for want of jurisdiction. Grand Gulf Railroad and Banking (165) 938 18. The preceding decisions upon this subject referred to. Hence, where it appears from the record that the decision of the State Court turned upon the construction and not the validity of a state law, and that the question of its validity was not raised, this court has no jurisdiction. Id. (Ib.) 938 19. The 13th and 30th section of the Act of Congress, passed in 1825 (4 Stat. at Large, 105-111), forbid a writing or memorandum from being written on a newspaper, or other printed paper, pamphlet, or magazine, and transmitted by mail. Teal v. Felton, (284) 990 Forsyth v. United States, the revision, by this court, of judgments of the circuit or district courts in criminal cases; and the Act of 1802 (2 Stat. at Large, 156) only embraced cases in which the opinions of the judges were opposed in criminal cases. There is, therefore, no general law giving appellate jurisdiction to this court in such cases. (571) 262 9. But the Act of Congress passed on the 22d of February, 1847 (Sess. Laws, 1847, chap. 17), providing that certain cases might be brought up from the territorial courts of Florida to this court, included all cases, whether of civil or criminal jurisdiction. Id. (lb.) 262 10. Under this Act, this court can revise a judgment of the Superior Court of the District of West Florida in a criminal case, which originated in October, 1845, and was transferred to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida. Id. (lb.) 262 11. Proceeding, therefore, to revise the judgment, this court decides that the jurisdiction of the territorial courts, of which the Superior Court was one, ceased on the erection of the territory into a state, on the 3d of March, 1845. The proceedings before the court in which the indictment was found were, consequently, coram non judice, and void. Id. (lb.) 262 4. But this article did not continue the existence of courts which had been created, as part of the territorial government, by Congress. Id. (lb.) 119 5. In 1845, the Legislature of the State passed an Act for the transfer from the Territorial to the State Courts of all cases except those cognizable by the federal courts; and, in 1847, Congress provided for the transfer of these to the federal courts. Id. (Ib.) 119 6. Therefore, where the territorial court took cognizance, in 1846, of a case of libel, it acted without any jurisdiction. Id. (Ib.) 119 7. The case of Hunt v. Palao (4 Howard, 589) commented on and explained. Id. JURY-11. (Ib.) 119 1. Where persons were indebted to a bank, and gave their promissory note for the amount of the debt, the mère acceptance of the notes by the bank did not necessarily operate as a satisfaction; and whether or not there was an agreement at the time to receive them in satisfaction, or whether the circumstances attending the transaction warranted such an inference, were questions for the jury. Lyman v. United States Bank, (225) 965 2. Before the defendants became indebted to the Bank, the Bank had made a compromise of certain claims, which, amongst others, were the subject of the sale by the Bank and purchase by the defendants. Two of the defendants had knowledge of the conditions of this compromise, and their knowledge must be considered as extending to the other defendants. It was a question for the jury to determine what the defendants purchased. 3. The Act, as revived and re-enacted as aforesaid, was not designed to invest the holders of imperfect titles with new or additional rights, but merely to provide a remedy by which legal, just, and bona fide claims might be established. Id. (Ib.) 74 4. The Treaty of St. Ildefonso, between Spain and the French Republic, and that of Paris, between France and the United States, should be construed as binding on the parties thereto, from the respective dates of those treaties. Id. (Ib.) 74 5. Upon no plausible pretext could it be denied that the Treaty of St. Ildefonso was obligatory upon Spain from the period of her acceptance of the provision made for the Duke of Parma, in pursuance of that Treaty, viz.: on the 21st of March, 1801, or from the date at which she ordered the surrender of the Province of Louisiana to France, viz.: on the 15th of October, 1802. 6. A grant by Morales, the Spanish Governor, issued on the 2d of January, 1804, for lands included within the limits of Louisiana, was void; Spain having parted with her title to that Province to France, by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, on the 1st of October, 1800; and France having ceded the same Province to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of the 30th of September, 1803. Id. (lb.) 74 7. Such a grant could not be protected by that article of the Treaty of Paris which stipulated for the protection of the people of Louisiana in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property; the term "property," in any correct acceptation, being applicable only to possessions or rights founded in justice and good faith, and based upon authority competent to their creation. Id. (Ib.) 74 8. The circumstance, that the Spanish authorities retained possession of portions of Louisiana till the year 1810, did not authorize the issuing of grants for land by those authorities, upon the ground that they constituted a government de facto, Spain having long previously ceded away her right of sovereignty, and her possession subsequently thereto having been ever treated by the United States as wrongful, viz.: after October, 1800. Id. (lb.) 74 10. After the cession by Georgia to the United States, in 1802, of all the territory north of 31° north latitude and west of the Chatahoochee River, Congress passed an Act (2 Stat. at Large.229) confirming certain titles derived from the British or Spanish governments,and appointing commissioners to hear and decide upon such claims, whose decision was declared to be final. (155) 85 La Roche et al. v. Jones et al., 11. In 1812 another Act was passed (2 Stat.at Large, 765) confirming the titles of those who were actual residents on the 27th of October, 1795, and whose |