to it the government and discipline of the university, and the control of its students, is delegated to a board of trustees, and that such control is an executive, and not a legislative, function; that under § 2 of the Constitution of the state all power properly belongs to the board of trustees, and the legislature has no control over it; that as a citizen of the United States and the state of Mississippi, within the jurisdiction of the state, under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, he is entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the pursuit of happiness, and entitled to the equal protection of the law, and that the above act of the legislature and the regulations of the board of trustees of the University of Mississippi, refusing him admission to the university, deprives him of his property, property rights, and liberty, and denies him the equal protection of the law. Complainant then proceeds to allege that the fraternity of which he is a member has for its paramount purpose the enforcement and promotion of good morals, the highest possible attainment and standing in class, good order and discipline in the student body of the different colleges with which it is connected, and that § 2 of the act of the legislature is unreasonable, in that it assumes extraterritorial jurisdiction, in prohibiting any member of any fraternity not connected with the university from receiving any class honors, diplomas, distinctions, etc., conferred by the university, and because it prohibits any student of the university from affiliating with or paying dues to, any chapter whatever, wherever situated, although entirely disconnected with the University.

the university as a student, and prayed, | of the University and all statutes relating further, that upon final hearing the act of the legislature in question be declared unconstitutional, as being in conflict with both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Mississippi, and that the order of the board be declared to be unreasonable, and ultra vires, etc. The application for the injunction sets out the fact that the University of Mississippi was incorporated in 1844, and states many features of the incorporating act, which we deem unnecessary to rehearse here. The complaint then sets out the act of the legislature in full, and alleges that the complainant is now, and has been for several years, a member of what is known as the Kappa Sigma fraternity, and is affiliated and identified with the chapter at Millsaps College; that the Kappa Sigma fraternity is one of the fraternities in the above-recited act. The complaint then sets out the order of the board of trustees, and alleges that in November, 1912, he applied to the chancellor of the university for admission as a student, and that the chancellor presented him with the pledge required to be signed by students desiring to enter the university, and requested him to sign as a prerequisite to admission as a student to the university; that complainant refused to do this, and the chancellor thereupon refused to admit him as a student in the university; and that the refusal was based alone upon the ground that complainant refused to sign the pledge. Complainant then alleges that he has never been a member of, nor has he affiliated with, or paid dues to, any chapter of any so-called Greek letter fraternity organized among the student body of the university. Complainant then alleges that he is affiliated with and pays dues to, the chapter of the Kappa Sigma fraternity at Millsaps College, and alleges that if he is admitted as a student at the university it is not his intention or purpose to encourage the organization, continuance, or maintenance of any Greek letter fraternity in the University of Mississippi, or to affiliate or pay dues to, or in any way support or encourage any such organization at the university, or be connected with any sort of active work, or meeting with any fraternity in the university. He then alleges that the act of the legislature is in conflict with the Constitution of the state of Mississippi and the Constitution of the United States; that it violates § 71 of the Constitution of the state, in that the title is not sufficient; that the act is further violative of §§ 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the state of Mississippi, in that under the charter

This bill was demurred to on many grounds, but we see no occasion to go beyond the first. The first ground of the demurrer challenges the fact that there is any equity on the face of the bill. We think this challenge brings into review, at once, the whole of this case. Counsel for appellee stress the fact that the demurrer admits all the allegations of the bill, and call the court's attention to the allegations wherein the high moral purposes of the order to which complainant belongs is set out, and argues that, whatever the general result may be, this case is bound to be affirmed, because with these admissions an institution cannot drive out of its halls, even before an act of the legislature, an order that is fruitful of so much good as is claimed for the order to which complainant belongs. But let it also be kept in mind that the court takes judicial knowledge of the law, and reads into every alleged com

plaint the law of the land, and where the thing complained of, and against which relief is sought, is a thing which the law prohibits the complainant from doing, the court will not grant relief merely because complainant alleges that, if allowed to do the thing which the law says he must not, a great moral good will be accomplished. The allegation of fact amounts to nothing, when it merely shows that a complainant is seeking to disobey the law, no matter how strong the allegation that a great good will be accomplished if allowed to violate the law. We think this ends any discussion as to any admission of fact made by the de

murrer.

In answer to that portion of the argument made by counsel for appellee that the act is void because the title is bad, we need only cite the case of Jackson v. State, Miss. 59 So. 873, holding that the sufficiency of the title is a legislative, and not a judicial, question.

2

that the trustees have required. If complaint desires to enter the university, all he has to do is to promise obedience to the law of the state, and the doors of the university will be open to him.

But complainant says that by requiring him to sign a pledge to obey the law of the state while he is a student in the educational institutions of the state, and to renounce his allegiance to, and affiliation with, secret societies et other institutions, he is denied a right guaranteed to him by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We fail to see any force in this contention. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was never intended to act as an accomplice to any young man who wanted to take advantage of the gratuitous advantages offered the youths to obtain an education, and yet refuse to obey and submit to the disciplinary regulations enacted by the legis lature for the welfare of the institutions A further contention of appellee is that of learning. The right to attend the educathe act of the legislature violates §§ 1 tional institutions of the state is not a and 2 of the Constitution. We fail to see natural right. It is a gift of civilization, how the act of the legislature violates either a benefaction of the law. If a person seeks section above named. Section 1 of the Con- to become a beneficiary of this gift, he must stitution merely provides for the distribu- submit to such conditions as the law imtion of the powers of government into three poses as a condition precedent to this right. distinct departments, and § 2 prohibits any The act in question is not class legislation. person, or collection of persons, being one It is quite the reverse, and seeks to destroy or belonging to one of these departments the possibility of the existence of any class of government, from exercising any powers at the educational institutions. No state properly belonging to either of the others. or Federal Constitution is violated by this We do not see how either of these sections act in any way. Complainant is not deis invaded by this act. The legislature did prived of any constitutional right, unless nothing but pass a law for the regulation complainant can be said to have a constituof the educational institutions of the state, tional right to breach the discipline of the and why it may not do so is something that school and set at naught the laws of the a reading of the sections of the Constitu- state. If it be true that the board of tion above referred to does not disclose to trustees, or the legislature, have extended us. The trustees are mere instruments to the operation of the rule beyond what would carry out the will of the legislature in seem to be the necessities, they have done regard to the educational institutions of it in order to effectuate the purpose of the the state. Both the institutions and the legislature in prohibiting the existence of trustees are under the absolute control Greek letter fraternities at any of the of the legislature. The legislature has the educational institutions in the state. The undoubted power to pass a law prohibiting trustees, and the legislature, both have the Greek letter fraternities from being or right to say that any student who desires ganized or carried on at any educational to enter the university shall not only institution in the state. The legislature promise not to affiliate with any Greek has the right to say that any student desir-letter fraternity while there, but that he ing to enter any educational institution of the state shall renounce his allegiance to any Greek letter fraternity, while he is a student in the state institution. The law requires the trustees of the educational institutions of the state to see that this act is enforced, and in order to do this they have a right to exact of any student who desires to enter, as a condition precedent to his entry, that he will promise to obey the statute law of the state, and this is all

shall not encourage the organization of any Greek letter fraternity elsewhere, by paying dues, etc., while a member of that institution. If this were not true, there might be organized at the university, although the dues were paid elsewhere, as complete a Greek letter fraternity, save the meetings, as if it were organized at the institution. Young men attending the educational institutions of the state, if allowed to hold their memberships in fraternities at other

council.

Same ordinance — void in part.

ing fire limits within which buildings com2. A provision in an ordinance establishposed of combustible materials cannot be erected, which permits the mayor and council to permit such buildings within the prohibited limits, cannot be eliminated, so as to permit the ordinance to be enforced as an absolute prohibition of such buildings. Constitutional law special privileges permission to erect non-fireproof building.

institutions while attending the state in- within which no building composed of comtitutions, could as effectually carry on their bustible material shall be erected does not fraternity relation as if an organization authorize an ordinance establishing limits existed at the particular place. The legis. within which no such building shall be erectlature knew this, and to make the law effec-ed without permission of the mayor and tive prohibited all affiliation with secret societies while a student at a state institution. In the case of Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 100 Miss. 650, 56 So. 316, the supreme court of this state and of the United States held that the legislature might, in order to make a police regula tion effective, press the act beyond the seeming necessities in order to effectuate its purpose. The case of Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 983, 49 So. 515, is not a parallel case to this. The trustees in that case were not acting under the power conferred upon them by an act of the legislature. They were not trying to break up any secret orders; but the trustees of the public schools, to which a child has a constitutional right to attend between certain ages, undertook to say that after the child had reached its home it should not be controlled by its own parents, but that they would establish rules that would reach into the fireside and control the

child around the hearthstone of its own parents. This court said this could not be done. Many decisions are cited by appellee, but we refuse to follow any decision that would hold this act unconstitutional.

We can see nothing in the act which is violative of any section of the Constitution. Whether the act was a wise one or an unwise one, was a question for the legislature to determine. The legislature is in control of the colleges and universities of the state, and has a right to legislate for their welfare, and to enact measures for their discipline, and to impose the duty upon the trustees of each of these institutions to see that the requirements of the legislature are enforced; and when the legislature has done this, it is not subject to any control by the courts.

The decree of the court below is reversed, the demurrer sustained, and the bill dismissed.

Affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, June 1, 1915, 237 U. S. 589, 59 L. ed. 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720.

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT. (In banc.)

W. B. HAYS, Respt.,

V.

CITY OF POPLAR BLUFF et al., Appts. (Mo., 173 S. W. 676.)

erection of buildings composed of combusti3. A municipal ordinance prohibiting the ble materials within certain limits without permission of the mayor and council is unconstitutional as granting special privileges. Municipal corporations

ordinance

delegation of legislative power. 4. A provision in a municipal ordinance requiring consent of neighboring property owners to the erection of non-fireproof buildings within fire limits is invalid as a delegation of the legislative power of the municipality to such property owners. Injunction

of buildings.

to prevent the destruction

Note. The validity of statutes or ordinances conferring upon local authorities discretion in granting permits to repair wooden buildings within fire limits is discussed in the note to State v. Lawing, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 64. Generally as to the power of a municipality to require permit to construct or repair building within its limits, see note to 1. Statutory power to establish limits Fellows v. Charleston, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 737.

that on April 27, 1908, the defendant city, the ordinance is void for lack of power unby its city council, granted plaintiff permis- | der the city charter to pass it; because the sion to erect a building of wood and iron on the west half of lot 61 in said city, of which he was seised as owner; that on the 20th day of September, 1909, the mayor and council granted him the further permission to construct on said building, which had then been erected, an iron roof, which he constructed in accordance with such permission. The plaintiff's right to erect and maintain the building under the ordinances pleaded, as well as the acquiescence of the city therein, and its continued and present use for business purposes by plaintiff and his tenants, are fully and particularly set forth, and the petition proceeds as follows: "Plaintiff, however, states that, notwithstanding all of the matters hereinbefore pleaded and set forth, the said city of Poplar Bluff, by and through its duly elected, qualified, and acting mayor and city council, on the 21st day of February, 1910, caused to be passed and enacted, the following ordinance, to wit:

"Ordinance No. 240. Bill No. 264. An ordinance declaring the building located on the west half of lot 61 of the original town (now city) of Poplar Bluff, Missouri, to be a nuisance, and ordering its abatement and removal.

"Be it ordained by the city council of the city of Poplar Bluff, Missouri, as follows:

city is estopped to deny the plaintiff's right to maintain the building; because it is in violation of that provision of § 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, which forbids the states to pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; also of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and of §§ 15, 20, 21 and 30 of article 2, and § 53 of article 4, of the Constitution of the state of Missouri. That the building is not constructed of combustible material, nor is it a nuisance, as stated in the ordinance quoted, but, although the ordinance is void, the city and defendant Luther, its street commissioner, are threatening and preparing, under its provisions, to not only tear down said building and destroy said building, but to arrest and prosecute plaintiff under the provisions of the third section thereof, all to his irreparable damage and injury, for which he has no adequate remedy at law. That the building is worth $10,000, and is occupied by tenants of plaintiff engaged therein in lawful and proper lines of business. The prayer is as follows: "Wherefore, plaintiff prays that a writ of injunction issue from this court enjoining and restraining said city of Poplar Bluff and its codefendant, George Luther, the duly appointed, qualified, and acting street commissioner of said city, and all other officers, agents, and employees of said city, from further proceedings to enforce the provisions of said ordinance No. 240 hereinbefore set forth, and from abating, tearing down, removing, or destroying plaintiff's building herein before described, and from trespassing upon or in any wise interfering with plaintiff's enjoyment of his said

"Section 1. That the building located on the west half of lot 61 of the original town (now city) of Poplar Bluff, in Butler county, Missouri, be and the same is hereby condemned and ordered abated and removed within ninety days after the service of notice of the passage of this ordinance on the owner, or agent, in charge of said building, for the reason that said building is con-premises, and from interfering in any manstructed of combustible material and therefore a nuisance, and was built in violation of §§ 313, 314, and 315 of the revised ordinances of the city of Poplar Bluff, of the revision of 1898, and ordinance No. 24.

"Section 2. That if said building shall not be abated and removed within the time provided in this ordinance the street commissioner of the city of Poplar Bluff is hereby ordered and directed to abate and remove said building, after the lapse of the time provided in this ordinance.

"Section 3. That the owners, or agent in charge of said building, failing to abate | and remove said building within the time specified by this ordinance, after notice herein provided for, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than $5 nor more than $100 for each of fense.'"

It then alleges with particularity that

ner with the possession or title of plaintiff of, in, or to said lot and tract of land and the building situate thereon, and for such other and further relief as to the court shall seem meet and just."

A preliminary restraining order. was granted, and the cause progressed so that on November 3d the defendants filed an amended answer denying each and every allegation not therein expressly admitted, and stating that defendant city is a city of the third class, and as such on March 6, 1899, passed a revision of its ordinances containing the following sections, also set out in the petition:

"Section 313. All that part of the city of Poplar Bluff comprised within the following described boundaries shall be known as the fire limits of said city: Beginning at the northeast corner of lot 21, in the city of Poplar Bluff, Missouri, running thence