censed to practise. It is the rule for such acts to preserve the status of those lawfully engaged in the pursuit regulated. As said by the United States Supreme Court: "The 14th Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning, and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time." Sperry & H. Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U. S. 502, 55 L. ed. 561, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490.

That there is no objection on constitutional ground to such exceptions has many times been decided. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987. 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644;

253, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137. There is nothing discriminatory in the said provision. All persons in the same class, i. e., those licensed and registered in this state on a given date, are treated alike.

In determining whether statutory requirements are arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory, it must be borne in mind that the choice of measures is for the legislature, who are presumed to have investigated the subject and to have acted with reason, not from caprice. Legislation passed in the exercise of the police power must be reasonable in the sense that it must be based on reason as distinct from being wholly arbitrary or capricious; but when the legislature has power to legislate on a subject, the courts may only look into its enactment far enough to see whether it is in any view adapted to the end intended. If it is, the court must give it effect, however unwise they may regard it, or however much they might, if given the choice, prefer some other measure as more fit and appropriate.

Coming, then, to the particular provisions of the act in question, the requirement as to preliminary and professional education is not, in and of itself, either arbitrary or unreasonable. A preliminary education equivalent to a four-year high-school course registered by the regents and a professional education in a registered dental or medical school, or both, are certainly appropriate to fit one to pursue the calling of dentistry, and with the wisdom of that requirement we have nothing to do.

The appellant has no grievance from the provision that those duly licensed and registered as dentists in this state prior to the

But it is said that the act prefers aliens to citizens of other states. As a matter of fact the contrary is the case. A person holding a diploma or license to practise dentistry in some foreign country, and granted by some registered authority, and having the prescribed preliminary education, may be admitted to examination pursuant to said § 166, whereas under § 168, a person having the prescribed preliminary and professional education, who holds a license to practise dentistry in any other of the United States, granted by a state board of dental examiners, indorsed by the Dental Society of the State of New York, may be licensed on the recommendation of the dental examiners without any examination at all.

It may seem hard that the defendant, who has practised dentistry for many years in other states, cannot be licensed here, or even permitted to take an examination to test his qualifications, until he first acquires the requisite preliminary and professional education; but it is difficult, if not impossible, to make a classification which will not in particular instances seem unjust. All in the same case as the defendant are treated alike. His fundamental error consists in the assumption that a license to practise dentistry in one state confers the like right in all other states, whereas such license is recognized, if at all, only on principles of comity. When the appellant came into this state he fell into the class of those who had never been licensed, unless the legislature saw fit to recognize the previous experience of those in the like case.

We find nothing in the statute which can fairly be said to discriminate in any way against the citizens of other states.

The

privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each state in the several states by the Federal Constitution are the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens in the latter states, and are not the special privileges enjoyed by the citizens in their own states. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562. As a citizen of the United States, the defendant is not privileged to practise dentistry in this state without a license so to do.

Of the many cases cited by the appellant, the two bearing the most resemblance to this case are State v. Hinman, 65 N. H. 103, 23 Am. St. Rep. 22, 18 Atl. 194, and State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, 5 L.R.A. 709, 18 Atl. 878. In those cases a statute of the state of New Hampshire, regulating the practice of dentistry and medicine, was held invalid because of a provision excepting those who had resided and practised their profession in the town or city of their present address during all the time since January 1, 1875,—a test which was held to be wholly arbitrary, and one having no reference to skill, learning, or fitness. The learned counsel for the appellant, on oral argument, placed great reliance on the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 58 L. ed. 1129, L.R.A. 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681. In that case a statute of the state of Texas prohibiting any person from acting as a conductor on a railroad train without having for two years prior thereto worked as a brakeman or a conductor of a freight train, and prescribing no other qualifications, was held to be invalid for arbitrarily excluding experienced and competent men from obtaining employment as conductors, and for arbitrarily limiting the class who could secure such employment to those who had served two years as a brakeman or a conductor on a freight train, regardless of their fitness.

It is urged that the provision of § 168 for licensing without examination those who hold a license to practise dentistry in any other state, granted by a state board of dental examiners, indorsed by the Dental Society of the State of New York, is void for granting to a private corporation, association, or individual an "exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise" in violation of article 3, § 18, of the state Constitution. In the first place, the act is general and is not a private or local bill. In the next place, the statute should be construed as imposing a duty, rather than as conferring a privilege, upon the dental society. It was the purpose of the statute to prescribe a standard and to provide methods to determine whether the qualifications of candidates

came up to that standard. The only exception made is in favor of those already licensed in this state. All others must have the required preliminary and professional education, or its equivalent, and. unless licensed in some other state, must pass an examination. A diploma or license granted by some registered authority in a foreign country was evidently deemed the equivalent of a dental degree from a registered dental school in this country, but the possessor is required to show that he has the requisite preliminary education and to pass an examination. Licenses granted by boards of examiners in other states are recognized as sufficient evidence of the licensees' qualifications to be licensed in this state without examination, provided as high a standard is exacted in such other states as in this; in other words, provided the preliminary and professional education of such licensees has not been less than that required in this state. The power to determine the standard exacted in other states had to be lodged in some body, board, or officer. The act is not to be condemned on the assumption that the dental society will selfishly exercise the power conferred upon it to exclude eligible licensees of other states from practising in this. Of course, that power is not to be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. It is certainly no greater than that conferred for many years in this state on county medical societies. See People ex rel. Dunnel v. Medical Soc. 3 Wend. 426.

It is unnecessary to determine whether the provision that fines, penalties, and forfeitures be paid to the State Dental Society is valid, because the appellant is in no way concerned with that question.

The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

Statement by Newman, J.: This was an action for an injunction brought by defendant in error on the 28th day of July, 1913, in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county. He sought to enjoin the plaintiff in error, Carrie E. Hunt, and one A. T. Sebek, a contractor, from any and all further work toward the construction of a two-family or double house on the real estate of said Carrie E. Hunt. He based his right of action on a certain clause of restriction contained in the deed of purchase of the real estate owned by said Carrie E. Hunt. The matter was heard in the court of common pleas on the motion of Carrie E. Hunt to dissolve a restraining order theretofore allowed, and was submitted to the court upon the petition, the answer of Carrie E. Hunt, the reply thereto, and an agreed statement of facts. The motion to dissolve was sustained, an injunction denied, and the petition dismissed at the costs of defendant in error. Defendant in error thereupon appealed the case to the court of appeals, and it was there heard upon the pleadings, the evidence, and agreed statement of facts. It appears from the agreed statement of facts that the defendant in error, Francis Held, was the owner of the easterly 25 feet of sublot 160 and the westerly 10 feet of sublot 161 in John W. Taylor & Company's Douglas Park subdivision, and that plaintiff in error, Carrie E. Hunt, was the owner of the easterly 30 feet of sublot 161 and the westerly 5 feet of sublot 162 in said subdivision; that both Francis Held and Carrie E. Hunt received their conveyances directly from the allotment company, and in each of the deeds there was the following covenant of restriction: "This property is sold for residence purposes only." It further appears that said plaintiff in error, Carrie E. Hunt, would construct on her

Rose v. Kern, 49 Ohio St. 213, 15 L.R.A. 160, 30 N. E. 267; Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 Ill. 344, 51 L.R.A. 310, 57 N. E. 1051; American Unitarian Asso. v. Minot, 185 Mass. 589, 71 N. E. 551; James v. Irvine, 141 Mich. 376, 104 N. W. 631; Jones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 106 Pac. 166; 13 Cyc. 687; Hays v. St. Paul, M. E. Church, 196 Ill. 633, 63 N. E. 1040; Walker v. Renner, 60 N. J. Eq. 493, 46 Atl. 626; Fortesque v. Carroll, 76 N. J. Eq. 583, 75 Atl. 923, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 79; Brown v. National Bank, 44 Ohio St. 273, 6 N. E. 648; Re Welsh, 175 Mass. 68, 55 N. E. 1043; Schadt v. Brill, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 728, note; McMurtry v. Phillips Invest. Co. 103 Ky. 308, 40 L.R.A. 489, 45 S. W. 96; Tillotson v. Gregory, 151 Mich. 132, 114 N. W. 1025; McDonald v. Spang, 55 Misc. 332, 105 N. Y Supp. 617; Sonn v. Heilberg, 38 App. Div 515, 56 N. Y. Supp. 341.

The practical construction placed upon the restriction by the parties thereto absolutely compels the construction above contended for.

Elliott, Contr. § 1537; James v. Irvine, 141 Mich. 376, 104 N. W. 631; District of Columbia v. Gallaher, 124 U. S. 505, 31 L. ed. 526, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; 4 Wigmore, Ev. § 2462, pp. 3479, 3492; Beach, Contr. § 721; Kling v. Bordner, 65 Ohio St. 86, 61 N. E. 148; Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 81 Fed. 911; Gillespie v. Iseman, 210 Pa. 1, 59 Atl. 266; Kinney v. Hamilton County, 8 Ohio C. C. 433.

The common grantor of plaintiff and defendant lost the right to enforce this restriction prior to the time when it deeded to plaintiff. Plaintiff acquired no greater rights than its grantor.

Kerr, Inj. 2d ed. 320; Chelsea Land & Improv. Co. v. Adams, 71 N. J. Eq. 771, 66 Atl. 180, 14 Ann. Cas. 758; Peek v. Matthews, L. R. 3 Eq. 515, 16 L. T. N. S. 991, 15 Week. Rep. 689; Roper v. Williams, Turn. & R. 17, 23 Revised Rep. 169; 16

Cyc. 1791; Korn v. Campbell, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 15; Bowen v. Smith, 76 N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675.

The present character of the neighborhood is such that the enforcement of the covenant would be of no value to plaintiff, and he is therefore not entitled to equitable relief.

Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 705, 88 N. E. 322; Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 41 Am. Rep. 365; Russell v. Harpel, 20 Ohio C. C. 127; Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 32 Am. St. Rep. 476, 31 N. E. 691; 11 Cyc. 1077.

Mr. A. C. Waid, for defendant in error: A double or two-family house is a violation of a clause in a conveyance restrict ing the use of the property conveyed to residence purposes only.

Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 15 L.R.A. 160, 30 N. E. 267; Burton v. Stapely, 4 Ohio N. P. N. S. 65, 74 Ohio St. 461, 78 N. E. 1120; Boehme v. Bertram, 8 Ohio C. C. Unrep. Op. 388; Round Lake Asso. v. Kellogg, 141 N. Y. 348, 36 N. E. 326; Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 726, 139 N. W. 878; Skillman v. Smatheurst, 57 N. J. Eq. 1, 40 Atl. 856; Koch v. Gorruflo, 77 N. J. Eq. 172, 140 Am. St. Rep. 552, 75 Atl. 767.

Plaintiff has not lost the right to enforce the restriction either through his own acts or through the acts of the common grantor. Lattimer v. Livermore, 72 N. Y. 174; Linwood Park Co. v. Van Dusen, 63 Ohio St. 183, 58 N. E. 576; Barton v. Slifer, 72 N. J. Eq. 812, 66 Atl. 899; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 22 L.R.A. 182, 34 N. E. 765; Levy v. Halcyon Casino Hotel Co. 45 Misc. 289, 92 N. Y. Supp. 231; McDonald v. Spang, 55 Misc. 332, 105 N. Y. Supp. 617; DuBois v. Darling, 12 Jones & S. 436; Knight v. Simmonds [1896] 2 Ch. 294, 65 L. J. Ch. N. S. 583, 74 L. T. N. S. 563, 44 Week. Rep. 580; Osborne v. Bradley [1903] 2 Ch. 446, 89 L. T. N. S. 11, 73 L. J. Ch. N. S. 49; Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327, 34 L.R.A. 227, 34 Atl. 663; Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 705, 88 N. E. 322; Bowen v. Smith, 76 N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675; Tripp v. O'Brien, 57 Ill. App. 407; Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N. E. 936; McGuire v. Caskey, 62 Ohio St. 419, 57 N. E. 53; Ashland v. Greiner, 58 Ohio St. 67, 50 N. E. 99; Burton v. Stapely, 4 Ohio N. P. N. S. 65, 74 Ohio St. 461, 78 N. E. 1120; Boehme v. Bertram, 8 Ohio C. C. Unrep. Op. 388; Sanford v. Keer, 80 N. J. Eq. 240, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1090, 83 Atl. 225; Bigelow, Estoppel, p. 720; Johnson Co. v. Covats, 12 Ohio C. D. 166.

Newman, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

In addition to the claim that the erection of a double or two-family house is not in violation of the clause of restriction contained in her deed, plaintiff in error contended that, if the erection of such a house did violate the restriction, it has been lost to defendant in error through his own acts or those of the common grantor. These acts are pleaded in the answer and are referred to at length in the agreed statement of facts. In arriving at a decision of this case, however, we have found it necessary to consider only the meaning of the clause of restriction contained in the deed.

It is the claim of counsel for defendant

in error that in the erection of a double or two-family house on her property plaintiff

in error would violate the restriction clause in her deed, and that, when the words, "this property is sold for residence purposes only," were inserted in the deeds, the sellers of the property clearly intended that single houses only should be built thereon, idea of a number of residences under the and that the language used excluded the same roof or in the same house. They concede that the use of a double or two-family house is a use for residence purposes in one sense, but that it is not a use for residence purposes "only," and say that therein lies the distinction. We are unable to see the distinction they would make. The word "only" in our opinion does not change the meaning of the words "residence purposes."

If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the words employed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the free use of the property by plaintiff in error for any lawful purpose and against restrictions, for it is a well-settled rule that, in construing deeds and instruments containing restrictions and prohibitions as to the use of property conveyed, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the free use thereof for lawful purposes in the hands of the owners of the fee. Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 Ill. 344, 51 L.R.A. 310, 57 N. E. 1051. And again defendant in error acquired no greater rights under the restriction clause than his grantor had, and the rule that a deed is to be construed most strongly against the grantor applies here.

But is there any doubt as to the meaning of the words? The word "residence," as we view it, is equivalent to "residential" and was used in contradistinction to "business." If a building is used as a place of abode and no business carried on, it would be used for residence purposes only, whether occupied by one family or a number of families. Counsel say that the words were intended to describe a type of building. We