the evidence are substantially as follows: The defendant is a wholesale dealer in furniture. On the afternoon of October 19, 1909, a driver in its employ was driving at a walk along Twentieth street in Omaha with two covered furniture wagons, connected together, on his way to the railroad station. The first wagon, to which three horses were attached, was heavily loaded with outgoing furniture; the other was empty and was to be loaded with incoming furniture. Both wagons were of the same size and character. The pole or tongue of the rear wagon was tied to the axle of the front one. An eye witness testified that as the wagons came past his drug store, near which he was standing, Philip Zigman, the deceased, a little boy between four and five years old, with another little boy of about the same age, were lying across the pole of the second wagon with their backs toward him and their faces down. The driver was seated in front of the first wagon with his view to the rear obstructed by the load of furniture. The witness stood about 5 feet from the wagons as they passed. Within a minute afterwards he was told by two school boys that the deceased, who was then sit ting upon the curbing about 60 or 65 feet away, had been run over. The boy had been run over across the body, and he died in a very few minutes. The street is usually busy at that point with heavy traffic. Street cars pass every 10 minutes, but few automobiles use it. The Zigman home is a block west from where the accident happened.

The driver testified that the tongue was about 2 feet from the ground; that there were about 8 feet between the box part of the front wagon and that of the rear one; that there was no one on the rear wagon; that this was the customary way of hauling the empty wagons; that he did not see any boys as he passed the drug store; and that he knew nothing about the accident until he was called back to the spot where it happened. The mother testified that the boy went to the drug store to buy some candy, and that it was only five minutes from the time he left the house until he was brought back dead.

At the conclusion of the evidence for plaintiff, defendant moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor for the reasons that it is not shown that defendant was guilty of any negligence in using the streets or in the manner of using the wagons; and that the injury to the child was due to the carelessness of the parent and plaintiff. The motion was overruled, and the questions as to the negligence of the defendant in connecting the wagons, and in using them on the street as connected, was sub

mitted to the jury under instructions based upon the doctrine of the "Turntable Cases." Defendant makes the same contention here as in the district court. The crucial question is whether the coupling of the wagons together in the manner described, and driving the team on the street without a guard or outlook on or about the rear wagon in order to warn children who might attempt to climb thereon, can be said, as a matter of law, not to constitute negligence. The jury has found that the act was negligent. Unless, when legal principles are applied to the facts presented, the defendant must be held to have been acting within its legal rights and was without fault, the verdict must stand, because otherwise the question was for the jury. The plaintiff relies upon the doctrine of Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, 4 Perry & D. 672, 10 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 73, 5 Jur. 797, that one who negligently leaves dangerous machinery or appliances of such a nature as to be attractive to children, within their reach, unguarded, or in such a situation that it may be easily put in motion by children, may, if injury to a child results, be guilty of actionable negligence. This is the rule of the "turntable cases" and is the law in this state. Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. ed. 745; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 59 L.R.A. 920, 12 Am. Neg. Rep. 300, 91 N. W. 880. Can this principle be applied to the passage of vehicles along the streets of a city? In the diversity of vehicles which traverse the streets there may be many forms attractive to children, and in many instances the attractive part of the vehicle is not within the view of the driver. Omnibuses are often used which are entered by steps at the rear with no conductor or guard, and the door to which is held closed by a cord or strap, reaching to the driver's seat. Would a child who climbed upon the rear steps while the omnibus was passing along the streets of a city be entitled to recover for injuries sustained by falling off the steps? Hebard v. Mabie, 98 Ill. App. 543, holds to the contrary, even in a case where the driver knew the child was there. not uncommon to see automobiles with trunk platforms or tire holders projecting from the rear, upon which a child might easily climb and be beyond the view of the driver. Could negligence be imputed to the owner of the machine if an accident occurred by reason of a child having seated himself upon the rear projection without the driver's knowledge? Wagons of certain types are constructed so that children can easily climb upon them. Those used for hauling stone, or to remove growing trees, or to carry iron girders, are of this class.

It is

Is

is infringed by requiring him, upon seeking a license in another state, to comply with educational qualifications much higher than were required when he first began to practise.

Constitutional law-conferring special privilege on corporation.

4. A provision authorizing the granting of a license to practise dentistry to persons holding a license in other states, granted by a state board of dental examiners indorsed by the dental society of the state" passing the statute, is not unconstitutional i as granting an exclusive privilege or frauchise to a private corporation, since the grant is not a privilege, but a duty to de

A statute prohibiting the practice of dentistry without having obtained a certificate of registration as a licensed dentist from the state board of dental examiners does not violate the due process of law provision of either the state or Federal Constitution as to one who had practised dentistry in another state, where he was a registered dentist, and who desired to practise in this state without complying with the statute of the state providing for the registration and licensing of dentists in the state, as the practice of his profession in a state where he was duly registered gave him no vested right to practise his profession in another state without complying with its laws. State v. Crombie, 107 Minn. 171, 119 N. W. 660.

To the same effect is Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So. 809, which involved a statute regulating the practice of medicine.

A statute requiring all persons to pass a satisfactory examination as to their qualifications to practise dentistry before being permitted to practise dentistry in the state is not obnoxious to the provisions of the state or Federal Constitutions against depriving persons of property without due process of law as to one practising before the passage of the statute, or as to one practising in another state, who desires to practise in this state. State ex rel. Grant v. Rosenkrans, 30 R. I. 374, 75 Atl. 491, 19 Ann. Cas. 824.

Nor is such statute obnoxious to the provision of the Federal Constitution which declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, and that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, because it requires one who is duly licensed and registered to practise in other states to submit to an examination as to his qualifications to practise dentistry before he is permitted to practise in the state. Ibid.

Nor is such statute obnoxious to the provisions of the Federal Constitution requiring full faith and credit to be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings in every other state, assuming

termine the standard exacted by other states for dental licenses.

A

(November 10, 1914.)

PPEAL by defendant from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, affirming a judg ment of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, convicting him of prac tising dentistry without a license, in viola tion of law. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Solomon Hanford, with Mr. Max J. Kohler, for appellant:

The statute is unconstitutional and void, that the certificates of registration granted by the dentistry boards of other states are within the class of public records comprehended by the Constitution, since the statute does not prevent the certificates from being accepted in the state as evidence that the person to whom they were granted is duly registered in the state in which they were issued, which is all that is required to be given such records; as no state has such extraterritorial jurisdiction that it can, by its certificate, confer upon the person named therein the right to practise his profession in another state. Ibid.

A statute regulating the practice of dentistry, declaring it unlawful to practise without having a diploma from some reputable school of dentistry, which excepts from its requirements persons engaged in practice within the state at the time of the passage of the statute, does not violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution as to equal privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states and citizens of the United States. State v. Creditor, 44 Kan. 565, 21 Am. St. Rep. 306, 24 Pac. 346. Likewise in State V. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 6 L.R.A. 119, 43 N. W. 789, a statute containing a similar provision was upheld. See also the numerous cases presented in note in 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 153, sustaining this view in case of statutes involving regulations of practice of medicine and surgery.

But in State v. Hinman, 65 N. H. 103, 23 Am. St. Rep. 22, 18 Atl. 194, it was held that a statute prohibiting a person from practising dentistry unless he has received a dental degree from some school authorized to confer the same, or a license from the New Hampshire Dental Society, which excepted from its provisions persons who had practised their profession in the place of their present residence for a certain time, and also persons residing out of the state, who are called on to attend patients within it, is unconstitutional because it discriminates between persons engaged in the same business or profession "by an arbitrary test, having no reference to skill, learning, or fitness for the practice of the_profession." To the same effect is State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, 5 L.R.A. 709, 18 Atl. 878 (physician). A. L. R.

tions, because the underlying classification is illegal and unreasonable.

Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 155, 41 L. ed. 666, 668, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 102115, 46 L. ed. 92, 106-111, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 552-565, 46 L. ed. 679, 686-692, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 417, 54 L. ed. 536, 541, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; People ex rel. Farrington v. Mensching, 187 N. Y. 8, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 625, 79 N. E. 884, 10 Ann. Cas. 101; People ex rel. Wineburgh Adv. Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 735, 88 N. E. 17; People ex rel. Duryea v. Wilber, 198 N. Y. 1, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 357, 90 N. E. 1140, 19 Ann. Cas. 626; Lappin v. District of Columbia, 22 App. D. C. 68; State v. Hinman, 65 N. H. 103, 23 Am. St. Rep. 22, 18 Atl. 194; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610, 90 N. W. 1058; People v. Warren, 13 Misc. 615, 34 N. Y. Supp. 942; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 52 L.R.A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 716.

The statute is also unconstitutional because it contravenes § 2 of article IV. of the Federal Constitution, providing that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states," and the 14th Amendment, providing that no "state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."

People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 528, 90 N. E. 451, 18 Ann. Cas. 474; State v. Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289, 55 L.R.A. 791, 87 Am. St. Rep. 605, 62 N. E. 325; State ex rel. Gard v. Harmon, 23 Ohio C. C. 292; Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562; Com. v. Shaleen, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 1; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 52 L.R.A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 716; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 77, 21 L. ed. 394, 409; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 249, 252, 43 L. ed. 432, 436, 437, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180, 19 L. ed. 357, 360; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 113, 114, 33 L. ed. 538, 541, 542, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 300, 44 L. ed. 1072, 1076, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935.

The acts involved are unconstitutional as against defendant, a licensed dentist from another state, because of the powers con

Fox v. Mohawk & H. River Humane Soc. 165 N. Y. 517, 51 L.R.A. 681, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767, 59 N. E. 353; Mahon v. Board of Education, 171 N. Y. 263, 89 Am. St. Rep. 810, 63 N. E. 1107; New York County Medical Asso. v. New York, 32 Misc. 116, 65 N. Y. Supp. 531; People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 528, 90 N. E. 451, 18 Ann. Cas. 474; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 64, 49 L. ed. 937, 944, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133.

Moreover, the statute is also violative of the state and Federal constitutional provisions against deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law, because arbitrary, undefined power to withhold "indorsement of licenses" is conferred on the state dental society.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; State ex rel. Baldwin v. Prendergast, 8 Ohio C. C. 401, 6 Ohio C. D. 807; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Ex parte Hollis, 82 S. C. 230, 64 S. E. 232; State Dental Examiners v. People, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201; Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 47 L.R.A. 802, 75 Am. St. Rep. 103, 55 N. E. 663, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 108; Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick. 353; Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 587, 52 L.R.A. 287, 79 Am. St. Rep. 238, 58 N. E. 616.

The New York dental act is unconstitutional as against defendant under the "due process of law" provisions of the state and Federal Constitutions, because unreasonable and unduly complicated.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 L. ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 50 L. ed. 204, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206; Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 350, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 338, 75 N. E. 404, 3 Ann. Cas. 263; People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 528, 90 N. E. 451, 18 Ann. Cas. 474; Com. v. Shaleen, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 1; State v. Walker, 48 Wash. 8, 92 Pac. 775, 15 Ann. Cas. 257; Harmon v. State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 58 L.R.A. 618, 64 N. E. 117; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 255, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610, 90 N. W. 1058; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 6 L.R.A. 119, 43 N. W. 789; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W. 888; State v. Hinman, 65 N. H. 103, 23 Am. St Rep. 22, 18 Atl. 194; State v. Gravett. 65 Ohio St. 289, 55 L.R.A. 791, 87 Am. St. Rep. 605, 62 N. E. 325; State v. Brown, 37 Wash.