478; Re Hughes, 95 N. Y. 55; Moses v. | N. E. 623; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. Hart, 25 Gratt. 795; Harvey v. Richards, 189, 47 L. ed. 439, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; 1 Mason, 381, Fed. Cas. No. 6,184; Apple's Re Dingman, 66 App. Div. 228, 72 N. Y. Estate, 66 Cal. 432, 6 Pac. 9; Re Joyslin, Supp. 694; Re Green, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 76 Vt. 88, 56 Atl. 281; Re Weaver, 110 N. E. 292; Re James, 144 N. Y. 10, 38 Iowa, 328, 81 N. W. 603; Channel v. Capen, N. E. 961; Re Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1, 34 46 Ill. App. 234; Re Cummings, 63 Misc. L.R.A. 238, 55 Am. St. Rep. 632, 44 N. E. 621, 118 N. Y. Supp. 684; Overby v. Gor-707; Dammert v. Osborn, 141 N. Y. 564, don, 177 U. S. 214, 44 L. ed. 741, 20 Sup. 35 N. E. 1088; Re Hull, 111 App. Div. 322; Ct. Rep. 603; Keeney v. New York, 222 97 N. Y. Supp. 701; People v. Griffith, 245 U. S. 525, 56 L. ed. 299, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313; Billings v. People, 1139, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; Pennoyer v. 189 Ill. 472, 59 L.R.A. 807, 59 N. E. 798; Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 722, 24 L. ed. 565, 568. Re Cummings, 142 App. Div. 377, 127 N. Y. The order below fails to give due faith Supp. 109. and credit to the decree of distribution of the superior court of Los Angeles.

The state of Illinois cannot be precluded from taxing the succession to the personal property of its citizens when such property is located in a foreign state. The domicil

Shaw, 175 Mass. 59, 78 Am. St. Rep. 475, 55 N. E. 623; Apple's Estate, 66 Cal. 432,

Crew v. Pratt, 118 Cal. 139, 51 Pac. 38; St. Mary's Hospital v. Perry, 152 Cal. 338, 92 Pac. 864; Humphrey v. Protestant Epis-governs the principal succession. copal Church, 154 Cal. 170, 97 Pac. 187; Re Cummings, supra; Frothingham v. Childs v. De Laveaga, 150 Cal. 281, 89 Pac. 82; Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 87 Am. St. Rep. 90, 66 Pac. 971; Re Cummings, 63 Misc. 621, 118 N. Y. Supp. 684; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43, 52 L. ed. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1.

The attempted renunciation of the will by the widow and her attack on the antenuptial agreement, which were abandoned and withdrawn, leave her subject only to tax on the provision made by the will of the testator.

Re Graves, 242 Ill. 212, 89 N. E. 978; Re Cook, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991; Baxter v. The Treasurer, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N. E. 854; People v. Cameron, 140 App. Div. 76, 124 N. Y. Supp. 949; Barth v. Lines, 118 Ill. 374, 59 Am. Rep. 374, 7 N. E. 679; Kroell v. Kroell, 219 Ill. 105, 76 N. E. 63, 4 Ann. Cas. 801; People v. Field, 248 Ill. 147, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 230, 93 N. E. 721; Ward v. Ward, 134 Ill. 421, 25 N. E. 1012; Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 197 Ill. 144, 64 N. E. 267; Scheible v. Rinck, 195 Ill. 636, 63 N. E. 497; Ward v. Ward, 120 Ill. 118; Lurie v. Radnitzer, 166 Ill. 609, 57 Am. St. Rep. 157, 46 N. E. 1116; Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 Pac.

99.

Messrs. W. H. Stead, Attorney General, and Walter K. Lincoln, for appellee:

The law of the domicil of a decedent governs the distribution of and succession to all personal property owned by him at death, regardless of where the property was located.

Russell v. Madden, 95 Ill. 485; Young v. Wittenmyre, 123 Ill. 303, 14 N. E. 869; Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350; Re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 18 L.R.A. 709, 32 N. E. 1096; Jennison v. Hapgood, 10 Pick. 77; Ramsay v. Ramsay, 196 Ill. 179, 63 N. E. 618; Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59, 78 Am. St. Rep. 475, 55

Pac. 7; Hopkins's Appeal, 77 Conn. 644, 60 Atl. 657; Re Hartman, 70 N. J. Eq. 664, 62 Atl. 560; Miller's Estate, 182 Pa. 157, 37 Atl. 1000; Re Short, 16 Pa. 63; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294, 3 L.R.A. 372, 17 Atl. 82; Kent, Com. 429; Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 87 Am. St. Rep. 90, 66 Pac. 971; Collins v. Maude, 144 Cal. 289, 77 Pac. 245.

Maud A. Robinson, widow, succeeded to the legal title of one half of decedent's estate, less the debts, as of the date of said decedent's death. The source of her title is fixed by her renunciation of the will and the cancelation of the antenuptial agreement. Her succession to one half of decedent's property is taxable as of decedent's death.

Re Graves, 242 III. 212, 89 N. E. 978; Billings v. People, 189 Ill. 472, 59 L.R.A. 807, 59 N. E. 798; Friederich v. Wombacher, 204 Ill. 72, 68 N. E. 459; Gullett v. Farley, 164 Ill. 566, 45 N. E. 972; Lessley v. Lessley, 44 Ill. 527; National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 Ill. 584, 95 N. E. 973, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 430.

The renunciation of the widow was not "withdrawn" in law. The state of Illinois was a stranger to the administration proceedings, and its right to a tax as of the date of decedent's death was not affected by the so-called "withdrawal of renunciation."

Coles v. Terrell, 162 Ill. 167, 44 N. E. 391; Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386; Ashlock v. Ashlock, 52 Iowa, 319, 1 N. W. 594, 3 N. W. 131; Scheible v. Rinck, 195 Ill. 636, 63 N. E. 497; Re Cook, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991; Frank's Estate, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 662.

The contract of February 9, 1906, as confirmed by the decree of April 6, 1906,

canceled and obliterated the antenuptial the widow withdrew her renunciation of agreement, and created a new contract be- the will. tween the widow and the James C. King Home for Old Men, residuary legatee.

James C. King died seised of certain property consisting of stocks and bonds of non-Illinois corporations, which were at that time lying in a safety deposit box in Los Angeles, California, amounting in value to something over $600,000. He also had a bank deposit of $16,140 in Los Angeles. His entire estate, real and personal, including the personal property in California, amounted approximately to $4,100,000. In February, 1906, an administrator with the will annexed was appointed by the superior court of Los Angeles county, California, who took possession of the personal property in that state left by the decedent. He published a notice to creditors and filed an

Carter, J., delivered the opinion of the inventory. No claims were presented

of the balance of said trust estate, if any, to the brother and sister of said testator, in equal semiannual instalments, $2,500 per annum during the life of the said brother and sister, and upon the further trust that the balance of said trust estate, if any, should be used for the creation, erection, maintenance, and endowment of an old men's home in or near Chicago. Then follows in the decree a detailed statement as to the management and care of said old men's home from said funds in accordance with the provisions of the will.

county court was without authority, under the law, to include the personal property situated in California in fixing the inheritance tax. They argue that the power to tax is limited to property over which the sovereign power of the state extends, and that the personal property of a resident decedent located outside of Illinois is not within the dominion of the state. The ancient maxim of the law was that the personal property followed the person. The great increase in that class of property has necessitated certain limitations of the maxim, especially in matters of taxation. "It is still the law that personal property is sold, transmitted, bequeathed by will, and is descendible by inheritance according to the law of the domicil and not by that of its situs." Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 46 L. ed. 697, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515. The general rule in this country is that the succession to movable property is governed by the law of the owner's domicil at the time of his death. Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59, 78 Am. St. Rep. 475, 55 N. E. 623. When, however, we apply the laws of another jurisdiction, we do so because the principles of comity recognize that those laws are applicable to a particular case. The succession determined by the law of domicil is generally recognized in other jurisdictions. This recognition, however, is limited by the policy of the local law, especially in matters of taxation and the subjecting of the personal property of nonresidents to the claims of local creditors. The law in California is that the distribution of the decedent's personal estate will be governed by the law of his actual domicil at the time of his death, subject to certain limitations not here involved. Apple's Estate, 66 Cal. 432, 6 Pac. 7; Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 87 Am. St. Rep. 90, 66 Pac. 971. "No one doubts that succession to a tangible chattel may be taxed wherever the property is found, and none the less that the law of the situs accepts its rules of succession from the law of the domicil, or that by the law of the domicil the chattel is part of a universitas and is taken into account again in the succession tax there." Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. ed. 439, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277. There is no constitutional objection to a law which lays an inheritance or succession tax according both to the principle of the domicil and to the principle of the situs, trustee and individually, were although this may result in double taxajointly and severally liable for all inher- tion. 1 Whart. Confl. L. 3d ed. § 80f. It itance taxes, and interest, on all legacies may be inexpedient or inconsistent that and successions payable out of the funds one state should tax according to the situs limited to said Northern Trust Company. and the other at the same time according It is insisted by appellants that the to the fiction that succession after death

November 2, 1906, the county court of Cook county appointed an appraiser to recommend the amount of inheritance tax in said estate. In March, 1907, the probate court of Cook county approved the final report of the Union Trust Company, administrator with the will annexed of said estate in Cook county, including the compromise settlement with the widow. In August, 1909, the appraiser reported to the county judge of Cook county his appraisement, and the report was approved by said county judge. From the order approving the report all parties appealed to the county court of Cook county. That court thereafter entered an order fixing an inheritance tax on all rights to succeed to the property of said testator, including the legacies that had been paid by the California administrator, less the exemptions allowed by the law of this state. The tax assessed by the order of the county court against the legacies paid in full, and the present value of those to be paid hereafter by the Northern Trust Company, was $6,567.10. There were also future interests included in said fund paid the trust company by the California administrator which might hereafter be required to pay an inheritance tax in this state. The order of the county court also appraised the property received by Maud A. Robinson King, the widow, at $2,044,685.82, and fixed the tax, after allowing the exemptions, at $20,246.85. The county court held as a proposition of law that the Union Trust Company of Chicago, both as administrator with the will annexed and in its corporate capacity, was liable for the inheritance tax of said widow, with interest until paid, and was also liable for all inheritance taxes, with interest, due and owing in said estate, and that said Union Trust Company, as administrator with the will annexed and individually, and the Northern Trust Company, as

supra.

is governed by the domicil of the decedent, | in the place of the decedent's or testator's but these inconsistencies infringe no rule domicil. See, in addition to the authorities of constitutional law. Blackstone v. Miller, already cited, McCurdy v. McCurdy, 197 Mass. 248, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 329, 83 N. E. Counsel have cited many authorities with 881, 14 Ann. Cas. 859; Re Swift, 137 N. Y. reference to the power of a state as to gen- | 77, 18 L.R.A. 709, 32 N. E. 1096; Re Hull, eral taxes. Laws imposing general taxes 111 App. Div. 322, 97 N. Y. Supp. 701; upon real and personal property are not Re Miller, 182 Pa. 157, 37 Atl. 1000; Hopcontrolling and usually give little assist-kin's Appeal, 77 Conn. 644, 60 Atl. 657; ance in considering the legality of inher- Re Howard, 80 Vt. 489, 68 Atl. 513; Dos itance taxes. People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313. We therefore deem it unnecessary to discuss or distinguish those authorities. Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350, cited and relied on, is not in point here, because the question there was whether an inheritance tax could be col-cussion in many of the decisions relied on lected in this state on real estate in another by appellants turns on the meaning of the state, and this court held that lands in a statute, and whether the legislature insister state pass, not under the laws of tended to levy such a tax. this state, but under those of the state where the land is situated. That, however, is not the law with reference to personal property in another state.

Counsel also rely on Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 56 L. ed. 299, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1139, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105. In that case Susan A. Keeney, a resident of New York, executed in that state a deed whereby she conveyed a cattle ranch in Texas and certain stocks and bonds to the Fidelity Trust Company of Newark, New Jersey, to hold in trust during her lifetime, and, after her death, to be paid to her children or their issue. The court, in discussing the question as to whether certain stocks and bonds in New Jersey were chargeable with a transfer tax in New York, after the death of Susan A. Keeney, said (222 U. S. 537, 56 L. ed. 306, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1150, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108) that "the real estate and tangible property in Texas were not within the taxing jurisdiction of the state of New York, and there was no effort to tax the transfer of that property." Counsel argue from this statement that the court intended to include in the term "tangible property in Texas" personal property in that state, and to hold personal property not situated in New York could not be compelled to pay a transfer or inheritance tax. That certainly was not the holding, for the opinion continues: "It is urged that on the same principle the stocks and bonds could not be taxed because they were in New Jersey in the hands of a trustee holding title and possession by virtue of a deed made three years before the grantor died," and the property in New Jersey was held subject to the New York transfer tax.

We believe the authorities are a unit in holding that personal property within the jurisdiction of a foreign state may be made subject to a succession or inheritance tax

Passos, Inheritance Tax Law, 2d ed. § 46; Dicey, Confl. L. 2d ed. 664; McElroy, Transfer Tax Law, 120, 37 Cyc. 1654, and cases cited. The constitutional right of a state to impose such a tax at the domicil of the decedent cannot be questioned. The dis

The inheritance tax law of New York contemplated that such a tax should be imposed. Re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 18 L.R.A. 709, 32 N. E. 1096. That act, after that decision, so far as it affects this question, was substantially adopted in this state. It must be presumed, therefore, that our legislature intended it to receive the construction given it by the courts of New York. People v. Griffith, supra. The personal property of the testator in California at the time of his death was subject to the payment of inheritance taxes in Illinois.

The further contention is made that the trial court in entering the order fixing the inheritance taxes on the personal property found in California failed to give due faith and credit to the decree of the superior court of Los Angeles county distributing the estate and discharging the adminis trator. That decree found that all claims presented against said estate had been paid, including taxes and inheritance taxes, and ordered that the administrator and his sureties be relieved of any obligations thereafter incurring. Was this finding conclusive, under the statutes and practice of the courts of California, as to all claims against the estate, the executor, legatees, or distributees?

In Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43, 52 L. ed. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, the New York court attempted to assess an inheritance tax against the property and the executor when the estate had already been administered upon and distributed in New Jersey; the New Jersey court holding that the testator was a resident of that state. The New York court held that the testator was a resident of New York. The United States Supreme Court in that case held that the New York courts were not precluded by the New Jersey courts from investigating whether or not the testator was a resident

of New Jersey or of New York. It further given to the judgments and public acts held that under the law and usage in the in every other state. The question in the courts of New Jersey, as presented in that Borer suit, so far as we can see, differed record, the New Jersey court had juris- from Tilt v. Kelsey only in that in the diction to probate the will and administer latter case all of the property was finally the estate and direct the final distribution, distributed in New Jersey, while in the which should be final so far as concerned Borer Case only a part of the funds was any person who had a demand against the distributed in California. Under the holdestate; that, in ascertaining what faith ing in the Borer Case the contentions of and credit must be given to the judicial appellants on this point are without force. proceedings in New Jersey to carry into effect the constitutional provision as to full faith and credit being given to the judgment of any court in the United States, it must be ascertained what credit is given to such judicial proceedings by the laws of New Jersey; that the full faith and credit to be given to the judgments of any court under the Constitution of the United States mean such faith and credit as are given in the state where rendered; that "they can have no greater or less or other effect in other courts than in those of their own state." The court held that on the record there presented the decree of the New Jersey court was a final bar to all claims as against the estate and against the executors and distributees of the property.

Without attempting here to decide whether these two cases are in conflict or can be distinguished, we will consider whether, under the rules of law laid down in Tilt v. Kelsey, supra, on the facts in this record, the county court of Cook county, in entering this judgment as to the inheritance tax, contravened constitutional provisions. The New York courts, after a somewhat elaborate discussion of a similar question, held that such a decree of a California court was binding only "on heirs, legatees, or devisees," and did not preclude collecting claims for inheritance taxes in another state. Re Cummings, 142 App. Div. 377, 127 N. Y. Supp. 109. While we might not agree with all the reasoning in that case, we think the conclusion was correct. If it be conceded, as contended by appellants, that under the statutes of California, as construed by her courts, ordinary claims of creditors against an estate should be presented to the probate court, and that its determination as to such claims, whether the creditor appears and presents his claim or fails to appear, will be conclusive, "subject only to be reversed, set aside, or modified on appeal" (William Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 Pac. 323; Crew v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 51 Pac. 38; Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 79 Am. St. Rep. 100, 61 Pac. 914; Childs v. De Laveaga, 150 Cal. 281, 89 Pac. 82; St. Mary's Hospital v. Perry, 152 Cal. 338, 92 Pac. 864), does it follow that the claim for

In the last case cited the United States Supreme Court did not refer to the case of Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 30 L. ed. 532, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342. In the Borer Case a citizen in New Jersey recovered judgment in a civil action on a contract against a citizen of Minnesota whose property was situated principally in California, and who died testate, leaving real estate and personal property to various persons in Minnesota. His will was admitted to probate in Minnesota and letters testamentary issued thereon. Ancillary proof was then made in California and letters issued on the certified copy of the will, and the estate was administered in California in accordance with the laws of that state and distributed according to the will. The the Illinois inheritance tax must be so final account was rendered to the probate court in California and the executor dis- An inheritance tax has been held by the charged by that court. A creditor in Min- courts of California not to be one of the nesota did not present his claim for pay-expenses of administration, or a charge ment in California. This creditor brought upon the general estate of the decedent, suit in Minnesota against one of the Minnesota executors. The United States Supreme Court held that the creditor was not barred by the proceedings and decree in California from the prosecution of the suit; that he had a right to follow into the hands of the holders in Minnesota, whether a legatee or executor, the assets of the deceased which had been distributed by the order of the probate court in California; and that the Minnesota court, in so doing, was not contravening that provision of the Constitution respecting the faith to be

presented in order not to be barred?

but in the nature of an impost tax or tax upon the right of succession, to be imposed upon the several amounts of the decedent's estate to which the successors thereto are, respectively, entitled. It is a charge against each share or interest according to its value, and against the person entitled thereto. Re Chesney, 1 Cal. App. 31, 81 Pac. 679; Re Wilmerding, 117 Cal. 281, 49 Pac. 181. That is also the law in this state. People ex rel. George v. Nelms, 241 Ill. 571, 89 N. E. 683. It was the intention of the legislature in this state that a per