vania and Wisconsin, and this court is | This decision also but follows the common asked to pass upon whether a judgment entered as against Daniel Murphy, judgment debtor, was a lien upon land owned of record in the name of Daniel J. Murphy but deeded out from under said judgment.

Again, the majority opinion attempts to hedge by the following statement contained in it: "Had one or the other of the initials been entirely omitted, and either the grantee of the deed or the judgment debtor been shown as simply Wm. Rideout, a different state of facts would exist, and possibly it would be the duty of the abstracter to show the judgment. Upon this, however, we express no opinion."

law. But in Johnson v. Wilson is found the following: "The case of Fincher v. Hanegan, 59 Ark. 151, 24 L.R.A. 543, 26 S. W. 821, cited by appellant's counsel, only involved a mistake in the initial letter of the middle name of the mortgagor. In that case the mortgagor executed the first mortgage by his true Christian name and surname. The court held the middle letter was immaterial, as the law recognizes but one Christian name. It is therefore not an authority upon the question here involved, if abstractly sound, of which we express no opinion."

That court there expressly refrained from venturing an opinion upon the very subject upon which the majority here cites and deems it an authority.

་་

Wicker v. Jenkins, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 366, 108 S. W. 188, does squarely support the majority holding. It also cites and follows the same cases from Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Indiana as does the majority opinion. In that opinion is the follow"Would one in searching the record of this abstract know that 'W. B. F. Wicker' was the same person as 'W. F. B. Wicker?'" Ordinary prudence would seem to say, "Yes, ascertain the fact, such similarity should invoke inquiry." Common law also answers, "Yes." If this be authority for its holding, evidently this court should also be prepared to hold that any transposition of middle initials destroys any presumption of identity. The L.R.A. notes cited in the majority opinion but classify the holdings, as has been attempted in this dissent, and but little if anything more.

Why not express an opinion? Every case cited to support, and that does support, this holding, most emphatically expresses just that opinion. The trouble is the opinion and the holdings followed are so out of harmony with business usage and ordinary ideas of prudence that the majority opinion has seen fit to refrain from expressing an opinion upon something that the precedent cited and followed has held upon. To illus-ing: trate, examining the precedent cited: In Crouse v. Murphy, the holding is that "Daniel Murphy" is not "Daniel J. Murphy." In Davis v. Steeps, 87 Wis. 472, 23 L.R.A. 818, 41 Am. St. Rep. 51, 58 N. W. 769, from Wisconsin, it is expressly held that a judgment entered against "Edward Davis" is not constructive notice that the judgment debtor is "E. A. Davis" or "Edward A. Davis." Our court refrains from express ing an opinion upon this matter, but by the very fact of refusing to do so indicates that it may or may not follow in the future the same precedent it cites and follows as authority for this decision, upon which and similar precedent it justifies its departure in this case from the commonlaw rule. Grundies v. Reid, 107 Ill. 304, is cited, while Illinois, as heretofore stated, has a separate rule of its own. Likewise, too, Johnson v. Hess, the Indiana case cited, but followed the common law. In Phillips v. McKaig, a Nebraska case, found at 36 Neb. 853, 55 N. W. 259, cited in the majority opinion as authority, it is held that a judgment entered against "May Alley" was not constructive notice to a purchaser of the real estate from "Mary Ann Allely;" the decision could not have been otherwise and the common law been followed. In Johnson v. Wilson, 137 Ala. 468, 97 Am. St. Rep. 52, 34 So. 392, cited in the majority opinion, the following from the syllabus makes its citation seem strange: "The record of a mortgage executed in the name of A. W. Dixson is not notice to purchasers for value that J. W. Dixson executed it."

To the writer it would seem that, if any departure from the common law is to be declared, it should be based upon the Illinois rule, wherein the record title of the real estate controls. The rule is arbitrary, but no more so than the hybrid or mongrel one that must be adopted wherever the commonlaw rule that the middle names or initial is immaterial is departed from. This decision seems to me to in effect at least overrule the basic reasoning in Johnson v. Day, and to demonstrate its fallacy by its attempt to draw distinctions, contrary to the very authorities upon which it is based. It can therefore result only in unsettling the prior settled and established law of this state upon a very important matter. But, whatever the effect of this precedent, it has been declared after thorough consideration. The writer is of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

Petition for rehearing denied April 26, 1915.

STATE BAR COMMISSION EX REL. BEN when they are admitted to the bar is not

F. WILLIAMS

ULLIVAN

P. M. SULLIVAN.

(35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703.)

disbarment

Attorney
of specifications.

verification

simply to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due the courts of justice and judicial officers; this obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining, out of court, from insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their judicial acts. An attorney may criticize the courts so long as his criticisms are made in good faith and in respectful language, but the printing and publication of a pamphlet falsely, purposely, and maliciously attacking the integrity of the courts and the judges thereof, designed to wilfully, purposely, and maliciously misrepresent the courts and the judges thereof, and bring them into disrepute and lessen the respect due them, violates his duties and obligations as an attor3. The right to practise law is not a vest-ney and counselor at law, for which he may ed right, but a mere privilege, and an acbe disbarred. tion to disbar an attorney under § 267, Comp. Laws, 1909, is a civil proceeding, and the accused is not entitled to a trial by a jury as a matter of right.

1. In disbarment proceedings instituted by the state bar commission by the order and direction of the supreme court, no verification of the specification of charges is necessary, under § 267, Comp. Laws, 1909. Same contradiction of specifications. 2. The sufficiency of the verification must be determined by an inspection of it, and the evidence of the affiant cannot be taken for the purpose of showing that he had no personal knowledge as to the charges.

Same

Note.

character of proceedings.

Statute of limitations as a defense to revocation of physician's or attorney's license.

This note is supplementary to the note appended to State Medical Examining Board v. Stewart, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 557.

It is shown in the earlier note that the ordinary statutes of limitation do not apply to proceedings for disbarment of an attorney or revocation of the license of a physician. While no later cases involving revocation of licenses of physicians have been, found, subsequent cases involving attorneys sustain the rule there stated.

Thus, in Re Leonard, 127 App. Div. 493, 111 N. Y. Supp. 905, affirmed without opinion in 193 N. Y. 655, 87 N. E. 1121, in which an attorney was disbarred because his admission to practice was procured upon a false certificate of practice and admission in another state, the court said: "Of course, there is no statute of limitations as affecting such a proceeding."

In Re Ramsey, 24 S. D. 266, 123 N. W. 726, it is held that an action for disbarment of an attorney for misconduct which occurred more than six years prior thereto was not barred by the lapse of time.

And in Re Crum, 7 N. D. 316, 75 N. W. 257, it was held that an action for disbarment was not barred by laches in prosecution of the charges where it appeared that the prosecution was diligent up to the point of presentation to the court, and that the delay was the fault of the court, and the court further said that they knew of no statute of limitations in the state that was applicable to such a proceeding.

In some cases, however, there are statutes of limitation expressly applying to proceedings for disbarment.

And in Re Mosher, 24 Okla. 61, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 530, 102 Pac. 705, 20 Ann. Cas. 209, it is held that in construing a statute of limitations it must, so far as affects rights of action in existence when the statute is passed, be held, in the absence of a contrary provision, to begin when the cause of action is first subjected to its operation, so that a statute which provided that all actions for suspension or removal should be brought within one year after the act charged was committed, and not thereafter, was held not to bar an action for disbarment of an attorney for misconduct which occurred more than one year prior to the bringing of the action, where the action was brought within one year after the statute took effect.

While the courts do not apply ordinary statutes of limitation to disbarment proceedings, they frequently take lapse of time into consideration in such cases.

Thus, in People ex rel. Colorado Bar Asso. v. Tanquary, 48 Colo. 122, 109 Pac. 260, the court dismissed a proceeding for disbarment of an attorney where the offenses complained of were shown to have occurred eight and one half years before any investigation thereof was made or prosecution begun, the court saying that that fact alone was, in their judgment, sufficient answer to the charges, and that it had ever been the policy of the court to discourage proceedings of that sort upon stale claims, and properly so, as a matter of common justice to the

tention to render judgment. 12. Special notice to an attorney is not necessary before the rendition of a judgment disbarring him.

7. Proceedings to disbar an attorney cannot be defeated because the committee presenting the charges had no authority to do so from any other person or body. Same- failure to order filing of charg- (Burford and Hubbell, Special Judges, dis

es.

8. Failure of the court to order the filing of charges for disbarment of an attorone charged, who otherwise might manifestly be placed at great disadvantage.

sent.)

(July 23, 1912.)

court of the state, and petitioner had had ample opportunity to establish the truth of the charges if the respondents had been guilty of the fraud as charged-the court, in dismissing the petition, said that it was the petitioner's duty to present the facts to the court within a reasonable time after the alleged wrongful acts were committed.

In State ex rel. Jewett v. Clopton, 15 Mo. App. 589, it was held that while it was a misdemeanor for an attorney to agree with a witness who was beyond the jurisdiction of the court to give him a sum of money if he would give his deposition, payment being

In People ex rel. Noyes v. Allison, 68 Ill. 151, the court, in dismissing an information for a rule upon respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys, said: "Nearly seven years have elapsed since the alleged misconduct. No explanation is given for the delay and the law will not favor the institution of prosecutions of this character after the lapse of such a great length of time. The charge is a serious one, and if respondent should be found guilty, the consequences would be most disastrous. The party whose rights are injuriously affect-conditioned upon the success of the side of ed by conduct of the character alleged ought to be required to exhibit his information within a reasonable time, that the attorney Implicated might be afforded an opportunity to make his defense while testimony for that purpose could be had. In analogy to our statutes which bar prosecutions for misdemeanors, there ought to be a limit as to the time in which informations could be filed."

In Re Whitridge, 162 App. Div. 884, 146 N. Y. Supp. 366, where the petitioner charged the respondent attorneys with unprofessional conduct, in that he had employed them to incorporate a mortgage insurance company, but that instead they made use of his ideas and plans and incorporated a company for their own benefit, which transaction took place twenty years prior to the filing of the petition for disbarment, it appeared that an action against the attorneys to recover damages for the alleged misconduct in the matter had been decided against the petitioner over ten years before the petition for disbarment was filed, and the decision affirmed by the highest

the cause represented by the attorney, nevertheless if the attorney's intention was to secure none other than truthful testimony, and the facts were at the time known to the relator, the attorney representing the other side of the cause, and no action was taken until five years thereafter, and then in consequence of ill feeling between relator and defendant, and it appeared that the latter had in the meantime conducted himself in an exemplary manner, and had maintained an honorable position at the bar, the court would dismiss the proceeding at the cost of the relator.

In State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45, 61 S. E. 355, aflirming a judgment of disbarment of an attorney, it is held that misconduct such as affords a ground for disbarment is not subject to the defense of the statute of limitation as a matter of law, but the court says: "Clearly where evidence shows a turning of one from wrong to right, a living down of gross errors after a sufficient length of time, in which there is a plain demonstration of such disposition to pursue the even tenor of his way, an at

Р

ROCEEDINGS for the disbarment of de-, it was verified upon information and belief,

fendant. Judgment of disbarment.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. C. W. Stringer for plaintiff.

Mr. James Twyford for defendant.

and not positively, and thereupon C. W. Stringer, the attorney for the plaintiff, and the person who verified the specification of charges upon information and belief, asked leave of court to amend the verifica

Dudley, Special Judge, delivered the tion of charges by making the verification opinion of the court:

This is an original proceeding in this court by the state bar commission, on the relation of Ben F. Williams, against P. M. Sullivan, a member of the bar of this court and the inferior courts of the state, residing at Oklahoma City. The regular judges of the supreme court were disqualified, and this fact was certified by them to the governor of the state, who thereupon appointed five special justices of the supreme court to hear and determine this cause, who thereafter assembled at Oklahoma City and qualified as such, and heard the testimony in this case. Before proceeding to a discussion of the merits of the case, it becomes necessary to determine some preliminary questions raised and urged by counsel for defendant.

positive. Leave was granted to do so and the amendment was made, and after the conclusion of the taking of testimony upon the part of the plaintiff the defendant again challenged the sufficiency of the verification of the specification of charges, for the reason that the testimony clearly showed that Mr. Stringer had no personal knowledge of the allegations contained in the specification of charges, and that by reason thereof the court did not have jurisdiction. The position of counsel for defendant is not well taken for two reasons: (1) This procceding was commenced by the bar commission of the state of Oklahoma, by the order and direction of this court, and therefore, under § 267, p. 229, of Snyder's 1909 Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, it was not necessary for the specification of charges to be verified The specification of charges was filed Jan- at all; and (2), even though it were necesuary 13, 1912. The defendant was duly sary for the specification of charges to be notified of the filing of the charges and fur-verified, after the amendment was made as nished with a copy thereof, and in due course of time filed an answer to and an explanation of the charges and specification filed against him, to which the plaintiff filed a reply, by way of general denial. Upon the hearing of the cause, the defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence upon the part of the plaintiff in support of the specification of charges, for the reason that the petition or specification of charges was not verified, as required by law, in that torney's name should not be stricken from the roll."

In Re Attorney, 39 U. C. Q. B. 171, the court, in refusing to take summary action against an attorney for past misconduct, said that even though the misconduct had been clearly proved, still the delay in making the application had been so great that it would not, in a matter of such serious consequences to the attorney, feel justified in proceeding further against him.

In an early case, Re, 2 Barn. & Ad. 766, the court, in denying a motion to strike an attorney off the roll on the ground of misconduct and want of regular service and clerkship, said that, though the facts presented would have been a ground for opposing the admission of the attorney, or for an application to strike him from the roll if made very shortly after their occurrence, such as a month or two or a term or two after the admission, it came too late after the party had been admitted three and one-half years.

In People ex rel. Stead v. Phipps, 261 |

to the verification, it was then a positive verification, and its sufficiency must be determined by an inspection of the verification itself; and, even though it developed upon the hearing of the case (a point which we do not concede) that the person who made the verification did not have actual knowledge of the statements contained therein, this fact cannot be taken for the purpose of showing that he had no personIII. 576, 104 N. E. 144, the court said that while they would not regard the fact that an attorney had misappropriated money eleven years prior to the bringing of an action for disbarment, which money had been repaid by his surety, as a wrong justifying disbarment or discipline, although, if it had been brought to the attention of the court at the time or soon thereafter, disbarment would have been inevitable, such conduct could not be overlooked or disregarded in view of subsequent acts of unprofessional or disreputable conduct which were proved.

In Re R. A. An Attorney, 6 Manitoba L. Rep. 601, where the court apparently takes the view that a proceeding to strike an attorney from the rolls should be commenced within a reasonable time, it is held that a delay of six months is not a bar to such a proceeding where an unsuccessful motion for an order to compel the attorney to answer has been made in the meantime. R. L. S.

al knowledge. Re Collins, 147 Cal. 8, 81 | is not a fit and proper person to engage in Pac. 221.

the practice of law in this state, and should be disbarred, for the reason that he has been guilty of gross misconduct and has violated his oath and duty as an attorney and counselor at law. This paragraph is subdivided into five specific charges. However, we only deem it necessary to consider two of them, namely, the second and fifth, and we will therefore discuss them in their order. In the second subdivision of this general charge it is alleged that the defendant has been guilty of gross misconduct and vio

It was also contended by the defendant that his right to practise law in the courts of this state was a vested right, and that therefore, as a matter of right, he was entitled to a trial by a jury in this court, upon the charges preferred against him, under chapter 56, p. 97, of the Session Laws of 1910, providing for trial by jury in this court. To this contention of the defendant we cannot agree. The right to practise law is not a vested right, but a mere privilege. 4 Cyc. p. 898, and cases cited; State ex rel.lated his duty and obligations as an attorMackintosh v. Rossman, 53 Wash. 1, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821, 101 Pac. 357, 17 Ann. Cas. 625. Section 268, p. 229, Snyder's 1909 Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, on the subject of "Trial in Disbarment Proceedings," specifically provides that the issues joined shall in all cases be tried by the court. This is a specific statute covering this class of proceedings, and should govern over the general statute. Section 1, chap. 56, p. 97, of the Session Laws of 1910, provides: "That in any cause now pending or hereafter brought in the Supreme Court wherein, said court is exercising its original jurisdiction in which an issue of fact is presented properly triable by a jury, and either party to said cause demands a jury trial, said court shall not dismiss such cause for the reason that a jury is required but shall proceed in the manner hereinafter prescribed." The issue of fact presented here is not properly triable by a jury for the reason that the special statute governing the trial of proceedings of this kind specifically provides that all questions of fact shall be tried by the court. provision of the Constitution as to the right of a trial by a jury means the right of trial by jury as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Williams's Anno. Const. of Oklahoma, § 27, p. 15; State ex rel. West v. Cobb, 24 Okla. 662, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639, 104 Pac. 361; Baker v. Newton, 27 Okla. 438, 112 Pac. 1034. A disbarment proceeding, under our statute, is a civil proceeding (Re Biggers, 24 Okla. 842, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 622, 104 Pac. 1083), and the right to a trial by a jury in a disbarment proceeding did not exist at the time of the adoption of the Constitution (Dean v. Stone, 2 Okla. 13, 35 Pac. 578). We therefore are clearly of the opinion that the defendant was not as a matter of law entitled to a trial by a jury, and his application was denied. This disposes of all preliminary questions raised and urged by the defendant, and we now proceed to a discussion of the merits of the case.

The

ney and counselor at law, in that he, within a year prior to the filing of the specification of charges in this court, falsely, maliciously, and without reasonable justification or excuse caused to be printed and published a certain book or pamphlet entitled "A Criminal Combine," consisting of the governor, the attorney general, the supreme court, district courts, district clerks, district attorneys, referees, perjurers, murder plotters, and crooks galore in the state of Oklahoma; that said book or pamphlet was printed and published by the defendant for the purpose of giving vent and expression to his own personal spleen and malice, and to excite and create an ill will and prejudice against the courts of this state and the judges thereof, and the other officers and attorneys mentioned in said publication. The defendant in his answer admitted the printing and publication of the pamphlet, but claims that the publication was in good faith and without malicious motives, and that the statements and allegations therein contained are true; he denies, however, that the pamphlet was printed and published at time within one year prior to the filing of the specification of charges herein, and claims that, if he did violate any of his duties and obligations as an attorney and counselor at law, he cannot be disbarred on account thereof, for the reason that the same is barred by the statute of limitations. In the fifth subdivision of the specification of charges it is alleged that the defendant has been guilty of misconduct and violated his duties and obligations as an attorney and counselor at law by preparing and filing in the district court of Oklahoma county, Oklahoma, a certain document styled a "Petition," in case No. 11,054, wherein he is a plaintiff and the Watch Tower Bible Tract Society and others, including the district, superior, and county judges of Oklahoma county, the district judge of Cleveland county, the judges of the supreme court, C. N. Haskell, governor, and Chas. West, attorney general, are defendants, in which he charges these defendants and others mentioned therein with a conspiracy to judicially rob him of certain real estate in Oklahoma City,

any