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an unsuccessful venture, or to fix irrigation | prives the customers of their property without due process of law.

rates.

Madison v. Madison Gas & Electric Co. Black, Const. Law, 3d ed. §§ 281-283, pp. 129 Wis. 249, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 529, 116 Am. 723, 728, 730, 731; 2 Wyman, Public ServSt. Rep. 944, 108 N. W. 65, 9 Ann. Cas.ice Corp. § 1421, p. 1251; Birmingham 819; Re Kearney Water & Electric Powers Waterworks Co. v. Birmingham, 211 Fed. Co. 97 Neb. 139, 149 N. W. 363; Cote v. Highland Park, 173 Mich. 201, 139 N. W. 69; Clague v. Tri-State Land Co. 84 Neb.

499, 133 Am. St. Rep. 637, 121 N. W. 570; Price v. Riverside Land & Irrigating Co. 56 Cal. 431; Jack v. Grangeville, 9 Idaho, 291, 74 Pac. 969; 3 Kinney, Irrigation, § 1381, p. 2499.

The enforcement of the order impairs the obligations of the contract between the ditch company and its customers, and deeral Supreme Court that notwithstanding the declaration in the Constitution of California that water appropriated for sale is appropriated to a public use, the water rights of an irrigation company acquired by prescription or by purchase should be included in the valuation of its property in determining whether the rates fixed by the board of supervisors would yield the 6 per cent return upon the value of the property to which the company was entitled under the California statute.

On a motion for a preliminary injunction in the above case, 163 Fed. 567, the rule was laid down that if a deduction is to be made from the value of the irrigation plant on account of deterioration, in fixing its value for the purpose of determining the rate, an allowance should be made for the deduction and added to the annual income so to enable the irrigation company to renew and reconstruct the plant and thereby preserve its integrity.

497.

The control of the canal has passed from the ditch company to its customers. App, 497, 42 Pac. 50; Blakely v. Ft. Lyon La Junta & L. Canal Co. v. Hess, 6 Colo. Canal Co. 31 Colo. 224, 73 Pac. 249; Wyatt v. Larimer & W. Irrig. Co. 18 Colo. 298, 36 Am. St. Rep. 280, 33 Pac. 144, 1 Colo. App. 480, 29 Pac. 906; 3 Kinney, Irrigation, 2d ed. § 1517, p. 2732; Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co. '44 Colo. 214, 98 Pac. 729; Union Mill &

Nor can the irrigation company defend such an action on the ground that the complainant has contracted with it for a higher rate than that fixed by the board. Ibid.

In an action between the same parties for damages on account of the irrigation company's failure to supply water, it was held in Northern Colorado Irrig. Co. v. Pouppirt, 22 Colo. App. 563, 127 Pac. 125, that the order of the board, fixing the maximum water rate at $1 per acre, was not void for uncertainty in not prescribing the amount of water which the company should be required to furnish to any consumer, where the statute provided that persons who had purchased and used water for irrigation from any ditch, and who had not ceased to do so for the purpose of procuring water from some other source of supply, should have a right to continue to purchase water to the same amount on paying the rate fixed by the county commissioners, and the amount of water to which the plaintiff was entitled was determinable from previous contract and recognized usage.

In considering the application for a preliminary injunction, the court in San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co. v. In Northern Colorado Irrig. Co. v. PoupStanislaus County, supra, indicated that, pirt, supra, the court said there was no as regards the relative rates paid for water question that under the Constitution, statby consumers in different counties at vari-utes, and decisions of that state the irrigaous distances from the head works of the canal, a rate to the consumers in the county farthest from the head works less than that in a county nearer thereto would be unjustifiable, since the service to the consumers in the former county is of greater value, owing to evaporation and seepage of water in the canal.

Also in San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co. v. Stanislaus County, 191 Fed. 898, a motion for a preliminary injunction, in an action between the same parties involving other water rates, was denied.

An order of the board of county commissioners fixing the rate at which an irrigation company, a party to the proceeding, shall furnish water to consumers, cannot be collaterally attacked in a mandamus action brought by a consumer to compel the company to deliver water at the rate fixed. Northern Colorado Irrig. Co. v. Pouppirt, 47 Colo. 490, 108 Pac. 23.

tion company was required to carry and deliver water to the class of consumers named in the certificate of its incorporation for a reasonable maximum charge, to be fixed by the board of county commissioners, and that when such rate had been fixed it was binding upon the company until relief had been afforded in some appropriate proceedings; also that the company could not exact a bonus as a condition precedent of the right of a consumer to procure water.

Water rates to be charged by an irrigation company, fixed by a board of county commissioners, as provided by the Constitution of Colorado, cannot be attacked collaterally as unreasonable in an action by the company to recover an excess alleged to be due for a supply of water. McCracken v. Montezuma Water & Land Co. 25 Colo. App. 280, 137 Pac. 903.

Under the Constitution of Colorado neither the legislature nor any court has power

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Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 73; Broad-, Com. v. Bailey, 81 Ky. 395; Butte v. Palmoor Dairy & Live Stock Co. v. Brookside trovich, 30 Mont. 18, 104 Am. St. Rep. 698, Water & Improv. Co. 24 Colo. 541, 52 Pac. 75 Pac. 521; Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 792. 8 Colo. 144, 6 Pac. 142; 34 Cyc. 1029.

The regulation of a public service corporation is only to prevent it exacting unreasonable and unjust rates, not to better for it its unthrifty contracts.

Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 28 L. ed. 173, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; 4 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 1725, p. 3699; Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 855, 88 Atl. 869; Elliott, Priv. Corp. 4th ed. § 91a, p. 97.

Mr. C. E. Eldred, for appellee:

The power given the Railway Commission to "regulate" rates includes the "fixing" of rates.

State ex rel. Hamilton County v. Ream, 16 Neb. 681, 21 N. W. 398; Higgins v. Mitchell County, 6 Kan. App. 314, 51 Pac. 72; Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 16 L.R.A. 161, 28 Pac. 834, 29 Pac. 1092; | to fix a maximum rate to be charged by an irrigation company for the delivery of water; but such power is vested in the boards of county commissioners, to be exercised on the petition of an interested party. Ibid.

Under the Constitution and statutes of Idaho, declaring that the use of all waters appropriated for sale or distribution is a public use, subject to the control and regu lation of the state, that the right to collect tolls for compensation for the use of water supplied to any county or its inhabitants is a franchise and cannot be exercised except in the manner prescribed by law, and authorizing the county commissioners to prescribe maximum rates for water delivered for irrigation purposes, an irrigation com. pany cannot obtain a decree canceling a rate fixed by the commissioners, on the ground that it is too low and does not yield it just compensation, unless the rate would be too low as applied to the total number of acres irrigated in other words, it cannot supply part of its consumers with water free or at an inadequate rate under contract, and secure the cancelation of the prescribed rate on the ground that, if such rate is applied to the balance of the irrigable land, its total income will not be just compensation. Boise City Irrig. & Land Co. v. Clarke, 65 C. C. A. 399, 131 Fed. 415.

It was held in Boise City Irrig. & Land Co. v. Clarke, supra, that although the year for which the board of county commissioners had fixed a water rate had expired, the court would entertain and decide an appeal from a decree upholding the rate, partly because a rate once fixed continued in force until changed as provided by law, and partly because of the necessity or propriety of deciding questions of law presented which might serve to guide the board when again called upon to act in the matter of fixing the rates.

The State Railway Commission had jurisdiction and authority to regulate and fix the rates. The fixing and regulation of water rates is a governmental function, one of the police powers of the state, and is not suspended, except by express provision of the law. At the time the contracts were entered into the parties joining in the contracts were bound to know that the rates were subject to legislative control.

White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. 22 Colo. 191, 31 L.R.A. 828, 43 Pac. 1028; Brummitt v. Ogden Waterworks Co. 33 Utah, 289, 93 Pac. 828; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 736, 77 C. C. A. 267, 147 Fed. 1; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co. 192 U. S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; Owensboro

And the court in Boise City Irrig. & Land Co. v. Clarke, supra, approved the rule that if the irrigation plant was built for a larger area than it found itself able to supply, or if as yet it did not have the customers contemplated, it was not necessary to fix the rate so high that a reasonable return would be paid upon the entire investment.

A consumer, it was held in Jackson v. Indian Creek Reservoir Ditch & Irrig. Co. 16 Idaho, 430, 101 Pac. 814, may make a valid contract as to the amount of maintenance charge to be paid an irrigation company, under the Constitution of Idaho, providing that the legislature shall designate the manner in which reasonable maximum rates may be established for the use of water sold or distributed for any useful or beneficial purpose, and a statute providing that any person who may contract to deliver a certain quantity of water to any party shall deliver that same, and that the amount to be paid for such delivery, "which amount may be fixed by contract, or may be as provided by law," is a first lien upon the land irrigated. And the court said that even if the legislature had not expressly provided that the amount to be paid for water might be fixed by contract, the right so to contract existed, there being no constitutional or statutory inhibition against such contracts.

And it was held also in Jackson v. Indian Creek Reservoir Ditch & Irrig. Co. supra, that the consumer was not deprived of the right to contract as to water rates by reason of the fact that the legislature had provided a manner by which the rate to be charged for the use of water might be established upon application to the board of county commissioners.

R. E. H.

v. Owensboro Waterworks Co. 191 U. S. | portion of this amount in a reserve fund for 358, 48 L. ed. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82; State use in emergencies. It was also ordered ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, that a new set of books be opened containL.R.A.1915C, 287, 120 Pac. 861, Ann. Cas. ing certain specified entries, and that a 1913D, 78; Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Tam- daily record be kept during the irrigation pa, 199 U. S. 241, 50 L. ed. 172, 26 Sup. season of the flow in the main canal and Ct. Rep. 23; Neb. Const. art. 1, § 26; Wil- the distribution of water to the users. loughby, Const. § 502; Black, Const. Law, From this order respondents have appealed. 3d ed. §§ 287-291, p. 742; 4 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. 1377, p. 3714; Dawson v. Dawson Teleph. Co. 137 Ga. 62, 72 S. E. 508; Wiel, Water Rights, 3d ed. p. 1321; Kinney, Irrigation, 2d ed. p. 1382; Osborne v. Sander deprives the defendants of their propDiego Land & Town Co. 178 U. S. 22, 44 L. ed. 961, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; Portland R. Light & P. Co. v. Portland, 210 Fed. 668; Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & N. Traction Co. 145 Wis. 13, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1056, 129 N. W. 930; Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 155 Fed. 554.

The principal contention of respondents is that the Commission has no authority to make an order releasing complainant from the provisions of the contracts; that the or

erty without due process of law, and impairs the obligation of their contracts, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of Nebraska, the Constitution of the United States, and of the 14th Amendment thereof. It is also said that the order is not supported by the evidence, and that under the covenants in the water deeds the

Letton, J., delivered the opinion of the title to the canal was and should be in its court:

customers, since the whole amount of available water rights had been sold. These contentions will be considered in different order than presented.

1. The evidence conclusively shows that

cient to maintain the canal, even after deducting certain charges criticized by the respondents, and that unless the complainant is allowed to increase the rate, it will be impossible to maintain the canal in a condition so that it will deliver water. The

A complaint was filed by the McCook Irrigation & Water Power Company before the State Railway Commission against 18 holders of water-right contracts under its canal, setting forth that the annual main-the rate of $1 per acre per annum is insuffitenance fee due from water-right holders to the company under the contracts was $1 per acre per annum; that complainant has not sufficient income therefrom to enable it to keep up and properly maintain the canal; that an increased charge is necessary, and that a charge of $2 per acre would be a rea-computations made by respondents and set sonable rate, which it is entitled to receive. forth in the reply brief, showing that the The prayer is that a hearing may be had income is more than sufficient to meet exand complainant be authorized to charge penses, are not accurate, since they include consumers an annual maintenance fee of $2 hundreds of dollars received from the sale per acre, to be made to apply for water fur- of water rights. Such sums are no part of nished for the year 1913. The respondents maintenance charges. The plan of the corfiled an answer denying the jurisdiction of poration, expressed in its deeds or contracts the Railway Commission of the subject- with holders of water rights, provides that matter of the complaint, which it is said is when the water rights to the capacity of the within the jurisdiction of the courts. The canal have been sold and paid for, the canal answer also pleads the failure of complain- becomes, by certain acts of its officers thereant to furnish sufficient water in the irriga- in specified, the property of the water-right tion season of 1913; that it carelessly and holders. Under such provision the money negligently allowed the canal to become paid for a water right represents pro tanto filled with weeds and débris, and to be ob- a portion of the capital of the corporation. structed, so that it failed to carry the When the rights have all been sold, the title amount of water to which the respondents' to the canal passes, but the title to the lands were entitled. It also pleads a num- money remains in the corporation. It may ber of acts of misconduct on the part of not therefore be taken from the corporacertain directors of the corporation whereby tion without its consent to be used for mainit is alleged they obtained special privileges tenance. This is said, assuming, of course, and advantages, and charges general mis- that the prices paid have been fair and reamanagement. A hearing was had, and an sonable, and not padded to such an extent order made allowing the complainant to in- that it is seen that at least a portion of the crease its maintenance charges to $2 per cost of maintenance should be met from the acre per annum. The company was also excess charge. In this case, however, no required to set apart each year $4,500 for such condition appears as to any of the the operation, maintenance, and betterment respondents. Under the order made by the of the ditch, and to place any unexpended' Railway Commission complainant is not

allowed to squander or dissipate any sum realized from the increase in rates in excess of that actually expended each year for the maintenance of the ditch. Its books are subject to inspection, and if it should prove when further repairs have been made to the canal, or a more specific and detailed system of bookkeeping used, that the rate now fixed is excessive, it can be reduced upon proper application being made to that body.

2. It is strongly insisted that the evidence shows that all the available water which could be furnished has been disposed of under existing water-right contracts; that for that reason the consumers own the canal, and the complainant as a stock corporation has no interest in the property. This question involves the ownership of the property, and is one which the Railway Commission has no jurisdiction to hear or determine. If the facts warrant, proper relief may be afforded by appropriate proceedings in a court of equity.

3. Respondents insist that if the existing rate is unsatisfactory to the company, it cannot complain because it was competent, and under no restriction when it fixed the rate, and that regulation can only apply on the complaint of water users when they show the agreed rate is unreasonable. This involves the constitutional questions raised.

The crucial question is whether the rate of $1 per acre per year fixed in the contract is a property right with which the state, in the exercise of its regulatory power, cannot interfere. At the time the canal was built the practice of irrigation in this state was in its infancy; but from the very first the legislature recognized the public interest in the use of water from the streams of the state for irrigation purposes. It placed canal companies in the same class as railways and other common carriers, and it has uniformly been considered that their rates were subject to regulation and control. Cummings v. Hyatt, 54 Neb. 35, 74 N. W. 411; Castle Rock Irrig. Canal & Water Power Co. v. Jurisch, 67 Neb. 377, 93 N. W. 690; Farmers' Canal Co. v. Frank, 72 Neb. 136, 100 N. W. 286; Fenton v. TriState Land Co. 89 Neb. 479, 492, 131 N. W. 1038. At first no tribunal was provided which had the power to fix and establish rates, and the only remedy the consumer had was to apply to the courts to restrain unjust exactions or unreasonable charges; but afterwards by constitutional amendment and statute the State Railway Commission was vested with full power and authority to regulate and fix rates and charges so that they would be fair and equitable both to the consumer and to the corporation supplying

the water. Const. art. 5, § 19a, Rev. Stat. 1913, §§ 3382-3384.

The question involved is an important one, and one as to which there has been some difference of opinion; but we believe the larger and broader view, that most consistent with the spirit in which the law of irrigation should be administered, and that to which courts are more and more tending, is that any contracts entered into between the irrigation company and consumers under the ditch, with reference to the annual rates which should be charged for the use of water, were entered into with the law forming a part of the contract, and were subject to legislative control. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Tampa, 199 US 241, 50 L. ed. 170, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23; Spring Valley Waterworks Co. v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 28 L. ed. 173, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & N. Traction Co. 145 Wis. 13, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1056, 129 N. W. 925; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co. 192 U. S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. 22 Colo. 191, 31 L.R.A. 828, 43 Pac. 1028. An interesting discussion of this topic with cases cited may be found in 2 Wiel, Water Rights, 3d ed. §§ 1315-1321.

If the canal company cannot receive sufficient money to keep the canal intact, the water supply must fail. The consumers will be direct sufferers from such a condition of affairs, but the state, which has granted the franchise to cross the lands of others, and has allowed the appropriation of public waters for the advancement of agriculture and the building up of prosperous agricultural communities, would also be injuriously affected by the failure of the enterprise. It is also worthy of consideration that if these contract holders are entitled to be supplied at the rate of $1 per acre, subsequent purchasers of water rights, if any, may be compelled to pay excessive rates in order to provide the necessary funds for maintenance. If the company should attempt to exact such rates, the question might arise whether such discriminatory charges could be upheld.

Osborne v. San Diego Land & Town Co. 178 U. S. 22, 44 L. ed. 961, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860, was a case brought by an irrigation company to settle the question whether it had authority to increase its water rates. The case was tried in United States circuit court and appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The contract provided that the annual rate should be fixed by the company "as allowed by law." The company had for many years collected $3.50 per acre, and was now seeking to raise the 'rate to $7. The defendants claimed that

the $3.50 rate had been fixed by contract, under the provisions of a statute which provided that until the rates "shall have been abrogated by such board of supervisors, as in this act provided, the actual rates established and collected by each of the persons, companies, associations, and corporations now furnishing, or that shall hereinafter furnish, appropriated waters for sale, rental, or distribution to the inhabitants of any of the counties of this state, shall be deemed and accepted as the legally established rates thereof."

of undue preferences in the sale of water rights and of other irregularities are made. For these a remedy exists in equity, and the Railway Commission is not vested with the power to settle and adjust the property rights involved.

The order of the Commissioners is reasonable and is affirmed.

Rose and Sedgwick, JJ., not sitting.

Petition for rehearing denied June 5, 1915.

CHARLES TURK, Respt.,

V.

MARTIN BENSON, Appt.

(30 N. D. 200, 152 N. W. 354.)

Abstracts

liability of abstracter. An abstracter is not liable for failure to

show a judgment against William J. Rideout upon search for William G. Rideout.

The circuit court held that the question whether an increase to the proposed rate of $7 per acre was reasonable was not open to its decision, and that resort must first be NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT. had to the board of supervisors of San Diego county, the only body with power to fix rates. The Supreme Court affirmed this decree. In the opinion, speaking of the claim that the contract rates thus established could not be altered at the desire of the company, that they were property rights, and to change them would be violative of constitutional rights, the court said: "The purpose of the act rejects such view. Its purpose is regulation, deliberate and judicial, and periodical regulation by a selected tribunal, and we cannot believe that the legislature intends by an absolute and peremptory provision to fix rates upon the water companies unalterable by them, no matter what change in conditions might supervene. Against rates which may be come unreasonably high, the statute gives relief to consumers through petition to the board of supervisors. Rates which may become unreasonably low it surely does not intend to impose on the companies forever, except as relief may come from the voluntary justice of its customers or by a violation of the statute and appeal to the

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A

(Goss, J., dissents.)

(April 10, 1915.)

PPEAL by defendant from a judgment

of the District Court for Pierce County in plaintiff's favor in an action to recover the amount of a judgment paid by plaintiff which was alleged to have been erroneously docketed by defendant.

Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Torsen & Wenzel for appellant.
Mr. Albert E. Coger, for respondent:

It is the general rule, obtaining not only in the state of North Dakota, but generally, that the middle initial is no part of a

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considered in the present note are gathered The early cases dealing with the question in the notes to Burns v. Ross, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 415, and Prouty v. Marshall, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1211, which this note supplements.

Generally as to liability of title abstracter, see notes to Equitable Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Bank of Commerce & T. Co. 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 449; Stephenson v. Cone, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1207; and Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 176.

As to effect of summons or notice to person by wrong initial, see notes to Illinois C. R. Co. v. Hasenwinkle, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.)

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