shall be necessary to the ends of justice." In other words, the purpose of Congress in passing the act was to advance the remedy for the enforcement of a right, and the act should receive an interpretation at the hands of the court as liberal as was the purpose of Congress when it passed the act. A remedial statute is entitled to receive an enlightened and liberal construction. ceivers of a railway company to construct manager was appointed, so far as the sanie a street crossing over its tracks, and on that subject said: "It may be conceded that all the property of the company in the hands of the receiver, including the revenues derived from its use, is held in trust for the benefit of the creditors of the company. But it does not follow that they can control the expenditures of money and the use of the property in all cases. It is for the general benefit of all the parties in interest that the railway of the company be operated, and that its tracks and appurtenances be kept in a proper condition for that purpose." This proceeding, in so far as the insolvent railroad company is concerned, as already stated, grows out of the neglect of its receivers to obey one of the general laws of this state, which law has become operative in the city of Bessemer by virtue of the order of the Railroad Commission. For their neglect or refusal to obey or carry out the terms of this law, these receivers, or the railroad company of which they are receivers, are liable to a penalty fixed by the act. For the collection of this penalty, undoubtedly an action, without first obtaining leave of the court in which the receivers were appointed, would lie. High on Receivers, 4th ed. p. 542, § 395b, and authorities cited. And as this proceeding is to confer action on the part of the receivers in a matter growing out of their management of the property as receivers, and required of them by the law of this state, we can see no reason why the above-quoted Federal statute does not apply to this case. High, Receivers, 4th ed. supra. 8. We are not inclined to the view that the order under consideration is void because it does not fix the exact spot upon which the station is to be built. The territory within which the station is to be located is fixed with definiteness, and the appellees should not complain because they are allowed reasonable latitude as to the exact spot upon which the station is to be located. It seems to us, that the order, with sufficient definiteness, apportions the cost of the proposed station among the various railroads. The books of the various railroads necessarily show the amount of the passenger business of each railroad at Bessemer during the twelve months next preceding the date of the order. Neither are we of the opinion that the crder is invalid or not final because of its failure to require the building to be erected according to plans and specifications furnished by the Commission. The order requires the appellees to build an “adequate passenger station," and, when that order is met, the appellees will have complied with the letter of the order. The appellees, managed as they are by practical railroad men, know how many passenger trains enter and leave Bessemer each day, and they can, when they proceed to comply with the order, be presumed to know how to construct a passenger station sufficient to meet the requirements of the order. The mere fact that the order has left certain details, to the reasonable discretion of appellees, should in no way affect the validity of the postive command that appellees construct, for their joint use, an adequate union passenger station at Bessemer. The above Federal act authorizing suits against receivers without the leave of the court in which they were appointed provides that such suits "shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such receiver or manager was ap-in complying with the terms of the order, pointed, so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of justice;" and, as this is true, the act, being remedial in its nature and at the same time preserving in the court in which the receivers were appointed that general equity jurisdiction over all suits brought against them "necessary to the ends of justice," should be given, not a narrow, but a liberal, interpretation in order that the purpose of Congress, in passing the act, may be given effect. The real purpose of the act is shown by § 2 thereof, which in effect places all receivers of corporations, who are appointed in Fedcral courts, and all such corporations, upon the same footing with reference to valid state laws as similar corporations not in the hands of receivers; subject, however, at all times, to "the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such receiver or It follows from what we have above said that we are of the opinion that the petition of appellant was not subject to the demurrer which was interposed to it by the appellees. The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court below for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views above expressed. Dowdell, Ch. J., and Anderson and Mayfield, JJ., concur. Petition for rehearing denied December 18, 1913. E (January 4, 1915.) RROR to the Mesa County Court to review a judgment in plaintiff's favor in an action brought to recover damages for failure of defendant to deliver a suit case when called for, which was received by it as baggage for transportation. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. E. N. Clark and G. P. Steele, for plaintiff in error: A passenger should demand his baggage within a reasonable time after it has arrived at destination; failing in that, the liability of the carrier as an insurer changes to that of a warehouseman, and negligence on its part must be shown. 4 Elliott, Railroads, 2d ed. § 1659; 3 Hutchinson, Carr. 3d ed. § 1285; 2 Redf. Railways, § 171; 6 Cyc. 672; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Boyce, 73 Ill. 510, 24 Am. Rep. 268; Schnitzmeyer v. Illinois C. R. Co. 147 Ill. App. 101; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. McGahey, 63 Ark. 344, 36 L.R.A. 781, 58 Am. St. Rep. 111, 38 S. W. 659, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 1; Hoeger v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 63 Wis. 100, 53 Am. Rep. 271, 23 N. W. 435; Kansas City, Note. As to carrier's liability for bag gage after reaching destination, see notes to Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. McGahey, 36 L.R.A. 781; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Beasley, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 183; and Milwaukee Mirror & Art Glass Works v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 383; and see references in last-mentioned note for annotation on related questions. Generally as to liability of carrier for baggage not accompanied by passenger, see notes to Marshall v. Pontiac, O. & N. R. Co. 55 L. R. A. 650, and Southern R. Co. v. Dinkins & D. Hardware Co. 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 806; and later case Alabama G. S. R. Co. V. Knox, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 411. Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Patten, 3 Kan. App. 338, 45 Pac. 108; Louisville, C. & L. R. Co. v. Mahan, 8 Bush, 184; Graves v. Fitchburg R. Co. 29 App. Div. 591, 51 N. Y. Supp. 636; Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605, 84 Am. Dec. 646; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Addizoat, 17 Ill. App. 632; Roth v. Buffalo & State Line R. Co. 34 N. Y. 548, 90 Am. Dec. 736; Wiegand v. Central R. Co. 75 Fed. 370; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Smith, 81 Tex. 479, 17 S. W. 133; Kahn v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. 115 N. C. 638, 20 S. E. 169; Levi v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 157 Mo. App. 536, 138 S. W. 699; Nealand v. Boston & M. R. Co. 161 Mass. 67, 36 N. E. 592; Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App. -, 147 S. W. 353; George F. Ditman Boot & Shoe Co. v. Keokuk & W. R. Co. 91 Iowa, 416, 51 Am. St. Rep. 352, 59 N. W. 257; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77, 97 Am. St. Rep. 76, 69 Pac. 578. Mr. R. G. Lucas also for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Henry R. Rhone and J. H. Burkhardt for defendant in error. Garrigues, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This action for damages is on account of the failure of the railroad company to produce and deliver a suit case when it was called for, which it, as a common carrier, had received as baggage for transportation. 1. The facts are admitted, and there is no conflict in the testimony. Mary M. Doyle came to Denver August 9, 1911, from her home in Clifton, Colorado, where she had purchased a round-trip ticket over the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad. She started to return on the evening of the 14th, and upon arriving at the Union Depot first checked her suit case to Clifton, and then went to the Pullman office to secure a sleeper berth, which she was unable to do, for the reason that they were all sold. Feeling that she was physically unable to travel at night without Pullman accommodations, she remained in Denver without informing the company that she did not intend to travel on the same train with her baggage, and the next morning, the 15th, went to Colorado Springs, where she endeavored to secure a berth on the night train, and was again informed that they were all sold. She remained at Colorado Springs until the morning of the 16th, secured a sleeper, and left that night, arriving at Clifton on the afternoon of the 17th, where she called for her baggage, which the company failed to deliver, and later she was informed by the agent that the depot had been burglarized the night before and her suit case stolen. In the court below, plaintiff tried the case upon the theory that under these facts the company was accountable as a common carrier and insurer of the baggage, without proof of negligence, and rested without attempting to prove negligence. Defendant then interposed a motion for a nonsuit upon the ground that it was not liable as an insurer or common carrier; that it was only accountable to the plaintiff as a bailee or warehouseman, and, no negligence having been shown, plaintiff could not recover. This motion was over- | ruled. Defendant then introduced its evidence from which it appeared that Clifton was a small day station, the agent remaining on duty from 8 A. M. to 8 P. M.; that the suit case in question arrived on the afternoon of the 15th, and, being unclaimed, it was stored in the baggage room used for that purpose; that on the night of the 16th the depot was burglarized and the suit case, with other property, stolen; that the depot was a substantial building with doors and windows equipped with ordinary locks and fastenings; that when the agent left at 8 o'clock on the night of the 16th, the doors and windows were securely locked and fastened; that the next morning it was discovered that an entrance had been forced through a window and the building burglarized. The court, in its instructions, after stating the issues, told the jury that they should determine from the evidence and circumstances whether plaintiff called for her baggage within a reasonable time after it arrived at Clifton; that what constituted a reasonable time for her to remove it after it arrived was a question of fact which should be determined by the jury; and in that connection that they might consider whether her failure to demand her baggage sooner was because of the inability or failure of the company to furnish her proper and suitable accommodations for travel, considering her state of health at the time; that the liability of the company terminated as a common carrier after her baggage arrived at Clifton and a reasonable time had elapsed to remove it; that if she failed to remove her suit case after a reasonable time after it arrived, the liability of the company shifted or changed from that of a common carrier to that of a warehouseman; that as a warehouseman, the company was only bound to use that degree of care and attention which a man of ordinary prudence and diligence would use in reference to the goods, under the circumstances, if they were his own; and if the company used such reasonable diligence in storing and caring for the goods, it would not be liable in case of loss by burglary; | that as a warehouseman, it was its duty to store the baggage in a room reasonably safe and secure, used for that purpose; that where a railroad company places uncalled-for baggage in its storeroom where it is its custom to place uncalled-for baggage, and such room appears to be reasonably secure for its safekeeping, the railroad company will not be liable unless guilty of neg ligence which caused the loss; and if they found for plaintiff, the measure of damages would be the value, for use by the plaintiff, of the property lost, at the time and place of its loss, together with legal interest thereon from that date, all damages having been waived except those coming within the above rule. 2. The undisputed testimony shows: August 14, 1911, plaintiff, at the Denver Union Depot, checked her suit case to Clifton, where it arrived August 15th, at 1:45 P. M.; it was uncalled for on its arrival, and the agent placed it in the baggage room of the depot; during the night of August 16th, the depot was burglarized, and the suit case, with other articles, stolen; August 17th plaintiff arrived at Clifton at 1:10 P. M., and called for the baggage, which the company failed to deliver, because it had been stolen; that the station was a substantial building, and no negligence was shown in caring for the baggage, which occasioned its loss. Plaintiff tried the case upon the theory of the company's liability as a common carrier and insurer. The the ory of the defendant was that its liability as a common carrier terminated long before plaintiff called for the baggage, and had changed or shifted to that of a bailee or warehouseman before the property was stolen, and that it was only liable as a warehouseman upon proof of negligence which caused the loss. 3. Plaintiff's railroad fare covered transportation for herself and baggage to Clifton, and ordinarily it is presumed that baggage and passenger will go by the same train, and that the baggage will be called for within a reasonable time after the arrival at its destination. Marshall v. Pontiac, O. & N. R. Co. 126 Mich. 45, 55 L.R.A. 650, 85 N. W. 242; Blumenthal v. Maine C. R. Co. 79 Me. 550, 11 Atl. 605; Wilson v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 56 Me. 60, 96 Am. Dec. 435. 4. While the company had charge of the baggage as a common carrier, it was an insurer of the property, and must pay for its value if it failed to deliver it while held in this capacity. It was the duty of the company to have the baggage ready for delivery within a reasonable time after it reached its destination, and it was the duty of the plaintiff to take it away within a reasonable time. | houseman, because there was no proof of If the baggage remained uncalled for, it negligence. was the duty of the defendant to store it in the baggage room at the station or in some other suitable place, and if plaintiff failed to take it away within a reasonable time after its arrival, the liability of the company as a common carrier and insurer changed or shifted to that of a bailee or warehouseman. It then held the property in storage; its liability as an insurer or common carrier no longer existed, and in case of its loss, plaintiff could only recover against the company as a warehouseman, upon proof that its negligence caused the loss. 4 Elliott, Railroads, 2d ed. § 1659; 3 Hutchinson, Carr. 3d ed. §§ 1285 et seq.; 2 Redf. Railroads, § 171; Cyc. 672. 5. A reasonable time means sufficient time within reason to remove baggage after it, not the passenger, arrives. Where the facts are not disputed, what constitutes a reasonable time for a passenger to remove his baggage after arriving at its destination is a question of law which the court must determine. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77-87, 97 Am. St. Rep. 76, 69 Pac. 578; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Boyce, 73 Ill. 510, 24 Am. Rep. 268; Schnitzmeyer v. Illinois C. R. Co. 147 Ill. App. 101; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Patten, 3 Kan. App. 338, 45 Pac. 108; Louisville, C. & L. R. Co. v. Mahan, 8 Bush, 184; Graves v. Fitchburg R. Co. 29 App. Div. 591, 51 N. Y. Supp. 636; Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605, 84 Am. Dec. 646; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Addizoat, 17 Ill. App. 632; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Smith, 81 Tex. 479, 17 S. W. 133; Kahn v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. 115 N. C. 638, 20 S. E. 169; George F. Ditman Boot & Shoe Co. v. Keokuk & W. R. Co. 91 Iowa, 416, 51 Am. St. Rep. 352, 59 N. W. 257. 6. The court left the jury to determine from all the admitted facts and circumstances whether plaintiff called for her baggage within a reasonable time, and whether the liability of the company had shifted from that of a common carrier to that of a warehouseman. This was error. Plaintiff's baggage arrived at 1:45 P. M., on the 15th, and remained in the baggage room until the night of the 16th without being called for, and it was the duty of the court to have held, as a matter of law, that the baggage was not demanded within a reasonable time after it arrived. Plaintiff could not recover against the company as a common carrier or insurer of the baggage as a matter of law. She did not demand or take it away within a reasonable time after it arrived, and she could not recover against the company as a ware 7. Plaintiff attempted to show, as a special circumstance excusing her from removing the baggage on the afternoon of the day it arrived, that she endeavored to, but could not, get a sleeper until the night of the 16th, and did not feel able to travel without one. In this way she sought to extend the reasonable time to remove the baggage after it arrived at Clifton. If plaintiff had used ordinary care, thoughtfulness, and prudence, it must have occurred to her that if she waited until a few minutes before train time, she might have difficulty, at that season of the year, in securing a berth. Without making any inquiry or knowing whether or not she could procure a berth, she first went to the baggage room and checked her suit case, expecting and intending to take the same train upon which it would go. Learning, upon inquiry, that she could not get a berth, she decided not to take that train, but to wait until she could secure sleeper accommodations. She allowed her baggage to go on, and it reached its destination two days in advance of her arrival, when she could easily have checked it for the train on which she was to travel. Under such circumstances, all the company could do was to store it in its baggage room on its arrival. There was no delinquency on the part of the company in transporting either plaintiff or her baggage which would excuse her for not calling for and removing it without delay upon its arrival, or which would extend the reasonable time for its removal after it arrived. It was the fault of the passenger that the baggage was not called for and delivered upon its arrival. By motion for a nonsuit, by requested instructions, by a request for a directed verdict, and by motion for a new trial, the court was given ample opportunity to have disposed of the case according to law. It not having done so, the judgment is rethe cause remanded, with versed, and directions to dismiss the action. PPEAL by defendant from an order of the District Court for Ada County refusing to dissolve an attachment alleged to have been improperly issued on certain property of the defendant railway company. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Cavanah, Blake, & MacLane, for appellants: a No attachment can be issued against a domestic corporation in an action on secured debt, and therefore, if foreign corporations have the same rights and privileges, and are subject to like laws, no attachment can be issued against them in such cases. 6 Thomp. Corp. 1895 ed. p. 6420, § 8060; Farnsworth v. Terre-Haute, A. & St. L. R. Co. 29 Mo. 75; Martin v. Mobile & O. R. Co. 7 Bush, 116: Burr v. Co-operative Constr. Co. 162 Ill. App. 512; Hackettstown Bank v. Mitchell, 28 N. J. L. 516; Blair v. Winston, 84 Md. 356, 35 Atl. 1101; Herbert v. Herbert, 49 N. J. Eq. 70, 22 Atl. 789; Munroe v. Williams, 37 S. C. 81, 19 L.R.A. 665, 16 S. E. 533. Messrs. Richards & Haga and McKeen F. Morrow, for respondent: one residence, and one citizenship, and that is in the state issuing its charter and maintaining supervision and control over the corporation. Cowardin v. Universal L. Ins. Co. 32 Gratt. 445; Barbour v. Paige Hotel Co. 2 App. D. C. 174; Shinn, Attachm. § 105; Boyer v. Northern P. R. Co. 8 Idaho, 74, 70 L.R.A. 691, 66 Pac. 826; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Pike, 51 Colo. 238, 117 Pac. 899; 5 Thomp. Corp. 2d ed. § 6629; Cook, Corp. 7th ed. § 1; Waechter v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 10 Cal. App. 70, 101 Pac. 41; Note to Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Southern Steel Co. 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 278. Budge, J., delivered the opinion of the court: On the 6th of November, 1911, the Idaho Railway, Light, & Power Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Maine, made, executed, and de livered its promissory note to one E. H. Jennings for $180,000, payable two years after date, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from July 6, 1912. In order to secure the payment of the above obligation, the Idaho Railway, Light, & Power Company deposited with the said Jennings as collateral security 1,200 shares of the preferred stock and 2,884 shares of the common stock of the Boise Railroad Company, Limited. After the loan had been negotiated and the stock of the Boise Railroad Company pledged, as. aforesaid, the Idaho Railway, Light, & Power Company, being then the owner of all of the stock of the Boise Railroad Company, elected its employees or officers as directors and officers of the Boise Railroad Company, and immediately thereafter caused said officers to convey by proper con The domicil, residence, and citizenship of a corporation are in the state where it is created, and, where the corporation is not domesticated, it can have but one domicil, Note. - Liability of foreign corporation | procuring the appearance of a defendant, which has complied with conditions and is not to be resorted to when the ordiof doing business in state to attach-nary process of the law can be used, though ment as nonresident. The earlier cases upon the above question are gathered in the note accompanying Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Southern Steel Co. 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 278, and the present note includes only the decisions since the writing of that note. In Burr v. Co-operative Constr. Co. 162 Ill. App. 512, under an attachment act making nonresidence, and not noncitizenship, the ground of attachment, it was held that a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state was a resident, and not a nonresident, within the meaning of the act. The court stated that it agreed with the court in Hackettstown Bank v. Mitchell, 28 N. J. L. 516, that the word "resident" as used in the attachment laws has a peculiar meaning, and that the writ of attachment is an extraordinary mode of the legal domicil of the defendant may be out of the state. In Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Ashland Sheet Mill Co. 31 Ohio C. C. 414, it was held that an affidavit for attachment upon the ground that the defendant is a foreign corporation must affirmatively show that such corporation is not within the exceptions contained in subdiv. 1, § 5521, Rev. Stat. (which apparently exempts foreign corporations which have complied with the requirements for doing business in the state from attachment as nonresidents), and a sworn averment stating that the defendant was doing business at a certain place in another state was held not to aid the affidavit, since such statement did not exclude the fact that the corporation might also be doing business in Ohio and owning or using a part of its capital or plant in that state. J. T. W. |