with the plans and specifications to be furnished by such Commission. Speaking of this act, Jones, District Judge, in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission (C. C.) 191 Fed. 757, said: "The general right of a state to compel railroads entering a city or town to receive and deliver passengers at a union or common depot very properly is not questioned in this case. The state may so direct by a statute giving specific regulations covering the whole matter, or leave the question and its details to the determination of an administrative body or commission." In another place in the opinion in this case, Judge Jones says: "The right which the state undertakes to exercise in the present case is its inherent right to regulate public carriers for the promotion of the public convenience." Of course the power to which we refer must be, taking into consideration the necessities of the situation and the public interests to be subserved, reasonably exercised, but the state possesses, under the state and Federal been considered and disposed of in this state adversely to defendant's contention, in Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. 71 Minn. 519, 40 L.R.A. 389, 70 Am. St. Rep. 358, 74 N. W. 893, now in the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error. It was there held that the act of 1895 did not, under the facts of that case, contravene the Federal or the state Constitution when conferring upon the Commission the power to compel the transfer and interchange of loaded cars, and the making of joint rates for through shipments, where the haul was in part on one, and in part on the other, of two connecting roads. There are no facts here which take this case out of the operation of the rule thus established, and we must abide by it as perfectly legitimate, until the Federal court declares that an error has been committed. We hold, therefore, that Laws 1895, chap. 91, violates no provision of the state or Federal Constitution, and under it the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of this state has the power to compel the enforcement of joint | Constitutions, all needed authority to so through rates between points within this state by the connecting carriers affected by the order." State ex rel. Railroad & W. Commission v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 80 Minn. 191, 196, 197, 89 Am. St. Rep. 514, 83 N. W. 60, 62. See further, on this subject, Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacob-panies operating railroads within a city, son, 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. supra. On the 5th day of September, 1903, the legislature passed an act (Local Acts 1903, p. 771) entitled, "An Act to Locate and Require the Railroad Companies Whose Railroads Enter the City of Mobile to Provide for the Construction of an Union Passenger Depot," etc. The act required the railroad companies, whose tracks enter the city of Mobile, to provide for the location and construction of a union passenger station in said city, and to commence work thereon within eight months. The act also authorized said railroad companies or any one or more of them to condemn to public use all lands necessary to the construction of said depot, and also all lands needed for rights of way into and out of said depot. It also lodged in the Railroad Commission full authority to enforce the provisions of the act. The act clearly contemplated that, if the railroad companies did not them selves, by a voluntary, joint arrangement, acquire the needed lands and construct the station, the Railroad Commission should have the authority to require such railroad companies, if that was necessary, to jointly purchase, or, by condemnation proceedings, to jointly acquire, the needed lands, and to jointly construct the station in accordance regulate public service corporations as to meet all the reasonable requirements of public convenience. Ibid. It would, however, create a strange anomaly for the courts to hold that a state has the authority to require all railroad com whenever the reasonable needs of the travel- Such an appor railroad, of such station; viz., the wheelage | of any agreement as to location or the probasis. It seems to us, therefore, that the legislature had the constitutional power to vest in the Railroad Commission the authority which it conferred upon it in the abovequoted § 5545 of the Code of 1907, and that no part of said section is violative of any clause of the state or Federal Constitution. State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. 212, 59 So. 543; Whaley v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 499, 52 So. 941; Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247, 84 Am. Dec. 782; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749; Nos. 291, 292, and 293, October Term, 1912, being the Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard, Simpson v. Kennedy, and Simpson v. Shillaber) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, present term; State ex rel. Covington v. Thompson, 142 Ala. 98, 38 So. 679; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 32 L. ed. 377, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; Spraggins v. State, 183 Ala. 663, 63 So. 83; Worcester v. Norwich & W. R. Co. 109 Mass. 103; North Carolina Corp. Commission v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 139 N. C. 126, 51 S. E. 793; Industrial Siding Case, 140 N. C. 239, 52 S. E. 941; Dewey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 142 N. C. 392, 55 S. E. 292; Griffin v. Southern R. Co. 150 N. C. 312, 64 S. E. 16; State ex rel. Railroad & W. Commission v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co.; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson; Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co.; and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission,-supra. portionate cost to each for such location, or for the cost of construction, operation, and maintenance thereof, as provided in a supplemental order of this Commission, dated October 2, 1911, the Commission of this date, after having given notice to the defendant railroads, proceeded to fix the location of said station, and apportion the proportionate cost to each defendant railroad in the location and construction of the building, and the operation and maintenance thereof, as follows: The location of said station to be between Alabama avenue and Second avenue, and Nineteenth street and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. The proportionate part of each, in cost of site and construction, shall be proportioned to the receipts of each from passenger business, based upon passenger receipts for the past twelve months. The proportionate cost of operation and maintenance shall be on a wheelage basis. Therefore it is hereby ordered that the said Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, the Southern Railway Company, the Atlanta, Birmingham, & Atlantic Railroad Company, and S. L. Schoonmaker and H. M. Atkinson, 1eceivers, or either of them, proceed to the procurement of sufficient grounds within the boundaries above set out, and proceed with the construction of an adequate passenger station thereon, to be used jointly by the above set out railroad companies, and that work on the construction of said building shall commence within ninety (90) days, and shall be completed within six (6) months." Said § 5545, it is true, says the Commis- Schoonmaker and Atkinson are the resion, shall possess the authority to make ceivers of the Atlanta, Birmingham, & Atsuch order "when practicable or when the lantic Railroad Company, and we direct necessities of the case in the judgment of attention to the fact that said Atlanta, the Railroad Commission demands it." Birmingham, & Atlantic Railroad Company The words which we have italicized in the is made a party to this proceeding as well quoted portion of § 5545 must be read in as its said receivers. The first section of the light of the decisions of this court which the above-quoted order shows plainly that existed at the time the statute was enacted; this proceeding was directed against "the and, when so read, those words do not place defendant railroads," and that Schoonthe matter of making such orders within maker and Atkinson were brought into the the arbitrary and uncontrollable judgment case simply because of their relation to one of the Commission. Those words, when so of the defendant railroad companies as its read, require that the judgment of the receivers. The order which we have quoted Commission shall be reasonable, and when was made because "the defendant railroads, so read offend no provision of the state or having failed to report to the Commission Federal Constitution. When such an order of any agreement as to location or the prois made, however, the presumption is that portionate cost to each for such location, the order was reasonable unless the con- or for the cost of construction, operation, trary is shown either by the record itself and maintenance thereof." and for no other or by evidence aliunde. Authorities, supra. reason. In other words, this entire pro5. In the present case the order of the ceeding, from its inception, shows that the Railroad Commission was as follows: "In Railroad Commission had in mind, at all the above cause, the defendant railroads, times, and was proceeding against, at all having failed to report to the Commission' times, the railroads which maintain depots for the reception and discharge of passen- | much as the statutes are penal, and regers at Bessemer, and that the names of ceivers are not specially mentioned, the Schoonmaker and Atkinson, as receivers, courts could not stretch the statutes and were brought into this proceeding because by implication include receivers. This case it is through them, as such receivers, that is a very thorough discussion of the subject the particular railroad is now being oper- and quotes at some length from the opinion ated. We deem it well, also, at this point of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of to say that the words "or either of them," United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, which we have italicized in the above- 5 L. ed. 37." quoted order, where they appear, evidently refer to Schoonmaker and Atkinson only. The order, as we understand it, is an order operating jointly upon all the railroad companies, and the words "and S. L. Schoonmaker and H. M. Atkinson, receivers, or either of them," simply mean that the Railroad Commission ordered that Schoonmaker and Atkinson, or either one of them, should, on the part of the railroad of which they were the receivers, comply with the order. It is contended by appellees, and in this contention they seem to have been upheld by the court below, that said § 5545 of the Code is highly penal, and that, as said § 5545 does not in terms include receivers of railroads within its provisions, the order requiring the Atlanta, Birmingham, & Atlantic Railroad Company and Atkinson and Schoonmaker, its receivers, to join in the acquisition of the land needed for the station, and to join in the construction of the union passenger station, is void, and that therefore the order of the Commission requiring the construction of the station by appellees is altogether invalid. In order that the contention of appellees on this subject may be well understood, we quote the following from one of the briefs of counsel for appellees: "This order of the Railroad Commission attempts to put this burden upon the receivers of the Atlanta, Birmingham, & Atlantic Railroad, regardless of the statute, and absolutely ignoring the words and terms of the statute. This statute cannot be extended or stretched by the Railroad Commission of the state, or by the courts of the state, so as to include the receivers in the order. In fact, the very principle for which we contend, in this case, on this point, has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. United States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305, 44 L. ed. 780, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609. In that case the court had under consideration the construction of §§ 4386-4388, and 4389 of the Revised Statutes. These statutes impose certain penalties upon any company, owner, or custodian of cattle who fails to feed, water, and rest the cattle as provided by the statutes. The question arose as to whether or not the statutes included receivers. Receivers are not mentioned in the statutes, and the court held that inas The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Harris, above cited, expresses the views of this court as to the manner in which penal statutes should be construed. In that case the court held, and we think properly, that a receiver could not be held to the payment of a penalty under the terms of an act which provided, for its violation, only a penalty against a railroad company. The court, however, pointed out that the construction which was placed upon the act did not defeat the purpose of the act, even when a railroad is in the hands of a receiver, for, said the court, "it does not, therefore, follow that the statute in question would be without operation where railroads are in the hands of receivers. The owners and custodians of the stock would still remain subject to the punishment prescribed." In concluding its opinion in said case, the court reaffirmed, as the true rule which should always govern the construction of penal statutes, the following, taken from the language of Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wiltberger, supra: "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial, department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment. It is said that, notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the lawmaker must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. But this is not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the ancient maxim and amounts to this: That, though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly, as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legis lature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one, indeed, the receiver, for most purposes, stands in which would justify a court in departing the place of the corporation, exercising its from the plain meaning of words, especially general powers, asserting its rights, conin a penal act, in search of an intention trolling its property, carrying out the obwhich the words themselves did not sug-jects for which it was created, discharging gest." the public duties resting upon it, and rep The rule in this state is that penal stat-resenting the interests as well of those who utes are to be strictly construed, but not so own the railroad as of those who have strictly as to defeat the obvious intention claims against the corporation or its propof the legislature. Reese v. State, 73 Ala. erty. The corporation remains in existence 18; Scott v. State, 152 Ala. 63, 44 So. 544. notwithstanding a provisional receivership The plainly indicated intention of the leg- established by an order of court; and for islature, in passing that part of the act the purpose of effectuating the will of the approved February 23, 1907 (Gen. Acts state, as manifested by the act of 1890, an 1907, pp. 117-129, inclusive), and which is action against the receiver, arising out of now § 5545 of the Code, is expressed in his management of the property, may be its first few lines as follows: "Any two or regarded as one against the corporation 'in more railroads which enter any city or the hands of' or 'in the possession of the town may be required, when practicable, receiver." See further, on this subject, or when the necessities of the case in the Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. judgment of the Railroad Commission de- R. Co. (C. C.) 26 Fed. 12; Hornsby v. mands it, to have and maintain one com- Eddy, 5 C. C. A. 560, 12 U. S. App. 404, mon or union passenger station for the 56 Fed. 461; Indianapolis, C. & L. R. Co. security, accommodation, and convenience v. Ray, 51 Ind. 269. of the traveling public." We direct attention also to the fact that said § 5545 is a section included in chapter 129 of the Code of 1907, and § 5507 of the Code, which is also a part of the same chapter, provides that "unless clearly otherwise apparent from the context, the term 'railroad company' as used in this chapter, includes any person or corporation owning or operating a railroad." It seems clear, therefore, that not only does § 5545 of the Code show, by its very terms, the legislative purpose, but also when read in connection with said § 5507, the language of which we have quoted and in places italicized, that receiv-| authority of the Railroad Commission does ers of railroad companies are brought di- not extend to the making of a law for the rectly within the letter of said § 5545. city of Bessemer, but it does validly extend Acts which are in pari materia must be to the determination of the question as to read and construed together, and § 5545 of when an already existing law shall go into the Code, read and construed in connection operation at that particular point. Whaley with said § 5507 of the Code, clearly em- v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 499, braces, within its terms, in truth, within 52 So. 941; State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. its letter, the receivers of railroad compa-212, 59 So. 543; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. nies as well as railroad corporations or 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716; Isenhour v. State, companies not in the hands of receivers. Powell v. Sherwood, 162 Mo. 605, 63 S. W. 485; Peirce v. Van Dusen, 69 L.R.A. 705, 24 C. C. A. 280, 47 U. S. App. 339, 78 Fed. 693. In fact, the above interpretation of said § 5545 of the Code appears to be the only one which can be reasonably given to it. As was said by Harlan, Circuit Judge, in Peirce v. Van Dusen, supra, in an opinion which was concurred in by Taft and Lurton, Circuit Judges: "The appointment of a receiver of a railroad does not change the title to the property nor work a dissolution of the corporation. Although the creature of the court, and acting under its orders, 6. Section 5545 of the Code of 1907 is therefore, in our opinion, in all of its parts a valid general law of this state, and is operative upon all railroad companies, whether those companies are in the hands of receivers or not. As the legislature cannot remain in continuous session and thus determine for itself when that section shall become operative in our various cities and towns, it has, under the legal limitations to which we have above referred, conferred that power upon the Railroad Commission, which, in the administration of this law, is an arm of the state government. The 157 Ind. 517, 87 Am. St. Rep. 228, 62 N. E. 40; Pierce v. Doolittle, 130 Iowa, 333, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 143, 106 N. W. 751. Conceding, therefore, as upon this appeal we must, that the order of the Railroad Commission to the appellees to build a union passenger station at Bessemer was based upon a proper finding of fact and that it was regularly made, then, when that order was made, said § 5545 of the Code went into operation at Bessemer and became as much the law of this state as applied to the city of Bessemer as if, by a special act, the legislature of Alabama had passed a valid special local law requiring a union passenger station to be built at Fed. Stat. Anno. vol. 4, p. 387, and au thorities cited in the notes to that section); and under this section it is generally held that previous leave of the court in which the receiver was appointed, to sue a receiver, is necessary only when the suit involves the actual custody or control by the receiver of the property, or a part of the property, of which he is in possession or control as such receiver. High, Receivers, 4th ed. p. 542, § 395b. Bessemer by all of the railroads entering | previous leave of the court in which such that city. Authorities above cited. It is receiver or manager was appointed" (see not merely by virtue of the will of the Railroad Commission that a union passenger station must be built at Bessemer, "but because of the legislative will duly expressed in a statute evidencing that will." Said § 5545 of the Code of 1907 has therefore, in the manner provided by the legislature, been placed in operation at the city of Bessemer, and said section is a general law of this state. It is the duty of all persons who receive protection at the hands of the law to obey it. Recognizing the binding. necessity of this truism, the Congress of the United States has expressly declared that "whenever, in any cause pending in any court of the United States, there shall be a receiver or manager in possession of any property, such receiver or manager shall manage and operate such property, according to the requirements of the valid laws of the state in which such property shall be situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof." 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. p. 386, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1047. If, therefore, the receivers of the Atlanta, Birmingham, & Atlantic Railroad Company are acting under the appointment and supervision of a Federal court, they are bound, under the express mandates of a Federal statute which pro vides a penalty for its nonobservance, to obey the valid laws of this state. In fact, we discard from consideration the suggestion that any court would even permit one of its servants or officers, over whose acts it has plenary control, to merely neglect to obey, much less to openly violate, the terms of a valid law. - The appellees, in support of their contention that the application for the writ of mandamus in this case is defective because of its failure to allege that previous leave of the court in which the receiver was appointed, to the institution of this suit, was obtained, refer us to the cases of Morse v. Tackaberry, Tex. Civ. App. -, 134 S. W. 273, which was a suit for the recovery of land from a receiver; Galveston, H. & H. R. Co. v. Pennefather, Tex. Civ. App. 126 S. W. 951, which was a suit upon a cause of action which arose before the receiver was appointed; Bennett v. Northern P. R. Co. 17 Wash. 534, 50 Pac. 496, which was an action to quiet the title to lands; Smith v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 151 Mo. 397, 48 L.R.A. 368, 52 S. W. 378, which was a suit upon a cause of action which arose before the appointment of the receiver; McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327, 35 L. ed. 796, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11, in which it was determined that a receiver was suable on a cause of action which arose through the act of a prior receiver; Buckhannon & N. R. Co. v. Davis, 68 C. C. A. 345, 135 Fed. 707, in which the court held that lands in the hands of a receiver could not be condemned without leave of the court in which the receiver was appointed; Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. (C. C.) 59 Fed. 523, and to Central Trust Co. v. Third Ave. R. Co. (C. C.) 181 Fed. 282, in which cases it was held that funds in the hands of a receiver could 7. This proceeding in no way involves not be reached by process of garnishment the actual custody or control of the re- without leave of the court in which the ceivers of the Atlanta, Birmingham, & At- receiver was appointed. An extensive exlantic Railroad Company over the property amination of those cases and of other auof said railroad company. It undertakes thorities referred to by appellees in their to take no property from them whatsoever. briefs convinces us that they have no apIt simply undertakes to compel the receiv- plicability to the instant case. The presers, in their operation of the railroad of ent suit was instituted for the purpose of which they are receivers, to obey a valid compelling receivers, in the administration law of this state. The Congress of the of the affairs of a corporation in this state, United States has declared that "every re- to obey laws which they are neglecting to ceiver or manager of any property, ap- obey, and for which neglect they are liable pointed by any court of the United States, to a penalty. In the case of Ft. Dodge v. may be sued in respect of any act or trans- Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 87 Iowa, 389, action of his in carrying on the business 54 N. W. 243, the supreme court of Iowa, connected with such property, without the 'by a writ of mandamus, required the re The courts of this union, state and Federal, have one common purpose in view, viz., the due, open, honest, and impartial administration of the law, and there can be no conflict when the law itself is plain. Felton v. Ackerman, C. C. A. 457, 22 U. S. App. 154, 61 Fed. 228. |