tion case as belonging to the petitioner's ancestors, and conse-
quently one to which the ordinary law of limitation was appli-
cable; as however, during the investigation, no notice was taken
of the settlement proceedings, but the case proceeded on the
merits, and a decree adverse to special appellant was arrived at,
no ground for interfering with that decision in special appeal
exists. (See Act XIII. 1848, No. 4.)

570-573

15. Defendant having shewn that the disputed land before 1765
and ever since was never mal, plea of limitation was valid, 650-651
16. Plaintiff did not show his possession within 12 years of the
suit. Order of the lower court upheld,

17.

Judgment of the lower court, in dismissal of appellant's suit
as barred by limitation, affirmed, as there was no proof that the
land in dispute had been in possession of those from whom ap-
pellant derived her title, or that she had ever obtained posses-
sion of the land as alleged by her,

18. Held that the principal sudder ameen, on the plea of limita-
tion being raised in a case, in which dispossession and pre-
vious possession on the part of plaintiff are alleged, should have
looked solely to the plaintiff's evidence and declared from it
whether he was within time in bringing his suit; and that a re-
ference to the possession of defendant if the plaintiff was not
within time was irregular and superfluous; further, that the
judge's decision is informal also, and that, as special appellant
now urges that he has not had the advantage of having his title
thoroughly examined in the court of first instance, he is entitled
to that as a legal right.

Case remitted to the judge, with directions that he remand it to
the court of first instance, for a full investigation on the merits
of the case,

19. A suit was instituted by (plaintiff) respondent to acquire a
share in certain villages by right of inheritance. The villages
in question had been settled with the plaintiff's mother during
her minority; and the institution of this suit, fourteen years
after the year of plaintiff's majority, was said to be justified on
the plea of unjust possession, under Section VII., Regulation
II. of 1805.

Plaintiff, asserting that the defendant held the land on a wrongful
title and knowing this infringement of her right, suffered more
than 12 years to elapse before she brought her claim into court;
but it was held that plaintiff was bound to set forth some act of
dishonesty by which she was originally over-reached and was
subsequently prevented seeking redress; and no such cause
being pleaded, the suit is dismissed,

20. The claim to recover a paternal estate brought into question
the actual possessor's deed of transfer from the party who pur-
chased the estate from claimant's father. That deed was re-
gistered, and the occupant had been in undisputed possession
upwards of 12 years. Held that the suit was barred by limita-

tion,

21. The plaintiff averred dispossession at some time in a certain
month, after some date in which his suit would have been barr-
ed by limitation.

700

707

772

804

815

Held by the majority that the non-specification of the date was
fatal to the suit,

22. Government sues Musst. Shuruffutoonissa and others for a
declaration of its right to bring to sale certain property, alleged
to be covered by a deed of sale in lieu of dower, with a view to
realise sums due as costs incurred before the Privy Council, by
the setting aside, as fraudulent, of the alleged deed of sale in
lieu of dower, and also by the reversal of a summary order of
the Sudder Court, dated 31st January 1838, confirming the pos-
session of the defendant.

Defendant pleads the statute of limitations in bar of the claim,
more than 12 years having elapsed between the date of the order
of the Sudder Court, to reverse which the present action is
brought, and that of the institution of the present suit.
Government replies that the ordinary statute of limitations docs
not apply, but that the present case is governed by Section II.,
Regulation II. of 1805, according to which special law 60 years
is laid down as the term in which claims of a public nature like
the present are cognizable.

Held by the majority of the Court, for reasons stated, that
Section II., Regulation II. of 1805 refers to public claims, that
is, to those claims which under the law the Executive Govern-
ment is entitled to make upon the property of its subjects for
the demands of the State or otherwise, to all direct demands of
the State upon all subjects for the revenue due by them, from
whatever source that revenue may be acquired, and also to all
claims connected with the provision of the Company's invest-
ment and all other commercial or financial claims of the
public.

Held also by the majority that the subject of the present claim
is an ordinary judgment debtor, and does not fall within the
category of public claims above enumerated; that consequently
it falls under the ordinary law of procedure applicable to such
claims in this country; and as more than 12 years had elapsed
from the date of the summary order of the Court, dated 31st
January 1839 at the period of the institution of the present
suit, it is barred under Section XIV., Regulation III. of 1793.
Decision of the lower court reversed, with costs,

...

23. Held that, as the lower courts have failed to enquire into the
main allegation urged by defendants, special appellants, viz.
that from 1804 to the present time they have remained in
possession of the property not as mortgagees but as proprietors,
an allegation which, if proved, puts plaintiff out of court, the
decisions of those courts are most defective. The case there-
fore is remanded, in order that a full enquiry may be made into
the titles set up by both parties, and such an application of the
statute of limitations be made as the result of the inquiries
instituted may seem to demand,

24. Judgment of lower court, in dismissal of appellant's suits as
barred by limitation, affirmed in appeal,

818

857

910

945-916

25. A special appeal was admitted to try whether, in the case of
an endowment, where the proceeds are appropriated to the dis-

charge of a religious trust, the ordinary principle of the law of
limitation is applicable.

1028

Held that in this case the property was not wukf, that is, property
devoted to the deity on relinquishment of proprietary right,
but that it was property claimed by inheritance and subject to
certain trusts, and thus, in regard to the parties interested in
the inheritance, the ordinary law of limitation would apply.
Case however remanded for trial of an issue, raised by the plead-
ings, not adjudicated, viz. up to what date plaintiff received an
allowance, which would affect the date of the cause of action,
and thus the application of the law of limitation,
26. Plea raised in special appeal, upon the point of limitation,
disallowed, as the action was protected by the pendency of a
previous suit for the same matter, which had been nonsuited,... 1069
27. Appeal dismissed; plaintiff having specifically pleaded in his
plaint that he brought his case under Section II., Regulation
II. of 1805, and having adduced no proof of having been dis-
possessed by fraud or violence sufficient to bring his case within
the provisions of that special law,
28. Held that, under the law of limitation, the period for bring-
ing a suit to enforce the fulfilment of an ikrarnama should be
calculated from the time when the defendants publicly opposed
the plaintiffs' claim, and not from the date of a subsequent order,
passed by the collector, striking off the plaintiffs' application
for registration,

29. Where an appeal against an order in a case of settlement
was preferred, first to the Board and then to Government, held
that limitation, under Act XIII. of 1848, must run from the
date of the Board's order, as the appeal to Government was not
provided for by law.

Held also that Act XIII. of 1848 refers to settlement awards
made by the Soonderbuns Commissioner.
30. In a suit, where parties, alleging themselves co-partners,
seek to separate their shares by a butwara, no question of limi-
tation can form an issue; for they must necessarily prove their
actual possession, or submit to a nonsuit. Special appeal
rejected,

31. A decree having been given in the Supreme Court in favour
of a nephew against his two uncles for his 3rd share and for
personalty and mesne profits, the property allotted to the latter
by partition was made answerable for satisfaction of the debt.
The estate in suit having been sold in execution as within the
uncles' share and bought by plaintiffs, possession of it was sued
for from them, on the ground that it was the uncles' property.
But on proof of its alienation by them prior to the institution of
the suit in the Supreme Court, and of the defendants' bonâ fide
possession for upwards of 12 years before the final award in
that court, and as defendants had not been parties to the suit
in question, the claim of plaintiffs was dismissed, in affirmation
of the judgment of the lower court,

32. The order of the judge, in rejection of the plea in bar found-
ed upon limitation, was reversed, as plaintiff's could get the

1076

1078

1205

1273

1291

benefit neither of the special law, Regulation II. of 1805, nor of
minority,

...

33. Plaintiff's ancestors are the rajas of Pachete, a property
which by law and usage of the family constitutes a raj, and de-
scends entire to a single heir, to the exclusion of the other
members of the family, who only receive maintenance. One of
the rajas in 1180 B. E. made a grant of pergunnah Kaseepore
to one Ramchurn Lal, a relation of his. Time went on, and a
subsequent raja brought a suit to reverse the grant, on the
ground that a grant for maintenance did not bind the successor
of the grantor. The case went to England, and eventually was
decided in the raja's favour. Whilst the suit for resumption
was pending, the grantor instituted a suit against the ancestor
of the defendant in this suit for 2,500 beegas of land, as belong-
ing to his estate pergunnah Kaseepore, and he obtained a decree
for the same. After the plaintiff's ancestor had obtained a decree
for the resumption of Kaseepore, he petitioned in execution to
be substituted in the place of the grantee, as the property of
Kaseepore had reverted to him. This was not granted, and he
has therefore brought this suit for the 2,500 beegas, belonging
to pergunnah Kaseepore, in the possession of the defendant.
Held by the Court that the statute of limitations does not bar the
plaintiff's claim, as on a correct calculation only nine years and
seven months had run against the plaintiff.

Held also that the land in dispute belongs to plaintiff, and that
defendant has all along been in possession, that plaintiff is
clearly entitled to mesne profits, and that the mean sum of
rupees 500 founded by the lower court seems as near an approxi-
mation to correctness as is under the circumstances likely to be
arrived at.

Decree of the lower court affirmed, with this variation that interest
upon mesne profits accruing prior to suit is granted only from
the date of the institution of the suit, and interest upon mesne
profits, accruing during the pendency of the suit, year by year,
from the commencement of the following year to the date of
realisation. Costs of both courts to be borne by (defendant,)
appellant,

34. Where money was lent with promise of a further loan, when
the transaction was to be considered one of conditional mort-
gage, which promise was never fulfilled, held that the original
loan being recoverable only as a debt, this case was barred by
the law of limitation,

35. Held that, when a plaintiff pleads a special law of limitation,
he is bound to shew the particular fraud or violence by reason
of which he claims the protection of that law.

Held also that dispossession as on a particular date having been
pleaded, that point should have been adjudicated.
Held that, under Section XIV. Regulation III. of 1793, and Sec-
tion III. Regulation II. of 1805, burden of proof of disposses-
sion is on plaintiff,

1402

1441

1491

1680-1681

36. Held that, in claims like the present, that is, for a balance
of current rent unsatisfied by the sale of the tenures themselves,
the statute of limitations runs only from the date of sale, the

N

date on which the tenures were proved to be insufficient to meet
the demands upon them, and on which the balances became a
personal debt of the individual putneedars, as regards parties
alleged to be severally clothed with the legal and equitable
ownership in the properties.

Case remanded for investigation with reference to the above
remarks,

37. Held by the majority of the Court that, on the pleadings in
this case, as plaintiffs sue for possession, alleging as the cause
of action an act of dispossession occurring nearly 12 years before
the institution of the suit, and as defendants in possession deny
the act of dispossession and plead continued possession on
their part and the statute of limitations in bar of the plaintiffs'
claim, it is incumbent on plaintiffs, the party out of possession,
to prove that their cause of action actually arose at the time
stated by them so as to bring them within time, before the
merits of the case can be entered on.

Held also by the majority that, as plaintiffs have failed to prove
their dispossession and previous possession within 12 years
before the institution of the present suit, it is barred by the
statute of limitations.

The decision of the lower court reversed, and the plaintiffs' suit
dismissed, with costs,

38. Held that a party who seeks to avoid a plea of limitation,
raised against his claim, is bound to show distinctly in his plead-
ings, by clear specification of dates, how the plea is to be
avoided,

39. Question raised first, whether a suit, not having been
brought within 12 years from the date of a summary order
which the plaintiff required to be set aside, be not barred by
the lapse of time: but it was held that, as the last day of the
12 years was a close holiday and the plaint was presented on
the first open court day, the suit was within time.
Held also that, as special appellant intimated to the lower court
his relinquishment of a plea which ascribed the date of plain-
tiff's cause of action to a hibanama earlier than the summary
order, that point cannot be re-opened,

1688

1696

1762

1777

Review of Judgment, Nos. 27, 40, 53.