We think therefore his decision defective in this respect; and remand the case, in order that he may, either from the evidence before him, or other proof to be called for, as to the precise date of plaintiffs' dispossession, find specifically the date from which he may consider the cause of action to have arisen, and how the law of limitation may apply, according to that finding. THE 4TH SEPTEMBER 1858. PRESENT: Review as admitted, an important had not been notice of the Court when the case was tried. Petitions for Review of Judgment passed by Messrs. C. B. Trevor G. Loch, and H. V. Bayley, in Cases No. 191 and 192 of 1857, dated 24th February 1858. AFZULUNNISSA KHANUM, (Respondent,) PETITIONER, versus SHEIKH MEHDEE ALEE AND OTHERS, (APPELLANTS,) Vakeels of Petitioner-Baboos Shumbhoonath Pundit Vakeel of the Opposite Party-None. By the decision of this Court, dated 24th February 1858, (page 292 of Sudder Decisions,) the special appellants, being the representdocument filed atives of Musst. Mehedee Begum, were released from the petiwith the record tioner's claim, on the ground that though Mehedee Begum had brought to the previously filed a petition in the civil court of Patna, offering to become liable for the debt of her husband, her offer had never been accepted by the petitioner who was the plaintiff in the case; and as it was only a simple offer requiring plaintiff's sanction to convert it into a contract, without such sanction the special appellants could not be held responsible. The petitioner now comes up for a review, on the ground that through an oversight her acceptance of the offer was not brought to the notice of the Court. Her acceptance is fully detailed in the lower court's decision of 7th October 1853, which is filed with the record. The counsel then proceeded to read the decision of the lower court abovementioned. As that decision clearly shows that Mehedee Begum had rendered herself liable for the debts of her husband, we admit the review. Application for Review of Judgment passed by Messrs. C. B. Trevor, G. Loch, and H. V. Bayley, in case No. 388 of 1854, decided on the 11th December 1857. TEKAYET JUGOMOHUN SINGH, (PLAINTIFF,) PETITIONER, versus RAJA LEELANUND SINGH, (RESPONDENT,) Opposite PARTY. Vakeel of Petitioner-Baboo Taruknath Sein. Vakeel of the Opposite Party-None. A PETITION for review has been filed in this case by the appellant Tekayet Jugmohun Singh, on the plea that a ghatwally tenure when once created is given in perpetuity, and that the ghatwal cannot be dismissed from office capriciously. Petition for review rejected, as the nature of a ghatwally tenure and in what respect a mookururee or perpetual lease were fully discussed when As the nature of a ghatwally tenure, and in what respects it differs from a mookururee or perpetual lease, were fully discussed it differs from when the case was first before us, and the distinction is clearly laid down in our decision of 11th December 1857, in which also we pointed out how, when the necessity for the service ceases, the zemindar might dismiss the servant and resume the land, and no fresh arguments are now laid before us, we do not think that there are any grounds for admitting a review; and we therefore reject the petition. Was the case Court and no ments have now been advanced. mistake in a decision re Application for Review of Judgment passed by Messrs. C. B. Trevor, G. Loch, and H. V. Bayley, in case No. 118 of 1855, decided on the 22nd December 1857. BYJNATH RAM, (RESPONDENt,) Petitioner, versus THAKOOR RAMKISHEN SINGH, (APPELLANT,) OPPOSITE Vakeel of Petitioner-Baboo Bhoobunmohun Roy. Held that a AN application for review of judgment has been made by the respondent, petitioner, to correct an error in the decision of this Court of 22nd December 1857, (page 1863 of Sudder Decisions,) charging the respondent with the whole costs of appeal. The costs should have been charged to both parties, in proportion, to the amount of the claim decreed and dismissed. garding costs cient ground for a review of judgement, as is not a suffi an error of this kind can al rected by an application, either verbal or by petition, to the Court. We do not think an error, such as that pointed out by the petiways be cor- tioner, a sufficient ground for review of judgment. Such errors in the decisions of this Court can always be corrected by application of the parties or their counsel to the Court, either verbally or by petition, and the Court will then, in the presence of both parties, rectify what is an evident error. In the present case, we direct that the costs of the appeal from the decision of the principal sudder ameen, decided by us on 22nd December last, be charged rateably to the parties in proportion to the amount of the claim decreed and dismissed; but the petitioner will bear the costs of his application for review, as there are no grounds for admitting it. Applications for Review of Judgment passed by Messrs. C. B. Trevor, G. Loch, and H. V. Bayley, in cases Nos. 83 and 322 of 1854, decided on the 31st March 1858. BIKROMAJEET SINGH AND OTHERS, (APPELLANTS,) PETITIONERS, versus SOOBUDRA BEEBEE AND OTHERS, (RESPONDENTS,) Vakeels of Petitioners-Baboos Ramapersad Roy and Vakeel of Respondent-Baboo Kishenkishore Ghose. Soobudra Beebee versus Mohebnarain Singh, Bikramajeet Singh, and others, Sudder Dewanny Decisions of 1858, page 542. Two applications have this day been Petition for filed by Baboo Shumbhoonath Pundit on review rejectthe part of Mohebnarain Roy and Bikra- ed, as the points now majeet Singh, praying for a review of the, taken up order of this Court, passed inthe case noted were urged in the margin. The grounds on which the review is demanded are:First. That the evidence did not prove the general agency of Mohebnarain, and as the Court has not proceeded upon the special agency of Mohebnarain for the purchase of the property in suit, no agency of any sort was proved. The law therefore applied by the Court, which would be good had the agency been proved, in the absence of that proof is erroneous. Secondly. That under the precedent of the 18th April 1857, as Baboo Bhowaneepertab noted in the margin, the bona fides of the transfer from Brijlal Opadhya to the plaintiff of the property should have been fully Singh versus Ranee Komul bas Koour. enquired into. And thirdly, that in a decision dated 13th May 1858, three Mudhoosoodun Pal Chow- judges of this Court ruled in a case exactly similar to the present that a fraud of the nature of that admitted by Brijlal Opadhya was fatal to his claim. dree versus Shumhhoochunder Singh and others, Deci sions of 1858, page 999. We entered at such great length into the facts and law of the case when it was first before us, that we think it unnecessary to с when the case was first before the Court, and, in the opinion of the Court, to which it still of no validity. adheres, were enter into them again. Suffice it to remark, that the Court proceeded entirely upon the facts proved as to Mohebnarain's being the agent of Brijlal Opadhya and the purchaser of the property in suit. The first ground consequently fails. On the second, we observe that, in the case of 18th April 1857, the reversionary rights of the defendant were directly affected by the sale set up. It was consequently of the first importance that the bona fides of that transaction should be enquired into. In the present case, there is nothing of that nature. The rights of the defendant in this case are in no wise affected by the transfer from Brijlal Opadhya to the plaintiff. The alleged resemblance therefore between the two cases is not founded on fact, and the argument founded on that allegation falls. The case which has been brought to our notice as having been decided by three judges of this Court on the 13th May last, in no way resembles this case; but it is one in which the defendant attempts to avoid the consequence of a deed executed by him in fraud of his creditors. It consequently is unnecessary for us to say more than that we entirely concur in the decision passed in the special appeal, by which the defendant is not allowed to avoid the consequence of his own fraudulent act. On the whole, we would observe that not the slighest argument has been advanced in justification of the present application; but the time of the Court has been occupied in hearing arguments which were urged and rejected when the case was first before it. These applications are rejected, with costs. |