shewn in a list at the foot of the deed. As the plaintiffs have brought their action under this kubooleut, the petitioners, although the period of the lease has expired, are responsible only for the rent under its express terms. We therefore amend the decree of the judge, making the petitioners liable only for rupees 159-12, the net jumma under the lease, at which rate the balance against them will be calculated. The costs will be awarded against the petitioners in proportion. Special Appeal from the decision of Mr. R. N. Farquharson, Judge MUSST. JANEE KHANUM AND OTHERS, (DEFENDANTS,) versus LUCHMEENARAIN AND OTHERS, (PLAINTIFFS,) Vakeel of Appellants-Moulvee Aftaboodeen Mahomed. Mr. B. J. COLVIN." The particulars of this case are set forth in the judge's decision, copy of which is annexed*. I admit the special No. 29 OF 1853. PATNA, THE 19TH JUNE 1857. Appeal from the decision of Moulvee Mahomed Nazim Khan, Principal Sudder Ameeen of Patna, dated the 11th May 1853. Musst. Janee Khanum, mother and guardian of Imam Alee Khan, Musst. Qadhee Begum, Muneeya Begum, and Pearee Begum, minors, and Nowab Mobarukooddowlah, (Defendants,) Appellants, versus Luchmeenarain, (Plaintiff,) Respondent. CLAIM to rupees 2,000, principal, and rupees 738 interest, in all, rupees 2,738, due on a bond or bhurnanama, dated the 27th of December 1848, corresponding with the 17th Poos 1256 F. S. Instituted on the 23rd January 1852. appeal, to try whether security, under Regulation XIV. of 1829, was demandable from petitioners when they had property within the jurisdiction of the Patna court, which was security for the debt on bond, for the recovery of which this suit has been instituted." Mr. H. T. RAIKES." I see no illegality in the judge's order to warrant the admission of a special appeal in this case." JUDGMENT The This appears to us to furnish quite an exceptional case. appellants, it is admitted, are by birth residents of Oude; but as it happened that, about one year and a half before the judge's decision was pronounced, the kingdom of Oude, as a foreign territory, had ceased to exist, we think that the provision of Regulation XIV. of 1829 (if otherwise bearing on the case) cannot be held applicable. We therefore set aside the judge's decision, and remand the case that the appeal may be heard on its merits. The principal sudder ameen decreed in favour of the plaintiff, Luchmeenarain. The judge dismissed the appeal, because no security had been given by appellants under Section II. Regulation XIV. of 1829, they being residents of a foreign country. The Sudder Court returned the case to consider whether their (the appellants') plea, that they are also residents and householders of Patna, should not free them from this liability. The judge, without, it seems, entering on this enquiry, took security and reversed the principal sudder ameen's decision. The (plaintiff) respondent then appealed, on the ground of the security not having been filed within the six weeks required by Section II. Regulation XIV. of 1829. On this the Sudder Court remanded the case, for enquiry as to whether security was necessarily demandable under Section II. Regulation XIV. of 1829, pointing out that, if so demandable, the appeal should not have been received. JUDGMENT. The point to be considered here is simply whether the appellants Musst. Janee Khanum and others were legally bound to furnish security, that is, whether, for the prosecution of their appeal against the principal sudder ameen's decision of the 11th of May 1853, compliance with the provisions of Section II. Regulation XIV. of 1829 was absolutely necessary according to the rules and practice of the courts. It appears that, in their durkhast appeal of the 10th June 1853, and in the vakalutnama accompanying, the appellants style themselves "residents of the kingdom of Lucknow." Construction No. 1355, clearly lays down that the possession of lands and other property within the limits of the British territories does not absolve residents of a foreign state from finding security under the provisions of Regulation XIV. of 1829. It is evident therefore that the plea of the appellants, that they, as holding house and other property in Patna were not bound to give security as residents of a foreign country, cannot hold good. The date of their appeal was the 10th of June 1853, the entry of their security was not made till 29th of June 1855, the provisions of Section II. Regulation XIV. of 1829, therefore, were not observed, and the appeal, under the precedent* quoted by the Sudder Dewanny in their remand of the 24th of June 1856, could not be received. The appeal is therefore dismissed, with costs chargeable to appellants. *No. 1855, Dr. Wise, Appellant. Special Appeal from the decision of Moulvee Ahmed Buksh Khan, BHYRUBCHUNDER SURMA RAE (ONE OF THE DEFEND- versus JADUBCHUNDER SURMA AND SHIBCHUNDER SURMA, THIS case was admitted to special appeal on the 1st February 1858, under the following certificate recorded by Messrs. A. Sconce late court and J. S. Torrens. This suit was instituted by Jadubram Surma and another, to establish their right to half of the property left by one Hurkishore, deceased. The moonsiff dismissed the suit; and between the date of dismissal and the filing of the appeal, the property in question having been sold in execution of a decree passed against Golukmonee Debea, widow of Hurkishore, the plaintiff made the present petitioner a respondent in the appeal. "The principal sudder ameen has held, in opposition to the moonsiff, that the debt, on account of which the execution sale occurred, had been contracted by the widow personally; and considering that an absolute sale is opposed to the life interest enjoyed by a Hindoo widow, he sets aside the purchase of this petitioner, and declares plaintiffs entitled to acquire possession of the share sued for on her death. "The ground of special appeal is that, even upon the facts found by the principal sudder ameen, petitioner's possession, under the sale of the rights and interests of Golukmonee Debea, should not be disturbed during her life time, as her life interest was capable of being sold. "We admit the special appeal to try that point." The lower appellate having can celled the sale of the rights and interests of a widow in certain property, on the ground that she had only in it, his order a life interest was reversed, as such life interest might be sold. The execu JUDGMENT. Kishenchunder Surma had gained a decree against Sooburna Debea and Golukmunee Debea, for rupees 36-8; and while the present suit, brought by Jadubram Surma, for the estate of Hurkishore, husband of Golukmonee, was pending, the rights and interests of the above widows were sold in satisfaction of Kishenchunder's decree and bought by petitioner. On the dismissal of Jadubram's suit by the moonsiff, he appealed and made petitioner a respondent. The principal sudder ameen has reversed the sale, on the ground of the debt being a personal one of the widows, and given Jadubram a decree to take effect on their death. It does not appear who Sooburna is, but she is said by petitioner's pleader to be not concerned in the present case, the order on which is therefore only relative to Golukmonee. As her rights and interests in the estate of Hurkishore were only sold, and she has a life interest in it, the order of the principal sudder ameen, reversing the sale absolutely, is wrong. We therefore amend his order, by affirming the sale of the rights and interests of Golukmonee in satisfaction of the decree of Kishenchunder Surma for her life time. Petitioner will get costs from plaintiff in this suit. Special Appeal from the decision of Mr. H. T. Thompson, Principal Sudder Ameen of East Burdwan, dated 15th July 1857, affirming a decree of Baboo Judoonath Mullick, Sudder Moonsiff of that district, dated 5th August 1856. MANIK LAL BABOO, (PLAINTIFF,) APPELLANT, versus TARACHAND MUNDUL, (DEFENDANT,) RESPONDENT. Vakeel of Respondent-Baboo Baneemadhub Banerjee. THIS case was admitted to special appeal on the 31st March tion of a deed, 1858, under the following cetificate recorded by Messrs. B. J. Colvin and J. S. Torrens. and that its terms were those of an absolute sale, being admit "Petitioner was plaintiff in a suit for real property sold to him by defendant, by whom he alleged it had been retaken as a jote. it was for the "Defence was that the land had only been pledged conditionally. ted, held that "The lower courts dismissed the suit, holding that the onus pro- vendor to bandi rested with petitioner. prove that the transaction sale. "The special plea is that it rested with special respondent, as was only one he admitted the execution of the deed, and therefore proof of of conditional its only being one of pledge was with him, for, if it were a conditional sale only, the usual ikrar would be in his hands. "We admit the appeal to try the point." JUDGMENT. It is admitted before us that the terms of the deed are those of an absolute sale. It was not therefore requisite for petitioner to prove this point, but for defendant, who notwithstanding the terms to the above effect, asserted the intention to be only a conditional sale, to establish his plea. The lower courts were, for this reason, wrong to dismiss the petitioner's suit for default on his part to produce the witnesses in support of the absolute sale. We accordingly, in reversal of the judgment below, remand the case to the first court for re-trial with reference to the foregoing remarks. Special Appeal from the decision of Baboo Gobindchunder Bidya- ABOO TORAB AND SUFDUR ALEE, (TWO OF THE versus ABDOOL HAMEED, (PLAINTIFF,) AND DABEERAM AND Vakeels of Appellants-Moulvee Ahmed Alee and Roy Vakeel of Respondents- None. THIS case was admitted to special appeal on the 11th June 1856, Plaintiff under the following certificate recorded by Messrs. A. Sconce and sued for C. B. Trevor. re covery of excess land |