not arise. As, from the foregoing statement, it would appear that special which the special appeal appellants appealed against the decision making them liable, simply has been adfor the purpose of obtaining their own exoneration, and not for the mitted does purpose of having their co-defendants declared liable, and as the prin- Special appeal cipal sudder ameen has found that the use and occupation of special dismissed, with appellants are proved, and has for that reason affirmed the decision of the lower court, the point on which the special appeal has been admitted does not arise. We therefore dismiss the special appeal, with costs. costs. THE 1ST JULY 1858. PRESENT: A. SCONCE, Esq., Judge. C. B. TREVOR, Esq., G. LOCH, Esq., } Officiating Judges. CASE NO. 468 OF 1857. www Special Appeal from the decision of Mr. E. DaCosta, Principal MUSST. ASMAN KOWUR AND OTHERS, (Defendants,) versus ISHUREEPERSAD AND OTHERS, (PLAINTIFFS,) Vakeels of Appellants-Baboos Dwarkanath Mitter and Vakeel of the Opposite Party-None. THIS case was admitted to special appeal on the 23rd April 1857, under the following certificate recorded by Messrs. B. J. Colvin and J. H. Patton. "The plea taken in special appeal in this application, in amendment of the grounds noted on the back of the petition, is the same as that which has been advanced in case No. 470 of 1857. "We admit the special appeal for the reasons therein recorded." JUDGMENT. The facts of this case are similar to those of No. 470, of which we have this day disposed. The remarks which we then made apply equally to the present case, and the order in this case will be of the same nature with that which we have passed in the other appeal. We dismiss the special appeal, with costs. See preced ing case. Special appeal dismissed, with costs. THE 1ST JULY 1858. Certain parties divided Special Appeals from the decision of W. T. Trotter, Judge of Mymensingh, dated 7th January 1857, amending a decree of Syed Ahmud Buksh Khan, Principal Sudder Ameen of that district, dated 23rd May 1856. CASE No. 724 OF 1857. KUMULNARAIN ACHARJ, (ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS,) versus BHOOBUNESHUREE DEBEA, (PLAINTIFF,) AND OTHERS, (DEFENDANTS,) RESPONDENTS. Vakeel of Appellant-Baboo Bungsheebuddun Mitter, Vakeels of Respondent, Bhoobuneshuree-Baboos Ramapersad Roy, Shumbhoonath Pundit, and Gobindchunder Mookerjea. CASE NO. 725 of 1857. BHOOBUNESHUREE DEBEA, (PLAINTIFF,) Appellant, versus KUMULNARAIN ACHARJ AND OTHERS, (Defendants,) Vakeel of Appellant-Mr. R. T. Allan. Vakeels of Respondent, Kumulnarain-Baboo Bungsheebuddun Mitter; and vakeels of Alukmonee -Baboos Ramapersad Roy and Shumbhoonath Pundit. THESE cases were admitted to special appeal on the 23rd July their ancestral 1857, under the following certificate recorded by Messrs. J. H. property and Patton and J. S. Torrens. agreed to support the plaintiff and other female relatives for life. On the death of one of the parties, his heirs refused to continue the monthly allowance, and all payments ceased. Plaintiff sued to enforce the contract. Defendants pleaded that the allowance was a simple gratuity, and as no consideration had been given no suit could be brought; and they urged further that the heirs were not bound by the acts of the original donors, as no provision for the continuance of the allowance after the death of the donors was made in the deed of partition. Held that the payment of the monthly allowance was not a contract, nor could it be considered as a gratuity, but was of the nature of a trust or settlement voluntarily made for a good consideration, and, as this voluntary settlement had been executed, the parties and their heirs, though not expressly mentioned in the deed of partition, were bound to act up to the terms of the settlement; and that, as the payment of the allowance was to continue during the life time of the plaintiff, mention of the heirs in such a deed was not necessary. "These cases refer to a claim to recover maintenance which was payable by Kumulnarain and Gunganarain Acharj to the plaintiff, according to an ikrarnama which they executed among themselves, on their both separating from the joint Hindoo family of which they are members. At present Kumulnarain, of the two parties to the ikrarnama, only survives, and plaintiff's claim is laid againt him jointly with the heirs of Gunganarain. "The judge on appeal has decreed the whole sum of maintenance claimed to be due from Kumulnarain, but, holding the conditions of the ikrarnama not to extend to the heirs of Gunganarain, has dismissed the claim as respects them. "From this decision, two petitions of special appeal are preferred, one by the plaintiff, alleging that the terms of the deed being to the effect that she was to receive during her life time from Kumulnarain and Gunganarain, the condition remains necessarily binding on the heirs of the latter. The second petition is preferred by Kumulnarain, with the view of getting the judge's order reversed, so as to make him liable for the payment of only one half of the amount of maintenance, which he contends is all that the terms of the deed bind him to. "A second objection is preferred by Kumulnarain, that the action is barred by the statute of limitation. We cannot allow, with reference to the nature of the claim, that the statute of limitation applies; but we admit both the special appeals to try the other objections raised with reference to the terms of the ikrarnama." JUDGMENT. From the record it appears that the plaintiff, special appellant, is sister to Gunganarain Acharj, and aunt to the defendant, Kumulnarain. On 21st Kartick 1247 B. S., Gunganarain and Kumulnarain divided the family estates between them, and drew up a paper of partition and agreement, which, among other things, provided in the third clause for the payment of a monthly allowance of rupees 10, as maintenance for life to the plaintiff and other female relatives of the family, living, as stated in the above document, under their protection. Gunganarain died, and the allowance ceased to be paid, and plaintiff brought an action against Kumulnarain and the heirs of Gunganarain to recover the arrears of maintenance. The principal sudder smeen found that Gunganarain paid the allowance up to 1249, and that after his death his heirs made partial payments up to 1260, and, considering the engagement entered into by Gunganarain binding on his heirs, he gave a decree against all the defendants. On appeal to the judge, that officer released the heirs of Gunganarain, and gave a decree against Kumulnarain as alone responsible for the whole allowance after the death of Gunganarain. Two appeals have been preferred from this order, one on the part of the plaintiff, who pleads that, as Gunganarain and Kumulnarain contracted to pay her a monthly sum for maintenance during her life, the heirs of Gunganarain are bound by the terms of that contract; and she prayed that they, as well as Kumulnarain, be declared liable for the payment of her allowance. In reply, it is urged by the respondents, heirs of Gunganarain, that there was no contract between the plaintiff on the one part, and Gunganarain and Kumulnarain on the other; but that Gunganarain and Kumulnarain, when dividing the family estates, did, of their own free will, agree between themselves to allow the plaintiff and other females of the family, as well as other parties, a monthly allowance for life. Plaintiff, a widow, has, under the Hindoo law, no claim to support from the defendants, and therefore the allowance to her must be looked upon as a gratuity, to which she has no legal right, and the payment of which she cannot enforce. Even admitting that Gunganarain was bound to pay the money, yet as there was no lien on the estate, his agreement with Kumulnarain could not be binding on his heirs though the allowance had been promised to the plaintiff for life. The other appeal was filed by Kumulnarain, who, in addition to the objections urged by the heirs of Gunganarain, pleaded that if the Court decided that the allowance was payable to the plaintiff, the order of the judge declaring him alone liable for the whole amount of that allowance might be reversed, and the heirs of Gunganarain be charged with their share of the maintenance. It has been urged by the counsel for the (plaintiff,) special appellant, that the engagement entered into by the parties, Gunganarain and Kumulnarain, was a contract by which they had bound themselves to support her during her life time, and that consequently their heirs are bound to fulfil the terms of that contract. We cannot however look upon the transaction as a contract in the proper meaning of the word; for plaintiff was not a party to the arrangement made between Gunganarain and Luckynarain, nor was her consent then asked or given. Neither can we look upon this payment as a gratuity, as urged by the respondents, but as a trust or settlement, voluntarily created and carried out by the parties for the benefit of the plaintiff, under which she was to receive a certain sum as maintenance during her life time, and has up to the year 1260 received payments on that account. It is urged by the respondents that, as no valuable consideration was given, the payment can only be looked upon as gratuitous. But a consideration may be either a good or a valuable one. "A good or meritorious consideration is blood or natural love or affection; a valuable consideration is money, marriage, or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent given for the grant." In the present instance, the consideration was a good one, viz. relationship and affection, for we find the plaintiff nearly related to the parties, and they agreed between themselves to support her and other females living under their protection, and as they have not only made such voluntary settlement, but executed it, we think that they and their heirs are bound to act up to the terms of the settlement, and that plaintiff has a right to claim maintenance from them during her life time. We think the heirs of the parties who originally made the settlement, though not expressly mentioned in the deed, as well as the parties themselves, are bound to continue the maintenance; otherwise the object of the settlement, to provide plaintiff with maintenance during her life time, would be defeated by the death of the parties who voluntarily created the trust; and in such a deed of settlement the mention of heirs is unnecessary. We therefore reverse the decision of the judge, and confirm the orders of the principal sudder ameen, giving a decree against all the defendants. THE 1ST JULY 1858. PRESENT: H. T. RAIKES, Esq., Judge. C. B. TREVOR, Esq., H. V. BAYLEY, Es: Officiating Judges. CASE NO. 37 of 1858. Special Appeal from the decision of Mr. M. Shawe, Officiating HEERA KHAN, (DEFENDANT,) Appellant, versus MAHOMED AFZUL, (PLAINTIFF,) RESPONDENT. Vakeel of Appellant-Moulvee Murhamut Hussein. Vakeel of Mahomed Arzan, the Respondent's representative as decree-holder--Moulvee Mahomed Ismail. THIS case was admitted to special appeal on the 22nd July 1858, under the following certificate recorded by Messrs. A. Sconce and J. S. Torrens. MR. J. S. TORRENS.-" The special appellant is a party in possession of certain property which he alleges he holds on deed of conditional sale, notice of foreclosure having been served after expiry of the period in which redemption was conditioned for. The deed is dated in 1254. Plaintiff sued in 1262, admitting that the kubala had been D The lower court was right in finding for forcibly displaintiff who had been possessed of his lands. Defendant's plea of a conditional sale or mortgage |