2. Evidence of declarations by the purchas- er to the agent before delivery that he did not want the goods, there being no evidence of the assent of the agent or seller to a rescis- sion, was irrelevant.-Id.
nue suit should deliver the property to de- | Rescission. fendant within 30 days after judgment, and pay damages, etc., in case they failed to re- cover, held that, the detinue suit having been dismissed, but no summary judgment on the bond having been recovered, nominal dam- ages at least were recoverable for breach of the condition, and defendants in the action on the bond could not allege ownership of the property in bar, but could allege it in mitiga- tion of damages.-Id.
3. The right to rescind must be exercised within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud.-Young v. Arntze, (Ala.) 253.*
4. In order to rescind a contract of sale de- fendants must return, or offer to return, the property to the place where the trade was consummated by delivery.-Id.*
5. Where plaintiffs induced a sale by mis- representation of a material fact on which defendants had the right to and did rely, de- fendants may rescind, or prove the fraud in reduction of damages.-Id.
Vendor's lien-Sequestration.
6. In sequestration of movable property, based on a vendor's privilege, an affidavit to the debt, to the privilege, and to the fear that defendant will conceal, part with, or dispose of the same in his possession during the pend- Per-ency of the suit, is sufficient, and affiant need not prove any other grounds of fear than the simple facts that he has a privilege and that it lies in the power of defendant to de- feat or destroy it by doing some of the acts which he swears he fears he may do.-Low- den v. Robertson, (La.) 405.
7. In an action for the price of property, where defendant claims that the property sold had been taken back by plaintiff, oral evidence offered by plaintiff that he had taken such property in attachment proceedings is not admissible.-Tanner & Delaney Engine Co. v. Hall, (Ala.) 584.
8. If there was no rescission of a contract of sale, and the goods purchased were of any value, an action for the price could not be wholly defeated on the ground of fraud and breach of warranty.-Young v. Arntze, (Ala.)
See Navigable Waters; Waters and Water- 253. Courses.
Conditional, see Mortgages, 1.
When title passes.
1. A contract for the sale of goods was made by the seller's agent, to whom the bill of lad- ing, in which the purchaser was named as consignee, was mailed, together with a bill for the goods, in which it was stated that the goods were shipped to the purchaser at a place named. The purchaser agreed that the agent should retain the bill of lading until payment, but the carrier delivered the goods to the purchaser without presentation of it. There was evidence that the goods were sold on credit. In an action between the seller and one claiming in good faith for value, under a sale from the purchaser, held, that the title passed to the purchaser.-Robinson v. Pogue, (Ala.) 685.
9. B., the plaintiff, sold lumber to S., the de- fendant, at plaintiff's mill, which was shipped to the defendant on the L. & N. R. R. At the trial way-bills of said company were ad- mitted in evidence, which showed the weight of lumber shipped by plaintiff to defendant on different dates, and the evidence showed that the way-bills were made out and sent by the company in the due course of their business, and that the defendant paid the freight on the not error.-Sullivan v. Boley, (Fla.) 244. lumber so sent by said way-bills. This was
10. One who has given a note in part pay- ment of certain timber cannot, after he has received all that he is entitled to under the contract, defend against the note on the ground that such timber at the time of the sale was on land belonging to the wife of the vendor, and that he had no right to sell it.-McKenzie v. Wimberly, (Ala.) 468. Conditional sale.
11. Where the buyer takes possession of the goods, giving his notes for the price, payable unconditionally, the fact that the goods are afterwards destroyed by fire is no defense to an action on the unpaid notes, though they
stipulated that the title was not to pass till all the notes were paid. Burnley v. Tufts, (Miss.) 627.
See Intoxicating Liquors.
Schools and School - Districts. School superintendent, breach of bond, see Bonds, 4.
State superintendent of public instruction, see States and State Officers, 5-7.
SEDUCTION.
Criminal prosecution chastity.
Under Code Ala. 1886, § 4015, providing that no conviction for seduction of an unmarried woman can be had, if it is proved that she was unchaste at the time of the alleged offense, instructions on such trial that, if any witness testified to the bad character of the prosecu- trix for chastity, the jury may believe her to be unchaste, though it is not proved that she had connection with any other man, and also that if her character for chastity is proved to be bad, though no intercourse, before the of- fense, is proved, defendant could not be con- victed, were properly refused, as "character" may mean reputation, and the statute requires actual unchastity.-Hussey v. State, (Ala.)
1. Under Code Ala. 1886, § 2678, providing that mutual demands, not sounding in dam- ages, may be set off by defendant in an action on a note defendant cannot set off damages arising from a trespass committed by the plain- tiff in wrongfully seizing and carrying off de- fendant's stock.-Nelms v. Hill, (Ala.) 344.
1. The sheriff's account, as presented, in which he claimed 20 cents per mile for going, and 20 cents per mile for returning, should not have been allowed in full; Code Miss. § 447, providing 20 cents per mile, in such case, as compensation, both for going and returning.— Bourdeaux v. Warren County, (Miss.) 227.
2. Where a sheriff had, in answer to a mo- tion, shown cause why he should not be fined for failure to properly execute an original capias, and satisfied the court that the fine should not be imposed, and the motion had been dismissed, it was error to refuse to allow him compensation for the execution of an alias capias.-Id.
3. Under Code Ala. 1886, § 273, which de- clares that every official bond shall bind the obligors as well for "any wrongful act com- mitted under color of his [the principal's] office" as for his failure to perform a duty im- posed by law, an action on a sheriff's bond will lie in favor of one whose property the sheriff has seized under an attachment against another person.-Albright. v. Mills, (Ala.) 591.
4. It is not error to allow a complaint in an action on a sheriff's bond, which avers that the wrongful act was committed under color of official authority, to be amended by the addi- tion of an allegation that said act is a breach of the bond; and the form of the action is not thereby changed from one ex delicto to one ex contractu.- Id.
5. An admission by the constable that he re- ceived the claim for exemption is admissi- ble, in an action on his bond against himself and his sureties, for damages from the sale of exempt property, as against him, conceding that it is inadmissible against his sureties. Their remedy is by a charge limiting and con- fining its effect to the constable alone.-Bryan v. Kelly, (Ala.) 346.
2. Where an order given for a debt and ac- cepted by the drawee is not paid, and is sur- 6. An attachment was issued October 17th, rendered to the maker, who gives his notes in claim for exemption was filed November 19th, lieu thereof, the drawee cannot set off such and an additional bond, the one in suit, was order in an action against him by the maker.-given by the constable, and approved Novem- Taylor Manuf'g Co. v. Key, (Ala.) 303.
3. An action was brought by one in his own name, but in reality for the benefit of non-res- v.5so.-60
ber 28th, and two days thereafter the proper- ty was sold. Held, under Code Ala. § 284, re- lating to additional bonds of officers, which provides that such additional bond shall be of like force and obligation, from the time of its
approval, as the first official bond, the plain- tiff cannot recover on such bond damages arising from the acts of the constable prior to its approval.-Id.
Held, that as the defendant had been mis- taken as to a material fact by the omission of plaintiff to point out the lines, specific per- formance would be denied, whether the omis- sion was intentional or unintentional.-Camp- bell v. Durham, (Ala.) 507.
Spirituous Liquors.
7. The attachment was issued generally against the estate of defendant therein, and failed to state that the amount alleged to be due was for rent and advances, or any statu- tory grounds for the enforcement of a land- lord's lien, against which the goods levied on See Intoxicating Liquors. would not be exempt, nor did it describe or recite the substantive averments of the affi- davit. Held, that the affidavit was not ad- missible to show that the nature of the debt was such as authorized the constable to disre- gard the claim for exemption, as it was not sufficiently described in the attachment to au- thorize him to look to it.-Id.
STATES AND STATE OFFI- CERS.
Mandamus to state comptroller, see Man- damus, 4-6.
Actions against state.
8. Code Ala. § 273, requiring plaintiff, before entitled to recover, to show that he had been injured by the act of the constable, the affida- vit was admissible to show that plaintiff had not been injured by showing that the attach ment was in fact issued for the enforcement of a valid and subsisting landlord's lien, and that the claim of exemption was frivolous.-costs shall be rendered as is provided in arti- Id.
9. The disregard of a claim for exemption, by selling the property in satisfaction of a lien which prevails against it, when the claim for exemption is in law and fact frivolous, is not such a breach of the official bond as will entitle the owner to recover nominal damages, in the absence of proof of actual damages. -Id.
Shipping.
See Marine Insurance.
Joinder of issues, see Pleading, 14.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Contracts enforceable.
1. A purchaser of immovable property can- not be judicially coerced to a doubtful title.- Beer v. Leonard, (La.) 257.
2. An oral agreement to rescind a contract of sale of land is a good ground for refusing to specifically enforce the original contract.- Perry v. McLain, (Miss.) 518.
3. On a bill for specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of land, it ap- peared that when the contract was made the land was inclosed by a fence, which, in front of the dwelling-house, extended beyond the southern line, inclosing a strip of one and one- half acres, belonging to a railroad company, on which were trees, and through which was the only passage from the dwelling to the public road. There was no visible boundary other than the fence, and a person looking at the premises would naturally assume that it was the boundary. Defendant purchased the tract for his residence. No information was sought or given as to the location of the lines.
1. In proceedings on the relation of the at- torney general to remove a judge from office, it is provided by Acts La. 1880, No. 122, § 7, that "the defendant judge shall be con- demned to pay the costs, if judgment be ren- dered against him; otherwise judgment for cle 200 of the state constitution." The latter article provides "that in all cases when the officer sued * ** shall be acquitted, judg- ment shall be rendered against the citizen signing the request for all costs." Held that, when the respondent was removed, and con- demned to pay all the costs, the court had no jurisdiction to render a direct judgment against the state for the costs of taking testi- mony.-State v. Lazarus, (La.) 289.
2. A state cannot be sued in a state court without its consent: and no direct judgment can be rendered against the state for costs, except in the manner, and on the conditions, it prescribes.-Id.
3. When a state submits itself to the juris- diction of a court in a particular case, either by the institution of suit or permitting itself to be sued, that jurisdiction may be used to give full effect to what the state has, by its act of submission, allowed to be done.-Id.
4. Railroad commissioners being authorized by statute to make reasonable regulations for all railroads in the state as to charges for transportation of passengers and freight, and to furnish each company with a schedule of charges, and having fixed certain rates for one of the companies which it deems not rea- sonable and just, said company filed a bill against the commissioners to enjoin them from promulgating said rates, or any other rates substantially the same. Held, that this is not, in effect, a suit against the state; but the statute having prescribed a penalty for violation of the rates fixed, and authorized the commissioners to institute action in the name of the state to recover the penalty, in so far as the bill seeks to enjoin them from doing this, it is in effect a suit against the state.- McWhorter v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., (Fla.) 129.
Comptroller and superintendent of public instruction.
5. Const. Fla. art. 4, § 23, (McClel. Dig. p. 196, § 4.) imposes on the comptroller the duty of auditing the accounts of all officers, and
provides that no funds can be disbursed by the treasurer, except on the order of the comp- troller, countersigned by the governor. Held, Diversion-Injunction. that where the constitution prescribes the amount of an officer's salary, and the legisla- ture has appropriated a sum more than suffi- cient to pay it and other salaries of the same class, the comptroller neither errs in judgment nor transcends his authority in refusing to al- low such officer a different amount than that prescribed by the constitution. Franklin Co. v. State, 24 Fla. 55, 3 South. Rep. 471, distin- guished.-State v. Barnes, (Fla.) 698.
6. Const. Fla. 1887, art. 4, § 29, fixes the sal- ary of superintendent of public instruction at $1,500 instead of $2,000, as prescribed by Const. 1868. Held, that such change took effect Jan- uary 1, 1887, the day on which the constitu- tion went into effect, as there is nothing in the constitution which defers the operation of said section to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January, 1889, the day fixed for the installation of officers elected in No vember, 1888.-Id.
7. Const. Fla. 1887, art. 4,8 23, (McClel. Dig. p.196, § 4,) imposes on the comptroller the duty of auditing the accounts of all officers, and provides that no funds can be disbursed by the treasurer except on the comptroller's order countersigned by the governor. By Const. 1887, art. 4, § 29, the salary of superintendent of public instruction was fixed at $1,500 in- stead of $2,000 as prescribed by Const. 1868. Acts 1887, c. 3687, § 1, appropriated a sum suf- ficient to pay the superintendent's salary at $2,000, but did not specifically declare that he should be paid that amount. Held, that the comptroller neither erred in his judgment nor transcended his authority in refusing to allow a different amount than that prescribed by the
State's Evidence.
See Criminal Law, 2.
Construction, see License.
Equity will restrain the owner of land from draining a body of surface water collect- ing naturally in a depression, principally on complainant's land, but covering also a small part of defendant's land, situated higher than complainant's, and which is used by com- plainant to float logs to his mill, though the water comes from defendant's land, and com- plainant has increased the size of the body by ural collection of the water will be prevented constructing a dam on his own land, if the nat- thereby.-Alcorn v. Sadler, (Miss.) 694.
Appointment of provisional, see Insolvency.
Assessment for public improvements, see Mu- nicipal Corporations, 22, 23.
Exemption from, see Railroad Companies, 7. Liability of tax collector for money collected, Of shares of bank, see Banks and Banking. see Counties, 1, 2. Tax deed as cloud upor title, see Quieting
paid on bringing suit, see Costs, 3, 4. title acquired by life tenant, rights of re- mainder-man, see Estates.
at which they accepted and approved the as- 1. The meeting of the board of supervisors sessment roll, though not held at a time au- thorized by the law of Alabama for a regular meeting, will be presumed to have been legal, in the absence of proof that it was not a spe- cial meeting such as might have been legally called and held at that time. - Tierney v. Brown, (Miss.) 104.
2. In the act La. 1888, No. 81, § 54, providing that the police jurors of the several parishes may levy, for the support of the common schools, not less than 1% mills of the 10 mills on the dollar of assessed valuation of the
Validity in part, see Constitutional Law, 10. property thereof, the word "may" is not man-
Liability of railroad company for killing, see Railroad Companies, 12-23.
Stockholders.
Liability of, see Corporations, 6-12. Street.
datory but permissive, and such levy cannot be enforced by mandamus.-Parish Board School Directors v. Police Jury, (La.) 23.
3. Neither the general revenue law of 1869, c. 1713, as amended in 1872 by chapter 1857, providing that the assessor should, in making up his role, assess for omitted years for as much as two previous years, nor that of 1874, c. 1976, providing the same for as much as three years, authorized a collector of revenue to assess lands for taxes, and a sale made by him under the act of 1874, and a deed executed pursuant to such sale, conveyed no title to the purchaser, and the deed is not within the protection of the sixty-third section of the and Impaneling. and the time within which, an action to set it said act, limiting the grounds upon which, aside may be commenced.--Sloan v. Sloan, (Fla.) 603.
See Dedication; Municipal Corporations.
Summoning
Of jury, see Jury, 3, 5.
Tax-title-Description in deed.
4. A description in a tax-deed from the state: "House & Lot, W. side Union St., No.
40, between State & Washington, City of Natchez, assessed to Est. C. Lacroze, "-is not void for patent ambiguity.-Strauss v. McAl- lister, (Miss.) 625.
Tax-title-Confirmation.
5. Under Code Miss. 1880, § 578, giving the holder of a tax-title a right to bring a bill for its confirmation, "when the period for re- demption has expired," such a bill may be brought against infants interested in the land, without waiting until expiration of the period of redemption after their disability is removed.-Metcalfe v. Perry, (Miss.) 232.
6. Under such section, a suit may be brought to confirm a tax title acquired at a sale for taxes to the levee board.-Id.
7. A decree confirming a tax title cannot be reopened after the period for appeal, or bill of review, on the ground that complainants were not made parties to the suit for confir- mation, and had no knowledge thereof, where their bill does not allege payment of taxes by them, except for the year for which the land was sold, and intimates that defendant is in possession; thus not showing that their ig- norance of the former suit was excusable. Id.
8. Under Code Miss. § 531, providing that the owner of land, or any person for him, may redeem from a tax-sale, within a year from sale, a redemption within that time divests all title of a purchaser, though the redemp- tionist is not the real owner of the land.- Jamison v. Thompson, (Miss.) 107.
9. Acts Miss. 1859-60, p. 213. § 7, to provide for the better security of tax-titles, and bar- ring suit to redeem after five years, does not apply to a sale for taxes where the taxes are paid before the sale.-Metcalfe v. Perry, (Miss.) 232.
and the demurrer was to the whole of the declaration.-Id.
3. The damages claimed are not too specula- tive, remote, or contingent.-Id,
Color of, see Adverse Possession, 2. Of laws, see Constitutional Law, 5. Tax-title, see Taxation, 4-7.
TRESPASS.
When enjoined, see Injunction, 8. Who may maintain.
1. An action for trespass committed on a church lot can be brought by trustees of the property who were appointed after the alleged trespass was committed.-Allison v. Little, (Ala.) 221.
What amounts to.
2. Where, after an unconditional delivery of the drawings of a building by the architect to the owner of the building under the con- tract of employment, the architect, before a completion of the building, and while the drawings were in the owner's possession, took and carried them away without his con- sent, he thereby committed a trespass, though under the contract the ownership of the plans was in him.-Lunsford v. Deitrich, (Ala.) 461.
3. In trespass for cutting trees on a church lot, it is no defense that defendant cut the trees under instructions of persons who had no authority in the matter, though he believed they had such authority.-Allison v. Little, (Ala.) 221. Evidence.
4. In an action for trespass by cutting trees on a church lot, the records of the church im- puting the cutting to defendant, and appoint- ing a committee to compromise with him, are
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. 5. Where, in a suit for wrongfully destroy Action for negligence - Complaint. alleges that the papers belong to him, and the ing papers belonging to plaintiff, defendant 1. In an action for damages for delay in de- jury find for defendant, it is conclusive of the livering a telegram, a declaration alleging fact that plaintiff is not entitled even to nom- that, if the message had been promptly de-inal damages.-Lunsford v. Deitrick, (Ala.) livered, plaintiff would have obtained the pur- chase of a lot worth $5,000, which was offered for sale for $3,000, and that by the delay they lost the purchase, and were damaged the dif- ference between the price at which the lot was offered to them and its market value
6. In such case, if error at all, it was harm- less to strike out a portion of the complaint asking special damages for the injury caused by such destruction.-Id.
7. Damages for injury to one's farming op- when the message should have been deliv-erations, by seizing and carrying away his ered, is good on demurrer.-Alexander v. Western Union Tel. Co., (Miss.) 397.
2. The facts that the statutory penalty of $25 allowed by act Miss. 1856, for failure to deliver telegrams in a reasonable time, was also claimed in the declaration, and that this penalty could not be enforced because the message was to be delivered beyond the lim- its of the state, do not make the declaration demurrable where the penalty was but a part claimed in a declaration of but one count,
stock used in farming, are too remote and speculative to be recovered in trespass.- Nelms v. Hill, (Ala.) 344. Criminal trespass.
8. Code Ala. 1886, § 3874, declares that any person who, without legal cause, enters the premises of another, after warning, "within six months preceding, not to do so, must, on conviction," etc. Held, under the statute, that there must be a warning first, and an en-
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