ing operation to section 4591, under which the orders of the governor and the probate judge were made, without violating or conflicting with any provision of the special law under consideration. The key to a law is found in its purpose and policy, which in this instance are manifest. The duty imposed upon the inspectors, to visit and report upon the treatment of county convicts hired out by the court of county commissioners, is perfectly consistent with the exercise of a like supervision by other subordinate officials. It is a cumulative precaution, designed to better insure the humane treatment of convicts. It may have been supposed that local officers would sometimes neglect this duty, or might exhibit favoritism towards a particular hirer of great personal influence in the community. However that may be, this duty of the inspectors applies, by the express terms of the statute, in both its letter and spirit, to all county convicts "hired out by the court of county commissioners," (Code 1886, § 4591,) and these convicts are unquestionably of that class.

The contract ordered to be annulled by the governor was entered into after the adoption of the Code. It is therefore made under and subject to the statute, every provision of which must govern the contract as fully as if expressly incorporated in the terms of the contract itself. The declaration of the written agreement, that the parties were to be "guided and controlled by the laws of the state of Alabama in regard to convicts," did not make this feature of it any plainer than the law alone would have made it unaided by such provision. The contract was made subject to the express condition that it might be annulled by order of the governor, acting on certain official information derived from the board of inspectors. Code 1886, § 4591. No judgment of a court is required to authorize this action, nor are the parties concerned entitled to notice or a day in court. "It is a settled rule of law that, where a particular functionary is clothed with the power of deciding such a question, his decision, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is final. It is not open for examination, and neither party can go behind it." Lynde v. County, 16 Wall. 6. The parties, having agreed to this mode of deciding the question, cannot complain that they have been injured by an erroneous exercise of the officer's discretion. Plock v. Cobb, 64 Ala. 127. The same discretionary power of annulment is conferred on the governor in reference to contracts for hiring state convicts, who is authorized to terminate all such contracts "at any time, without assigning any reason therefor." Crim. Code 1886, § 4649. We see in none of the arguments of appellant's counsel any sufficient reason for reversing the judgment. The bill was properly dismissed, and the decree is affirmed.

BLACK V. PRATT COAL & COKE Co.

(Supreme Court of Alabama. December 6, 1888.)

1. DEED-DESCRIPTION-PATENT AMBIGUITY-PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN. A deed described the property as "all that part of the west half of the north-west quarter of section 19, township 17, range 3 west, that lies south of Black creek." Held, that while the omission of land-district, state, and county might create a patent ambiguity, the statement that the tract is bisected by Black creek introduces such a landmark as to allow testimony, as an identifying circumstance, that Black creek does in fact flow across this particular subdivision of land; also that before the deed was made the grantor, and afterwards the grantee, claimed and cultivated it.

2. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-RUNNING OF THE STATUTE-DISABILITIES.

The extension of five years in which infants may sue "after the termination of their disabilities, " given by act Ala. Feb. 7, 1843, prescribing a limitation of ten years in which to sue for the recovery of real estate, enlarges the ten years only to the extent necessary to secure to the suitor the five years after reaching majority. If during the ten years there have been five years of majority, the period is not enlarged beyond the ten years.

3. SAME-PERIOD OF CIVIL WAR.

In Alabama, the period from January 11, 1861, to September 21, 1865, is to be deducted, in any computation covering that period in which the time necessary to perfect the statutory bar is the subject of inquiry.

4. SAME TWENTY YEARS' PRESUMPTION.

From the twenty years necessary to raise the presumption against claims suffered to slumber for that length of time, the period during the war is not deducted. 5. SAME-ADVERSE POSSESSION-QUESTION FOR JURY.

In ejectment, there was evidence that S. took actual possession as early as 1852, and cultivated the land until 1871; that he paid the taxes and exercised acts of ownership until 1880, when he sold to M.; and that M. then exercised acts of ownership until he sold to defendant, who took possession and exercised acts of ownership up to the time of trial. Held, that the evidence warranted the submission to the jury of the question of adverse holding, its connection and continuity.

6. APPEAL-REVIEW-PRESUMPTIONS.

Where the record does not purport to contain all the evidence, it will be presumed that there was evidence before the trial court to justify its rulings, if such rulings would be correct on any state of legal proof.

7. SAME-GENERAL EXCEPTIONS.

Unless all the rulings to which a general exception is reserved are erroneous, nothing can be taken by the exception.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; LEROY F. BOX, Judge. Ejectment by Robert L. Black against the Pratt Coal & Coke Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

A. Y. Harper, for appellant. Hewitt, Walker & Porter, for appellee.

STONE, C. J. The appellant claims title to that part of the W. of the N. W. of section 19, township 17 S., range 3 W., which lies south and east of Black creek, in Jefferson county, Ala. He proves prima facie title in one James Black, acquired by deed in 1839, under which he took possession that year, cultivated a part of the land, and exercised other acts of ownership. He, James Black, and those whose right he had, having the oldest possession brought to view in this record, prima facie he was the owner. James Black died intestate in 1840, residing upon the land at the time, and left 10 surviving children. The family became dispersed, and we hear of no more occupancy of the land by any of the descendants of James Black. One son, Benjamin Black, was born May 1, 1835. He died intestate in 1864, leaving one only surviving child, Robert L. Black, who was born September 28, 1863, and is sole plaintiff in this action. The present suit was instituted April 23, 1887. Proving these facts, plaintiff rested.

The defense rests on the statute of limitations. The case made by defendant is as follows: On the 23d day of December, 1850, William J. Philyear and his wife executed a deed of conveyance to Russom Shoemaker, on the recited consideration of $85, in hand paid. The description of the land conveyed is in the following language: "All that part of the west half of the north-west quarter of section 19, township 17, range 3 west, that lies south of Black creek." On the 12th day of February, 1879, said Shoemaker and wife, and one Miller and wife, sold and conveyed to the Pratt Coal & Coke Company, on a recited consideration of $100 paid, "all the coal, ores, metals, and minerals in, under, and upon the following described real estate, to-wit: All of the west half of the north-west quarter of section 19, township 17 south, of range 3 west, that lies on the south and east side of Black creek, containing forty acres, more or less; also the right and privilege to said Pratt Coal & Coke Company to mine, use, and sell for their own use and benefit, and the benefit and use of their successors and assigns, all coals, ores, metals, and minerals upon, in, and under said lands; and also all timber and water upon the same necessary for the development, working, and mining of said coal, ores, metals, and minerals, and the preparation of the same for market, and the removal of the same; and also the right of way and the right to build roads of any description over the same, necessary for the convenient transportation of said coal and other minerals, metals, and ores from said lands,

and for conveying and transporting to and from said lands all materials and implements that may be of use in the mining and removal of said coal, ores, metals, and minerals, in the preparation of the same for market: situated, lying, and being in the county of Jefferson and state of Alabama." On the 25th day of February, 1880, Shoemaker and wife, on a recited consideration of $200 paid, sold and conveyed to Miller all that part of said W. of N. W. section 19, township 17, range 3 W., lying south and east of Black creek, "excepting such mineral rights as have been conveyed to the Pratt Coal & Coke Company," described as being in Jefferson county, Ala.; and on the 26th day of the same month Miller and wife, on a recited consideration of $1,400, sold and conveyed to the Pratt Coal & Coke Company, conjointly with another tract, the same interest Miller had acquired the day before from Shoemaker, and with the same description and local situs.

Testimony was offered by the appellee, and received, tending to show that at the time of the execution of the deed of Philyear to Shoemaker they both resided in Jefferson county, Ala.; that Philyear resided near the land in controversy, and had for several years prior to the execution of the deed claimed to own, and had cultivated, about two acres of the same. The testimony further tended to show that in March, 1851, or 1852, he (Shoemaker) took actual possession of the inclosed part of the land, though he never resided on it; that he cleared and fenced an additional two or more acres, and cultivated the cleared land until about 1871, claiming the whole land under Philyear's deed, and exercising acts of ownership over it. That after 1871 he did not cultivate the land, but continued to pay taxes on it, and to claim it under Philyear's deed, and to exercise acts of ownership over it, up to the time he sold to Miller. Appellee's testimony tended further to show that Miller took possession under his purchase from Shoemaker, and held possession under claim of right, until he sold to appellee. (This was only one day, unless the contract of purchase antedated the deed.) The testimony of appellee further tended to show that it took possession of said lands under the deed from Miller, built houses thereon, claimed the same under said purchase, and has held it adversely, or under claim of independent right, down to the trial, November, 1887. In rebuttal, appellant produced testimony tending to show "that there had been no cultivation or occupation of any kind, that the places cultivated once had grown up with small trees, and since the year 1865 until the year when Miller and the Pratt Coal & Coke Company took possession under their deeds." This last sentence, which is a copy, is not very clear. We suppose the meaning is that since the year 1865 no one has cultivated the land, and it has been suffered to grow up in small trees. This, then, presented at least a disputed question of fact as to the time when the land ceased to be cultivated.

This case is not controlled alone or to any extent by the statute of limitations of 1802, which provides 20 years as a bar to entry upon lands. Clay, Dig. p. 327, § 83. The later statute, (Sess. Acts 1843,) approved February 7, 1843, governs this case. Clay, Dig. p. 329, § 93. Ten years is the bar prescribed by that statute. See, also, Code 1852, § 2476; Id. 1867, § 2900; Id. 1876, § 3225; Id. 1886, § 2614. The act of 1843 gives to infants, etc., five years within which to sue, "after the termination of their disabilities to bring suits." The Codes reduce this proviso in favor of infants, etc., to three years. Code 1852, § 2486; Rawls v. Kennedy, 23 Ala. 240; Owen v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547. This five years, or three, as the case may be, is not necessarily an addition to the ten years prescribed by the statute. It enlarges the ten years only to the extent that may be necessary to secure to the demandant or suitor the five or three years, after he or she shall have attained to majority. If during the ten years, he or she has had the five years of majority, then the period is not enlarged beyond the ten years. The statute is conformed to if ten years have elapsed; and for five or three years, either as part of them or as addition

to them, in whole or in part, there has been no disability to sue. Ten years of adverse holding, relieved of disability to sue for five or three of them, as the case may be, works a complete bar. Tayloe v. Dugger, 66 Ala. 444. So, as we shall show hereafter, it is not important to inquire in this case whether the proviso or exception on account of infancy be five years, as prescribed by the act of 1843, or three years, as declared by the Code of 1852.

Another well-recognized principle should be here stated. A party claiming the benefit of an exception or proviso in the statute of limitations can only avail himself of the disability which existed when the right of action first accrued. He cannot avail himself of a succession of disabilities. One disability cannot be tacked upon another. Nor will interpretation ingraft upon a statute exceptions which the legislature have failed to declare. When the statute begins to run, nothing less than a statutory exception intercepts it. 7 Wait, Act. & Def. 272, 276, 277; Barclay v. Smith, 66 Ala. 230; Baker v. Barclift, 76 Ala. 414. The limitation applicable to this suit, as we have shown, must be the 10-years statute of 1843, (Clay, Dig. p. 329, § 93,) or sections 2476, 2502, of the Code of 1852. It is not necessary we should decide which of these statutes governs; but see Collins v. Robinson, 33 Ala. 91; act to repeal section 2502 of the Code of 1852, (Sess. Acts, 1853-54, p. 71;) Daniel v. Day, 51 Ala. 431. Another gap in the running of the statute of limitations affects this case. From January 11, 1861, to September 21, 1865,-4 years, 8 months, and 10 days, the statutes of limitations were suspended. That time must be deducted, in any computation covering that period, in which the time necessary to perfect the statutory bar is the subject of inquiry. Jones v. Nelson, 51 Ala. 471; Anderson v. Melear, 56 Ala. 621. To perfect a bar in this case there must have been a continuous adverse holding for 14 years, 8 months, and 10 days. According to the testimony in this case, Shoemaker took actual possession, and commenced cultivating the lands, at the latest in March, 1852. Benjamin Black, father of plaintiff, attained his majority May 1, 1856. Against him the statute commenced running in March, 1852, and, no other obstacle intervening, the bar would have been perfect in 1862. He attained to adult manhood more than five years before that time. His death in 1864 was not and cannot be a factor in the decision of this legal question. Robert L. Black can assert no rights which his father could not have asserted, if living. But before the bar of 10 years was complete, the statute was suspended; and the bar could not become perfected until, say, December 10, 1866. The 14 years, 8 months, and 10 days could not extend beyond that time.

The first exception reserved by appellant was to the introduction of the deed from Philyear to Shoemaker. The objection was that, the description of the land being only by section, township, and range, without stating the land-district or state and county in which the land lies, a case of patent ambiguity was presented, which the law would not allow to be explained, and that this rendered the deed void. Stated nakedly, as the objection presents it, it is amply sustained by authority. Commissioners v. Tarver, 25 Ala. 480; Long v. Pace, 42 Ala. 495, and many other authorities. But the description in the deed we are considering is not confined to a mere statement of section, township, and range. Its language is: "All that part of the west half of the north-west quarter of section 19, township 17, range 3 west, that lies south of Black creek.” Now, while we judicially know that there are and may be found in many government surveys lands corresponding to the description, "west half of north-west quarter, section 19, township 17, range 3 west," we do not and cannot know judicially that they, or any two of them, are bisected by a stream known as "Black Creek." This is a landmark, a natural boundary, which, as far as we can judicially know, distinguished this from all other tracts with corresponding government numbers. And it was within the pale of legitimate testimony to prove, as an

identifying circumstance, that Black creek did flow across this particular subdivision of land. This description of testimony was admissible, on the ground that proof of attendant facts and circumstances is admissible, as shedding light on the question of the intention with which a contract was entered into. So proof that the parties lived near the land, that before the deed was made Philyear claimed and cultivated it, and afterwards Shoemaker did likewise, were admissible circumstances to be considered on the inquiry of identity. It was not the direct proof of intention, which, as an independent proposition, is not admissible. It was the proof of antecedent, concomitant, and subsequent facts, to aid in arriving at the intention.

If it be objected that the present record does not inform us that any testimony was offered, tending to show that a stream known as "Black Creek" flowed across the land, the answer is that it is nowhere shown that the record contains all the evidence. In such case the rule is to presume that there was evidence before the jury to justify the court's rulings, if such rulings would be correct on any state of legal proof. 1 Brick. Dig. pp. 336, 337, §§ 12, 23; 3 Brick. Dig. p. 110, § 54; State v. Posey, 79 Ala. 45. The circuit court did not err in receiving Philyear's deed in evidence, for it was not void on its face. Neither was their error in receiving testimony of attendant facts and circumstances. Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140; Morris v. Robinson, 80 Ala. 291; Gaston v. Weir, 84 Ala, 193, 4 South. Rep. 258; 2 Devl. Deeds, § 1012, note 3; Long v. Wagoner, 47 Mo. 178; Clamorgan v. Railway Co., 72 Mo. 139; Clamorgan v. Hornsby, 13 Mo. App. 550; Harding v. Strong, 42 Ill. 148; Butler v. Davis, 5 Neb. 521; Richards v. Snider, 11 Or. 197, 3 Pac. Rep. 177 Whenever the description is sufficient to enable a surveyor, on search and inquiry of facts, to ascertain and locate the land, this is a full answer to the charge of ambiguity. 2 Devl. Deeds, § 1012, note 3; Pennington v. Flock, 93 Ind. 378; Smiley v. Fries, 104 III. 416. A surveyor, on inquiry of facts, could have located the lands involved in this suit. It is certainly true that to toll entry, or perfect title, which, by mere possession, will maintain or defeat an action of ejectment, the possession must be actual, public, or notorious, adverse, or in independent right, and continuous. The adverse holder, however, need not reside on the premises, and need not cultivate the land. There must, however, be public or visible acts of ownership, such as a true owner, and not a mere tenant, exercises, and they must be such, or accompanied by such conduct, as indicates a holding in independent right. To constitute continuity of possession, it is not essential that one and the same person shall have been all the while the adverse holder. A succession of holders meets the requirement of the rule, if they succeed to the asserted rights of the preceding holder or occupant as grantee or transferee succeeds to the rights of the grantor or transferrer. Successive, independent trespasses do not come up to the rule. Coker v. Ferguson, 70 Ala. 284; Lipscomb v. McClellan, 72 Ala. 151; Dothard v. Denson, Id. 541; Beard v. Ryan, 78 Ala. 37; Burks v. Mitchell, Id. 61; Bernstein v. Humes, Id. 134; Elliott v. Dycke, Id. 150; Alexander v. Wheeler, Id. 167.

As we understand the appellee's testimony, it tends to show that Shoemaker took actual possession, and commenced cultivating the lands, at least as early as March, 1852, and that he continued to cultivate until 1871. His adverse holding, according to this, completed its 10 years in December, 1867. The testimony on that side goes further, and tends to show that he continued to pay the taxes, and to exercise acts of ownership over the land, until he sold to Miller; that Miller then exercised acts of ownership until he sold to the Pratt Coal & Coke Company; and that the latter then took possession and exercised acts of ownership until the trial in the court below. There was certainly enough testimony to go before the jury on the inquiry of adverse holding, and its connection and continuity. Appellant's testimony differed from appellee's mainly in the length of time Shoemaker actually cultivated the cleared land. No special ruling was asked or given on the difference between the opposing