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from fire or other cause) as common carriers or given away his ticket on the train, and that
for any article after it has been transported he had it after he left the train. Held, that
to its place of destination, and been placed in plaintiff was properly asked, on cross-exam-
the depot of the company.” is valid, and, upon ination, what became of his ticket.-Louis-
the storage of the goods in the depot at their ville & N. R. Co. v. Maybin, (Miss.) 401.
destination, the carrier's responsibility there- 8. If a passenger sell or dispose of a non-
after is that of warehouseman.- Western Ry. transferable ticket, and is unable to exhibit
Co. v. Little, (Ala.) 563.*

it within a reasonable time after request, and

refuse to pay fare for the balance of the trip,
Carriage of passenger beyond des- and is required, without abuse or unnecessary

force, to leave the train, he cannot recover.-
2. Plaintiff and wife were prevented from

leaving a train at the rear platform, when has sold a non-transferable ticket while using

9. The fact that a son over 21 years of age
they attempted it, by the throng getting on,
and, being carried by, the conductor refused it on a trip does not justify ordering his fath-
to stop and let them off, but promised to send er, who is accompanying him, to leave the
them back from the next station on the next train, or ejecting the father.-Id.
train. He failed to make the arrangement,

10. Laws Fla. c. 1987, $ 41, which prohibits
and plaintiff paid fare. Held, that plaintiff the expulsion of a passenger by a railroad
could not recover punitive damages, but only company for non-payment of fare at any point
compensation.-Mississippi & T. R. Co. v. Gili, other than a usual stopping place, or near
(Miss.) 393.

some dwelling-house, does not apply to the

expulsion of a passenger wantonly violating
Injuries to passengers.

any other reasonable rule of the company.
3. A passenger crossing a railroad track at The company may expel him from the train
a station, in order to leave or board a train at any convenient and safe point that may be
halted for that purpose, is not held to exer- selected by the officer in charge, no more
cise the same care and diligence as persons force being used than may be necessary for
crossing tracks, but may assume that the such purpose.- South Fla. R. Co. v. Rhoads,
railroad corporation will 'so order its trains (Fla.) 633.
that he will be safe from harm on the track, · Violation of rules.
which he is thus invited and required to cross 11. The reasonableness of a rule is purely a
in order to secure his passage. - Weeks v. I question of law, to be decided by the court,
New Orleans, S. F. & L. R. Co., (La.) 72.

and not a question of fact, to be passed upon
4. Where a person attempts to board a train by the jury.-Id.
while moving, and after it has left the sta-

12. The question as to whether a contract or
tion, he no longer acts on the invitation, or agreement entered into between a railroad
stands under the protection, of the company, company and a line of steamers, under which
and, while crossing or occupying the track, is only representatives of that line were allowed
bound to use proper care for his own protec- to solicit business on the cars of the railroad
board a moving train which has just left the constituted an oppressive monopoly, is a mixed
5. When a passenger, who is attempting to company, was entered into in good faith, and

was legal and binding, or that such contract
station, stands upon the track in full view of
a nearly approaching train, which rings its question of law

and fact, for the jury.-Id.

13. A rule adopted by a railroad company
bell and sounds its whistle, and fails to use which prohibits passengers on their trains
his senses in his attempt to board the train, from wearing the uniform cap of a line of
he is guilty of contributory negligence, which steamers running in opposition to a line of
debars recovery.-Id.

steamers running in connection with the com-
6. Plaintiff was traveling on a train which pany, is not reasonable, and hence not binding
had with it a stock-car carrying horses for on the public. Railroad companies have no
him, his duty under his contract of carriage right to prescribe the dress of any passenger.
being “to feed, water, and take care of the la.
horses." He sometimes rode on the stock-car,

14. A complaint by a passenger against a
but was allowed to ride on the passenger car | railroad company for damages for wrongfully
whenever he wished. At the time the acci- ejecting him from the train, need not allege
dent occurred he had left the passenger car to that, at the time of his expulsion, he was com-
feed his horses while the train stopped at a plying with all the reasonable rules of the
station, and had not finished when the train
started, after stopping 15 or 20 minutes, in company, nor that he was not about to violate


such rule.-1d.
stead of 45 minutes, the usual time. Held,
that he was not guilty of contributory negli-

gence by being on the stock-car at the time of 15. In an action against a railroad company
the accident. -Florida Ry. & Nav. Co. v. for wrongfully ejecting plaintiff from its train,
Webster, (Fla.) 714.

it appeared that the company had established

a rule prohibiting the employés of a rival
Ejection of passengers.

steam-ship line from wearing their uniform
i. In an action for ejection from a train, on the cars of the company; that plaintiff
defendant contended that plaintiff did not bought a ticket and went upon the cars, ex-
produce his ticket within a reasonable time pecting and hoping to be expelled, for the pur-
when requested; that he had sold his ticket pose of instituting an action for damages; that
to another; and that he refused to pay his he was expelled, only such force being used
fare. Plaintiff testified that he had not sold as was necessary to overcome his violent re-
(Ala.) 147.
Justification - Apprehended attack.


sistence; that he was compelled to walk about CHAMPERTY AND MAIN-
four miles to a station. The jury were charged
that if he was violating no reasonable rule he

was entitled to recover damages, either com. What constitutes champerty.
peusatory or exemplary; that he could only
recover exemplary damages for acts accom- the N. 0. & S. R. Co., defendants, who were

Pending a suit for certain bonds issued by
panied with maliciousness or willful wrong,
and could not recover for injuries received by the owners of the S. & G. R. R., and who de-
reason of his own violent resistance. Heli, sired to lease the N. 0. & S. road, negotiated
that a verdict in his favor for $5,000 should with the litigant bondholders for such lease.
have been set aside.--Id.

All consented except plaintiff, and defendants
16. Where a passenger op a railroad train is purchased his bonds. The bonds were not to
abused and insulted by the conductor, who has be delivered until the end of the suit. The
been informed that he has sold his ticket, litigation was to be continued in the name of
which was not transferable, and, without be the seller, and the purchaser was to pay the
ing given reasonable time to 'produce his attorneys' fees and legal expenses, except a
ticket, is required to leave the train, he may had such an interest in the suit as to reliere

certain retainer fee. Held, that defendants
recover exemplary damages.-Louisville & N.
R. Co. v. Maybin, (Miss.) 401.*

the contract of any charge of champerty.-

Gilman v. Jones, (Ala.) 785.

Change of Venue.
Statute in force.

1. The Mississippi act of March 9, 1888, See Criminal Law,8; Venue in Civil Cases,&
amending the law in regard to carrying con-
cealed weapons, changed the characier of and

the penalties for the offense, so as to render Evidence of see Criminal Law, 29, 30.
it an ex post facto law as to such offenses
committed prior to that date, and left no law
in force by which they could be punished. — CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
Hodnett v. State, (Miss.) 518.

See, also, Fraudulent Conveyances, Mort-
2. An indictment fixing the date of the of.

fense at a time prior to the passage of the Ratification by infant, see Infancy.
act is not relieved by Code Miss. $ 3013, pro: Validity.
viding that no indictment shall be held insuf-
ficient for omitting to state the time at which

1. The owner of the soil may mortgage the
the offense was committed, where time is not crop to be grown by him, before the crop is
of the essence of the offense, nor for stating planted.--McCown v. Mayer, (Miss.) 9S.
the time imperfectly, nor stating the offense

2. One to whom property is mortgaged to
to have been committed on a day subsequent secure a usurious debt cannot set up the de-
to the finding of the indictment, or on an im- fense of a bona fide purchase against one har.
possible day, or on a day that never happened. ing a prior equitable title to the property.

CLOPTON, J. dissenting. — Meyer v. Cook,

3. Under Code Ala. 1836, 3775, providing Lien.
that on indictment for carrying concealed 3. A mortgage of a mare is a lien on colts
weapons defendant may show “that at the afterwards foaled, whether before or after
time of carrying the weapon concealed he had the mortgagee takes possession under the
good reason to apprehend an attack, which mortgage, as against one having the equitable
the jury may consider in mitigation of the title to the mare, in favor of a mortgagee who
punishment or justification of the offense, ” an is a bona fide purchaser for value.-Id.*
instruction which predicates an acquittal upon

4. Where a note and chattel mortgage to se-
defendant's mere belief that he was in danger cure it were given for supplies obtained for
of an attack, and not upon the fact that he the declared purpose of making a crop, and
had good reason to apprehend it, is properly the mortgage provided that if the mortgagees
refused.-Davenport v. State, (Ala.) 152.

should advance additional supplies the mort-

gage should stand as security for them, as
4. Evidence that defendant carried a pistol includes advances or supplies for planting,

fully as if included in the note, the mortgage
concealed in a hand-basket, which he carried cultivating, and gathering the crop, though
in his hand, or on his arm, from his residence made after it became due.-Hill v. Nelms,
to a street-railway station, a distance of three
or four hundred yards, and that when he en-

(Ala.) 796.
tered the car he put the basket on the seat be-

Verbal agreement.
side him, is sufficient to convict of carrying a 5. A verbal agreement by one of several
weapon “concealed about his person. "— Diffey chattel mortgagors that the mortgage shall
v. State, (Ala.) 570.

include other debts, is good as to him, as a

verbal mortgage of his property, the agree.

ment having been made before Code Ala. 10,

§ 1731, prohibiting verbal mortgages, was in
To jurors, see Jury, 6, 7.



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6. The word "proving, ” in McClel. Dig. Fla.
p. 213, § 1, as to the admission of chattel mort. See, also, Payment.
gages to record, includes an acknowledgment What constitutes.
of the instrument for record by the makers
before a proper officer.-Einstein's Sons v.

Where differences between the parties to a
Shouse, (Fla.) 380.

contract have been referred by them to a third
7. An acknowledgment made by the mak- person, and afterwards a settlement has been
ers of a chattel mortgage of "the foregoing agreed to by the contracting parties on the
instrument by them signed, to be their free basis of the referee's adjustment, and such
act, " such instrument also appearing upon its settlement has been partly performed

by the
face by the attestation clause to have been payment of sums, the party receiving the pay-
"delivered,” is a sufficient acknowledgment

ments will, in the absence of any fraudulent
of both the signing and delivering to entitle or unfair dealing by the other party, or by
such instrument to be recorded.-Id.

such referee, and of any mistake on the part
8. The Florida statute (McClel. Dig. p. 215, of such referee, be held to the settlement
$ 6,) provides that “no mortgage of personai agreed upon by them.-Howard v. Pensacola
property shall be effectual or valid to any pur-

& A. R. Co., (Fla.) 356.
pose whatsoever," if the mortgage is not re-
corded, unless the property be delivered with-

in 20 days after the execution of the mort of state, see States and State Officers, 5–7.
gage. Held that, no time being prescribed
within which the record shall be made, it will
be sufficient, as against the mortgagor, though

Conditional Sale.
made after the debt is due, if made before See Mortgages, 1; Sale, 11.
suit for foreclosure, and there are no circum-
stances, such as unreasonable delay, or the
death of the mortgagor after undue lapse of

time denoting laches, nor any fraud to im- See Divorce, 2.
peach the transaction.-Reese v. Taylor, (Fla.)


See Criminal Law, 21-25.
9. A voluntary assignee for benefit of cred-
itors, who is in possession under the deed of

assignment, cannot resist a foreclosure of a
chattel mortgage made by his assignors, on Lex loci.
the ground that there was an agreement be-
tween such mortgagors and the mortgagees, a sale executed in one state of real estate situ-

The rights and obligations of the parties to
authorizing the mortgagors to remain in pos-ated in another must be determined under the
session, and sell the goods mortgaged, with laws of the state in which

the property is situ-
out accounting to the mortgagees for the pro-ated. --Succession of Cassidy, (La.) 202.
ceeds of the same. Act Fla. 1881, c. 3241, (Mc-
Clel. Dig.,) providing that all civil actions may
be maintained in the name of the real party

in interest, and that an executor or trustee of Of conveyances, see Fraudulent Convey."
an express trust, including one with whom,

ances, 3.
or in whose name, a contract is made for an-

note, see Negotiable Instruments, 1, 2.
other, may sue without joining with him the
person for whose benefit the action is prose-
cuted, does not change this rule.-Einstein's

Sons y. Shouse, (Fla.) 380.

Of cities, see Municipal Corporations.
Cloud on Title.


See Quieting Title, 2-4.

When conspiracy has once been proved, evi.

dence of the acts and declarations of one of
Color of Title.

the conspirators in the prosecution of the com--

mon design is admissible against all the
See Adverse Possession, 2.

others. Affirming State v. Ford, 37 La. Ann.

443.—State v. Banks, (La.) 18.*


See Sheriffs and Constables.
Of executors, etc., see Executors and Admin-
istrators, 5, 6.

Common Carrier.


1. Const. Ala. art. 4, § 30, providing that
See Carriers,

all public printing shall be performed under

contract, to be given to the lowest responsible, creasing the penalty. Held, that the amend.
bidder below a maximum price, "and under atory act was ex post facto as to defendant,
zuch regulations as shall be prescribed by and,

section 2955 being repealed by it, defend-
law,” is operative only to the extent that vi- ant could not be punished for the offense.-
tality has been imparted to it by supplemental Lindsey v. State, (Miss.) 99.
legislation.-Brown v. Seay, (Xla.) 216.

Due process of law.
Delegation of legislative power. 7. Act Ala. Feb. 28, 1887, (Sess. Acts 1856-57,

2. A statute conferring on a commission p. 87,) requiring all persons employed by rail.
authority to regulate the charges of railroads road companies, in any capaciiy calling for
for transportation of passengers and freights discrimination of color signals, to be exam-
is not a delegation of legislative power for- ined by a state board of examiners as to their
bidden by Const. Fla., giving the legislature ability to distinguish colors, and making it a
full power to prevent unjust discrimination misdemeanor to accept or continue in such
and excessive charges by common carriers.-employment without a certificate from the
McWhorter v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., (Fla.) examiners, is unconstitutional, as depriving

persons of property without due process of

law, in so far as it requires the fees for such
Judicial powers.

examinations to be paid by the railroad com-
3. Under Const. Fla., giving to any criminal panies. CloPTON, J., dissenting.-Louisville
courts of record that may be established by & N. R. Co. v. Baldwin, (Ala.) 311.
the legislature jurisdiction of all criminal 8. Section 4, act Fla, June 7,1887, entitled" An
cases not capital, the legislature cannot take act to suppress gambling-houses and gam-
from such courts their jurisdiction to try such bling,” which provides “that if any of the im-
offenses, after it has once established them.- plements, devices, or apparatus commonly used
State v. Butt, (Fla.) 597.

in games of chance usually played in gambling.
4. The seventh section of the delinquent houses, or by gamblers, are found in any house,
tenant act of Florida (Laws 1881, c. 3243; room, booth, shelter, or other place, it shall be
McClel. Dig. p. 705, $ 24) is, in so far as it au- prima facie evidence that the said house,
thorizes the circuit court to try de novo, upon room, or place where the same are found is
its merits, a case appealed under such statute kept for the purpose of gambling," is not un-
from a judgment of the county judge, incon- constitutional, as depriving the citizen of due
sistent with sections S, 11, art. 6, Const. 1868, process of law.-Wooten v. State, (Fla.) 39.
as amended in 1875, and inoperative. The

Criminal law - Necessity of indict-
purpose and effect of section 11, art. 6, was
that the appeal in such cases should be to the ment.
appellate, and not to the original, jurisdiction 9. Rev. St. La. $ 1056, providing that on in-
of ihe circuit court.-State v. McClellan, (Fla.) | dictment for larceny the jury may bring in a
600, 003.

verdict of “not guilty of larceny, but guilty of

embezzlement" is not in conflict with Const.
Titles of laws.

1879, és 5,8, providing that prosecutions shall
5. Act Ala. Nov. 87, 1886, entitled “An act be by indictment or information, and that the
to amend an act approved December 12, 1882, accused shall be informed of the nature of the
to amend section 1544 of the Code of Alabama, accusation.-State v. Williams, (La.) 16.
so far as applies to Butler county, Ala.. so as Statute valid in part.
to authorize the probate judge of said county
to order an election to determine whether

10. The constitutionality of section 4, act
spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors, "etc., "shall Fla. June 7, 1887, providing that the finding of
be sold, given away, or otherwise disposed of, the implements and devices used in gambling
ir precinct 12 of said county,"is, as the latter on any premises shall be prima facie evidence
part of the title indicates, a complete law, that such premises are used for gambling pur-
original in form, providing for a “local option

poses, is not impaired by other unconstitu-
election in that precinct,

and amends no pre- tional sections of the same statute, when the
vious law, except by implication. Held, that constitutional section is entirely independent
the reference in the title to the amended act of the unconstitutional sections, and it cannot
may be regarded as surplusage; and, so re-

be held that the legislature would not have
garded, the act is not violative of Const. Ala. adopted the former without the latter,
1875, art. 4, $ 2, providing that "each law shall Wooten v. State, (Fla.) 39.
contain but one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title," and that “no law shail

be revived, amended, " etc., “by reference to
its title only, but so much thereof as is re- Adjournment of court by judge, see Judge, 2.
vived, amended,” etc., “shall be re-enacted In criminal cases, see Criminal Law, 9, 10.
and published at length."-Gandy v. State,
(Ala.) 4:20.
Ex post facto laws.

6. Defendant was indicted for carrying con- See, also, Arbitration and Award; Assim-
cealed weapons while Code Miss. $ 2985, pre- ment; Assignment for Benefit of Creuit-
scribing the penalty therefor, was in force, ors; Bonds; Carriers; Chattel Mortgages;
and was tried after the act of March 9, 1888, Covenants; Deed; Factors and Brokers;
amending section 2935 by striking out the Frauds, Statute of; Fraudulent Com cey-
clause which excepted from the prohibition (inces; Interest; Landlord and Tchant;
persons apprehending an attack, and by in- Negotiable Instruments; Partnership;

Principal and Agent; Principal and 7. A contract described the timber sold as
Surety; Sale; Specific Performance; Ven- timber 12 inches heart and up,” and it was
dor and Vendee.

in dispute as to what was meant by this
Breach, measure of damages, see Damages, phrase, conflicting testimony being introduced
3, 4.

on the point. Held, that the question as to
Enforcement of, see Specific Performance, the proper rule for the measurement of the

timber should have gone to the jury.-Mc-
For sale of land, see Vendor and Vendee, 1-3. Kenzie v. Wimberly, (Ala.) 468.

street paving, see Municipal Corpora- Performance.

tions, 15-21.
Ler rei site governs in sale of realty, see Con- during the coming season, for sale at retail

8. Where G. has agreed to deliver ice to B.
flict of Laws.
of cities, see Municipal Corporations, 7-9. pounds, in such quantities as B. may receive

price not exceeding 75 cents per hundred
on consolidation, see Municipal Cor- from G., the bills for the same to be paid
porations, 4.

monthly, the simple omission of G. to perform
insurance, see Insurance, 1.
wife, see Husband and Wife, 18-20.

his entire undertaking, on account of B.'s
Ratification by infant, see Infancy.

failure to pay, is no defense to a recovery of
Reformation, see Equity, 2-7.

the value of ice actually delivered to B. by G.,
Rescission and cancellation, see Equity, 8–12. against the obligors on the bond under such

agreement, the bond being conditioned for the

payment of all sums due for ice delivered un-

der the agreement.-Booske v. Gulf Ice Co.,
1. A bond with the following conditions: (Fla.) 247.
That whereas, the obligee in the bond “has 9. A cotton factor, who had agreed to ad-
agreed to deliver ice during the coming season vance to a planter inoney and supplies neces-
to” A. B., the principal obligor, “for sale at sary to make a crop, is liable to the planter
retail price not exceeding 75 cents per hun. for damages sustained through his failure to
dred pounds, in such quantities as " A. B. “may make the advances promised.-Kelly v. Devall,
receive from” the obligee, “the bills for the (La.) 657.
same to be paid monthly;" and that the bond
shall be void if A. B. shall pay to the obligee

“all sums due forice delivered under the above 10. Though the parties to a written contract
agreement, ” but otherwise to remain of full may, by dealings inconsistent with the con-
force and effect,-is not invalid on account of tract, substitute the terms of their dealings
vagueness. -Booskev. Gulf Ice Co., (Fla.) 247. for the provision of the contract, yet they

2. A provision by which a party who is to will not be bound by such substitution, when
perform a specified work for another agrees it appears that, on discovering that they had
that he will not execute any extra work, nor through mistake of both parties been acting
make any modifications or alterations in the contrary to the agreement as written, they
work described in the specification and plans, abandoned such course, and conformed to the
unless ordered in writing by a named agent terms of the written contract; and the con-
of the party for whom the work is to be done, duct of the party against whom it is sought to
nor claim pay for extra work, modifications, recover on the basis of such departure from
or alterations, unless such written order be the contract has shown, from the time of the
produced, is valid. - Howard v. Pensacola & discovery of the mistake, a positive determi-
A. R. Co., (Fla.) 356.

nation to insist on and adhere to the contract

as written.--Howard v. Pensacola & A. R.

Co., (Fla.) 356.
3. A contract made under duress cannot be
enforced, but, if bad only for that cause, it is

voidable; and, if ratified after the duress has

11. Plaintiffs sold to defendants machinery,
ceased, it becomes valid and enforceable.- in consideration of which defendants agreed
Ferrari v. Board of Health, (Fla.) 1.

to deliver lumber to plaintiffs on the side

track at a certain point on a railroad. In an

action for breach of the contract, where de-
4. The agreement meant by the expression fendants seek to rescind the same on account
"above agreement,” in the condition of a bond, of fraud, held, that evidence that no side
is not one outside of the bond, but that pre- track had been built, and that defendants, be-
viously set out in such condition.-Booske v. fore they offered to rescind, knew that none
Gulf Ice Co., (Fla.) 247.

would be built, is immaterial.-Young v.
5. Where a contract is embodied in several Arntze, (Ala.) 253.
instruments, its true meaning is to be ascer- 12. Evidence as to a witness' negotiations to
tained from a consideration of all the instru- purchase the machinery from plaintiffs after
ments and their effect upon each other. the alleged rescission by defendants is admis-
Howard v. Pensacola & A. R. Co., (Fla.) 356. sible as tending to show plaintiffs' consent to

6. Where an additional sum was agreed to a rescission, and a waiver of the right to a re-
be paid for certain bonds in case it should be turn of the machinery.-Id.
decided in a suit involving their validity that 13. Evidence that such witness informed
they were a superior lien to other bonds of one of defendants that he was to buy the ma-
the same issue, the vendor had no right to chinery, and gave him permission to use it, is
such additional sum, where equal priority was material, as explaining the use of the machin-
accorded to certain other bonds of the same ery by defendants after offer to return it.-Id.
issue.-Gilman v. Jones, (Ala.) 735.

14. In an action for breach of a contract to

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