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for compensation for labor. The next evil most common of occurrence was that arising from the renting by the husband of the wife's farm, and conducting business with it, presumably as her representative. If the business proved to be profitable, the world heard nothing of the contract by which the profits passed to the husband, and usually, if an attempt to subject it to his debts was made, the wife interposed a claim to it as produced on her land with her teams, implements, and supplies. But if misfortune followed, the creditor who had dealt with the husband, believing him to be, as appearances indicated, the mere agent and manager of the wife's estate, found that he had unwittingly given credit to a principal, insolvent in estate, and whose whole care for the future would be to devote his energies to the cultivation of the wife's estate.

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The second clause of the statute begins by enumerating the plantation, houses, horses, mules, wagons, carts, and implements of the wife as things which the husband should not rent from the wife, and conduct business therewith in his own name, except by virtue of a written contract, indicating thereby that the attention of the legislature was directed principally to the evils that arose from business conducted by the use of such property, and then broadens into the terms "or any of her means. It is a well-settled rule of construction that where special words are used, and they are followed by words of more general import, the general words are to be limited to matters ejusdem generis with the special words, unless an intention may be found to extend their meaning. This rule, of course, excludes the suggestion that the mere use of general words is sufficient to indicate a purpose to include matters not ejusdem generis. It is but the application of a principle that governs men in their usual intercourse, and applies language to the subject with which the speaker is dealing, and limits or expands the words used to accord to his understanding and intention. We find neither in the subject-matter nor in the other words of the statute anything indicating a purpose to include within the import of the words "any of her means" property other than that of a visible, tangible character, the possession of which is indicative of ownership, and calculated to invite the public to deal with the possessor as owner, and to mislead it to its injury if the truth be found to be otherwise. On the contrary, the language of the whole section is peculiarly appropriate to visible property, and unless money is included in the words "her means" there are none in which it may be found. The business is not declared to be that of the wife as between herself and her husband, but is only such "as to all persons dealing with him without notice;" that is, persons who in the view of the legislature may be misled by seeing the husband engaged in the management of his wife's property,-property known to be hers by the fact of its possession by her and of her claim to it. And then, again, if the "contract" by which the relation of principal and agent is changed is written, acknowledged, and recorded, the statute does not have application. The word "contract" is a very proper one to be used if it has relation to the hiring of personalty, or the leasing of a farm or house, but is not suggestive of one by which a loan of money is made; at least, it would have been natural, if it had been intended to require such contract as that to be in writing, to have added words indicating such purpose. This section (1177) relates exclusively to cases in which the husband transacts the business in his own name with property which, though used in the business, continues throughout the property of the wife. But it was thought that this provision might not meet the whole evil, and that by secret transfers of ownership of the property between husband and wife it would be difficult for third persons to know in whom the title really was vested. To meet this condition of things the next section (1178) declared that "no transfer of goods or chattels or lands between husband and wife shall be valid as against any third person, unless such transfer or conveyance be in writing, and acknowledged and filed for record, as a mortgage or deed of trust

of such property is required to be filed for record, and in such cases possession of the property shall not be equivalent to filing the writing for record, but, to affect third persons, such writing must be filed for record.

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The two sections, we think, have reference to the same character of property,--the first dealing with those cases in which the mere possession or use is or may be sought to be changed by secret contracts; the other, with those in which the title itself may be transferred. The “goods and chattels" of section 1178 manifestly do not include money, and the words, we think, in this section have reference to the same things as are included in the words "any of her means" in section 1177. The same result will be reached by a rigid interpretation of the language of section 1177 alone. This section does not prevent the husband from transacting business in his own name, and on his own account, with property derived from the wife. It applies only where the business is conducted with the property of the wife,-property which remains hers, though used in the business. The only property which, by the language of the act, the husband is prohibited from renting or hiring from the wife is "the plantation, houses, horses, mules, wagons, carts, or other implements." Borrowing of money is not prohibited, but if the money of the wife is borrowed by the husband, it is no longer hers, but his, and the business transacted with it is not transacted with her means, but with his own, derived from the contract with the wife, it is true, but by means of a transaction not forbidden by the language of the statute. It may be added that a construction by which the words “any of her means" should be held to include everything, whether of a visible and tangible, or of an invisible, character, would practically deprive the preceding words of all effect; for it would be useless to specify certain things as to which the statute should apply, if it was intended that it should apply to all other things, whether ejusdem generis or of a totally distinct character.

The only remaining objection which, it seems, can be urged to the view we have taken is that a part of the general evil at which the statute is aimed may be left without correction. To this we reply that by section 1300, a part of the same Code, protection is afforded to creditors of all mercantile establishments in which the business is transacted by one as the agent of an undisclosed principal. Under the two sections there is but little danger that any serious evil of the class aimed at will be left without remedy. The judgment is affirmed.

LOWDEN . ROBERTSON.

(Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 3, 1888.)

1. REPLEVIN-SEQUESTRATION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY—AFFIDAVIT.

In sequestration of movable property, based on a vendor's privilege, an affidavit to the debt, to the privilege, and to the fear that "the defendant will conceal, part with, or dispose of the movable in his possession during the pendency of the suit," fills all the requirements of the law; and the party is not bound to swear to or to prove any other grounds of fear than the simple facts that he has a privilege, and that it lies in the power of the defendant to defeat or destroy it by doing some of the acts which he swears he fears he may do.

2. SAME-FAILURE OF PURCHASER TO PAY.

The case is still stronger where the purchaser of the movable has failed to pay the price when due; which default would be a sufficient reason for the fear, even if the law required the creditor to swear to and to prove that he has good cause to fear, which it does not.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from civil district court, parish of Orleans.

Horner & Lee, for appellant. Sam L. Gilmore, for appellee.

FENNER, J. The appeal is from an interlocutory judgment dissolving a sequestration. The sequestration issued upon an affidavit of plaintiff that the

debt claimed is due and owing; that he has a vendor's privilege upon the movable sequestered; and that he "fears that the defendant will conceal, part with, or dispose of the same during the pendency of the suit." The grounds assigned in the rule to dissolve are: (1) That the statements contained in plaintiff's affidavit are entirely unfounded and untrue; (2) that the bond herein furnished is insufficient.

The ground first above stated is the one on which the judge a quo acted, and the only one urged before us. Recurring to the affidavit, the statements contained in which are charged to be untrue, we find no statements therein except those above recited. It is not pretended that under his rule to dissolve the defendant has established the non-existence of either the debt or the privilege, or that the debt is not overdue.

The only remaining allegation is the one that plaintiff fears that defendant will conceal, part with, or dispose of the property during the pendency of the suit. It would certainly be difficult to establish that such an allegation is untrue. Fear is a subjective mental condition, the existence or non-existence of which can hardly be the subject of extrinsic proof. If a man says and swears that he fears, it is, to say the least, difficult to contradict him. But the contention is that it is not sufficient that a party has a privilege, and that he fears it may be lost by some disposition of the property during the pendency of the suit, but that he is bound to establish in addition that his fear is based on such acts or declarations of defendant as would justify the fear. If this were correct, we should not hesitate to hold that where a man has sold movable property for a price payable in notes at a fixed day, and when the purchaser fails to pay them when due, the mere fact of non-payment, coupled with the additional fact that it lies in the power of the purchaser to defeat the vendor's privilege by the alienation or removal of the thing sold, constitutes ample cause for a just and reasonable fear that his privilege may be defeated.

In the case of provisional seizure the lessor is required to make affidavit "that he has good reasons to believe that the lessee will remove the furniture,” etc., (Code Prac. art. 287;) yet this court has repeatedly held that the failure of the tenant to pay the rent when due constitutes a sufficient basis for the affidavit. Heirs of Labaurie v. Woods, 8 La. Ann. 366; Wallace v. Smith, Id. 376; Fox v. McKee, 31 La. Ann. 71. The same principle applies with equal force to a vendor's privilege, where the purchaser fails to pay the price when due.

In the case of sequestration, moreover, the plaintiff is not required to swear that he has good reason to fear, but simply that he fears. Code Prac. art. 275, No. 8. In some earlier cases there were dicta to the effect that a party must not only establish his privilege and his fear that it may be lost, but also good grounds for the fear. But in Wells v. St. Dizier, 9 La. Ann. 119, the court held a simple affidavit in the terms of No. 8 of article 275, Code Prac., to be sufficient; and in a later case the court follows the same rule, making the following significant reference: "We are aware that there are other decisions which are inconsistent with the decision in Wells v. St. Dizier, but prefer to abide by the doctrine of the last-named case, as being, in our opinion, more in conformity to the letter of the Code of Practice." Mabry v. Tally, 15 La.. Ann. 563. Still later it was held that an affidavit to the privilege, coupled with a statement of the fear, in accordance with No. 8 of article 275, Code Prac., was sufficient basis for sequestration. Blanc v. Wallace, 26 La. Ann. 492. And in the latest case it was treated as conceded that "had the affidavit set forth the fear of a removal of the cotton (in addition to the privilege) it would have followed the exigencies of the law." Gumbel v. Beer, 36 La. Ann. 487. We treat it therefore as fully settled, in accordance with the uniform prac tice, that in sequestration based on a privilege, (at least when the debt secured is due,) an affidavit to the debt, to the privilege, and to the fear stated in No. 8 of article 275, Code Prac., is sufficient. The party is not bound to swear to

or to prove any other grounds of fear than the simple facts that he has a privilege, and that it lies in the power of the defendant to defeat or to destroy it by doing some of the acts which he swears he fears he may do. Where the debt is not due, possibly different considerations might arise. It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be annulled and reversed, and it is now ordered and decreed that the motion to dissolve the sequestration be denied and overruled, at defendant's cost, in both courts.

APPEAL

STATE ex rel. SCHLATER v. JUDGE OF DISTRICT COURT.

(Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 3, 1888.)

PRACTICE-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

A bill of exceptions is only necessary for the purpose of disclosing to the appellate court what the judge's ruling was, and the grounds of objection thereto. If they appear of record, the right of the party excepting is fully preserved without the re

tention of a bill.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Application for mandamus.

Samuel Matthews and Charles O. Laure, for relator.

WATKINS, J. During the progress of proceedings in a suit pending in the respondent's court, in which the relatrix is plaintiff, and Wilbot & Sons are defendants, counsel of the former caused an amended petition to be filed, which, on objection urged by counsel of the latter, was stricken from the record. To the respondent's ruling, counsel for relatrix excepted, and tendered a bill of exceptions, which the former declined to file, and the latter has applied for a mandamus to compel him to sign said bill.

The respondent returns that there is no rule of our practice which requires him to sign a bill of exceptions in case all the proceedings are of record, and a note of them appears in the minutes of the court. He has annexed to his answer a copy of the minutes for the purpose of showing that all of the proceedings are of record, and that the rights of the relatrix will be perfectly protected in the court on an appeal. In thus ruling the respondent was certainly correct. The provisions of the Code of Practice on this subject are that, “if one of the parties calls on the court to express an opinion on a point of law arising in the cause, such opinion may be excepted to," (article 487;) "and that the party excepting to the opinion of the court draw a bill of exceptions, in which the question of fact and of law, on which such opinion has been demanded, shall be concisely set forth, as well as the grounds of the exception so taken," (article 488.) In construing these articles, this court said, in State v. Judge, 12 La. Ann. 113, "that the object of a bill of exceptions is to place on the record and make part thereof something which was done under the order of the court during the progress of the cause which would not otherwise appear, in order that the question of law arising from the ruling of the judge in the matter excepted to may be reviewed by the appellate court."

It is obvious, then, that the Code only contemplates that a bill of exceptions should be signed and filed in the record when it is necessary to disclose to the appellate tribunal what the judge's ruling was, and what was the ground of objection thereto. Harrison v. Waymouth, 3 Rob. (La.) 341; Commissioners v. Yorke, 4 La. Ann. 138; Scott v. Lawson, 10 La. Ann. 547. In the instant case there was no necessity for a bill of exceptions to have been retained, as it fully appears from the record what the judge's ruling was, and also what was the objection urged thereto; hence the application of the relatrix must be refused.

It is therefore ordered and decreed that the preliminary writ be set aside, and that a peremptory mandamus be refused, at the cost of the relatrix.

FIRST NAT. BANK OF SHREVEPORT v. BOARD OF REVIEWERS.

(Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 3, 1888.)

1. BANKS AND BANKING-NATIONAL BANKS-CAPITAL INVESTED IN UNITED STATES BONDS -TAXATION OF STOCK.

However true it be that United States bonds are not taxable as independent assets, and that their taxation does not depend upon constitutional provisions of the different states, it is a matter beyond discussion that, when the capital of a bank is in part or in whole invested in them, the shares of such banks, whether national or state, are liable to state taxation.

2. SAME.

In the assessment of the shares of a bank, whose capital is represented by stock, it is immaterial whether the capital was or not invested in United States bonds and state bonds, although as a rule the same be themselves exempt from taxation. 3. SAME-EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION.

The words, "all exempt property," found in section 28 of act 98 of 1886, relating to deductions from the amount of taxes assessed to such shares, do not apply to United States bonds, or to state bonds in which the capital of a bank, state or national, represented by shares, has been invested.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from district court, parish of Caddo; TALVY, Judge.
Wise & Herndon, for appellant. Land & Land, for appellee.

BERMUDEZ, C. J. The bank and the stockholders join to obtain a reduction of the assessment put on the shares for the year 1887. From a judgment rejecting their demand, they prosecute this appeal.

In May, 1887, the bank returned to the assessor a statement showing the valuation of the capital stock to be $200,000, deducting therefrom the amounts then invested in United States bonds, $146,593.75, and in state bonds, $27,637.50, aggregating $174,231.25,-leaving a difference of $25,768.75 as representing the value of the shares, which had been assessed at $100,000. The bank does not contend for the exemption of the shares, but insists that the legislature having determined and directed the manner in which the shares of the banking associations should be assessed to arrive at their value, and the assessment having been made in disregard of the method or process indicated, the assessment made ought to be rectified, and made pursuant to the mode prescribed by the law-making power, and which is contained in section 28 of act 98 of 1886.

Practically, the contention is that, taking the cash value of the shares to be $200,000, they ought not to be assessed at even half of that sum, because part of the capital of the bank having been invested in exempt property (United States and state bonds) the amounts of the investment ought to be deducted from the value of the shares, and that by this operation the assessment ought to be of $25,768.75 and no more. However true it be that bonds or obligations of the United States are not taxable, and that their taxation does not depend upon the constitutional provisions of the different states of the Union, it is conceded, as a matter beyond the domain of discussion, "that shares in banks, whether state or national, are liable to taxation by a state, although the capital of the bank may be entirely invested in United States bonds." Indeed, clearly to that effect are the federal statutes and the jurisprudence on the subject. Rev. St. U. S. § 5219; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; Bank v. Com. 9 Wall. 353; Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480; Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19; People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 145-162, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826, (1887,) in which anterior jurisprudence is reviewed.

The solitary question presented in this controversy is therefore simply whether the shares of the stockholders have or not been assessed in the manner pointed out by the act of 1886. The section relied upon, which it is un

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