POCHÉ, J. In this case, in which Adolphus Banks, Louis Edwards, Edmund Drunnels, and Prudy Williams had been indicted for conspiracy and murder, a nolle prosequi was entered as to Banks, who was afterwards used as a state witness; and the trial resulted in the acquittal of Prudy Williams, and in the conviction of murder, by an unqualified verdict, of Edmund Drunnels, and in the conviction of Louis Edwards for murder without capital punishment. The two convicted defendants prosecute this appeal, and urge numerous complaints for our examination. 1. They contend that the minutes of the court fail to show that an indictment was presented against them in open court, because the entry in the minutes on the subject refers to an indictment against Adolphus Banks only. But the record shows that the indictment, which was presented on that day, was entitled, "State of Louisiana v. Adolphus Banks and als. ;" and the indictment itself charges all four of the persons herein above enumerated with the crime of murder and conspiracy. This and other errors in the general confection of the transcript may go a great way to prove gross negligence or glaring incompetency on the part of the clerk; but they cannot vitiate the proceedings, from the whole tenor of which it appears to our entire satisfaction that an indictment was duly presented against the two defendants who are now appellants before us, and that their complaint in this particular is groundless. 2. The next complaint involves the ruling of the trial judge in admitting as evidence the statement by the state witness Adolphus Banks that Louis Edwards had told him where he had procured the axe with which the homicide had been committed. In the opinion of the judge the conspiracy for the perpetration of the murder had been proved against the two appellants, and it appeared that the statement had been made at the time and place of the homicide. Hence it follows that the declaration of one of the co-conspirators, in connection with the common purpose, must be held as that of all the others; and it was therefore admissible as evidence against them all. In Ford's Case, 37 La. Ann. 443, this court, guided by undisputed authority, formulated the rule as follows: "When a conspiracy has once been proved, in the opinion of the trial judge, evidence of the acts and declarations of one of the conspirators in the prosecution of the common design is admissible against all the others." Whart. Crim. Ev. §§ 698-701; U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 469. We therefore uphold the trial judge in the ruling complained of. 3. It is next charged as error on the part of the judge to have admitted the testimony of a witness to the effect that Banks had shown him the place where the homicide had been committed, and the spot where the body of the victim had been found. The evidence was properly admitted to corroborate the testimony of Banks, who had already testified. There is no force in the contention that the facts disclosed by that evidence were res inter alios acta, as it appears that at the time Banks was one of the accused in the case. The objection that the state could not corroborate his testimony before it was attacked finds no sanction in law or reason. The parties to a suit cannot be controlled in the order of introducing their evidence. It was not only competent for the district attorney to seek, at any stage of trial, to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice who had turned State's evidence, but it was his duty to do so, in compliance with well-settled jurisprudence, and in justice to the accused themselves, whose counsel were zealous in their efforts to prevent a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; and this was the subject of their fourth bill of exceptions, in which they complain of the refusal of the judge to charge the jury to give no faith to the statements of the accomplice implicating other persons but himself, unless he was therein corroborated by unimpeached evidence. The judge very properly refused the charge as requested, because it was unwarranted by the laws of this state; and because, in his general charge to the jury, he had covered the whole ground in a manner fully sanctioned by criminal jurisprudence, in this state as well as in other common wealths of the American Union. He had charged as follows: "The fact that a witness was an accomplice may affect his credibility, but not his competency; that is, he is a legal witness, and you must determine what credit you think his testimony is entitled to, whether corroborated or uncorroborated." In these few clear and terse utterances the judge successfully announced the whole doctrine as established in jurisprudence, and complied at the same time with the rule of law which places the solution of the facts in a criminal prosecution within the exclusive province of the jury. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. §§ 1160, 1169; State v. Mason, 38 La. Ann. 476; State v. Prudhomme, 25 La. Ann. 522; State v. Bayonne, 23 La. Ann. 78; Proff. Jury, § 365. 5. From the foregoing considerations we conclude that the trial judge was equally correct in refusing the charge requested by counsel for the defense, embodying the legal maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, which is the subject of their fifth bill of exceptions, and which was likewise intended to affect the testimony of the accomplice Banks. As the jury were the sole judges of the credibility of the witness, it was their right, untrammeled by any direction, check, or restraint on the part of the court, to adopt their own rules or modes of testing the credit to which the witness was entitled, and of weighing the value of his testimony. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 1149; Whart. Crim. Ev. § 380; Wat. Crim. Dig. p. 130, No. 34. After a thorough examination and a minute consideration of all the grounds of error urged by these appellants, we reach the conclusion that they have had a fair and impartial trial, and that they are entitled to no relief at our hands. Judgment affirmed. STATE v. ROBINSON. (Supreme Court of Louisiana. October 12, 1888. 40 La. Ann.) CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA OF GUILTY-SENTENCE ON TWO COUNTS. Where an accused person is charged, in separate counts, with burglary and larceny, and he confesses himself "guilty as charged," it is competent for the judge to sentence him to one term of imprisonment for the commission of the burglary, and to another term for the commission of the larceny, the latter to begin at the expiration of the former. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, parish of Red River; W. P. HALL, Judge. J. C. Pugh, Dist. Atty., Tenth Dist., and J H. Shepherd, Dist. Atty., First Dist., for the State. S. A. Hull and J. D. Roach, for defendant. WATKINS, J. The accused is charged in the indictment with burglary and larceny in separate counts, and to the charge in general terms pleads guilty. Thereupon the trial judge sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment for the commission of the burglary, and one year in addition for the commission of the larceny; the latter sentence to begin at the expiration of the former. From this judgment and sentence the accused appeals, and assigns as error that the judgment and sentence are contrary to law. The argument of his counsel is that, under a general verdict, rendered under an indictment containing several counts, the accused cannot be sentenced to cumulative punishment; that, inasmuch as there has been but one conviction, there cannot be more than one punishment; that the effect of such a rule would be to cumulate several punishments for one offense, and under a single finding. There is no statute on the subject, and the question has never been passed upon by this court, or its predecessors; hence the decision of it must rest on the principles of the common law. On this subject Mr. Bishop formulates the following rule, viz.: "The courts hold that, if a man in the night-time breaks and enters a dwelling-house, intending to steal therein, and actually steals, he may be punished for two offenses or one, at the election of the power prosecuting him. If a single count of the indictment charges him with breaking, entering, and stealing, they say his offense is single, being burglary committed in a particular manner; but if the first count sets out, in the other form, the burglary as done by breaking and entering with intent to steal, then a second count may allege the larceny as a separate thing, and he may be convicted and sentenced for both." 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. (5th Ed.) § 1062. The district attorney has drawn the bill under present consideration in conformity with the latter paragraph of the foregoing quotation; and it would seem to sanction the course pursued by the judge a quo in the instant case. Reference to the record shows that the accused in open court withdrew his plea of not guilty, and pleaded "guilty as charged." Now, inasmuch as he was charged with burglary and larceny in separate counts, his plea of "guilty" extends to both; and as he confessed himself guilty of both, what good reason is there for saying that sentence for both could not be pronounced? There is none. If it be permissible under our law-and it assuredly is--for an accused person to be indicted as the defendant has been, it is equally permissible for the judge to sentence him accordingly upon conviction. Rev. St. §§ 852, 1059. In a certain sense, separate counts are distinct indictments cumulated into one, in order that they may be tried by one jury. Oftentimes such offenses as may be thus cumulated for trial and sentence are those that arise in a single transaction; and, should the accused be separately indicted and tried, one trial might prove a bar to the other, and the ends of justice be in part defeated. Is it not equally clear that if we should hold with defendant's counsel that but one punishment can be inflicted under such dual indictment, that the ends of justice would be likewise defeated, and just to the same extent? We think so. What good purpose would be accomplished by thus permitting the cumulation of counts charging different offenses in one indictment, if but one punishment could be inflicted? None. This construction would defeat the law. We are of the opinion that the sentence and decree of the court are correct, and the same are affirmed. STATE v. PATE. (Supreme Court of Louisiana. October 17, 1888. 40 La. Ann.) 1. COURTS-ADJOURNMENT BY JUDGE-JURY TERM. Under the provisions of section 1934 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, a district judge has the discretionary power to adjourn, by a written order to the sheriff, a regular term of the court, to any day preceding the next regular session, as he thinks proper; and to require the attendance of jurors accordingly. Under the effect of such an order the first day of the actual session becomes the first day of the regular jury term for that month, within the contemplation of section 6 of act No. 44 of 1877, requiring that the grand jury be drawn on the first day of the regular term. 2. GRAND JURY-DRAWING-INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-MOTION TO QUASH. A grand jury thus drawn is a legal body, and a motion to quash an indictment presented by that body, on the ground of illegality in the organization thereof, cannot prevail. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, parish of De Soto; W. P. HALL, Judge. J. C. Pugh, Dist. Atty., for the State. E. W. Sutherlin, C. W. Pegnes, and J. B. Lee, for defendant. POCHÉ, J. This appeal, which was taken from a conviction of manslaughter under an indictment for murder, presents but one point for review. Before trial the accused moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the grand jury which had presented it had not been legally organized. The alleged illegality is drawn from the following incident: On the 3d of February, 1888, the judge issued a written order to adjourn the regular term of the court -which had been fixed, according to law, for the first Monday-to the second Monday of that month, and to require the attendance of the jurors drawn for that term, in accordance with the adjourned session of the court. The term was held in pursuance of the adjournment, and the grand jury was organized on the first day of the session, which began on the 13th, which was the second Monday of February. The contention is that the order of adjournment was illegal, because it was issued without sufficient or legal reason; and that in consequence thereof the grand jury was not impaneled on the first day of the term, and was not drawn from a venire of jurors serving for the week for which they had been drawn, as required by law. The judge relies, as authority for his action in the premises, on section 1934 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: "In case the judge should not appear on the first day of any term, the sheriff, or, in the event of his sickness, death, resignation, absence, inability, or failure to act, the coroner, shall adjourn the court from day to day for not more than three days. The judge may also, by written order directed to the sheriff, adjourn the court to such day preceding the next regular session as he may think proper." But defendant's counsel argues that, under a proper construction of both paragraphs taken together, the written order of adjournment by the judge must be justified by a reason expressed in the order, or subsequently given when called for. The argument finds no sanction in the words of the statute. The first clause contemplates an adjournment by the sheriff in the absence of, and without any order from, the judge; the absence of the latter being the reason for the adjournment. The second clause provides for an adjournment of the term, by means of a written order emanating from the judge, whether present or absent, at his discretion, and without being required to give any reasons. Barring the limit to the adjourned term, which must be to a day preceding the next regular session, the discretion which the law vests in the judge is unqualified; and no interference with its exercise can be tolerated, on the part of litigants, by way of pleading. Abuse of such power by a judge must be remedied by other modes, for which adequate provisions are afforded by the constitution and laws of the state. As the order was sanctioned by law, it had its legal effects,-one of which was to legalize the session of the court which begun on the second Monday of the month. The first day of that session was the first day of the February term, within the scope and requirement of section 6 of act No. 44 of 1877, which provides that the grand jury must be drawn and organized on the first day of the regular jury term of the court. This conclusion is not only sanctioned by the text of the law, but is fully warranted by authority. In Bunger's Case, 14 La. Ann. 461, this court, in dealing with a germane question, held: "The court was not in session the first and second weeks. These jurors did not serve, or even attend court, during that time; and the district judge properly held that, in contemplation of law, the first week of the actual session of court was that during which the jurors first enlisted had to attend court and serve in that capacity." The foregoing considerations lead to the logical conclusion that the grand jury which returned the indictment under which appellant was tried, was a legally organized body, and that the district judge committed no error in overruling his motion to quash the bill. Other points were made below, but are not pressed on appeal, and hence they are considered as abandoned. Judgment affirmed. PARISH BOARD SCHOOL DIRECTORS v. POLICE JURY. 1. TAXATION-LEVY OF TAX-POLICE JURY-DISCRETIONARY POWER. The word "may," found in section 54 of act No. 81 of 1888, does not mean "shall." Traced back, through the last sentence of article 229 of the constitution, to act No. 23, § 28, of 1877, which the framers of that instrument intended to continue in force in that respect, it simply means, "are authorized." 2. SAME. The constitution merely directed that the legislature "shall provide that every parish may levy a tax," which means, "is authorized or empowered. ' 3. SAME LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. Any legislation, seeming to impose upon police juries the duty or obligation of levying the tax, would transcend the delegated authority, and so be unconstitutional and barren of effect. Police jurors are therefore clothed by law with the discretionary or optional power of levying or not, as in their wisdom they may deem fit and proper, the tax in question for school purposes. 4. MANDAMUS-FAILURE OF POLICE JURY TO LEVY SCHOOL TAX. In case of a failure to levy the tax, no mandamus can issue to compel the levy. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, parish of De Soto; W. P. HALL, Judge. BERMUDEZ, C. J. Relying upon section 54 of act No. 81 of 1888, the relators seek, by mandamus, to have the police jury of De Soto parish commanded to levy a one and a half mills tax for common-school purposes. One of the grounds of resistance urged by the police jury is that the levy of such tax rests in their discretion, and that they cannot be judicially constrained to exercise it. The district court having made the mandamus peremptory, and ordered the levy of the tax asked, the police jury have appealed. The section relied on (2541) enacts substantially that the police jurors of the several parishes may levy, for the support of the common schools of their respective parishes, not less than one and a half mills of the ten mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the property thereof, to be provided for in their annual budgets; and that, on the refusal or neglect to levy said tax, or to vote for such levy, the parish school board shall have the right, and it shall be its duty, to compel, by mandamus, the levy of said tax. The relators contend that this provision is mandatory, and that the legislature had the power, under the constitution, to enact such legislation, which is obligatory, and should be carried out. In order to show that the language is mandatory, the relators argue that the statute provides that, on the refusal or neglect of the police jury to levy said tax or to vote for it, it shall be the right and duty of the school board to compel them to do so by mandamus; which is a writ which issues to coerce specific performance when no discretion to do or not to do exists,-in other words, to coerce a ministerial duty. It is evident that the first part of the section merely provides that police jurors "may" levy a tax. The word "may" in its usual acceptation, is merely permissive. It is true, however, that cases have occurred in which that word has been construed to mean "must" or "shall;" but the question is, in the instant controversy, whether it has that meaning and purport. The statute is not an original piece of legislation, which the general assembly would be authorized to enact proprio motu, in consequence of the possession of the powers vesting generally in such bodies. It is a legislation which, in Louisiana, owing to constitutional restrictions on the law-making power, must find, to be valid, its authority in the organic law itself, and which was enacted under a constitutional behest. We deem it unnecessary to enter into any inquiry as to what the powers are of the state and of the parishes to levy taxes for the common schools for general or local purposes, as there exists in the constitution special provisions for the exercise of the right of taxation for |