tract within the statute of frauds, directed a verdict for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

C. M. Williamson, for appellant. M. Dabney, for appellee.

COOPER, J. The court erred in directing the jury to find for the defendant. The defendant, without the consent of the landlord, took charge of the crops grown on the demised premises under purchases from the tenants, and retained possession after the rents were due. The crops were removed from the houses in which they had been stored by the tenants, and placed in the gin-house situated on the same plantation, but not upon the leased land. The landlord, apprehending danger from fire, objected to such disposition of the property, whereupon the defendants stated that they would take all risk of such injury, and the landlord, in reliance upon this assumption, forebore to act. We do not see what influence the statute of frauds has upon the question involved. There was no promise to pay the debt of a third person, (the tenant,) but a simple agreement by the defendants, who were in possession of property upon which the landlord had a lien, that they would have the property forthcoming to respond to his demand for rent, and would bear the loss if it should be destroyed by fire, as the landlord feared it would be if left in the place where it had been deposited by the purchaser. We do not perceive anything illegal in the agreement of the parties, nor is there anything in the statute of frauds that required the contract to be in writing. The danger of loss to the landlord by reason of the destruction of the property by fire, and the advantage to the defendants in being permitted to deal with it as they desired, formed a sufficient consideration to uphold their promise to bear the loss in event the property should be lost by fire. Since the loss has resulted it may seem hard that defendants should pay so much for so small a consideration, but the risk also seemed small when responsibility was assumed, and, but for the agreement of the defendants, it is but fair to assume that the landlord would have protected himself by a resort to other remedies. In any event, a recovery of the value of the property destroyed, to the extent of the lien of plaintiff upon it, is within the terms of the agreement. The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded.

TIERNEY V. BROWN et al.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 12, 1888.)

1. DEED-SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION.

In ejectment to recover possession of the S. E. 4 of section 5, etc., described in one of plaintiff's muniments of title as "part of S. E. 4, section 5, " etc., but also described as "south part of section 5,-225 acres, "though the first description is void for uncertainty, recovery may be had of that part of the S. E. 4 embraced in the latter description, that being good to convey a strip containing 225 acres of equal depth, having the southern boundary of the whole section as the base line for measurement.

2. TAXATION-ASSESSMENT MEETING OF SUPERVISORS-PRESUMPTION.

The meeting of the board of supervisors at which they accepted and approved the assessment roll, though not held at a time authorized by the law of Alabama for a regular meeting, will be presumed to have been legal, in the absence of proof that it was not a special meeting such as might have been legally called and held at that time.

Appeal from circuit court, Warren county; RALPH NORTH, Judge.

· Ellen Tierney brought ejectment against King Brown and others to recover possession of the S. E. of section 5, etc. Tierney claimed through a tax title; one of the muniments of her title describing the land as S. E. 4, and another as S. E. part. In 1879, the land appeared on the assessinent roll as state land, but in 1880 was omitted from the roll as state land and appeared as "unknown"

1See Morse v. Stockman, (Wis.) 40 N. W. Rep. 679.

owner, but the description remained the same, to-wit: South part of section 5, etc.,-225 acres. In 1879, the supervisors complied with the law in reference to the assessment roll, except that it appears that the roll was approved on October 13th, a day not authorized by law for such approval under the regular course, but it is not shown that the meeting was not a special or called one under the law. The defendants objected to the description of the land as void for want of certainty. There was a judgment in favor of the defendants, from which plaintiff, Ellen Tierney, appealed.

Wade R. Young, for appellant. Birchett & Gilland, for appellees.

ARNOLD, C. J. The contest is for the S. E. of section 5, township 14, range 4 E. In one of appellant's muniments of title it is described as part of S. E. 4, section 5, township 14, range 4 E. This description indicates no particular part of the subdivision named, and is therefore fatally defective and void. Yandell v. Pugh, 53 Miss. 295; Bowers v. Andrews, 52 Miss. 596; Cogburn v. Hunt, 54 Miss. 675; Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038. But the land claimed by appellant is also described as south part of section 5, township 14, range 4 E.,-225 acres. This description is not void for uncertainty. It is easy enough to lay off 225 acres of the south part of a given section. Such description is good to convey 225 acres, to be laid off in a strip of equal depth in the southern part of the section, the southern boundary of the whole section being the base line for the measurement. Goodbar v. Dunn, 61 Miss. 618; Enochs v. Miller, 60 Miss. 19; McCready v. Langsdale, 58 Miss. 879; Bowers v. Chambers, 53 Miss. 259. So that treating part of the S. E. 4, section 5, township 14, range 4 E., as void for uncertainty, still a part of it at least may be embraced in the other description,-the south part of section 5, township 14, range 4 E.,-225 acres.

The list of land sold to the state is prima facie evidence that the assessment and sale of the land for taxes was valid, and there is nothing in the record that contravenes this evidence. The land having been assessed to the state in 1879, and afterwards omitted, under the act of 1880, from the list of lands belonging to the state, it was not necessary, as far as the record shows, that it should be reassessed, in order to sell it for the taxes of an unknown owner in 1881. Gwynn v. Richardson, 3 South. Rep. 579. The assessment of 1879 was valid, except as to the name of the owner; and it does not appear that more was done towards omitting or striking the land from the tax-roll as state land than to erase the name of the state, as owner, from the roll, and insert "unknown" in lieu thereof, as to the ownership. It is true that the meeting of the board of supervisors in October, 1879, at which they accepted and approved the land-roll, was not at a time authorized by law for a regular meeting, but it is not shown that it was not a special meeting such as might have been legally called and held at that time, and meetings of boards of supervisors not affirmatively shown to have been illegal are presumed to have been legal. Corburn v. Crittenden, 62 Miss. 125; Brigins v. Chandler, 60 Miss. 862. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

BRETT v. BRETT.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 5, 1888.)

EQUITY-ACTION TO SET ASIDE DEED-FRAUD OF PARTIES.

Where land is bought and taken in the name of a third person for the purpose of defrauding the real purchaser's creditors, and the grantee understands the motive, the deed is valid and binding between the parties.

Appeal from chancery court, Kemper county; S. EVANS, Chancellor. Appellant, J. M. Brett, filed this bill, praying the cancellation of certain deeds to land executed to his son. The facts alleged are, in substance, that in 1868 J. M. Brett bought some land, and had the deeds thereto made to his

son, W. P. Brett, the appellee, but the land remained in possession of complainant. Only one of the deeds was recorded. The reason for having the deeds made to his son was that the father might escape the payment of some old debts. The bill prayed a cancellation of the deeds so executed, and that title to said lands be vested in complainant. Defendant demurred to the bill. The demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed, from which complainant appeals.

T. W. Brame, for appellant. Calhoon & Green, for appellee.

ARNOLD, C. J. The bill shows that the deeds sought to be canceled were made at the instance of appellant, and delivered to him for appellee, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of appellant, and that appellee "fully understood the motive, reasons, and purpose" of appellant in the transaction. Under these circumstances, the deeds are valid and binding between the parties, and cannot be impeached or annulled by appellant. Simmons v. Ingram, 60 Miss. 886; Gully v. Hull, 31 Miss. 20; Snodgrass v. Andrews, 30 Miss. 472; Watt v. Conger, 13 Smedes & M. 412. Affirmed.

JAMES v. WOODS.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 5, 1888.)

1. APPEAL-FROM INFERIOR COURTS-BOND.

The fact that an appeal-bond, on appeal from a justice, is executed and approved before rendition of the judgment appealed from does not invalidate the bond. 2. SAME-APPROVAL OF BOND-NEW BOND.

Where an appeal-bond has been given with security approved by the justice, appellant should be allowed to give a new bond if the first proves defective in any respect.

3. SAME-RIGHT TO APPEAL JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION.

Code Miss. § 2309, denying appeal from judgments by confession or consent, does not apply to justices' courts.

Appeal from circuit court, Holmes county; C. H. CAMPBELL, Judge. Appellee, A. A. Woods, sued Peter James before a justice of the peace. James did not appear at the trial, but, supposing that judgment would be rendered against him, for some reason he sent by his son an affidavit and appealbond to take the case to the circuit court. The son handed the affidavit and appeal-bond to the justice, who approved the bond before he rendered the judgment against James. The son was asked, after the plaintiff had presented his case to the justice, if he had anything to say in defense, and he replied that he had nothing to say; whereupon there was prepared and entered a judgment by confession or consent. The case was carried to the circuit court, where a motion was made by Woods to dismiss the appeal-(1) because the appeal-bond was approved before judgment was rendered by the justice of the peace, and (2) because the judgment being by consent no appeal lay from it. The motion was sustained, and judgment was entered against James, from which he appeals.

J. E. Gwin, for appellant. Hooker & Wilson, for appellee.

ARNOLD, C. J. Appellant had given an appeal-bond with security approved by the justice of the peace, and should have been allowed to give a new bond, as he offered to do, if the bond given had been defective in any respect. Code, § 2353; Gaddis v. Palmer, 60 Miss. 758. But it is not perceived that the irregularity of the appeal-bond being executed and approved before the judgment appealed from was rendered vitiated the bond. The bond had the effect which one regularly executed and approved would have had, and it was available to protect appellee for all the purposes contemplated by law in such case. If it be insisted here, as it was done on the motion to dismiss in the circuit court, that the judgment in the justice's court was by confession, and there

fore could not be appealed from, it is sufficient to say that the statute which denies appeal from judgments by consent or confession does not apply to justices' courts. Code, § 2309. Reversed and remanded.

WALKER v. Ross.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 5, 1888.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE-TRUST-DEED FOR SUPPLIES-FORE

CLOSURE.

Plaintiff, her husband joining, executed a trust-deed of her property to secure payment of supplies to be advanced. On default, the land was sold under the deed, and bought in by the creditors; defendant subsequently becoming the owner. Held, that plaintiff could not recover on the ground that the deed was not valid to convey the corpus of her estate because given to secure her husband's obligation. Appeal from circuit court, Noxubee county; S. H. TERRAL, Judge. In 1871, the appellant, Mrs. Magnolia Walker, owned a plantation in Noxubee county, she then being a married woman. She and her husband executed a deed of trust to a firm in Mobile, (Beauchamp & Co.,) to secure said firm in the payment of supplies, etc., to be advanced. The supplies were advanced, but were not paid for; and the land was sold under the deed of trust, and the creditors bought the same, and finally the title of the land vested in the appellee, T. J. Ross. Mrs. Magnolia Walker brought this action of ejectment to oust Ross, because the deed of trust under which the creditors bought was not valid and binding to convey the corpus of her estate; because it was given to secure advances for the benefit of her husband, and not for supplies for her place or herself. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ross, from which Mrs. Walker appeals. In McDougal v. Bank, 62 Miss. 663, referred to in the opinion, the complainant, a married woman, had given a deed of trust upon her separate property, a part of the consideration of which was a debt which she had legal capacity to contract; the remainder not being binding upon her. The property having been sold under the deed, she filed a bill to avoid the sale. The court said, inter alia: "A part of the debt intended to be secured, and for the payment of which the property conveyed was devoted to sale, was her debt, binding upon her estate, and enforceable as a contract, and this debt remained unpaid. The property was of an indivisible character. The contingency upon which the trustee was authorized to act arose, and, without objection or protest from her, he dealt with the estate as directed by the deed. Under such circumstances, the transaction should be held to be closed and unassailable. To permit attacks of this character would unsettle the titles of many estates, and would be especially dangerous in view of the fact that under the Code of 1871 no statute of limitation ran against a married woman."

Foote & Foote, for appellant. Bogle & Bogle, for appellee.

CAMPBELL, J. The cases of O'Hara v. Alexander, 56 Miss. 316, and McDougal v. Bank, 62 Miss. 663, are decisive of this case. Affirmed.

JAMISON . THOMPSON et al.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 5, 1888.) TAXATION-REDEMPTION FROM TAX SALE-PURCHASER'S TITLE.

Under Code Miss. § 531, providing that the owner of land, or any person for him, may redeem the same from a tax sale, within a year from such sale, a redemption within that time divests all title of a purchaser, though the redemptionist is not the real owner of the land.

Appeal from chancery court, Lauderdale county; S. EVANS, Chancellor. Bill by R. H. Jamison against E. W. Thompson and R. M. Bourdeaux, sheriff. The lots described in complainant's bill originally belonged to de

fendant E. W. Thompson. In 1886 these lots were sold for the taxes of 1885, and at said sale one Ragsdale became the purchaser; but failing to pay the taxes due for 1886, in March, 1887, said lots were again sold for taxes, at which sale the complainant, Jamison, became the purchaser. Ragsdale failed to redeem, but the original owner, E. W. Thompson, within the time allowed for redemption, went before the chancery clerk and redeemed the lots, paying to the clerk the taxes and damages as provided by law, and receiving from the clerk the deed made by the sheriff to Jamison. Complainant filed this bill to have said redemption by Thompson canceled, and to compel the sheriff to make him another deed to the lots. The defendants demurred to the bill on several grounds, the one on which the case was decided being that the legal redemption of the lots by the defendant Thompson divested whatever title the complainant may have acquired by the tax sale. The demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed. Complainant appeals.

Cochran & Cochran, for appellant. S. B. Watts, for appellees.

COOPER, J. The right of the complainant to the land in controversy never became consummate because of the redemption by Thompson, who claimed to be the owner thereof. It it not competent for complainant to draw into controversy the validity of the title of the redemptionist, nor can he defeat the effect of the redemption by showing an outstanding paramount title. The statute declares that, when lands have been sold for taxes, "the owner of such land, or any person for him, may redeem the same" within a year from the date of the sale for taxes, upon payment of the bid of the purchaser, and certain damages. Code, § 531. The redemption by Thompson prevented the inchoate right of complainant from ripening into title by lapse of time. Whether Thompson or Ragsdale was the real owner is not material, since the redemption was for the benefit of the owner, whoever he may be. The decree is affirmed.

YAZOO & M. V. R. Co. v. THOMAS, Sheriff, et al.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 12, 1888.)

RAILROAD COMPANIES-TAXATION-EXEMPTION.

Under section 8 of the charter of the Y. & M. V. R. Co., which exempts the property of the company from taxation "for a term of twenty years from the completion of said railroad to the Mississippi river, but not to extend beyond 25 years from the date of the approval of this act," the exemption was intended to commence from the completion of the road to the Mississippi river, and not during its construction; and, the road not having been completed, is subject to a subsequent statute making all railroads liable to taxation, though at the date of the charter railroads were not liable to taxation during construction, under the general laws.

Appeal from chancery court, Hinds county; WARREN COWAN, Chancellor. In 1882 the legislature granted to the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company a charter, in which it was provided "that said company, its stock, its railroads, and appurtenances, and all its property in this state, necessary or incident to the full exercise of all the powers herein granted,—not to include compresses and oil-mills,-shall be exempt from taxation for a term of twenty years from the completion of said railroad to the Mississippi river, but not to extend beyond 25 years from the date of the approval of this act; and, when the period of exemption herein prescribed shall have expired, the property of said railroad may be taxed at the same rate as other property in this state;" but the company to be exempt from taxation by cities and towns. The company built the road through several counties, and has been operating the same, but has not yet completed it. In 1888 the legislature passed an act providing that all railroads which had escaped taxation be now subjected to taxation; whereupon the sheriffs and tax collectors of the various counties, through which the railroad runs, proceeded to enforce the collection of the taxes due,