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out special inquiry as to the source of the power, but this in itself is the best evidence of its existence.

[2] It is true, also, that laws affecting the status of individuals sometimes materially affect their personal privileges. It was so in this instance. The amendatory statute subjected the daughter to parental control for three years longer than she would otherwise have been subjected. By it her right to manage, control, and convey her property, her right to her personal earnings, her right of personal freedom, and many other rights which could be enumerated as belonging to persons of full age, were postponed for a like period. But this, as we say, does not argue against the validity of the law. The condition being a status, it was one which the Legislature had the right to impose.

To say, therefore, that the statutory amendment extended the payments is to say that it increased the appellant's liability under the decree; it is to say that it increased the liability, to use the calculations of the appellant's learned counsel, from $1,750 to $3,550.

[6] We need not argue, we think, that the Legislature is without power to set aside, annul, or change the liability upon a judgment affecting solely the rights of private parties by the enactment of a general law. It may possibly, after entry, change the rule of procedure for enforcing judgments, such as the manner of issuing execution, conducting sales, making redemption, and the like, but it is without power to affect the substan|tive rights of the parties to a judgment. A judgment is property, and is as much protected by the fundamental law against invasion by the legislative body as is any other species of property.

The order appealed from is reversed, and the cause will be remanded, with instructions to dismiss the proceedings.

MITCHELL, PARKER, BRIDGES, and PEMBERTON, JJ., concur.

[3, 4] But we are not persuaded that the foregoing considerations are controlling of the appellant's rights in the instant case. While it is the legal duty of every parent to support his minor children, the duty is affected by many considerations. His health, his means, his station in life, as well as similar considerations on the part of the child, have a bearing upon it. But this general duty to support is not the duty that is sought to be enforced in the proceeding before us. There is a decree of court, entered, it is true, for the purpose of requiring the appellant to support his minor child, but the question now is, Has this decree been satis-(Supreme Court of Washington. Oct. 7, 1924.) fied? If it has been satisfied, it no longer imposes any duty on the appellant. It may be that he still owes the duty of support, but if this be so it must be enforced in special proceedings instituted for that purpose, proceedings in which the appellant will have the right to appear and be heard as to the amount of such support. It cannot be done by the revival of an expired decree.

HARE v. WINFREE. (No. 18611.)

Action 53(3)-Rule as to commencement of separate actions for installments of rent stated.

Landlord may bring separate actions to recover each installment of rent as it becomes

due, but at time of commencement of action all installments then due must be included in the demand, and if not so included will be deemed

waived.

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Blake, Judge.

Action by Katherine Hare against W. H. Winfree. From judgment awarding her insufficient relief, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. A. G. Starkey, of Spokane, for appellant. Allen, Winston & Allen, of Spokane, for respondent.

[5] It is our opinion that the appellant has fully performed the decree. The language of the decree is that the appellant shall make the monthly payments "during the minority" of the daughter. The statute then in existence limited minority to the time the minor reached the age of 18 years. Seemingly, therefore, the decree is as definite and certain in that respect as it would have been had the decree expressly named the 18th year of the minor as the date of its expiration. It is manifest that it could bear PEMBERTON, J. On the 22d day of no other meaning at the time of its entry, June, 1923, appellant instituted this action and equally so that it could bear no other against respondent for the recovery of $110 meaning prior to the time the Legislature due for the month of June as rental for an amended the statute. Being a judgment for apartment in a building in Spokane belongthe payment of money, it could have been ing to appellant. On July 12, 1923, respondsatisfied at any time before the statutory ent made a motion to strike out certain poramendment, and its apparent, if not its ac- tions of the complaint. This motion was tual, lien upon the appellant's real property granted and an amended complaint served removed by the payment into court of a sum on the 26th day of September, 1923, and sufficient to satisfy the deferred payments. thereafter, on leave of court, an amended For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(229 P.)

and supplemental complaint was filed, in-, month of August being due and unpaid at cluding an additional $110 for the month of the time of bringing the action for the rentAugust. al due for the month of July, the trial court properly disallowed the claim for the August rental.

The answer of the respondent offered as an affirmative defense to the amount due for the month of August the allegation that appellant on August 7, 1923, after the rental for the month of August was due and unpaid, had instituted a suit for $110 for the July rent, and a judgment was entered and satisfied on August 29, 1923.

The trial court granted judgment for the rental for the month of June, and refused to allow the rental for the month of August under the theory that appellant had waived or abandoned any claim for the August rent which was then due at the time of the filing of the suit for the amount due for the month of July. From the judgment this appeal is

taken.

Appellant relies principally upon the case of McDole v. McDole, 106 Ill. 452, which apparently sustains her contention.

Our attention is also called to the case of Helsley v. American Mineral Production Co., 118 Wash. 571, 204 Pac. 190. In this case the court held that the bringing of an action for the payment of a definite sum in case was not a bar to the bringing of an action upon the same contract for the failure to pay certain accounts. In that case we said: "Nor is there any splitting of causes where the demand which is the subject of the second action was not due at the time of the first action." 1 C. J. 1108.

"It may be litigated as often as an independent cause of action arises which, because of its subsequent creation, could not have been litigated in the former suit, as the right did not then exist." Harsin v. Oman, 68 Wash. 281, 123 Pac. 1.

The judgment is affirmed.

MAIN, C. J., and MITCHELL and FULLERTON, JJ., concur.

BRIDGES, J., concurs in the result.

DINGFELDER et al. v. WHITE BLUFFS
WAREHOUSE CO. (No. 18671.)

(Supreme Court of Washington. Oct. 7, 1924.)
1. Principal and agent 24-Agency held
question for jury.

In an action on notes and for money loanand lender, evidence held to raise question for ed, plaintiff claiming as assignee of the payee jury whether assignor was plaintiff's agent.

2. Evidence 208 (4)-Complaint in another case held admissible, though not signed by party, where he authorized suit.

In an action on assigned notes and claim for money loaned, where defendant alleged plaintiffs' assignor was their agent, complaint in another action by plaintiffs against such assignor for accounting as agent was admissible against plaintiffs, notwithstanding complaint was not verified by any of plaintiffs; they having authorized the action and sanctioned its prosecution.

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Benton County; Truax, Judge.

Action by C. I. Dingfelder and others, a copartnership doing business under the firm

In the case at bar the right of action for name of C. I. & M. Dingfelder against the the rental for August did exist.

"Where rent is payable at stated intervals, a separate action may be brought to recover each installment as it becomes due, but all installments which are due and unpaid at the time an action is brought must be included in that action in order to be recovered." 1 C. J. 1115. "On the other hand, where several installments of rent have accrued, the action to recover the same cannot be split up into several actions, but a single action only can be maintained, and a recovery in an action for one matured installment will bar another action for another installment which was overdue at the time of the first action." 16 R. C. L. p. 1000.

The weight of authority sustains the contention of respondent that a separate action may be brought to recover each installment falling due as it becomes due. At the time of bringing the action, however, all installments then due must be included in the demand, and it not so included will be deemed to have been waived. The rental for the

White Bluffs Warehouse Company, in which defendant filed a counterclaim. From a

judgment for defendant on its counterclaim, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Moulton & Jeffrey, of Kennewick, and D. V. Morthland, of Yakima, for appellants. Holden, Shumate & Cheney, of Yakima, for respondent.

PARKER, J. The plaintiffs, Dingfelder and others, constituting a copartnership with its principal place of business of New York City, commenced this action in the superior court for Benton county against the defendant, White Bluffs Warehouse Company, a domestic corporation, having its principal place of business at White Bluffs in that county. As a first cause of action the plaintiffs seek recovery upon a promissory note for the principal sum of $5,000, with interest, executed by the defendant on July 25, 1921, payable to H. D. Smith or order on or before five months from date; which note

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 229 P.-2

was assigned to the plaintiffs. As a second, plaintiffs in the sum of $9,666.62. Judgment cause of action the plaintiffs seek recovery was rendered accordingly, from which the upon a promissory note for $2,000, with in-plaintiffs have appealed to this court. terest, executed by the defendant on August In July, 1921, H. D. Smith was located at 15, 1921, payable to Cascade Packing Com-Yakima, engaged in buying and securing conpany or order on December 15, 1921, which signments of fruit by carload lots for apnote was assigned to the plaintiffs. As a pellants. Respondent was then engaged in third cause of action the plaintiffs seek re- marketing fruit received by it from growers covery upon a loan of $3,045 made by H. D. in the neighborhood of White Bluffs, which Smith to the defendant on August 22, 1921, is some 50 miles from Yakima. Smith and which was agreed to be evidenced by a prom- respondent then entered into an agreement issory note, but was not so evidenced by the looking to the sale of the fruit it should prodefendant as agreed, which obligation on the cure from growers in the neighborhood of part of the defendant was assigned to the White Bluffs to or through appellants. It plaintiffs. was agreed that Smith was from time to time to cause credits to be made upon respondent's bank account with the First National Bank of Yakima. In pursuance of this agreement Smith caused the bank to so credit respondent's deposit account with the $5,000 and $2,000 represented by the two notes here in question and also the $3,045 loan here in question. These advances to respondent were made by Smith from moneys furnished him by appellants, and the obligations so created were very soon after their creation assigned by Smith to appellants; it having previously been agreed between respondent and Smith who, as respondent claimed, was appellants' agent, that these and other advances similarly made would be repaid by shipments of carloads of fruit to be made by respondent to appellants. During the fall of 1921 respondent accordingly, by direction of Smith, made shipments of some 45 cars of fruit to appellants, some of which were direct sales and some of which were consignments on sale for a commission; the latter, however, were sold by appellants and accounts rendered therefor. Appellants claim that Smith was in all of these dealings the agent of respondent and not their agent; that they were innocent holders of the two notes acquired by them in due course before maturity and also the holders by assignment of the $3,045 loan claim against respondent; and that in any event no part of the notes or loan claim has ever been paid by respondent either to Smith or appellants. Respondent claims that Smith was in all these dealings the agent of appellants and

Answering the first cause of action, the defendant admits the execution of the $5,000 note and its transfer to the plaintiffs, but alleges that the note was given in the first instance for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs, and that Smith was acting as the agent of the plaintiffs in the transaction; and further alleges that the note has been fully paid, satisfied, and discharged by the application of credits due the defendant. Answering the second cause of action, the defendant admits the execution of the $2,000 note, but alleges that the note was delivered to the Cascade Packing Company as the agent of the plaintiffs herein and for their use and benefit, and further alleges that the note has been fully paid by the application of credits due the defendant. In this connection it may be noted that, in support of the allegation of this note being given for the benefit of the defendant, the plaintiffs' evidence manifestly proceeds upon the theory that the Cascade Packing Company and H. D. Smith are one and the same person so far as this transaction is concerned. Answering the third cause of action, the defendant admits that it received at the hands of Smith a loan as an advance payment of $3,045 on account of prospective shipments of cars of fruit to the plaintiffs, Smith acting as agent for the plaintiffs in that behalf, and further alleges that the amount of the loan has been fully paid and satisfied by the application of credits due the defendant. Further answering by way of set-off and counterclaim, the defendant alleges in substance that between September 8, 1921, and November 14, 1921, it sold, shipped, and con-not its agent, and that there is a balance signed to the plaintiffs apples in carload lots, and also rendered services, expended moneys, and furnished material in connection with such sales and consignments at the instance and request of plaintiffs, for all of which there is justly due from the plaintiffs to the defendant the total sum of $21,032.75. for which the defendant prays judgment against the plaintiffs, less the amount of the notes and loan upon which the plaintiffs seek recovery, to wit, in a sum of approximately $10,000. Upon the issues so made the cause proceeded to trial in the superior court sitting with a jury, and resulted in a verdict awarding to the defendant recovery against the

due to it from appellants upon the shipments of fruit made by it to them of approximately $10,000 after giving full credit for the advances evidenced by the notes and the loan claim upon which appellants seek recovery in this action.

[1] It is contended in behalf of appellants that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury for determination the question of Smith's agency; it being argued that the court should have decided as a matter of law that Smith was not the agent of appellants but was the agent of respondent in all the transactions in question. We cannot agree with this contention. The evidence

(229 P.)

was such that the jury could well have believed, and evidently did believe, that all of the moneys advanced by Smith to respondent and paid by Smith to respondent were furnished by appellants to Smith for that express purpose; that it was understood between Smith and respondent that 25 cars or more would be shipped during the fall of 1921 by respondent to appellants; that from the beginning respondent was given to understand that the transactions were to be financed by Smith as the representative of appellants with moneys furnished him by appellants for that express purpose; that it was agreed between Smith and appellants that they would pay him for his services in procuring the business one-third of the profits they might make in the marketing of the cars of fruit, whether they purchased the fruit and sold it for themselves or received and sold it on commission, and that they would also charge Smith for one-third of any loss they might incur in so marketing the fruit; that Smith was acting for appellants in a similar manner and for like compensation and subject to like loss in procuring shipments of fruit to appellants from others in the Yakima fruit section of our state. These outstanding facts and other minor ones, pointing to Smith's being appellants' agent, as the jury might believe them to exist, we think, render it plain that the trial court did not err to the prejudice of appellants in submitting to the jury the question of whether or not Smith was their agent in all the transactions in question. We conIclude that the trial court would not have been warranted in deciding as a matter of law that Smith was not appellants' agent.

It is contended in behalf of appellants that the evidence was such that they were entitled to a judgment in their favor as a matter of law, notwithstanding the verdict, and that the trial court erred in not so ruling. In answer to this contention we deem it sufficient to say a painstaking reading of the voluminous evidence convinces us that it was ample to support the verdict and judgment. This inquiry does not involve any question of law calling for serious consideration.

"That on various occasions during the summer of 1921 the plaintiffs intrusted to the defendant large sums of money for the purpose of enabling the defendant to buy apples in the the account of plaintiffs; that the defendant Yakima Valley in the state of Washington for undertook the performance of his duties as agent for the plaintiffs, and made various purchases of apples for plaintiffs with a portion of the funds so intrusted to him therefor; that, after the purchase of apples was commenced by the defendant for plaintiffs, other and additional sums of money were advanced from time to time by plaintiffs to defendant for the continuance of his operations in the purchase of apples for plaintiffs."

These are followed by allegations showing that Smith has not accounted, and by a prayer requiring him to account. It is argued that this complaint is not admissible as tending to show admissions of Smith's agency for appellants because it is not signed or verified by any member of the partnership. There has been much discussion, and some conflict of opinion expressed, in the decisions of the courts of this country as to the admissibility of statements made in pleadings as admissions on the part of a party so making them, or in whose behalf they are so made; that is, when such statements are sought to be put in evidence in another case. We think it is the all but universal rule under the code or system of pleading where the pleadings consist of statements of facts that such statements are admissible in evidence as admissions, if tending to show admissions of facts, when the pleading in which such statements are found is signed or verified by the party rather than by some one else in his behalf. 2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1066. This general rule, however, seems to have some exceptions and limitations as applicable to pleadings not signed or verified by the party himself but by his counsel or some other person in his behalf. In such cases the limitations of admissibility, we think, are well stated in the text of 22 C. J. at page 335, as follows:

"The more generally accepted view recognizes a distinction between statements contained in pleadings in another case which are emanations of counsel and those which can fairly be regarded as statements by the party, and as a result requires, as a condition of admissibility, that the statement be affirmatively connected with the party as one which he has made because it was true."

[2] It is contended that the trial court erred to the prejudice of appellants in admitting in evidence, over the objection of counsel, a complaint filed in their behalf in another action commenced in the superior court for Yakima county seeking an accounting from Smith as their agent in connection with Now it here appears that, while none of fruit shipping transactions, apparently in-appellants in person signed or verified the cluding the transactions here in question. The complaint so admitted in evidence was verified by J. W. Vickers on April 26, 1922, in behalf of these appellants as plaintiffs in that action. The complaint was also signed in behalf of these appellants by the same counsel who represent them in this action. It is therein alleged, among other things, as follows:

complaint here admitted in evidence, yet they authorized the commencement of that action; and, if not actually sanctioning all that was stated in the complaint before the commencement of the action, they thereafter adopted it by sanctioning the prosecution of that action upon the theory of these allegations. This, we think, rendered the statements made in that complaint admissible as

3. Vendor and purchaser 190-Where contract canceled, vendor retaining possession, held that outstanding title acquired by purchaser did not inure to vendor's benefit.

tending to show admission of the fact of, isfaction of taxes subsequent to sale with inSmith being their agent, unless as further terest. contended the allegations of the complaint above quoted do not contemplate an accounting from defendant for moneys furnished him to buy or procure consignments of apples from respondent at White Bluffs. We think, Where holder of tax deed to lots, voidable in view of the circumstances here shown, at instance of record owners, after cancellathat those allegations might be deemed as tion by agreement of contract to sell to defendsome evidence by way of admission that ap- ant, retained possession, claiming absolute title pellants were seeking an accounting from under tax deed, held that his claim that title acSmith with reference to the shipment of ap-ord owners inured to his benefit, was untenquired by defendant by quitclaim deed from recples from respondent at White Bluffs to appellants. White Bluffs may not be strictly in the Yakima Valley, but it seems intimately connected with the district so designated. Indeed, in its last analysis the objection, it seems to us, goes more to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. We think the trial court did not err in admitting in evidence the allegations of this complaint.

able.

4. Vendor and purchaser

190-Purchaser in possession cannot assert title acquired by him adverse to vendor.

tract cannot assert title acquired by him ad-
Purchaser in possession under sales con-
under the contract.
verse to vendor while he remains in possession

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Griffiths, Judge.

Action by J. S. Slocum and wife against Fred H. Peterson and wife. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed

and remanded, with instructions.

Ralph H. Foster, of Longview, and Fred
H. Peterson, of Seattle, for appellants.
Karr & Gregory and H. G. Sutton, of Se-
attle, for respondents.

Some contention is made in behalf of appellants that they were in any event entitled to some deductions from whatever might be due from them to respondent on account of storage of certain of the cars of apples shipped upon consignment for sale on commission, pending such sale of those cars of apples. The evidence is not very direct or satisfactory touching this question. It was within the power of appellants to make it so. Besides, it does not appear at all certain but what the jury did allow appellants something for such storage. It is at all events quite plain to us that it cannot be determined as a matter of law that appellants were entitled to any such storage charges. think the case does not call for further dis-inclusive, in block 1 of Powell's North Unicussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

We

PARKER, J. The plaintiffs Slocum and wife commenced this action in the superior court for King county seeking a decree quieting title in themselves to lots 11 to 20,

versity addition to the city of Seattle as against the claim of title therein made by the defendants Peterson and wife. The

MAIN, C. J., and MACKINTOSH, TOL- Klatawa Investment Company is also a party MAN, and HOLCOMB, JJ., concur.

SLOCUM et ux. v. PETERSON et ux. (No. 18512.)

(Supreme Court of Washington. Oct. 2, 1924.) 1. Taxation 658 (2)—Failure to notify record owner of tax sale renders sale and deed void, or at least voidable.

County treasurer's failure to notify record owner of tax sale, as required by Rem. Comp. Stat. § 11298, renders sale and tax deed void, or at least voidable, at suit of record owners or their grantee.

defendant to the action; but that company is merely the grantee in a conveyance taken by it in trust for Peterson and wife of a portion of the lots. We shall for convenience of expression discuss the case as though Slocum and Peterson were the only parties to the action. Since the platting of the addition, portions of lots 14 to 17, inclusive, have by condemnation been acquired by the city of Seattle for the street running diagonally across them, known as Bothell Way, which condemned portions of those lots are concededly not here involved.

Slocum's claim is rested upon the theory that he has acquired a general tax title to the lots, evidenced by a tax deed issued to

ty, and that on August 31, 1922, Peterson acquired in trust for him under a quitclaim deed all of the lots from the record owners thereof, paying them therefor $250, which sum he offers to pay to Peterson with in

2. Taxation 829-Purchaser at void sale en-him by the county treasurer of King countitled to reimbursement for amount paid for land and for subsequent taxes with interest. Purchaser at tax sale rendered void by failure to notify record owner of sale, under Rem. Comp. Stat. § 11298, is entitled to reimbursement for amount paid for land and in sat-terest from that date.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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