If the vessel be fraudulently imperilled by the master, this does not defeat the claim of the salvors, unless they were parties to the fraud, or were cognizant of it while it was going on, and did not interfere to prevent it as far as they could, or endeavored to conceal the master's misconduct and screen him from detection.1

As it is equally a salvage service, and within admiralty jurisdiction, whether the service be rendered at sea, or when the vessel is wrecked on the coast,2 and whether it be performed by seamen or by landsmen;3 so, in the case, when the salvors neglected their growing crops of cotton, in order to save the property, this fact was considered in awarding salvage. But one whose vessel had been lost while conveying the things saved to another place of delivery, is entitled only to freight, not to salvage.5

On the other hand, when a barge was brought in which was found without anchor or crew, salvage was denied, because it was shown to be usual to leave barges there in that condition, and generally mere land service in unlading a shipwrecked vessel and superintending those unlading her, is not a salvage service. If a vessel at sea is short-handed by reason of sickness, and is navigated into port by part of the crew of another vessel, this is to be treated as a salvage service. But when salvors found a ship derelict and went on board, and in their haste forgot to take with them a log glass, a watch, and a chart, it was held that the officer of a king's vessel, who was afterwards requested to supply these articles, and payment offered, was not

and her offer of assistance was accepted; but it is clear that she impeded the progress of the service." And £100 was allowed, the value being £4,600. See also, The E. U., 1 Spinks, Adm. 63; The Santipore, id. 231.

1 Brevoor v. The Fair American, 1 Pet. Adm. 87, 95.

2 Stephens v. Bales of Cotton, Bee, 170; The Jonge Bastiaan, 5 Rob. Adm. 322.

3 Stephens v. Bales of Cotton, Bee, 170.

Stephens v. Bales of Cotton, Bee, 170.

5 Stephens v. Bales of Cotton, Bee, 170. The Upnor, 2 Hagg. Adm. 3.

7 The Watt, 2 W. Rob. 70. See cases cited ante, p. 606, notes 1 and 2.

8 Williamson v. Brig Alphonso, 1 Curtis, C. C. 376; The Active, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 644; The Roe, 1 Swabey, Adm. 84; Sturtevant v. The Geo. Nicholaus, 1 Newb. Adm. 449. In The Janet Mitchell, 1 Swabey, Adm. 111, a vessel was met with in distress, her captain having been drowned, and some one was required to manage her. The mate of the vessel volunteered his services, and the vessels reached their ports in safety. Salvage was allowed to the owners, master, and rest of the crew.

entitled to dispossess the first salvors, on the ground that they could not bring the vessel safely to port without his assistance.1 But it is said that a salvage service can only be founded in the rescuing of a ship and cargo from some impending danger or distress. It would, therefore, seem that if part of the crew were captured, and subsequently recaptured and restored to their vessel, the only claim of the recaptors would be on the ground of supplying the deficiency in the number of the crew occa sioned by the capture.3

Compensation has been granted for keeping near a vessel in distress, at the earnest request of her master and crew, although but little aid was rendered.4 If a vessel is stranded near her port of destination, and it becomes necessary to transship the cargo, this is a salvage service. So, if a vessel in distress 'is boarded at some risk by a fishing smack, and an order for a steamer taken, compensation as salvage is allowed. And generally the court may give compensation, in the nature of salvage, for services which fall below those necessary to found a strict salvage claim."

In a case where some shipwrecked mariners were taken from a ship which had rescued them, and they brought with them a bag of gold, which was taken on board the vessel, it was held that, although this last vessel was not entitled to claim salvage, the persons and property being in no danger at the time, yet that a compensation was due beyond mere freight money. And salvage has been awarded for rescuing a raft of timber which was floating out to sea.9

1 The Blenden Hall, 1 Dods. Adm. 414, 419.

2 The Mary, 1 W. Rob. 448, 457.

3 The Mary, 1 W. Rob. 448. The master and part of the crew in this case had been taken by pirates, and the vessel at the time she was discovered by the alleged salvors was in the offing with a signal of distress flying. They went out to her and brought her safely in, and afterwards joined in an expedition against the pirates. The master and crew were ransomed, and then the pirates attacked. The court held that salvage was only due for conducting the vessel into harbor.

Allen v. Ship Canada, Bee, 90.

5 The Westminster, 1 W. Rob. 229.

6 The Ocean, 2 W. Rob. 91. The value of the ship, cargo, and freight was £10,500, and £40 were allowed.

7 George v. Ship Arctic, Bee, 232.

8 Williams v. Box of Bullion, U. S. D. C., Mass., 6 Law Reporter, 363.

9 A Raft of Spars, Abbott, Adm. 485.

As a general rule, when two vessels come into collision, they are bound to render assistance to each other if necessary; and one aiding the other cannot generally claim salvage, although the one assisted was the cause of the accident.1

SECTION V.

OF DERELICT.

As to what is "derelict" there is no certain and accepted definition; and perhaps none better than a vessel which is abandoned and deserted by her crew without any purpose on their part of returning to the ship, or any hope of saving or recovering it by their own exertions.2 If so abandoned, the ship is derelict, although the vessel is afterwards saved by the crew who left her, they having unexpectedly received assistance.3

If the ship be only temporarily left, with the distinct purpose of return, it is not abandoned, and therefore not derelict. And

1 The Sappho, 1 Swabey, Adm. 242. A small amount of salvage was, however, allowed in this case, though the general rule was said to be that which we have stated in the text.

2 The Aquila, 1 Rob. Adm. 37; The Amethyst, Daveis, 20; Rowe v. Brig — 1 Mason, 372; The Elizabeth and Jane, Ware, 35; The Caroline, 2 W. Rob. 124; The Charlotta, 2 Hagg. Adm. 361; The Effort, 3 Hagg. Adm. 165; The Winsor Castle, 2 Notes of Cases, Supp. liii.; Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 240; The Watt, 2 W. Rob. 70; The Clarisse, 1 Swabey, Adm. 129. In The Minerva, 1 Spinks, Adm. 271, a vessel was stranded on the coast, and the crew in endeavoring to escape, were all drowned. The vessel was afterwards saved, and the court held that it was a case of derelict.

8 The Boston, 1 Sumner, 328. The vessel in this case was run into at sea. The master and crew, supposing she was about to founder, took to their boats, and afterwards met another vessel, by whose aid the next day their own vessel was brought into port. Held to be a case of derelict. See also, The Florence, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 607.

* There can be no doubt of the general principle that the master and crew may leave a vessel, and she cannot be considered as a derelict, if they had the intention of returning. Thus, if a vessel is left at anchor in the stream without any one on board, the master and crew having left with the intention of returning, this of course would not be a derelict. See The Upnor, 2 Hagg. Adm. 3. See also, The Bee, Ware, 332; Tyson v. Prior, 1 Gallis. 133. In Clarke v. Brig Dodge Healy, 4 Wash. C. C. 651, it was held that where a vessel imbedded in the ice was drifting towards a shoal, upon which, if she had struck, she would have probably gone to pieces, and the crew left her on

if the master and crew remain on board, but give up the entire control of the vessel to the salvors, this does not make a derelict.1 But if property be actually deserted at sea, the presumption that it is derelict exists, and casts upon those who left it the burden of proving their purpose of return.2 If the ship or property be left without any intention whatever, either of return or otherwise, as by those who jump suddenly from a ship they think sinking, on board another, if the crew are carried off in the vessel against their will, the vessel left is derelict de facto, but not de jure.3 But it has been held that where the master and crew leave the vessel for the preservation of their lives, a mere intention of sending a steamer to look for the vessel, does not prevent it from being a derelict.4

So a ship or goods sunk under the waters are generally derelict, but would not be so if the owner had not lost the hope and purpose of recovering his property, nor ceased his efforts for that

account of this danger, with the intention of returning if the danger should be escaped, the vessel was not a derelict. See also, The John Perkins, U. S. C. C., Mass., 21 Law Reporter, 87, 94; The Schooner Emulous, 1 Sumner, 207. But if a vessel is deserted de facto, and while exposed to great danger is rescued by salvors, she will, it would seem, be considered a derelict, if the master and crew at the time when they left her had no intention of returning, or rational hope of regaining possession of the vessel, though they endeavored to take possession after the salvors had rendered assistance. The Sarah Bell, 4 Notes of Cases, 144. See also, The Brig John Gilpin, Olcott, Adm. 77.

1 Montgomery v. The T. P. Leathers, 1 Newb. Adm. 421.

2 The Cosmopolitan, 6 Notes of Cases, Supp. xvii., in the Irish Admiralty.

8 The Fenix, 1 Swabey, Adm. 13; The Cosmopolitan, 6 Notes of Cases, Supp. xvii. in the Irish Admiralty. In this latter case as soon as it was found that their vessel had not sunk, the master and crew desired to return, but were prevented by the master of the vessel on which they were. The court considered that the leaving the vessel was under a momentary impulse for the purpose of saving their lives, and that it could not be considered as an abandonment, because they wished to go back as soon as their judgment returned. Stress was also laid on the fact that the leaving the vessel at the moment the crew did, tended rather to increase than diminish their power to save the vessel. But for these facts the case is similar to that of Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 240, where the vessel, deserted by her crew, who jumped on board the vessel which ran into them, was considered a derelict. In The Pickwick, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 628, the vessel came into collision with another, and the master and crew, with the exception of three men at once abandoned her through fear. The three men afterwards left, and three days after the collision she was found deserted. Dr. Lushington said: "It has never been held that an abandonment at the instant of collision constitutes derelict, but I can entertain no doubt that in the legal sense of the word, this vessel was a derelict to all intents and purposes, because three days had elapsed from the time of the collision." 4 The Coromandel, 1 Swabey, Adm. 205.

1

purpose. If goods are saved from a wreck, and the crew are taken off at the same time, the goods cannot be considered as derelict.2 Nor are they so considered, where the vessel goes to pieces on the shore and the cargo floats out, if the master is using exertions to save them, unless indeed where the goods float out to sea.3

If a ship or property be left, though not derelict, one who in good faith takes possession as salvor, is not a trespasser, but has his reasonable claim for salvage, according to the good he actually does.1

By the common law, the finder of lost property has an absolute title to it against all the world, except the owner. In England, however, derelicts found at sea belonged to the Lord High Admiral until they were given up by him, in the reign of Queen Anne, to the sovereign, who for the most part since that time has continued to take them in a capacity distinguishable from that of sovereign. Wrecks, by which is meant property cast on the shore, often in England belong to the lord of the manor, who is authorized to keep them a year and a day for the owner, and if none appears at the expiration of that time, the property vests absolutely in the lord.5

What disposition is to be made of property found abandoned, when no one appears to claim it, cannot be said to be settled in this country. In an early case in Massachusetts, it was held that after the salvage was paid the property belonged to the government, to hold in trust till an owner should appear.

In

1 The Barefoot, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 661; Bearse v. Pigs of Copper, 1 Story, 314. See also, The Thetis, 3 Hagg. Adm. 14.

2 Warder v. La Belle Creole, 1 Pet. Adm. 31.

3 The Samuel, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 581.

4 It would seem, however, to be well settled on principle and authority, that if a vessel is not a derelict, the master and his owners have the power, unless there is some immediate danger, to decline any assistance, and to choose their own salvors, and if persons render them assistance against their will, these persons will not only recover nothing for their services after the prohibition, but may forfeit compensation for their prior services. The Glascow Packet, 2 W. Rob. 306; The Barefoot, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 661 ; The Glory, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 551. The case of The John Gilpin, Olcott, Adm. 77, where an opposite doctrine is intimated, proceeded on the ground that the vessel was derelict. 5 The King v. Property Derelict, 1 Hagg. Adm. 383; The King v. Two Casks of Tallow, 3 id. 294; The King v. Forty-Nine Casks of Brandy, 3 id. 257. See also, The Merchants' Shipping Act of 1854, 17 and 18 Vict. c. 104, § 471-475, for the present state of the law on this subject in England.

Peabody v. The Proceeds of 28 Bags of Cotton, U. S. D. C., Mass., 1829, 2 Am.