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paring for her voyage, as well as after she begins it. And there may not only be a "deviation” in the port, springing from unreasonable slowness or entire suspension of the preparations, but the policy may never attach from the want of the preparations, or its attachment be delayed by a delay in the preparations; so that where a vessel has been a long time in a port, the risk seems not to commence until preparations are begun for the voyage insured.

If the insurance be “from ” only, and not "at,” it does not begin until the vessel leaves the port or place; that is, weighs anchor, or casts off her moorings with the preparations which she purposes, made, and with the intention of sailing.? But the word "from" has a more extended meaning when applied to an intermediate port. Thus, if a vessel be insured at and from A. to B., from thence to C. and back to A., a loss at B. will be covered.3

If the insurance is on goods “at and from " a place, it does not begin (unless expressly so provided in the policy),4 until

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1 Seamans v. Loring, 1 Mason, 127, 140; Kemble v. Bowne, 1 Caines, 75. See also, ante, p. 282, note 2. In Lambert v. Liddard, 5 Taunt. 480, a vessel which was then cruising, was insured “at and from Pernambuco or any other port or ports in the Brazils, to London, beginning the adventure on the termination of the cruise, and preparing for her voyage to London.” The vessel, at the end of the cruise, was off the coast of Brazil to the northward of Pernambuco. The master sent a boat ashore to see if a cargo could be obtained at Pernambuco, and finding that it could not, he set sail for St. Salvador, for the purpose of obtaining a cargo, and the vessel was lost on the way. It was held, that the risk attached from the time the master sent the boat ashore, on the termination of the cruise, that being considered preparing for the voyage within the policy.

2 Sec Mey v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 3 Brev. 329, and cases ante, p. 124-129.

8 Bradley v. Nashville Ins. Co., 3 La. Ann. 708. In Bell v. Marine Ins. Co., 8 S. & R. 98, a vessel was insured at and from Philadelphia to Cork and back to Pbiladelphia. After discharging her outward cargo at Cork, the vessel went to Limerick, and the captain wrote home, communicating this fact, and stating that his ship was then lying at Grass Island. This letter was shown to the underwriter, who thereupon made the following memorandum on the policy : "It being represented by the assured, that The Amiable was ordered from Cork to Limerick and had arrived there, it is hereby agreed that for a further consideration of one per cent., we engage to see the said ship from thence, instead of Cork, back to Philadelphia.' The court held that the vessel was covered while at L., as well as from that port, such being the manifest intention of the parties.

- See Kennebec Co. v. Augusta Ins. and Banking Co., 6 Gray, 204.

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the goods come under a marine risk; that is, until they are laden on board the vessel, or whatever else, as a boat or lighter, it is customary to use in lading them. And this applies equally to insurance against lake or river risks. In some cases of insurance on goods, these words, “to begin from the loading of the goods on board,” are held to define the terminus a quo, so distinctly, that if there be no lading at the designated place, there is no such terminus, and no beginning of the insurance. So, if there were insurance on cargo on a voyage from A. to B., beginning the adventure from the lading of the goods on board at A., if the goods are laden on board before the vessel reaches A., and are not reladen at A., the adventure never begins, and the policy never attaches. And, even if the goods are insured from A. to B., beginning the adventure from the loading of the goods, without specifying where, the policy does not attach, unless the goods are laden at A.3 If similar words are used, they are primâ facie subject to this construction, as the only grammatical construction. There are, however, many cases in which it is obvious that they are not used, either in this sense, or for, this purpose; but only as words of description, which are to be considered, construed, and applied in connection with the language of the whole policy, and all the circumstances of the case. And if these make it apparent that it was not the intention of the parties to make the attachment of the policy dependent upon the fact of the loading, it would seem to us a departure,

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1 In Coggeshall v. Am. Ins. Co., 3 Wend. 283, the vessel was on a trading voyage on the western coast of South America. The policy covered goods laden on board the vessel during a specified period. Within this time a basket of virgin silver was lost while being brought from the shore to the vessel in a flat boat. Held, that this being the customary mode of taking goods on board, the underwriters were liable. So, during the voyage, goods in boats are as much protected while the boats are “employed as auxiliary to the legitimate purpose of the voyage,” as they are while on board the ship. Parsons v. Mass. F. & M. Ins. Co., 6 Mass. 197, 208.

2 Hodgson 0. Richardson, 1 W. Bl. 463 ; Horneyer v. Lushington, 15 East, 46, 3 Camp. 85; Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130; Grant v. Paxton, 1 Taunt. 463; Park v. Hammond, 6 Taunt. 495 ; Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 651, 2 Nev. & M. 562; Graves v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Caines, 339; Scriba v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 2 Wash. C. C. 107; Richards v. Marine Ins. Co., 3 Johns. 307.

Spitta v. Woodman, 2 Taunt. 416 ; Mellish v. Allnutt, 2 M. & S. 106; Langhorn v. Hardy, 4 Taunt. 628. See also, the next note,

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not only from natural justice, but from the true and rational principles of commercial law, to give these words this construction and effect.1 The fact that the cargo is valued, is

1 In Bell v. Hobson, 16 East, 240, 3 Camp. 272, goods were insured at and from Gottenburg to any port in the Baltic, beginning the adventure from the loading of the goods on board. The policy was declared to be in continuation of other policies which were on the same goods from Virginia to any port in the United Kingdom, but the defendant was not an underwriter upon any of the former policies. Lord Ellenborough, C.J., said: “A very strict, and certainly a construction not to be favored, and still less to be extended, was adopted in the case of Spitta v. Woodman, where it was holden that the words, 'beginning the adventure from the loading on board,' were to be confined to the place from whence the risk commenced. But if there be any thing to indicate that a prior loading was contemplated by the parties, it will release the case from that strict construction. Then, can there be any thing more indicative of such an understanding between the parties, than the statement made at the foot of this policy, that it was in continuation of former policies, which were distinctly upon a voyage from Virginia. This was taking up the voyage from a period in the former policies. The conclusion, therefore, which was drawn in Spitta v. Woodman, is completely rebutted by the reference in this policy an antecedent loading.”

In Spitta v. Woodman, 2 Taunt. 416, the defendant had insured the same goods from London to Gottenburg, the outward voyage, and therefore knew that the subsequent policy was on the same goods, but notwithstanding this, he was exonerated. So, in Langhorn v. Hardy, 4 Taunt. 628, where the jury expressly found that the defend. ant knew at the time of executing the policy, that the cargo was put on board at London, and was intended to continue on board during the voyage insured, the policy describing the risk to commence from the loading of the goods on board at Gottenburg. The case of Vredenbergh v. Gracie, decided Jan. T. 1799, 4 Johns. 444, note, and referred to in Graves v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Caines, 339, 342, was this, goods were insured on board the brig Nancy, at and from any port or ports in the West Indies and at and from thence to New York, “ beginning the adventure on the said goods from the loading thereof on board in the West Indies.” The goods were shipped in New York, and were not insured on the outward voyage. At the time of the insurance, the vessel was in the West Indies, and the underwriter was informed that the goods were shipped in New York, a letter was also shown him, in which it was stated that the vessel had arrived at Cape Nicola Mole, and after disposing of part of her cargo there, had proceeded to St. Marks with the rest. “It was also,” says Thompson, J., in 2 Caines, 342," by the express understanding of the underwriter, a policy on goods shipped at New York, and the vessel being already in the West Indies, that part of the world was only mentioned as the place where the risk was to commence."

In Gladstone v. Clay, 1 M. & S. 418, goods were insured “at and from Pernambuco to Maranham, and at and from thence to Liverpool, beginning the adventure from the loading of the goods wheresoever, etc.” The underwriter was held liable for loss happening to the goods, on the voyage between Pernambuco and Maranham, although the goods were laden at London.

In regard to what is to be considered as a loading at the port at which the risk is to commence, see Nonnen v. Reid, 16 East, 176, where part of the goods were unloaded and landed on the wharf, sufficient in quantity to enable the custom-house officers to

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not evidence that the risk was to attach on the outward cargo.

It is very clear, that if goods are insured “at and from " a certain place; they are covered, although previously loaded at another place. And goods subsequently loaded are covered, if such is the manifest intention of the parties, although the risk was to commence from the loading on board at the port of departure.3

The word "at,” especially in connection with "to" and "from" may apply to an island, or region of coast or district, in such a way as to cover the vessel while sailing from port to port, or

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examine the whole cargo on board, and then that taken out was reladen. This was considered as a reloading of the whole. In Murray v. Col. Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 302, the whole cargo was hoisted on deck at the loading port, in order to take on board some salt as ballast, and it was then examined and restowed. It was held, that the policy attached on the salt only.

1 Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 651.

2 Gardner r. Col. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, C. C. 473. The voyage described in the policy was, “at and from Rio Janeiro to Santos, and two ports in South America, and at and from either of them to a port of discharge in the West Indies, or Europe, or the United States," and the risk was declared to be on goods, “ at and from Rio Janeiro odtil safely landed at Santos.” It was held, that goods laden on board at Cadiz, which were lost between Rio Janeiro and Santos, were covered.

3 In Grant v. Delacour, 3 Taunt. 466, “the policy was at and from London to all ports and places, on this side, and on the other side of the Cape of Good Hope, forwards and backwards at sea, at all times, on all services, and in all ports and places, until the ship's safe arrival back again at her last station of discharge at Blackwall, or Deptford, upon any kind of goods in the Brunswick, beginning the adventure upon the said goods from the loading thereof on board the said ship at London, and so should continue.” The court held, that though these words literally applied only to goods taken on board at London, yet, as the course of such a voyage was to trade away the goods taken out, the words would apply to any goods, acquired by trading, wherever loaded on board. But in Grant v. Paxton, 1 Taunt. 463, where goods were insured “at and from China to all or any ports or places whatsoever and wheresoever in the East Indies, Persia, or elsewhere, beyond the Cape of Good Hope, in port and at sea, in all places, at all times, and in all services, until the ship's safe arrival at London,” which was not the last place of discharge, the court held, that only goods put on board China, were covered, and not those loaded elsewhere on the voyage from China to London.

Insurance on goods at and from Plymouth to Malta, with liberty to touch at Penzance for any purpose whatever, beginning the adventure from the loading thereof on board as aforesaid, will cover goods taken on board at Penzance. Violett v. Allnutt, 3 Taunt. 419. See also, Barclay v. Stirling, 5 M. & S. 6; Hunter v. Leathley, 10 B. & C. 858, 7 Bing. 517.

place to place within that district. Whether it shall have this effect must depend upon the construction which is required by usage, by the context of the policy, and by the facts of the case. 1

If the insurance be on a certain voyage, the presumption of law — liable to be rebutted only by very strong evidence — would confine this to the next voyage which comes under this description. But the attachment of the policy may be delayed, and not prevented, by a different voyage previously, under circumstances of necessity or compulsion, or by a voyage permitted by usage.*

SECTION III.

OF THE TERMINATION OF THE RISK.

Insurance to a place, or to a port of discharge, or until arrival in port, must terminate at the first place or port of arrival, which distinctly and certainly answers to the description. But, if the ship reaches a port only for the purposes of inquiry or advice, and leaves it at once, or is instantly ordered by the owners to another port, there to discharge the cargo, the first port would not be a port of discharge. And, if the phrase be “a final port,"

i Dickey v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 7 Cranch, 327; Cruikshank v. Janson, 2 Taunt. 301 ; Camden v. Cowley, 1 W. Bl. 417; Warre v. Miller, 4 B. & C. 538.

2 Courtenay v. Miss. M. & F. Ins. Co., 12 La. 233. 8 Driscol v. Passmore, 1 B. & P. 200. 4 See ante, p. 281, n. 2. 6 Coolidge v. Gray, 8 Mass. 527; Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co., 24 Pick. 1; King v. Middletown Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 184; Sage v. Middletown Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 239; King v. Hartford Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 333. And where a vessel is insured to two ports, either or both, she may put into a third port to inquire as to the state of the markets at these ports. Clark v. United F. & M. Ins. Co., 7 Mass. 365. In King v. Middletown Ins. Co., a ship was insured on her homeward voyage to a port of discharge in the United States. She cleared for, and arrived at New York. As soon as the owner heard of her arrival, he ordered her to proceed to Middletown. To enable her to sail up the river, part of the cargo was taken out to lighten her. The cargo was entered at the custom-house and the duties paid. On the way to Middletown, the vessel was

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