If insurance is made to commence "on" a certain day, it begins at the beginning of the day, and covers all losses occurring in any part of it. If the word used be "from" a certain day, strictly speaking, it should exclude the whole of that day; and such would be the construction, if there are no facts or admissible evidence to control it. A distinction has been taken between "from the date," which is held to include the day, and "from the day of the date," which excludes it.2 But this distinction seems almost too nice for practical use; and we should say that either of these phrases, or any one of like character, would be always open to construction upon the evidence, and the circumstances of each case.3

If the insurance be on goods, the policy attaches to them when it would attach to the vessel carrying them, if she were insured. If the risk is to begin at a certain time, and this be definitely fixed, and the policy also provides that the insurance shall begin upon the ship "at" a certain place, the policy may

case was, "lost or not lost, $10,000 on the barque Esperanza, building at Perry, to take effect as soon as water-borne." The policy was executed November 15, and the vessel was launched on the preceding day. It was contended, that the policy was to attach only on the happening of an event subsequent, namely, the vessel being water-borne, but the court held, that even if the words "lost or not lost" did not make the policy attach the moment the vessel was water-borne, yet that as the vessel was in the situation described when the policy was executed, the policy attached from that time.

1 In Chiles v. Smith, 13 B. Mon. 460, it was held, that if time is to be computed from an act done, the day on which the act was done must be included, but if the computation is to be made from the day itself, then the day must be excluded, on the authority of Bellasis v. Hester, 1 Ld. Raym. 280. In Lorent v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 1 Nott & McC. 505, the question was, whether a policy issued on the day of the passage of the embargo act, was valid or not. The embargo was laid for the term of ninety days, from and after the passage of the act. The court held, that it did not go into operation till the day after the passage of it, and the policy was, therefore, valid.

2 Sir Robert Howard's case, 2 Salk. 625.

3 This subject was elaborately considered by Lord Mansfield, C. J., in Pugh v. Leeds, Cowp. 714. He held, that the word "from," might be either inclusive or exclusive, according to the context and subject-matter, and that "the day," and "the day of the date," meant in every case the same thing, and said: "The date is a memorandum of the day when the deed was delivered. In Latin it is 'datum,' and 'datum tali die' is, delivered on such a day. Then, in point of law, there is no fraction of a day; it is an indivisible point. What is 'the day of the date?' It is the day the deed is delivered.' 'The date,' therefore, being also defined to be the day the deed is delivered; 'the date,' and 'the day of the date,' must mean the same thing. The day of the date is only a superfluous expression."

attach at that time, although the ship be at another place, if the whole policy and all the circumstances make it certain that the name of the place is either surplusage or a mere term of description.1

If the words used be "at and from" a certain place, to which the ship is sailing, the risk begins when the vessel is at that place, in such condition as is contemplated by the policy; and, in general, this must be a safe condition. It is said, indeed, that the policy does not attach, unless the vessel is there in safety.2 But we do not see that she needs, always, to be there in safety. If, for instance, one policy insures her "to" such a place, and a second is made upon her "at" that place, for the obvious pur

1 Manly v. United Mar. & F. Ins. Co., 9 Mass. 85. In Martin v. Fishing Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 389, a vessel was insured "at and from Calais, Maine, on the 16th day of July, at noon, to, at, and from all ports and places, to which she may proceed in the coasting business, for six months." The court held, that the policy attached, although there was no evidence that the vessel was at, or prosecuting her voyage from Calais on the day named. See also, Grousset v. Sca Ins. Co., 24 Wend. 209. And in Kent v. Manuf. Ins. Co., 18 Pick. 19, the vessel was insured at and from Boston to certain places. The policy was dated October 18th. There was a previous policy on time, for one year, which expired October 20th. The vessel sailed from Boston on the 18th or 19th of October and was never heard from. The court held, that the second policy attached on the 20th of October, although the vessel was at sea, and if she was lost after that time the underwriters were liable.

2 Upon the question, whether the risk on a ship "at and from " a port commences on her arrival, or whether it begins when she has been moored twenty-four hours in safety, see Garrigues v. Coxe, 1 Binn. 592, where the latter rule was adopted. In Patrick v. Ludlow, 3 Johns. Cas. 10, 14, Kent, J., said: "The true rule on this subject is, that at and from, when applied to a ship, includes the period of her stay in the port from the time of her arrival there." The question before the court was distinct from this, and the remarks of the learned judge were altogether obiter. In Motteux v. London Ass. Co., 1 Atk. 545, 548, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said: "There was a case before me, upon a trial at Guildhall, where it was then debated, whether the words 'at and from Bengal to England,' meant the first arrival of the ship at Bengal? And it was agreed that the words 'first arrival' were implied and always understood in policies.” It is to be observed in regard to this case, that the Chancellor did not intend to distinguish between the moment of arrival and the being moored twenty-four hours, but the case was mentioned as bearing on the question, whether under the words used, the assured might leave the port, make an intermediate voyage and then return and sail for the port of destination.

See also, Parmeter v. Cousins, 2 Camp. 235, in which Lord Ellenborough, C. J. held, that the policy did not attach until the ship was in safety. See ante, p. 144, n. 5. And in Bell v. Bell, 2 Camp. 475, 478, Lord Ellenborough said: “The safety required to give a good commencement to the risk on the ship, is a physical safety from the perils insured against, and not a freedom from political danger.”

pose of attaching when the first ceases, and the ship arrives at the place in a violent and dangerous storm, which continues until the first policy is discharged, we do not see that the danger prevents the second policy from attaching.1 The greater part of the policies of the present day contain a clause, by reason of which, the outward voyage does not expire till the vessel has been moored twenty-four hours in safety. And this question would not then arise.

If the words are "at and from" a certain port, although the insurance begins only at that port, the word may compre-. hend an open roadstead, or any places included naturally or usually within the port named, as places at which vessels receiving cargoes, are considered as "at" the port. It is sometimes a difficult question of mixed law and fact, whether a certain place is really within the scope of the word " Port," or is a part of a place named; and this question can only be answered by usage and the nature of the case.2

The words "at and from" are often, if not always, especially in a home port, intended to cover a ship while in the port pre

1 If the policy on the homeward voyage is stated to be in continuance of the policy on the outward, it would certainly take effect on the termination of the outward, but perhaps not otherwise. See post, p. 317, note 3.

2 De Longuemere v. Firem. Ins. Co., 10 Johns. 126. In Higgins v. Aguilar, cited 2 Taunt. 406, on a policy, at and from Demerara to London, it was held, that a loading at Essequibo was a loading at Demerara. This was decided upon the particular usage of the trade. And in McCargo v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 10 Rob. La. 334, slaves, taken on board in Hampton Roads, were held to come within a policy "at and from Norfolk." So insurance on goods at and from the ship's loading port or ports in Amelia Island, will cover goods taken in at Tigre Island, there being no port at Amelia Island, and the usage of the trade being for ships to lie at Tigre Island to take on board their cargoes and then clear from Amelia Island. Moxon v. Atkins, 3 Camp. 200. So, Grass Island has been held to be within the port of Limerick. Bell v. Mar. Ins. Co., 8 S. & R. 98. See, generally, as to the meaning of the word port, Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. 43; Stockton R. Co. v. Barrett, 7 Man. & G. 870, and post, p. 328, n. 1.

In Payne v. Hutchinson, 2 Taunt. 405, note, goods were insured "at and from Caermarthen to London." The vessel took in her cargo at Llanelly and sailed thence for London. Llanelly is a member of the port of Caermarthen, but there is a distinct custom-house at each of these places. Caermarthen lies higher up the river, and is accessible only by an intricate navigation. The vessel cleared at L. It was held, that the risk had not commenced. See also, Constable v. Noble, 2 Taunt. 403; Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241.

paring for her voyage, as well as after she begins it. And there may not only be a "deviation" in the port, springing from unreasonable slowness or entire suspension of the preparations, but the policy may never attach from the want of the preparations, or its attachment be delayed by a delay in the preparations; so that where a vessel has been a long time in a port, the risk seems not to commence until preparations are begun for the voyage insured.1

If the insurance be "from" only, and not "at," it does not begin until the vessel leaves the port or place; that is, weighs anchor, or casts off her moorings with the preparations which she purposes, made, and with the intention of sailing.2 But the word "from" has a more extended meaning when applied to an intermediate port. Thus, if a vessel be insured at and from A. to B., from thence to C. and back to A., a loss at B. will be covered.3

If the insurance is on goods "at and from" a place, it does not begin (unless expressly so provided in the policy), until

1 Seamans v. Loring, 1 Mason, 127, 140; Kemble v. Bowne, 1 Caines, 75. See also, ante, p. 282, note 2. In Lambert v. Liddard, 5 Taunt. 480, a vessel which was then cruising, was insured "at and from Pernambuco or any other port or ports in the Brazils, to London, beginning the adventure on the termination of the cruise, and preparing for her voyage to London." The vessel, at the end of the cruise, was off the coast of Brazil to the northward of Pernambuco. The master sent a boat ashore to see if a cargo could be obtained at Pernambuco, and finding that it could not, he set sail for St. Salvador, for the purpose of obtaining a cargo, and the vessel was lost on the way. It was held, that the risk attached from the time the master sent the boat ashore, on the termination of the cruise, that being considered preparing for the voyage within the policy.

2 See Mey v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 3 Brev. 329, and cases ante, p. 124-129. 8 Bradley v. Nashville Ins. Co., 3 La. Ann. 708. In Bell v. Marine Ins. Co., 8 S. & R. 98, a vessel was insured at and from Philadelphia to Cork and back to Philadelphia. After discharging her outward cargo at Cork, the vessel went to Limerick, and the captain wrote home, communicating this fact, and stating that his ship was then lying at Grass Island. This letter was shown to the underwriter, who thereupon made the following memorandum on the policy: “It being represented by the assured, that The Amiable was ordered from Cork to Limerick and had arrived there, it is hereby agreed that for a further consideration of one per cent., we engage to see the said ship from thence, instead of Cork, back to Philadelphia." The court held that the vessel was covered while at L., as well as from that port, such being the manifest intention of the parties.

See Kennebec Co. v. Augusta Ins. and Banking Co., 6 Gray, 204.

the goods come under a marine risk; that is, until they are laden on board the vessel, or whatever else, as a boat or lighter, it is customary to use in lading them.1 And this applies equally to insurance against lake or river risks. In some cases of insurance on goods, these words, "to begin from the loading of the goods on board," are held to define the terminus a quo, so distinctly, that if there be no lading at the designated place, there is no such terminus, and no beginning of the insurance. So, if there were insurance on cargo on a voyage from A. to B., beginning the adventure from the lading of the goods on board at A., if the goods are laden on board before the vessel reaches A., and are not reladen at A., the adventure never begins, and the policy never attaches.2 And, even if the goods are insured from A. to B., beginning the adventure from the loading of the goods, without specifying where, the policy does not attach, unless the goods are laden at A.3 If similar words are used, they are prima facie subject to this construction, as the only grammatical construction. There are, however, many cases in which it is obvious that they are not used, either in this sense, or for, this purpose; but only as words of description, which are to be considered, construed, and applied in connection with the language of the whole policy, and all the circumstances of the case. And if these make it apparent that it was not the intention of the parties to make the attachment of the policy dependent upon the fact of the loading, it would seem to us a departure,

1 In Coggeshall v. Am. Ins. Co., 3 Wend. 283, the vessel was on a trading voyage on the western coast of South America. The policy covered goods laden on board the vessel during a specified period. Within this time a basket of virgin silver was lost while being brought from the shore to the vessel in a flat boat. Held, that this being the customary mode of taking goods on board, the underwriters were liable. So, during the voyage, goods in boats are as much protected while the boats are "employed as auxiliary to the legitimate purpose of the voyage," as they are while on board the ship. Parsons v. Mass. F. & M. Ins. Co., 6 Mass. 197, 208.

2 Hodgson v. Richardson, 1 W. Bl. 463; Horneyer v. Lushington, 15 East, 46, 3 Camp. 85; Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130; Grant v. Paxton, 1 Taunt. 463; Park v. Hammond, 6 Taunt. 495; Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 651, 2 Nev. & M. 562; Graves v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Caines, 339; Scriba v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 2 Wash. C. C. 107; Richards v. Marine Ins. Co., 3 Johns. 307.

8 Spitta v. Woodman, 2 Taunt. 416; Mellish v. Allnutt, 2 M. & S. 106; Langhorn v. Hardy, 4 Taunt. 628. See also, the next note.