risk.

Thus, liberty to touch at a port for any purpose whatever, is said to include liberty to touch there for the purpose of taking on board part of the goods insured.

And if liberty is

from Antigua to England, with liberty to touch at all or any of the West India islands, Jamaica included," the vessel went to St. Kitts and remained there two months taking in cargo. It was contended that this was a deviation, but Gibbs, C. J., held that the whole scope of the policy showed that the vessel might go from island to island seeking freight, and added: "What could be the object of the liberty given her to touch at Jamaica, if she could not stay there to take in goods? Was she to go five hundred miles out of her way for the mere pleasure of viewing that island, and asking for news." See also, Ashley v. Pratt, 16 M. & W. 471, Exch. 257; Gilfert v. Hallet, 2 Johns. Cas. 296. And in Chase v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Pick. 51, where goods were insured from New York to Lynn, the vessel having liberty to call at Newport, at which place the deck load was discharged, this was held not to be a deviation.

1 As where the vessel is at a port belonging to the voyage. Cormack v. Gladstone, 11 East, 347; Laroche v. Oswin, 12 East, 131; Ashley v. Pratt, 16 M. & W. 471, 1 Exch. 257; Thorndike v. Bordman, 4 Pick. 471. So, if the vessel puts into port through necessity, she may discharge or take in cargo there, provided the risk is not thereby increased. Raine v. Bell, 9 East, 195; Chase v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Pick. 51, 53. So, where a vessel was driven from her loading port to another, and not being able to return, completed her loading at the latter port. Delaney v. Stoddart, 1 T. R. 22. Or where a vessel deviated to save life on board, and at the port of necessity took in additional cargo. Perkins v. Augusta Ins. & Banking Co., Sup. Jud. Ct., Mass., Nov. T. 1855. In this case, Merrick, J., stated the law as follows: "If a ship under the terms of a policy, or for any sufficient legal cause, is justified in originally entering into the port, her subsequent trading by breaking bulk, loading or unloading, during the period of her lawful stay and detention there, although such trading, loading, and unloading, are foreign to the main purpose of the adventure, or not specifically provided for by the terms of the policy, will not be held to amount to a deviation. But it would be otherwise, if those caused additional delay, or otherwise substantially enhanced or varied the risk." In Kane v. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Johns. 264, there appears to have been a necessity for selling the cargo, and the case may not therefore be an authority in point. In Kingston v. Girard, 4 Dall. 274, it was held that a ship detained in port by captors, might trade. So in Hughes v. Union Ins. Co., 3 Wheat. 159, where the vessel had liberty to stop at a port to ascertain whether there were any men of war off her port of destination. In Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co., 24 Pick. 1, it was held that a vessel insured to a port of discharge in the United States, might put into port to inquire for a market, and while there, might take a cargo for the port of destination. In Raine v. Bell, 9 East, 195, the insurance was on the ship and freight, and Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "I reserve giving any opinion as to the operation of a change in the state of the cargo in the case of a policy on goods; because the taking in of other goods in the course of one entire voyage, where it is not provided for, may be contended to constitute a different adventure from that on which the ship started with her original cargo." But in Laroche v. Oswin, 12 East, 131, the insurance was on goods, and this was held to make no difference. So, in Thorndike v. Bordman, 4 Pick. 471; Chase v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Pick. 51.

2 Violett v. Allnutt, 3 Taunt. 419; Hunter v. Leathley, 10 B. & C. 858, 7 Bing.

given to stop at all places, or specified places, for trade, refreshment, and recruiting, the vessel is not thereby deprived of her right to stop at other places for purposes connected with the voyage. So if liberty is given to stop at a port to ascertain whether there are any hostile men-of-war off the port of destination, the vessel may remain at that port until the danger has passed away.2

It seems to be clear, that the most general liberty of touching, or staying at any port or ports, with or without naming them, must be construed in reference to the voyage itself, and is so far limited that it will not justify an entrance into any port, if it has no connection with the purposes of the voyage.

Nor

1 Child v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Sandf. 26. The vessel in this case was insured on a whaling voyage by a policy containing this clause. It was held that this did not prevent her from entering bays, or touching and staying at islands for the purpose of taking whales or sea elephants, if these were shown to be the proper purposes of a whaling voyage.

2 Hughes v. Union Ins. Co., 3 Wheat. 159.

3 Hammond v. Reid, 4 B. & Ald. 72. The vessel, in this case, put into port to learn the state of the market with reference to another adventure. It was held to be a deviation. So where a ship was insured "at and from London to Berbice, with liberty to touch and stay at any ports and places whatsoever and wheresoever, and for all purposes whatsoever, particularly to land, load, and exchange goods," Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "The liberty in the policy must be construed with reference to the main scope of the voyage insured." Williams v. Shee, 3 Camp. 469. In Solly . Whitmore, 5 B. & Ald. 45, insurance was effected on a vessel "at and from Hull to her port or ports of loading in the Baltic sea and gulf of Finland, with liberty to proceed to, and touch and stay at, any port or ports whatsoever for any purpose, particularly at Elsinore, without being deemed a deviation." The vessel, loaded with goods for Elsinore, Dantzic, and Pillau, which last was her intended port of loading, sailed and delivered the goods at Elsinore and Dantzic, and was lost on the voyage to Pillau. Abbott, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The liberty given by this policy to touch at any ports for all purposes, must be construed to mean purposes connected with the voyage. Here the voyage was from Hull to a loading port in the Baltic, and if the ship had gone to Elsinore or Dantzic to see if she could get a cargo, that would have been a purpose connected with the voyage, and consequently would not have been a deviation. But the vessel, in fact, went to those ports for the purpose of delivering goods, which was wholly unconnected with the object of the voyage insured. I am therefore of opinion that this was a deviation." See also, Clason v. Simmonds, cited 6 T. R. 533; Langhorn v. Allnutt, 4 Taunt. 511. In Rucker v. Allnutt, 15 East, 278, the policy gave the vessel liberty to touch and stay at any ports and places for all purposes whatsoever. Afterwards there was a clause making it lawful for the ship to proceed, sail to, and touch and stay at any ports and places whatsoever or wheresoever, particularly with leave to wait for information off any ports or places. The port of discharge was any port or place in the Baltic. It was held that the vessel might wait either in or off ports for the purpose of obtaining information. 25

VOL. II.

will a liberty to touch at ports; without naming them, justify the master in wandering more widely from his course, than a reasonable interpretation of such a liberty will permit.1 So

1 In Bottomley v. Bovill, 5 B. & C. 210, the ship was insured from London to New South Wales, and at and from thence to all ports and places in the East Indies or South America, with liberty for the said ship to proceed, sail to, touch at and stay at any ports or places whatsoever, with leave to take in and discharge goods and passengers to all ports and places in the Channel, Cork in Ireland, Madeira, Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, and wheresoever the ship might proceed to, as well on this as on the other sides of the Capes of Good Hope and Horn, and for all purposes whatsoever; particularly to trade and sail backwards and forwards, and forwards and backwards. The court held that the voyage insured was from London to New South Wales, and thence to South America or the East Indies, and that although the words above cited, would allow of intermediate voyages, yet only such as were undertaken with a view to an accomplishment of one or other of the voyages pointed out by the policy. So in Hogg v. Horner, Park on Ins., 394, where a ship was insured" at and from Lisbon to a port in England, with liberty to call at any one port in Portugal for any purpose whatever," it was held that this would not authorize a voyage from Lisbon to Faro, to complete the loading of the ship, Faro being to the southward of Lisbon and out of the course from Lisbon to England. And in Ranken v. Reeve, Park on Ins., 8th Ed. 627, where a ship was insured at and from Africa to the Canaries, Madeira, and Lisbon, with liberty to touch, stay, and trade at all ports, in the voyage, it was held that after the inception of the risk in Africa, the vessel could proceed only to the northward towards Europe, and not to the southward. In Lavabre v. Wilson, 1 Doug. 284, the voyage was described in these words: "At and from Port L'Orient to Pondicherry, Madras, and China, and at and from thence back to the ship's port or ports of discharge in France, with liberty to touch in the outward or homeward bound voyage, at the Isles of France and Bourbon, and at all or any other place or places what or wheresoever." There was also this clause: "And it shall be lawful for the said ship in this voyage, to proceed and sail to, and touch and stay at any ports or places whatsoever, as well on this side as on the other side of the Cape of Good Hope." It was at first contended that the vessel might go to Bengal, and that the ship being there, the voyage might be abridged, and her further progress to China abandoned, on the ground that vessels insured might always return back from any point within the limits of the voyage contained in the policy. But, says the reporter, “Lord Mansfield having intimated a clear opinion that the general words were, by the expressions of 'in the outward, or homeward-bound voyage,' and 'in this voyage,' qualified and restrained so as to mean, 'all places whatsoever in the usual course of the voyage to and from the places mentioned in the policy,' this ground was immediately abandoned." See Coles v. Marine Ins. Co., 3 Wash. C. C. 159. In Winthrop v. Union Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. 7, the insurance was on goods "at and from New York to the Cape of Good Hope, with liberty to proceed to and trade at the Isle of France, and any other port or ports in the Indian seas, and at and from these ports back to New York," with liberty to touch and trade as usual on the outward and homeward voyages. The vessel sailed from New York to the Cape of Good Hope, touched at the Isle of France, went thence to the island of Ceylon, thence to Madras, where part of the cargo was sold, and an order on Tranquebar taken in return, she then sailed to this port, purchased some goods, and then went to Batavia where the remainder of the outward

too, if a port be named, it is a deviation to enter another not named in the stead of that which is named, although the substituted port is no further off, and in no way increases the risk.1 And if the vessel is unable to enter the port by reason of a municipal regulation, the liberty is construed so strictly that she cannot go to any other port.2 So if permission is given to deviate on the occurrence of certain specific events, these precise events must take place to give that liberty. And, a liberty to cruise six weeks, means only six successive weeks from the commencement of the cruise.4

It is sometimes intended by the parties, that the ship shall have two termini, the beginning and end of the voyage, but may make intermediate passages, backwards and forwards, between these termini. Perhaps the most usual way of meeting the exigencies of such a case as this, is by a policy on time, which permits the insured to go where he will. But it may be provided for by certain liberties, expressly given. For this purpose, liberty is sometimes given "to go backwards and forwards," or "to make any intermediate passages," or "to touch and return,"

cargo, and that purchased at Tranquebar, was sold, and the proceeds invested in a return cargo, with which the vessel sailed. Held no deviation. In Lambert v. Liddard, 5 Taunt. 480, the insurance was on a vessel at and from Pernambuco, or any other port or ports in the Brazils, to London. Not being able to obtain a cargo at Pernambuco, the captain sailed to St. Salvador, a port six hundred miles to the southward, and more distant from London than Pernambuco. This was held not to be a deviation.

1 As the stopping at Morrison's Haven instead of Leith on a voyage from Carron to Hull with liberty to call at Leith. Eliot v. Wilson, 4 Brown, 470.

2 Stevens v. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Duer, 594. The insurance in this case was by a time policy, which contained this clause: "Warranted not to use ports and places in Texas, except Galveston, nor foreign ports and places in the Gulf of Mexico, nor places on or over Ocrocoke Bar." Permission was afterwards given to use the port of Laguna for one voyage. When the vessel arrived at Laguna, she was not permitted to enter under a regulation made prior to the permission, until she had entered at a neighboring port, Laguna not being a port of entry. The vessel went to Sisal for that purpose, and was there lost. Held that this was a deviation which discharged the underwriters.

Goods were insured in this captain on arriving on that Hearing that he could pro

3 Duerhagen v. United States Ins. Co., 2 S. & R. 309. case from New York to Bremen. Liberty was given the coast to enter a Dutch port, if he could do so with safety. ceed to Amsterdam, without being molested by the British, he attempted to enter that port and was captured by the French. This was considered a deviation.

4 Syers v. Bridge, 2 Doug. 527.

If, however, after vessel is to sail

or" to touch one or more times," or the like. performing these intermediate voyages, the thence to a home port, she cannot after sailing for home put back, unless through an excusing necessity; and "to such a

1 In Thorndike v. Bordman, 4 Pick. 471, the insurance was on the vessel and cargo from Boston to any port or ports beyond the Cape of Good Hope, one or more times to the same port, for the purpose of selling the outward and procuring a return cargo, and at and from thence to a port of final discharge in Europe, or the United States, with liberty to stop at the usual places for refreshments, and to trade thereat. The master sailed for Cochin China, with directions to purchase a cargo of sugars, but as he had only gold coin on board, with which he could not trade, he sailed thence to Manilla, with the intention of there purchasing a cargo of sugars, or of exchanging the gold for silver, and returning to Cochin China. This latter intention was executed, and he proceeded to Saigon, a port to which an American vessel had never before been. Here he obtained part of his return cargo, and sailed for Batavia, where being unable to obtain any sugars, except at a great expense, he went to Samarang, an outport of the island of Java, but before sailing he was obliged, by a law of the island, in order to proceed to S., to discharge the sugar brought from Cochin China. At Samarang, the cargo was completed, and the vessel sailed for Holland and was lost. Held, that neither the returning from Manilla to Cochin China, nor the selling at Batavia of the sugars purchased in Cochin China, and going thence to Samarang and there taking in a full cargo was a deviation. See also Bize v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 284. A very liberal construction was given to the policy in Hunter v. Leathley, 10 B. & C. 858. Goods were insured "at and from Singapore, Penang, Malacca, and Batavia, all or any, to the ship's port or ports of discharge in Great Britain, or to any port or ports in the United Netherlands, or to Altona or Hamburg, or all or any, with leave to touch, stay, and trade at all or any ports or places whatsoever and wheresoever in the East Indies, Persia, or elsewhere." Liberty was given to proceed to any ports and places whatsoever and wheresoever, in any direction and for any purpose necessary or otherwise, etc. The court held that the assured must have intended to have protected himself against loss at whatsoever places in the East the goods might be put on board. Part of a cargo of coffee was put on board at Batavia, with the intention of taking it to Antwerp, but there not being enough, the vessel went to Sourabaya, another port in the island of Java, and there loaded more coffee, with the intention of taking it to Antwerp, returned thence to Batavia, and thence sailed to Antwerp. Sourabaya is not in the direct course from Batavia, Singapore, Penang, or Malacca, to Europe, nor in the direct course of any one of those four places to any other of them. The underwriters were held liable. Affirmed. Leathly v. Hunter, 7 Bing. 517, 5 Moore & P. 457, 1 Cromp. & J. 423, s. c. at Nisi Prius, Lloyd & W. 244.

2 Burns v. Holmwood, Q. B., 1856, 19 Law Reporter, 163. The policy was on goods on a voyage "at and from Liverpool to Cardiff, whilst there, and thence to all or any part or parts, place or places, islands and settlements on the west coast of America, in the Pacific, and seas adjacent, particularly Acapulco and Panama on the outward voyage, and the Chincha Islands, on the homeward, backward and forward, or forward and backward in any order or succession, during the vessel's stay, trading, discharging, and loading there, and thence back to a port or ports of discharge in the United Kingdom." The vessel arrived at Callao and sailed thence for the Chincha Islands, and took a full cargo of guano, with which she returned to Callao, at which