expressed in opposition to law. If "public sentiment could warrant the suppression of the circulation of unpopular or even abhorred opinions, there could be no chance for progress, nor would the liberty of any individual be safe. He who stood with the majority on one issue, and rejoiced in helping to put down the dissenting minority, might himself on the following day fall a victim to the principle of majority tyranny which he had helped to invoke. Majorities are not infallible; and among the mass of dissenting views, no one and no group, however large, among us, is able to prophesy with unerring certainty which will prove ephemeral, and which will be found by a later and wiser generation to represent a larger truth than the prevailing opinion of to-day. Right of Free Assemblage. The Constitution in granting free speech and free assemblage, writes John D. Chamberlain in the November Case and Comment, does not involve the right to assemble and discuss at any time and in any place at the will of the speaker. It does not confer upon a person the right to enter a man's private lawn and address the populace from the front porch. It does not confer upon one the right to take possession of a park or highway belonging to the public and dedicated by the public to other uses. If a speaker desires to assemble an audience on a private lawn he must get permission of the private owner. If he desires to assemble an audience on a public lawn he must get permission of the public owner. Steps to Liberty. Every step toward liberty, states James F. Morton, Jr., in the November Case and Comment, has been won against the loudest outcries from those who feared that the adoption of a new idea would destroy the very foundations of society; and in every single instance the jeremiads have been proved unfounded. A few centuries ago, scarcely a voice was raised in the civilized world in behalf of religious liberty, as we understand it today. The bare suggestion of tolerating dissent from the established creed was met with horrified indignation. This attitude of mind, undoubtedly sincere and shared by noble and high-minded leaders of the thought of their day, persisted until a very recent epoch. It was maintained that law, morality, the family, and all else sacred and precious would perish, if heresy were not rigorously kept down. The establishment of a republican form of government on the ruins of hereditary monarchy met the same strenuous opposition and the same direful predictions of the awful consequences of trusting the people. abolition of chattel slavery, the higher education of woman, and her admission into the professions, and each other advance in the consistent application of fundamental democratic principles, were all condemned beforehand as certain to bring social chaos; and in not a single instance have the fears of the laudatores temporis acti been justified. The Contempt-Refusal to Answer Question of Grand Jury. The right of a bank officer to refuse to disclose the state of a depositor's account was considered in the Indiana case of Baker v. State, L. R. A. 1915D, 1061, which holds that a cashier of a bank cannot refuse to answer a question propounded by a grand jury as to the state of the account of a particular depositor. on the theory that it was abusing its inquisitorial power, where it knew that the deposits in the bank greatly exceeded the deposits returned for taxation, and was seeking to ascertain who had falsified his tax returns, although it knew of no one who had done so, and was inquiring as to the accounts of persons whose names were taken at random from the tax duplicates of the county. Kelchner on a judgment for $65; the LANCASTER LAWREVIEW sheriff seized two automobiles which were claimed as the property of Ryder; VOL. XXXVI] FRIDAY, JAN. 17, 1919. [No. 12 an issue was framed to determine the Superior Court. Ryder, Appellant v. Jenkins. Bill of sale-Possession-Chattel mort gage. Where the maker of a promissory note gives to his endorser as collateral security a bill of sale for two automobiles purchased from the proceeds, which are leased back to the maker and remain in his possession, the transaction is void against the maker's creditors. Appeal No. 86, Oct. 7, 1917, by plaintiff, L. E. Ryder, from judgment of C. P. of Lancaster Co., August T., 1916, No. 42, on verdict for defendant, D. J. Jenkins, in sheriff's interpleader issue. Affirmed. Sheriff's interpleader on execution against John W. Kelchner on judgment. for $65.00 and levy on two automobiles claimed by plaintiff. Verdict for defendant for $525, found as the value of the automobiles. The Court below, HASSLER, J., discharged rules for a new trial and for judgment for plaintiff n. o. v. See 35 LAW REVIEW 93. Errors assigned were [1] refusal to give binding instructions for plaintiff; [2-4] portions of the charge; [5] refusal to allow question on cross-examination of a witness for defendant, "Are you under indictment for larceny of one of these machines?"; and [6] entry of judgment for $525 instead of $65. B. C. Atlee and B. F. Davis, for appellant. Cite Myers v. Harvy, 2 P. & W. 478. Cobb & Chase v. Dietrich & Co., 7 Super. 252. Christ v. Zehner, 212 Pa. 188. Collins' Appeal, 107 Pa. 590. Wallace's Appeal, 104 Pa. 559. Chas. W. Eaby, for appellee. January 3, 1919. Opinion by WILLIAMS, J. Jenkins issued execution against one superior right. Kelchner ordered two automobiles and paid for them with the proceeds of a note for $1,000 endorsed by Ryder; he gave Ryder a bill of sale for the two cars and was given a lease for them by Ryder; Kelchner's chauffeur testified the cars were consigned to Kelchner; they were put in his possession (the chauffeur) on arrival, and kept in a garage leased by Kelchner from Ryder; and that Ryder never had possession. Ryder's testimony contradicted that of the chauffeur. mitted to the jury, which found for JenThe conflicting evidence was subkins and fixed the value of the cars at $525. Judgment was entered and Ryder appealed. The cross-examination refused by the court was improper and irrelevant. is for $65. This amount, with interest Jenkins's judgment against Kelchner and costs, is all he is entitled to receive upon execution. The judgment is affirmed. price of a horse should be opened on petition A judgment entered on a note given for the averring breach of warranty where there is a warranty had expired when the defendant conflict of testimony as to whether or not the notified the plaintiff of the unsoundness of the horses and whether or not the horse was sound at the time of the sale and delivery. Rule to open judgment and let defendant into a defense. C. P. of Lancaster Co. April Term, 1918, No. 276. B. F. Davis, for rule. Chas. G. Baker, contra. December 21, 1918. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J. On March 28, 1918, the defendant purchased from the plaintiff, at a public | the horse was sick; that on Monday sale in the City of Lancaster, two horses, night he called him up, but he was not for $116.00 and $56.00 respectively. He at home, and he told the party at that thereupon gave to the plaintiff a judg-end of the line to tell him; and that subment note for $172.00, payable ninety sequently he notified Mr. Hallman that days after date, at the National Bank of the horse had died, either on April 2 or Oxford. As the note was not paid when early April 3. it matured, the plaintiff, on July 8, 1918, caused it to be entered in this Court, and, having issued execution thereon to August Term, 1918, No. 15, the Sheriff levied upon the personal property of the defendant. Thereupon the defendant presented his petition, setting forth these facts, and alleging, also, that the horse which was purchased for $116.00 was sold under a warranty that it was a good worker and sound, but that, when it was delivered by Hallman at Fritz's Hotel, at Quarryville, on the following day (March 29), he, the defendant, found that it was not sound, and from the illness from which it was then suffering, it a short time thereafter died. There are but two points arising out of this transaction which seem to me to be controverted. One of them is, the extent of the contract of warranty, and the other is, whether or not the horse was sound at the time of the sale and delivery. It is admitted that the conditions of sale were not in writing. The defendant has testified that, at the time the horse was purchased by him, it was warranted as a good worker and sound, and that there were no other limitations or terms. The plaintiff has testified that the horse was warranted as a good worker and sound, but that all his horses were sold on terms that the purchasers should have two days to try out the animals; that in this case the time expired Saturday noon, and that by that time he had received no notice from the defendant of any defect in the horse. The defendant on his part has stated that no such announcement was made at the sale; that the horse was to be delivered at Fritz's Hotel, in Quarryville Borough; that on Friday, March 29, he found it at that place; that he could hardly get the horse home, and was obliged to get out of his wagon and walk a considerable portion of the way; that on the same night he called up Mr. Hallman and told him that The plaintiff claimed that the horse, at the time of the sale, had the appearance of a sound horse; and it was also testified by two witnesses that, the following week, Stewart told them that he had a gray horse for sale, a good worker and sound, which he had purchased from Hallman. Stewart denies that he made any such statement. He alleges that he telephoned to Dr. Hall, a veterinary, of Oxford, to come to see the horse, and that he came. The doctor testified that he saw the horse on Sunday, and, from the appearance of the horse, it had been suffering from this disease for some days previous. The controversy, therefore, it appears, resolves itself into one of disputed facts, dependent on the veracity of the parties, and I think it is proper for a jury to decide the issue between them. For this reason, the rule is made absolute, so far as the sum of $116.00, the price of the horse, is concerned. Rule made absolute. Prouse v. Stocker. Mechanic's lien - Striking off lien Claim partly lienable-Notice of filing lien. A mechanic's lien cannot be maintained for assisting the owner in making contracts with material-men and contractors for the furnishing of work and materials in and about the erection and construction of a building. If in a mechanic's lien there is a claim for a round sum for services, part of which are the subject of lien and part not, the whole claim must fall. A notice of filing a mechanic's lien sufficiently states the Court in which it is filed if it gives the Court's name and the County. It is not necessary to set forth the name of the State. Motion to strike off lien. Delaware Co. March Term, 466. C. P. of 1918, No. W. R. Fronefield, for motion. November 16, 1918. BROOMALL, J. Opinion by The lien filed in this case is for three classes of claims, to wit: I. The lien avers a verbal contract by the plaintiff with the defendant as owner, by which the owner agreed to pay the claimant four hundred dollars ($400.00), he agreeing to assist the defendant and defendant's architect, Richard C. Loos, in making contracts with material men and contractors for the furnishing of work and materials in and about the erection and construction of the hereinafter described structures," and "to superintend the work of erection and construction of said structures." The lien further avers the nature or kind of work under this contract to be " for the assisting of the owner and architect, R. C. Loos, in making contracts with material-men and contractors for the furnishing of the work and materials in and about the erection and construction of the hereinafter described structures and of superintending work of erection and construction of said structures." If any part of the work contracted for is not the subject of a mechanic's lien, the item of charge of four hundred dollars ($400.00) cannot be sustained. While it may be that the work in superintending the erection or construction is lienable, yet if the other part of the contract is not lienable, then inasmuch as it cannot be determined how much is payable for the part which is not lienable, the whole charge will have to fail. Under the Act of 1836, which did not specially mention architects, it was held that an architect was entitled to a lien, as a person furnishing work and labor in and about the construction, and this might include his plans and specifications: Banks v. Griese, 35 Pa. 423. It was subsequently held and the above case distinguished in Price v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 47, " that an architect who merely furnishes plans and specifications is not entitled to a lien." It thus appears that where an architect does the work of superintending the building, this work is lienable and includes its plans and specifications according to which the building is to be built, but the mere making of plans and speci fications without any work of superintendence is not lienable. The plans and specifications are merely a necessary accessory to the work of superintending. To the same effect is Bernheisel v. Smothers, 5 Pa. Supr. Ct. 113, and Rush ". Abel, 90 Pa. 193. This lien is filed under the present existing Act of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 431. Under this act, a person is entitled to a lien who contracts with the owner to plan or superintend the structure or furnishes labor, skill or superintendence thereto, whether as an architect, superintendent, builder or material-man. One of the elements of the contract for which the owner agrees to pay four hundred dollars ($400.00) is to assist the owner or her architect in making contracts with material-men and contractors. The contract does not specify in what this assistance consists and the averment of the lien does not show what assistance was furnished. Every intendment is against the lien, because it is a statutory creation, and if a property is lienable for assistance to the owner in making contracts, it would entitle the scrivener who wrote the contracts or the lawyer who advised upon the subject of contracts or the next friend who might advise the owner with respect to the contracts to assert a lien. We do not think that the Act of 1901 intended to include as a beneficiary a person who advised. the owner with respect to contracts, and therefore the rule granted on the petition of the defendant is made absolute as to this item of four hundred dollars ($400.00). 2. The second class is made to rest upon the contract of the owner with the claimant to furnish labor at the usual and customary market prices. The lien avers that labor was furnished by the claimant to the erection and construction of the buildings, and an itemized statement is annexed to the lien of this labor so furnished. We see no objection to this item, and the rule to show cause is dismissed with respect to it. 3. The third class is made to rest on a contract of the owner with the claimant to furnish materials to the erection. and construction of the said building, and the lien avers that materials were that the findings and conclusions of the master must stand. He concludes, that "there was, no doubt, more or less unpleasantness in the family life, but that it is apparent that the libelant greatly magnified her supposed wrongs, and that she placed too much stress in trifling incidents upon which she relied to support her petition for a divorce." He might have added, that the quarrels, which were frequent in the later years of their married life, were due largely to her jealousy and to her temporary weakness of mind and body. This condition was aggravated by the misconduct of her neighbor. Her suspicious mind was poisoned by the pretended revelations made through card readings. so furnished, and an itemized statement is annexed to the lien, showing the amount thereof. We see no objection to this part of the claim and the rule to show cause with respect to it is discharged. The defendant contends that the lien should be stricken off because the notice of the filing of it, which was served upon the owner, did not state the court in which the lien was filed. The notice states the court as the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, and it is contended that in order to comply with the law, it should have stated in what state the court thus designated is situated. This criticism is somewhat refined. The purpose of the notice is to give the owner information as to the court in which the lien is filed. The The faults of the husband are found, owner knew in what county her land was we think, in his failure to give due consituate. The notice states that her deed sideration and sympathy for her weakis recorded at Media, and the notice fur-ness, but her accusations and unfounded ther states that the owner's land is situate suspicions were, no doubt, very annoyin the County of Delaware, which is in ing. the State of Pennsylvania. We think that the notice is sufficiently informative, to the owner and a sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law. The payment of costs in a divorce proceeding does not follow the decree, but the court may order each party to pay his own costs. The bill for the official stenographer's services, before a master in a divorce case, constitutes a part of the costs in the proceeding, and the court may order such costs to be placed upon the parties or upon the county. Before a master in divorce proceedings calls in a stenographer to assist him, he should obtain a special order of the court authorizing such employment. Divorce. C. P. of Montgomery Co. T. Lane Bean and Norwood D. Matthias, for libelant. C. D. McAvoy, for respondent. June 3, 1918. Opinion by SWARTZ, P. J. After a careful reading of all the testimony submitted and after due consideration of the same, we are convinced The disposition of the costs in the proceedings raises a question of some difficulty. The stenographer presented a bill for $65.50. She was selected by the parties to perform the work. The court arranges with our official stenographers respond at equity hearings and other to appear at all jury trials. They also court proceedings. There are numerous hearings, however, before the court where we call upon other stenographers to assist us in an emergency. The two who answer these calls have proved their efficiency, and their aid is given so frequently that under the law they may be termed official stenographers of this court so far as this case is concerned. The bill for the official stenographer's services, before a master in a divorce case, constitutes a part of the costs in the proceedings. That the court has the authority to place such costs upon the parties or upon the county is shown in Russell v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. Superior Ct. 622, and by the affirmance of that decision in 236 Pa. 560. The county is not liable for copies of the transcribed notes furnished to counsel, unless in pursuance of a special order of the court: Cliff v. Philadelphia, 41 Pa. Superior Ct. 638. |