LANCASTER LAWREVIEW VOL. XXXVI] FRIDAY, NOV. 1, 1918. Orphans' Court. [No.1 Estate of H. Harvey Boyd, deceased. Partnership O. C. Jurisdiction-Surviving partner as administrator. The Orphans' Court has jurisdiction to settle partnership accounts where a decedent was one of the partners, and the surviving partner is his executor or administrator. Where a surviving partner was made administrator of his deceased partner, the administrator should charge himself with half of the net value of partnership assets. His confusion of his duties as surviving partner and as administrator may be corrected by marshaling the partnership assets. deducting the liabilities, exceptions to credits in the administration account re lating to partnership affairs are adjusted. (Estate of John Unruh, 13 Phila. 337.) To fix the amount with which the accountant should have charged himself it is first necessary to find the net value of the partnership assets. For professional services counsel charges $60.00, which is allowed. We find that the wheat in the ground, and some loose wheat and oats, which were assets of the firm and which the surviving partner went through the form of purchasing at his own sale, are worth $175.00. The net balance of the partnership assets is $2,253.71, one-half of which, or $1,126.85, is the full debt for the administration account. Thus have been met all the exceptions to the administration account except the credits-William R. Boyd, $6.05, W. Y. Haldy, for straightening family tombstone, $20.00, H. Clarence Boyd, labor Adjudication. O. C. of Lancaster Co. and material for foundation of dece February Term, 1918, No. 4. Chas E. Workman, for accountant. B. Frank Kready, for exceptions. October 17, 1918. Opinion by SMITH, P. J. H. Harvey Boyd died intestate January 16, 1918. He left the following next of kin: 1. Isabel R. Long, a sister. 2. H. Clarence Boyd, a nephew, only child of William T. Boyd, a deceased brother. 3. William A. Boyd, a nephew, only child of Samuel J. Boyd, a deceased brother. 4. Alice Boyd Griffith, a niece, only child of James P. Boyd, a deceased brother. The decedent, and H. Clarence Boyd, the administrator of his estate, had been farming as partners and owned the farm as tenants in common. H. Clarence Boyd failed to properly distinguish his dual responsibilities and confused his duties as surviving partner and administrator. By marshaling the partnership assets and dent's tombstone, $11.03, and Clerk of Orphans' Court, adjudication, $2.00, which are dismissed and those to W. F. Tollinger, meat bill, $18.24, Howard Reynolds, printing sale bills, etc., $13.00, and accountant's compensation, $86.00, which are partly sustained, respectively as follows, $6.00, $6.50 and $55.00. It will be understood that as to the balance of these credits and all the other exceptions have been substantially sustained and demonstrated by the amount fixed as partnership assets, one-half of which became the debit for the account. If this somewhat summary disposition of the questions raised is acceptable the preparation of two accounts is avoided. Any one wishing to verify the arithmetical conclusions can readily do so by carefully reviewing the notes of testimony. With a statement attached in the form of an account as to the real estate we have nothing to do. It appears that an order improvidently issued from this Court for a sale for the payment of decedent's debts on a petition alleging that there was insufficient personalty for that purpose. This was a mistake, as the administration account shows a balance of $434.60. A number of witnesses were called case and from the argument of counsel whose testimony was wholly irrelevant that on the 12th day of June, 1916, there and had no connection with the matter was an automobile parade in the Borproperly before the Court, and, there- ough of New Kensington, Westmoreland fore, they will not be allowed fees and County, Pennsylvania; that both the mileage. The awards will indicate those plaintiff in error and the defendant in who are legitimately entitled to be paid error were in that parade with automobiles; that the automobile of the plaintiff for attending Court as witnesses. in error was driven by Jack Fagale, an employee of the plaintiff in error; that the positions of these automobiles in the parade were, first the truck of the Independent Brewing Company; second, the automobile of the defendant in error; third, the automobile of Louis Steiner; and fourth, the automobile of the plaintiff in error. DISTRIBUTION. To A. S. Harkness, witness To Lory Neff, witness To Frank Eckman, witness To Israel Penrose, witness To Register of Wills, balance col- To Isabel R. Long, one-fourth.. $2.40 2.88 2.88 2.88 55.65 91.97 91.98 91.98 $434.60 It is ordered and decreed that H. Clarence Boyd, administrator, do pay the amounts, as herein directed, to those respectively entitled to the same. This report is confirmed nisi. Common Pleas–Law. Miller v. Rorabaugh. Justice of the peace-Certiorari-Action for damages for negligence. A justice of the peace has no jurisdiction of an action for damages alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence or that of his servant. The negligence complained of is that the employee of the plaintiff in error drove the automobile of the plaintiff in error with such recklessness and carelessness into the Steiner automobile, which in turn was driven into the automobile of the defendant in error, causing the automobile of the defendant in error to crash into the rear of a large truck of the Independent Brewing Company, damaging the automobile of the defendant in error. To be compensated for the damage done to his automobile, the defendant in error brought suit in an action of trespass before John B. Hagerman, a Justice of the Peace, and on Saturday, the 16th day of December, 1916, judgment was entered for the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error for the sum of $110.39, and costs of suit. On the 5th day of January, 1917, a certiorari was issued, and on this writ of error the specifications assigned why the judgment of the Justice should be set aside are as follows: "I. That the above case is founded on an action of trespass and was orig In the Court of Common Pleas of ially brought before John B. Hagerman, Westmoreland County. No. 478, Feb-a ruary Term, 1917. Certiorari. justice of the peace, that the said justice of the peace had no jurisdiction. 66 2. That the record of the docket of William M. Kahanowitz, attorney for the justice of the peace shows that the plaintiff in error. Opinion by COPELAND, P. J. We gather from the papers in this damages suffered by the defendant in error was caused by the negligence of one Jack Fagale, an employee of the plaintiff in error, and a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction in trespass against a de It is readily seen, from what we have said here and the cases we have cited, that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction and that he has no jurisdiction in an action for damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant servant. Therefore, we must sustain both specifications of error. And now, to wit, the 4th day of February, 1918, after argument and after due and careful consideration, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the specifications of error be sustained; that the judgment of the justice be reversed; the costs to be paid by the defendant in error. Lyle v. Hutchins Car Roofing Co. Applicability of Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 to injuries to minors while in prohibited employments. The provisions of the Practice Act that all actions therefore brought in trespass on the case shall be now sued in trespass, did not enlarge the jurisdiction of the justice. "It is urged that the Practice Act (May 25, 1887, P. L. 271) has enlarged the powers of magistrates, and we are referred to Duffield v. Rosenweig, Where a suit is brought by a minor for per144 Pa. 520, as sustaining this contensonal injuries sustained by him while engaged tion. That case, however, merely estab-in an employment prohibited by the Act of lishes that as regards procedure the dis- 13 May, 1915, P. L. 286, and a demurrer is tinction between trespass and case is filed challenging the right of the plaintiff to' bring such an action because the plaintiff's abolished. The Court there had juris- remedy, if any, is under the Workmen's Comdiction in either contingency and the dis- pensation Act of June 2, 1015, P. L. 736; it pute was one of form only. Here the was held, that the Legislature in providing for question is one of substance. the ingrafting of statutory provisions on contracts of hiring had in mind contracts which were valid in law, or at least, contracts, the making of which were not prohibited by express legislative enactment and that the Workclude the plaintiff in this case from this commen's Compensation Act of 1915 does not pre "We are clearly of the opinion that there is nothing in the Act of 1887 which enlarges the jurisdiction of magistrates": Printing House v. Chachkin, 14 D. R. 77. A justice has no jurisdiction of an action for damages alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence: Douglas v. Davison, 1 Phila. 516; Freedom Township v. Snowden, 5 D. R. 73; Hill v. Tionesta Township, 129 Pa. 525. A justice has no jurisdiction of an action for damages alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence or by that of his servant: Lynch v. Alderfer, 6 Montgomery 108; Hobdy v. Margotte, 4 Dack. L. Ñ. 17. Liability of the master to answer for the negligence of his servant is not, as a rule, direct but consequential: Practice in Subordinate Courts of Pennsylvania, page 507. mon-law remedy. In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. No. 121, August Term, 1917. Question of law raised by affidavit of defense. Harry C. Golden, Moorehead & Smith, for plaintiff. Dalzell, Fisher & Hawkins, WVm. S. Rial, for defendant. Opinion by COPELAND, P. J. The plaintiff, John Lyle, by his brother and next friend Rex Lyle, brings this action against the defendant, Hutchins The Child Labor Act of 13th May, 1915, P. L. 286, which was on the statute books at the time the Workmen's Compensation Act, supra, was passed, clearly prohibits the employment of a minor under fourteen years of age and forbids the employment of minors between fourteen and sixteen years of age, and forbids the employment of a minor under fourteen years of age in certain specified occupations and, in others, under certain restrictions. Under the circumstances as set forth in the plaintiff's statement of claim, as was said in Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Company, 98 Atl. Rep. 306, "it can hardly be doubted that the Legislature, in providing for the ingrafting of these statutory provisions on contracts of hiring, had in mind contracts which were valid in law, or, at least, contracts the making of which was not prohibited by express legislative enactment; for it would be entirely unreasonable to attribute to the Legislature the intention of adding terms to a contract of hiring which it had already prohibited the parties thereto from making." Car Roofing Company, a corporation, for | contracting or because such contract of personal injuries sustained while in its hire is prohibited by legislative enactemploy. He sets forth the grounds of ment. his action, in substance, as follows: That on the 22nd day of March, 1917, he was employed by the defendant company, in its plant at Hyde Park, Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, to run a power machine, for the purpose of transforming plates of tin or metal into blocks or putting edges on tin or metal plates; that, while thus engaged, he was injured by having his hand caught in the machine with the result that the amputation of two or three fingers on his right hand was necessitated; that the injury he received was the result of unlawful conduct and negligence upon the part of the defendant company in employing him contrary to the laws of this Commonwealth regulating the employment of minors generally and the laws regulating the particular kinds of work in which minors may be employed-the plaintiff at the time of the accident being fifteen years of age; that, when injured, he had been working for the defendant company for a period of two or three days; that he was employed to work for a day of ten hours in violation of law; that he was an inexperienced and youthful employce; that proper and adequate instructions and warnings, as required by law, had not been given him and that the work assigned to him was dangerous and hazardous and of the nature for which he legally could not be employed. The defendant company challenges the sufficiency of the statement of claim filed in this case on the ground that the plaintiff's remedy, if he has any at all, is under the Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736. This challenge of the sufficiency of the statement of claim upon the part of the defendant company raises this question of law: Can the plaintiff maintain his action at common law as it is now brought or does the Workmen's Compensation Act, supra, defeat his action? The plaintiff in this case was fifteen years of age, having been born December 5, 1901, and if he is to escape this provision of an implied agreement to be bound by the terms of the Act, it is because he is incapable of To us, this is a plain proposition of law that, where a minor has not attained. the age at which he can be legally employed, he cannot be regarded as an employee, and considered as having entered into an implied contract under the provisions of the Workingmen's Compensation Act, supra. It is true that Section 302 (a) says: "In the employment of minors, article three shall be presumed to apply, unless the said written notice be given by or to the parent or guardian of the minor," but we must keep in mind, in construing this Act of Assembly, that the Legislature, at the same session, enacted a law forbidding the employment of children under the age of fourteen years and forbidding the employment of children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years in certain specified occupations and permitting their employment in other occupations with certain restrictions. We also must keep in mind that this Act does not authorize or empower minors to contract. We also Now, to wit, the 26th day of January, 1918, after argument and after due consideration, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Workmen's Compensation Act does not preclude the plaintiff from a common-law action; that the affidavit of defense is insufficient, and that the defendant, within fifteen days from the date of this decree, may file a supplemental affidavit of defense, as required by law. must keep in mind the manifest purpose | disturb when our Workmen's Compenin enacting laws which relate to and sation Act was made into a law. directly affect employer and employee, and especially the purpose to safeguard children under sixteen years of age, and when we keep these things in mind we are led to the conclusion that the words, "all natural persons," as used in Article I, Section 104, of our Workmen's Compensation Act, must be construed in the light of and as affected by statutes relating to the employment of minors. It also must be kept in mind that the plaintiff's statement in this case sets forth, in paragraph 14, that he is emancipated; that his father is dead; that his mother is married to a second husband, and that he is supporting himself by his own earnings in whole or in part. The plaintiff in this case was without proper persons to whom to give written notice and he cannot be considered in the contract of hiring as impliedly agreeing to accept the provisions of Article III of this Workmen's Compensation Act. The more we study this case the more we are led irresistibly to the conclusion that the Legislature, when it passed this Workmen's Compensation Act and especially Article III, which relates to the contract of hiring and written notice to be given by either party, had in mind contracts which were valid in law and which were not prohibited by express legislative enactments. In construing this Act in reference to minors we must keep in mind legislation in relation to their employment and place a construction on it in harmony with legislation passed for the protection and betterment of minors and with that prohibiting the employment of minors. In reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff in this case has the right of a common-law action we believe we are giving effect to the kind of contracts the Legislature had in mind when it passed the Workmen's Compensation Act, to wit: valid contracts are not contracts prohibited by legislative enactments. To reach the opposite conclusion would be to tear down the protection legislation has thrown around the minor, and this protection we believe the Legislature did not intend to Legal Miscellany. Response of Chief Justice Brown at Dedica- Chief Justice J. Hay Brown said: We have listened with pleasure and interest to what has just been so well said. As this beautiful room is now consecrated to the preservation and furtherance of justice, let the devout prayer of every one within it be that righteousness here may be everlasting righteousness, and that the law as here declared may forever be the truth. A member of the American Bar, who was easily first among his fellows, declared: "Justice is the great interest of man on earth. It is the ligament which holds civilized nations and civilized beings together. Wherever her temple stands, and so long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social security, general happiness, and the improvement and progress of our race; and whoever labors on its edifice with usefulness and distinction, whoever |