litical life so eminently prosperous as the one which we have been contemplating, which rolled on in an uninterrupted tide of worldly gain and worldly honours, but was advanced only by shining and superficial talents, supported by no fixed principles, illustrated by no sacrifices to public virtue, embellished by no feats of patriotism, nor made memorable by any monuments of national utility; and which, being at length closed in the disappointment of mean, unworthy desires, ended amidst universal neglect, and left behind it no claim to the respect or the gratitude of mankind, though it may have excited the admiration or envy of the contemporary vulgar. LORD THURLOW. THE other helpmate upon whom Gibbon paints the pilot of the state as reposing, was as different a person from Lord Loughborough in all respects as can well be imagined. We refer of course to Mr. Thurlow, who filled the office of attorney-general until the year 1778, when he took the Great Seal. The remains that have reached us of his exhibitions as a speaker, whether at the bar, in parliament, or on the bench, are more scanty still than those of his colleagues; for, while he sat on the bench, the reports in Chancery were on the meagre and jejune footing of the older books; and it is only over a year or two of his presiding in the Court, that Mr. Vesey, junior's, full and authentic reports extend. There seems, however, from all accounts, to have been much less lost of Lord Thurlow, than there would have been of subsequent judges, had the old-fashioned summaries only of equity proceedings been preserved; for his way was to decide, not to reason; and, in court as well as in parliament, no man ever performed the office, whether of judging or debating, with a smaller expenditure of argument. This practice, if it saves the time of the public, gives but little satisfaction to the suitor. The judges who pursue it forget that, to satisfy the parties, or at least to give them such grounds as ought to satisfy reasonable men, is in importance only next to giving them a right judgment. Almost as important is it to satisfy the profession and the country, which awaits to gather the law, the rule of their conduct in advising or in acting, from the lips of the judge. Nor is it immaterial to the interest even of the party who gains, that the grounds should be made known of his success, especially in courts from which there lies an appeal to a higher tribunal. The consequence of Sir John Leach deciding generally with few or no reasons assigned was, that appeals were multiplied; the successful party had only obtained half a victory; and it became a remark frequent in the mouths of successive chancellors, that causes were decided below, but heard before them. It is an unaccountable mistake into which some fall, when they fancy that the more weight is attached to such mere sentences, because prefaced by no reasons; as if the judge were to declare the law, infallible like an oracle, or omnipotent like a lawgiver, and keep to himself all knowledge of the route by which he had arrived at his conclusion. The very reverse is true. With an enlightened bar and an intelligent people, the mere authority of the bench will cease to have any weight at all, if it be unaccompanied with argument and explanation. But were it otherwise, the reason would fail, and signally fail; for the only increase of weight derived from the practice would be that to which the judgment had no claim, namely, the outward semblance to the ignorant multitude of a determination more clear and positive than really existed. Add to all this, that no security whatever can be afforded for the mind of the judge having been directed to the different parts of each case, and his attention having been held awake to the whole of the discussions at the bar, still less in equity proceedings of his having read the affidavits and other documentary evidence, unless he states explicitly the view which he takes of the various matters, whether of law or of fact, that have been brought before him. With the exception of Sir John Leach, Lord Thurlow is the last judge who adopted the very bad practice of unreasoned decisions. But his habit of cavilling at the reasons of the common law courts, when a case was sent to them for an opinion, a habit largely followed |