Hobbs agt. Wetherwax. the learned county judge held that the agreement to work the plaintiff's premises on shares being by parol, was but a revocable license in so far as it related to the growing grass. I am not aware that the precise question here. presented has ever been decided in this court. It is a question of the gravest importance, for as all well know, a great proportion of the agreements made under which the lands throughout the state are worked on shares, rest in parol. If these agreements are void as to growing grass, they are wholly void when they embrace, as they commonly do, meadow to be mowed, or the right to cut standing timber for fuel-for it is a settled principle of law, that if a part of a contract be void under the statute of frauds, the whole is void. (De Beerski agt. Paige, 36 N. Y., 537; see also cases cited on page 339). The question then is, may the landlord at the beginning of the harvest, after the crops are all put in and the labor of cultivation ended, revoke and treat the agreement void; or may the tenant revoke at pleasure when he finds it for his interest so to do? If it be so, the statute of frauds, which sanctions the proceeding and protects the party, becomes an instrumeut of wrong and oppression. It may be said that if the landlord revoke, the tenant may recover for his services on a quantum meruit. But suppose the season has been propitious and his share of the crops far exceeds his services in value, will a recovery for work, labor and services, reduced perhaps by a set off for house rent, meet the justice of the case? Besides, is it nothing to be thrown out of employment, and to have his family thrust out of doors? For these injuries he could have no redress, inasmuch as he could not resort to the void agreement for the purpose of determining the damages. (Erben agt. Lorillard, 19 N. Y., 299). In this case it was held that when the agreement is void, it furnishes no evidence on which to base a rule of damages, for a recovery between the parties. The statute of frauds was not intended to work injustice, and to avoid Hobbs agt. Wetherwax. such result, it has long been a settled principle, that in equity, part performance takes the parol agreement out of its operation. When a contract void because not in writing, has been so far performed that it would be a fraud npon the party, or operate as a great hardship upon him, unless carried out, it will be enforced, notwitstanding the statute. (Malins agt. Brown, 4 Com., 403; Bennett agt. Abrams, 41 Barb., 619; Ryan agt. Dox, 34 N. Y., 307; Lowry agt. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch., 407; Rathbone agt. Rathbone, 6 Barb., 98; Story's Eq., § 759; Willard's Eq., 283-4-5). Judge WILLARD says: that the principle of this class of cases is, that if one of the contracting parties induces the other so to act, that if the contract be abandoned he cannot be restored to his former position, the contract must be considered as perfected in equity, and a refusal to complete it at law is in the nature of a fraud. In another case, it is said that a party who has permitted another to perform acts on the faith of an agreement, shall not insist that the agreement is bad, and that he is entitled to treat those acts as if it never had existed. The case at bar falls directly within the principle established by the authorities above. cited. The plaintiff was not at liberty to retain the advantages of the agreement and a the same time urge its invalidity. The plaintiff then could not revoke. The agreement was to a very considerable extent performed-so far executed that the rights of the parties could not be preserved unless carried out according to the original intention. The county court therefore, erred in holding that the agreement between the parties proved in this case, operated as a revocable license, merely in so far as it had application to the growing grass. The part performance was too available to the defendant, as a defense in the action commenced in the justice's court. He was sued in trespass, and his defense was the agreement with the plaintiff, authorizing and justifying the acts complained of. If valid, the agreement afforded full protection. Hobbs agt. Wetherwax. Having been so far executed as to entitle the defendant to have it carried out, it was valid and just as effectually a protection for all acts done under it, as if it had been in writing, subscribed by the parties. The judgment must be reversed and a new trial had in the county court, with costs to abide the event. I do not wish to be understood as intimating the opinion that a letting of a farm by parol for a year, to be worked on shares, is within the statute of frauds, and void. On the contrary, I am inclined to a different opinion. But all the members of the court are not entirely satisfied on that point, and inasmuch as the case may rest on the ground above considered, it becomes unnecessary to decide the question last suggested. Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to abide the event. In re Kingon. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. IN RE JAMES KINGON. Where solicitor of bankrupt moved that the assignee be ordered to amend his return in a certain respect, but nothing appeared to show wherein such amendment was proper or necessary, or what interest of the bankrupt would be effected, Held-The assignee, on this certificate not showing the facts, is not required to make the amendment. Southern District of New York, February, 1869. THE above entitled cause is now pending before me. That it appears by the schedules annexed to the petition of the above named petitioner for adjudication of bankruptcy and the amendments of the same, that the assets consist of a small amount of money, a few notes, and a large number of book accounts, amounting in the aggregate to about $17,000. There is no proof before me that any part of either of the notes or book accounts are collectable. The assignee, Stephen V. White made his return on the 10th day of November, 1869, under oath, after the return of the order to show cause, why the said bankrupt should not be discharged, the material part of which is as follows, to wit: "That he, said assignee, as assignee of the estate and effects of said bankrupt, has received on account of the said estate the sum of thirty dollars and fifty cents in money, mentioned in the amended schedules of said bankrupt, that he has paid out for account of said estate the sum of nine dollars and fifty cents for the publication of the notice of his appointment as such assignee, which sum has been refunded to him by said bankrupt; that he has also received from said bankrupt the sum of twenty-five dollars on account of his fees as such assignee; that he has also received a portion of In re Kingon. the promissory notes mentioned in the amended schedules. of said bankrupt, but that all of said notes are as deponent is informed and believes, barred by the statute of limita tions, and are by said bankrupt pronounced worthless, and deponent believes them to be of no value whatever; and that deponent as such assignee has received no other assets whatever on account of said estate. wit: The solicitor for the bankrupt upon petition and the proceedings and proofs in this cause, moves for an order requiring said assignee to amend his return as follows, to "And that there has also come to my hands certain open accounts due to the bankrupt as member of the firm of Kingon and Elmore, as are set forth in schedule B 3 of amended schedules, which open accounts amount in the aggregate to $17,708.67. I have made no effort to collect the same or any of them, and have no knowledge that they can or cannot be collected." The decision of this motion involves the questions of the rights, powers and duties of an assignee, and the power of the courts over them and their proceedings. It is to be regretted that the framers of the bankrupt law did not, in defining the duties of the assignee, more fully state the power and duty of the court to control his action, and to compel his obedience to its orders, but the law and practice of the courts give sufficient power to the courts for all practical purposes to compel the assignee to obey its orders. In England, the courts hold an assignee to be a person appointed by the court during the pendency of a suit, to do and perform certain acts under the direction and order of the court, or under the provisions of some statutory enactment. (Wyatt's Prac. Reg., 355). He is an officer of the court. (Matter of Burke, B. and B., 74,) and cannot be disturbed by any body without leave of the court. (Fairfield agt. Weston, 2 S. & S,. 98; Bryan agt. Cormack, 1 Cox 422; Wardel agt. Loyd, 2 Molloy, 388; Hutchinson agt |