Fox agt. Dunckel. existed which authorized the summary confiscation of private property as a punishment for a mere trespass. Now, the question arises, whether the amendment of the act of 1867, constitutionally authorizes the taking and seizure of private property for a mere private trespass. This question is decided in the affirmative by the foregoing able opinion of Judge POTTER, on the ground, that the act furnishes due process and proceedings, and confers jurisdiction on the court for that purpose. But it will be seen that the act authorizes the seizure of the property without any process whatever, except the authority of the act, which like any other act of the legislature, cannot be considered of itself, due process of law. Is not the owner of the property deprived of it, within the meaning of the constitution, just as much where it is seized and held for twenty-four hours, as he is where it is held for any longer time? It is the seizure and the taking of the property which we think violates the constitution; the owner is then effectually deprived of it. If the summons and complaint by and before the justice authorized by the act, were required to be issued and served before the seizure and taking of the property, it would seem to give some semblance of authority for taking it; although we are not aware of any legal method of taking private property in satisfaction of damages for a private trespass, except by judgment and execution; any other proceeding to accomplish such a result, would seem to be "undue process of law." We therefore, cannot see why, the amendment of this act is not as directly in the teeth of the constitution, as was the original act of 1862, when applied to a private trespass. REP. Mackintosh agt. Fatman. SUPREME COURT. WILLIAM H. MACKINTOSH and others agt. JOSEPH FATMAN, survivor of SAMUEL MYERS, deceased. Where on the dissolution of a copartnership, the retiring partners take a bond of indemnity of the remaining partner, with a surety, to pay all the partnership debts, &c, the landlord of the premises can not sustain an action on the bond for rent due from the partnership, or from the remaining partner. There is no privity of contract between the parties to the action. Special Term, October 1869. THE complaint alleges that Myers, Canfield & Son, as copartners, leased certain premises of plaintiffs for a term of years. The lease contained covenants on the part of the tenants to pay the rent. The premises were occupied by the partners. During the term, Myers, Canfield & Son dissolved. The Canfields sold out their interest in the partnership property and effects to Myers, and Myers entered into an agreement with the Canfields to pay and discharge the partnership debts and obligations. At the time of making this agreement, the defendant, Fatman, jointly with Myers, executed a bond to the Canfields, (the retiring partners,) in the penal sum of fifty thousand dollars, with a condition that if the said Myers should well and truly assume and pay all the debts and liabilities of the said firm of Myers, Canfield & Son, and save harmless the Canfields from and against the same, the obligation was to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue. The complaint alleges that after the making of the bond, rent for the premises fell due to the plaintiffs, to the amount of $3,375. Mackintosh agt. Fatman. That subsequent to the making of the bond, Myers died. The action is brought on this bond by the plaintiffs, the landlord, against the defendant, Fatman, as the surviving obligor thereof, for the rent due and unpaid. The defendant demurred to the complaint, and alleged as ground of demurrer that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. CHARLES H. SMITH, for plaintiff. HOOPER C. VAN VORST, for defendant. SUTHERLAND, J. Assuming that the rent is a debt or liability of the firm of Myers, Canfield & Co., I think that the complaint does not show a right in the plaintiffs to bring an action on the bond, and therefore, that it does not show a cause of action by the plaintiffs against the defendant. The plaintiffs were not parties to the bond, and there is no privity of contract between them and the obligors, or the surviving obligor. The case made by the complaint is not the case of A. promising B. to pay C. (a named, specified third party,) a eertain specified sum of money. There must be judgment for the defendant on the demurrer, with costs. Veazie Bank agt. Fenno. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY OF THE Veazie Bank agt. JEREMIAH FENNO, collector. “Every national banking association, state bank, or state banking association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of notes of any person, state bank, or state banking institution, used for circulation, and paid out by them, after the 1st day of August, 1866; and such tax shall be assessed and paid in such manner as shall be prescribed by the commissioner of internal revenue." (Act of Congress, July 1st, 1866; 14 U. S. St., 146.) This law is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, as being a direct tax, which requires to be apportioned among the states agreeable to the constitution; because it is not a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution. Nor is it unconstitutional as impairing a franchise granted by the state; for it is not the franchise of the banks which is sought to be taxed, but the property created or contents made and issued by them. The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to the people, by whom its members are elected; so that if a particular tax bears heavily upon a corporation, or a class of corporations, it cannot, therefore, be pronounced contrary to the constitution.* (NELSON and DAVIS, Justices, dissented.) Chief Justice CHASE delivered the following opinion: THE necessity of adequate provision for the financial exigencies created by the late rebellion suggested to the administrative and legislative departments of the government, important changes in the systems of currency and taxation which had hitherto prevailed. These changes, Suppose the tax imposed by congress upon the circulation of state banks was confessedly so excessive as to close them up and render their franchises entirely nugatory, would not such a tax be clearly unconstitutional, as destroying a franchise granted by the state? The object for which the franchise was granted, being taxed to death, the franchise itself must fall; consequently if it is unconstitutional to tax the franchise of a state bank directly and in terms, and thus fatally impair it, the same result must follow by taxing its circulation out of existence. Then the question in this case would be, whether the tax of ten per centum on their circulation is sufficient effectually to produce that effect; and if not, then the question arises, does not this tax indirectly impair the franchise to a certain extent, contrary to the constitution.-REP. Veazie Bank agt. Fenno. more or less distinctly shown in administrative recommendations, took form and substance in legislative acts. We have now to consider, within a limited range, those which relate to circulating notes and taxation of circulation. At the beginning of the rebellion, the circulating medium consisted almost entirely of bank notes issued by numerous independent corporations, variously organized under state legislation, of various degrees of credit, and very unequal resources, administered often with great-and not unfrequently with little-skill, prudence and integrity. The acts of congress then in force prohibiting the receipt or disbursement, in the transactions of the national government, of anything except gold and silver, and the laws of the state requiring the redemption of bank notes in coin on demand, prevented the disappearance of gold and silver from circulation. There was then no authorized national currency except coin, and no national taxation was imposed in any form on the state bank circulation. The first act authorizing the emission of notes by the treasury department for circulation was that of July 17, 1861 (12, U. S. St., 259). The notes issued under this act were treasury notes, payable on demand in coin. The amount authorized by it was $50,000,000, and was increased by the act of February 12, 1862 (12, U. S. St., 338) to $60,000,000. On the 31st of December, 1861, the state banks suspended specie payment. Until this time the expenses of the war had been paid in coin or in the demand. notes just referred to, and for some time afterwards they continued to be paid in these notes, which, if not redeemed in coin, were received as coin in the payment of duties. Subsequently, on the 25th of February, 1862 (12, U. S. St., 341), a new policy became necessary, in consequence of the suspension and the condition of the country, and was adopted. The notes hitherto issued, as has just been stated, were called treasury notes, and were payable on demand in coin. The act now passed authorized the issue of bills for |