4 Wheat., 416 (§§ 380-398, supra). The power to modify at discretion the remedial part of a contract is the same thing.

1668. Imprisonment for debt may be abolished even for past debts.

But it is said that imprisonment for debt may be abolished in all cases, and that the time prescribed by a statute of limitations may be abridged. Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. Cooper's Justinian, 658; 12 Tables, Tab. 3. It has descended with the stream of time. It is a punishment rather than a remedy. It is right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and dooms him, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud, it is the opposite of a remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when such a blot is removed from the statute-book. But upon the power of a state, even in this class of cases, see the strong dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Washington, in Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat., 370.

§ 1669. Statutes of limitation do not impair the obligation of contracts. Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. They are necessary to the welfare of society. The lapse of time constantly carries with it the means of proof. The public as well as individuals are interested in the principle upon which they proceed. They do not impair the remedy, but only require its application within the time specified. If the period limited be unreasonably short, and designed to defeat the remedy upon pre-existing contracts, which was part of their obligation, we should pronounce the statute void. Otherwise, we should abdicate the performance of one of our most important duties. The obligation of a contract cannot be substantially impaired in any way by a state law. This restriction is beneficial to those whom it restrains, as well as to others. No community can have any higher public interest than in the faithful performance of contracts and the honest administration of justice. The inhibition of the constitution is wholly prospective. The states may legislate as to contracts thereafter made, as they may see fit. It is only those in existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect. In Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How., 311 (§§ 1650-55, supra), the subject of exemptions was touched upon, but not discussed. There a mortgage had been executed in Illinois. Subsequently, the legislature passed a law giving the mortgagor a year to redeem after sale under a decree, and requiring the land to be appraised, and not to be sold for less than two-thirds of the appraised value. The law was held to be void in both particulars as to pre-existing contracts. What is said as to exemptions is entirely obiter; but, coming from so high a source, it is entitled to the most respectful consideration. The court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taney, said: A state "may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered in every civilized community as properly belonging to the remedy, to be executed or not by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy and humanity." He quotes with approbation the passage which we have quoted from Green v. Biddle. To guard against possible misconstruction, he is careful to say further: "Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But, if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy, or directly on the contract itself. In either case, it is prohibited by the constitu

tion." The learned chief justice seems to have had in his mind the maxim "de minimis," etc. Upon no other ground can any exemption be justified. "Policy and humanity" are dangerous guides in the discussion of a legal proposition. He who follows them far is apt to bring back the means of error and delusion. The prohibition contains no qualification, and we have no judicial authority to interpolate any. Our duty is simply to execute it.

Where the facts are undisputed, it is always the duty of the court to pronounce the legal result. Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall., 604. Here there is no question of legislative discretion involved. With the constitutional prohibition, even as expounded by the late chief justice, before us on one hand, and on the other the state constitution of 1868, and the laws passed to carry out its provisions, we cannot hesitate to hold that both the latter do seriously impair the obligation of the several contracts here in question. We say, as was said in Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall., 622 (§§ 1659-63, supra), that no one can cast his eyes upon the new exemptions thus created without being at once struck with their excessive character, and hence their fatal magnitude. The claim for the retrospective efficacy of the constitution or the laws cannot be supported. Their validity as to contracts subsequently made admits of no doubt. Bronson v. Kinzie, supra.

§ 1670. The history of the contract clause.

The history of the national constitution throws a strong light upon this subject. Between the close of the war of the Revolution and the adoption of that instrument, unprecedented pecuniary distress existed throughout the country. "The discontents and uneasiness, arising in a great measure from the embarrassment in which a great number of individuals were involved, continued to become more extensive. At length, two great parties were formed in every state, which were distinctly marked, and which pursued distinct objects with systematic arrangement." 5 Marshall's Life of Washington, 85. One party sought to maintain the inviolability of contracts, the other to impair or destroy them. "The emission of paper money, the delay of legal proceedings, and the suspension of the collection of taxes, were the fruits of the rule of the latter, wherever they were completely dominant." Id., 86. "The system called justice was, in some of the states, iniquity reduced to elementary principles." "In some of the states, creditors were treated as outlaws. Bankrupts were armed with legal authority to be persecutors, and, by the shock of all confidence, society was shaken to its foundations." Fisher Ames' Works (ed. of 1809), 120. "Evidences of acknowledged claims on the public would not command in the market more than one-fifth of their nominal value. The bonds of solvent men, payable at no very distant day, could not be negotiated but at a discount of thirty, forty or fifty per cent. per annum. Landed property would rarely command any price; and sales of the most common articles for ready money could only be made at enormous and ruinous depreciation. State legislatures, in too many instances, yielded to the necessities of their constituents and passed laws by which creditors were compelled to wait for the payment of their just demands, on the tender of security, or to take property at a valuation, or paper money falsely purporting to be the representative of specie." 3 Ramsey's Hist. U. S., 77. The effects of these laws interfering between debtors and creditors were extensive. They destroyed public credit and confidence between man and man, injured the morals of the people, and in many instances insured and aggravated the ruin of the unfortunate debtors for

whose temporary relief they were brought forward." 2 Ramsey's Hist. South Carolina, 429.

Besides the large issues of continental money, nearly all the states issued their own bills of credit. In many instances the amount was very large. Phillips' Historical Sketches of American Paper Currency, 2d Series, 29. The depreciation of both became enormous. Only one per cent. of the "continental money" was assumed by the new government. Nothing more was ever paid upon it. Id., 194; Act of August 4, 1790, sec. 4 (1 Stat., 140). It is needless to trace the history of the emissions by the states. The treaty of peace with Great Britain declared that "the creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full amount in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." The British minister complained earnestly to the American secretary of state of violations of this guaranty. Twenty-two instances of laws in conflict with it in different states were specifically named. 1 Amer. State Papers, pp. 195, 196, 199 and 237. In South Carolina, "laws were passed in which property of every kind was made a legal tender in payment of debts, although payable according to contract in gold and silver. Other laws installed the debt, so that of sums already due only a third, and afterwards only a fifth, was securable in law." 2 Ramsey's Hist. S. C., 429. Many other states passed laws of a similar character. The obligation of the contract was as often invaded after judgment as before. The attacks were quite as common and effective in one way as in the other. To meet these evils in their various phases, the national constitution declared that "no state should emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." All these provisions grew out of previous abuses. 2 Curtis' Hist. of the Const., 366. See, also, The Federalist, Nos. 7 and 44. In the number last mentioned, Mr. Madison said that such laws were not only forbidden by the constitution, but were "contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation."

The treatment of the malady was severe, but the cure was complete. "No sooner did the new government begin its auspicious course than order seemed to arise out of confusion. Commerce and industry awoke, and were cheerful at their labors, for credit and confidence awoke with them. Every where was the appearance of prosperity, and the only fear was that its progress was too rapid to consist with the purity and simplicity of ancient manners." Fisher Ames' Works (ed. of 1809), 122. "Public credit was reanimated. The owners of property and holders of money freely parted with both, well knowing that no future law could impair the obligation of the contract." 2 Ramsey's History of South Carolina, 433.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in Bronson v. Kinzie, supra, speaking of the protection of the remedy, said: "It is this protection which the clause of the constitution now in question mainly intended to secure." The point decided in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518 (§§ 2099-2117, infra), had not, it is believed, when the constitution was adopted, occurred to any one. There is no trace of it in the Federalist, nor in any other contemporaneous publication. It was first made and judicially decided under the constitution in that Its novelty was admitted by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, but it was met and conclusively answered in his opinion.

§ 1671. The remedy for a breach of a contract is a part of its obligation, and a law or constitutional provision which abridges the remedy impairs the obligation. We think the views we have expressed carry out the intent of contracts and the intent of the constitution. The obligation of the former is placed under the safeguard of the latter. No state can evade it; and congress is incompetent to authorize such invasion. Its position is impregnable, and will be so while the organic law of the nation remains as it is. The trust touching the subject with which this court is charged is one of magnitude and delicacy. We must always be careful to see that there is neither non-feasance nor misfeasance on our part.

The importance of the point involved in this controversy induces us to restate succinctly the conclusions at which we have arrived, and which will be the ground of our judgment. The remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is made and is to be performed is a part of its obligation, and any subsequent law of the state which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden by the constitution, and is, therefore, void.

The judgment of the supreme court of North Carolina will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to proceed in conformity to this opinion; and it is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented.

§ 1672. In general.-The prohibition upon the states passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts was contemplated merely to embrace contracts respecting property, or some object of value, and conferring rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518 (§§ 2099–2117).

§ 1673. A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do, or not to do, a particular thing. The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is the obligation of his contract. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat., 122 (§§ 1937–39).

§ 1674. Obligation defined.— The obligation of a contract, in the constitutional sense, is the means provided by law by which it can be enforced,― by which the parties can be obliged to perform it. Whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of these means impairs the obligation. If it tend to postpone or retard the enforcement of the contract, the obligation of the latter is to that extent weakened. Louisiana v. New Orleans,* 12 Otto, 203. See § 1615. $1675. The obligation of a contract, in the sense in which those words are used in the constitution, is that duty of performance which is recognized and enforced by the laws. This includes the remedy, and if the law is so changed that the means of legally enforcing this duty are materially impaired, the obligation of the contract no longer remains the same, and the law making the change is unconstitutional. Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How., 319 (CORPORATIONS, §§ 1316–29); Louisiana v. New Orleans,* 12 Otto, 203; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 213 (§§ 1940–2003).

$1676. Impairing the remedy. A creditor by contract has a vested right to the remedies for the recovery of the debt which existed at law when the contract was made, and the state legislature cannot take them away without impairing the obligation of the contract, though it may modify them, and even substitute others, if a sufficient remedy be left, or another sufficient one be provided. The law is in effect a part of the contract. So where a new remedy is given by law after a contract has been made, it cannot be taken away if the creditor has acquired vested rights thereunder, and the repeal of the statute cannot affect his rights. Memphis v. United States, 7 Otto, 295 $ 1888-94); Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 213 (1940-2003); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall., 535 (§§ 1877-82). See § 1614, 1615, 1622, 1629.

§ 1677. The act of the legislature of Missouri of March 8, 1879, known as the "Cottey Act," if it applies to judgments on county aid bonds issued prior to its passage, is in conflict with the clause of the constitution of the United States forbidding states to pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract, for the reason that it makes the remedy of the holder of such bonds less certain and direct. United States v. Lincoln County, 5 Dill., 204.

§ 1678. Any change in the remedy which practically cuts off a portion of the cause of action, or renders the contract of less available worth, is as much within the constitutional

inhibition against the passage by a state of a law impairing the obligation of a contract, as a law which strikes directly at the contract itself. The remedy existing at the time the contract is made is a part of the obligation of the contract, as entering into the contemplation of the parties at the time, and it should be no more in the power of the legislature to impair that in such a way as to render the contract of less value, than it is to impair the contract itself. Burton v. Town of Koshkonong, 4 Fed. R., 377.

§ 1679. A law enabling banks to sue upon paper made payable to their cashiers merely affects the remedy, and in no wise impairs the obligation of the contract contained in promissory notes executed prior to its passage. Crawford v. Branch Bank of Mobile,* 7 How., 279.

§ 1680. Power of congress. -The inhibition of the constitution against the passage of a law impairing the obligation of a contract applies to the states and not to the general government. Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McL., 165; Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C., 322; Buckner v. Street, 1 Dill., 249; Fowler v. Dillon, 1 Hughes, 236; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457. In the last case cited, FIELD, J. (at page 662), dissents, holding that congress cannot impair the obligation of contracts, in the exercise of an implied power. And see his dissenting opinion in the Sinking Fund Cases, as well as those of Justices STRONG and BRADLEY, 9 Otto, 700 (CORPORATIONS, § 1624-69). Also, Territory of Kansas v. Reyburn, McCahon, 141.

§ 1681. Statutes of limitation.- A statute which repeals the provision of the statute of limitations relating to the absence of the defendant from the state, and thereby takes from the plaintiff all remedy upon his contract, without affording him any, even the shortest, time in which to bring suit after the return of the defendant to the state, is unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of the contract. Johnson v. Bond,* Hemp., 533.

§ 1682. Statutes of limitation affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional if a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect. Whether the time limited is reasonable or not is primarily a question for the legislature, and the courts cannot overrule the decision of the legislature unless a palpable error has been committed. In judging of the reasonableness of the time, the surrounding circumstances must be considered, for what is reasonable in a particular case depends upon its particular facts. Terry v. Anderson, 5 Otto, 632; Samples v. The Bank, 1 Woods, 523; Koshkonong v. Burton, 14 Otto, 674; Barker v. Jackson, 1 Paine, 559.

§ 1683. The time fixed by a state statute within which actions must be brought upon causes of action accruing before the passage of the act is not conclusive, but is subject to be reviewed by the courts, and if they deem it unreasonably short, it is their duty to disregard such statute as being in violation of the constitutional inhibition against passing laws violating the obligation of contracts. A statute prescribing an unreasonably short time is not a statute of limitation, but an unlawful destruction of a right, whatever it may purport to be by its terms. That the legislature are the sole judges of what is a reasonable time is inferentially conceding to them the power of impairing, and even destroying, the obligation of a contract. Pereles v. City of Watertown, 6 Biss., 84.

§ 1684. Retroactive laws.- A retroactive statute may be constitutional, provided it is remedial in its nature, and does not impair the obligation of contracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and goes only to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. In re Kirkland,* 12 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.), 302; Thompson v. Phillips, Bald., 284; Peay v. Schenck, 1 Woolw., 175; Albee v. May, 2 Paine, 78; Griffing v. Gibb, McAl., 220; Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dill., 267; Blount v. Windley, 5 Otto, 180 (MCLEAN, J., dissenting, 6 McL., 441); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet., 380 (§§ 1630-35); Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet., 88 (§ 1849-51); Curtiss v. Whitney, 13 Wall., 68 (§ 1821). See sub-title V, supra; also §§ 20, 638.

§ 1685. Courts should give changes of judicial construction in statutes the same effect, in their operation on contracts and existing contract rights, that they would give to a legislative enactment; that is to say, make them prospective, but not retrospective. After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is to all intents and purposes the same in its effects on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment. Douglass v. County of Pike, 11 Otto, 686; In re Dunham.* 9 Phil., 471.

§ 1686. State decisions.— The construction given by the courts of the states to state legislation and state constitutions is not conclusive upon the supreme court of the United States when it is called upon to interpret the contracts of states, though they may have been made in the forms of law, or by the instrumentality of a state's authorized functionaries, in conformity with state legislation. It may revise the judgment of the supreme court of a state, whenever such court shall adjudge that not to be a contract which has been alleged, in the forms of legal proceedings, by a litigant, to be one, within the meaning of the constitutional