the taking of the gravel was not an "incident" to the construction of the
road, and that defendant should be enjoined. Robert v. Sadler, N. Y., 498.
3. Traveled part — center -- obstruction.] Where the conformation of the
ground clearly indicates that the center of a public road is not the traveled
route, that is sufficient notice to one driving over it; but in ordinary cases,
the center of a public street passing between the open lots of a populous town,
in the usual course of travel, and in the night-time, or when the route is
obscured by snow, may be taken as the traveled route, and if the municipal
officers cause an obstruction to be placed on that part of the highway, it is
their duty to give some appropriate notice of the fact. Borough of Carlisle v.
Brisbane, Penn., 141.

INJUNCTION.

1. To enjoin collection of tax.] An injunction to restrain the levy and col-
lection of a tax upon what the complainant alleges is only an interest in a
body of water is not within the equity jurisdiction of the court. Flax Pond
Water Co. v. City of Lynn, Mass., 745.

2. Restraining libel.] It is not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity to
restrain, by injunction, representations as to the character and standing of
the plaintiff, or as to his property, although such representations may be false,
if there is no breach of trust or of contract involved. Raymond v. Russell,
Mass., 382.

3. Obstructing alley.] Equity will enjoin a party from erecting and maintain-
ing an obstruction in an alley which destroys the complainant's right of way
therein, and materially decreases the value of his property. The fact that the
complainant himself had previously encroached upon the alley will not estop
him from obtaining equitable relief against the defendant on account of his
trespass. Schaidt v. Blaul, Md., 452.

4. Public nuisance -- right of private party to enjoin.] An injunction
cannot be granted at the instance of a private party to compel the removal of
a building from a public street upon the ground that it was unlawfully placed
there by the defendant, and was a nuisance. Pavonia Land Association v.
Temfer, N. J., 817.

5. Suspending decree of foreclosure

damages.] In an action on an
injunction bond executed by a mortgagor on the granting of an injunction
suspending the operation of a decree of foreclosure, the plaintiff mortgagee
cannot recover for timber sold from the premises or for the rental value of the
premises during the pendency of the injunction and before the decree becomes
absolute, when there is no redemption, and the value of the security is greater
than the mortgage debt. Hill v. Hill, Vt., 62.
See DAMAGES, 57.

INSOLVENCY.

--

1. Balance due on mortgage proof of] The mortgagee of a second mort-
gage, who has been paid a part of the mortgage debt out of a surplus arising
on a foreclosure sale under the first mortgage, may prove the balance due on
his mortgage before the insolvency court in proceedings in insolvency against
the mortgagor.
Washburn v. Tisdale, Mass., 549.

2. Co-defendants.] The fact that the plaintiffs had proved their claim, for
which the action was brought on the proceedings in insolvency against the
estate of one of the defendants, and that, upon the trial, no liability was
established against such defendant, will not affect the plaintiffs' right to pro-
ceed against the other defendants. Gardner v. Peaslee, Mass., 551.
3. Preference of wage claim waiver.] A firm engaged in the construction
of railway cars, instead of paying their employees their wages in cash, issued
to them certificates of indebtedness with a blank attached, which was in the
form of an assignment, the object being to enable the employee to transfer
his claim to merchants and others to whom he might be individually indebted.
Parties to whom certificates were so issued assigned them to the firm who
lifted them, giving in their stead negotiable notes at sixty or ninety days,
which were renewed with discount paid; later, the firm became insolvent.
Held, that if any preference of payment in favor of the assigned wage claims

existed under the act of 1872, it had been waived. Appeal of Montgomery,
Penn., 402.

4. Partnership-affidavit.] Where an application is made for the benefit of
the insolvent law in behalf of a partnership, the affidavits should be made
and the interrogatories answered by all the members of the firm. Proceedings
in insolvency on behalf of a firm, upon the application of only one of its mem-
bers, are ineffectual to bind the firm property. This is so notwithstanding
the other partner has absconded. Second National Bank of Balt. v. Willing,
Md., 714.

5. Property pledged for part of debt-sale-residue.] In proceedings
under the insolvent law, when a creditor has a pledge of property of the
debtor for securing the debt, the property shall, if the creditor requires it, be
sold and the proceeds applied toward the payment of the debt, and the cred-
itor may prove for the residue, or he may release and deliver up the property
to the assignee, and prove for the whole debt. Nichols v. Smith, Mass., 748.
6. Proving whole debt - failure to disclose security.] When a creditor
who holds security which comes within the terms of the statute, inadvertently
by mistake, either of law or fact, proves his whole debt without disclosing
his security, and before he has derived any advantage, or the creditors have
suffered any detriment from his acts, takes proper measures to waive and
abandon his proof, and to pursue his rights as a secured creditor, according
to law, he does not thereby waive or forfeit his security, and the unsecured
creditors do not thereby acquire any equitable rights to it which can be
enforced by the assignee. Id.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 527.

INSURANCE.

1. Forfeiture - non-payment of premium waiver.] B. was the agent
of an insurance company, for the purpose of securing risks, receiving pre-
miums, etc.; in his dealings with the company he was made its personal
debtor for premiums on all policies issued through him; he effected an insur-
ance upon a building of D., which insurance was at the expiration of the
period for which it was to run renewed; D. did not, upon the renewal, pay'
the premium; some days after the issuing of the renewed policy, the property
insured was burned; the following day D. paid over the premium for the
renewal to B., who forwarded it to the company, who refused to receive it
because of the alleged failure to comply with the following condition in the
policy issued. If the assured "shall have neglected to pay the premium
then, and in every such case, the policy shall be null and void.'
Held, that the mutual understanding between the parties that a short credit
would be given by the company to B., and by him to D., justified a recovery
in an action upon the policy. Lebanon Mutual Insurance Co. v. Humes,
Penn., 20.

2. Fire increase of risk.] The court cannot assume as matter of fact that
changing the machinery of a grist-mill from the burr process to the roller
process is such an alteration as will increase the risk. Planters' Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Rowland, Md., 456.

3.

4.

5.

indorsement on policy. An indorsement on the back of a policy may
be regarded as a part of the contract, provided it is referred to in the policy
as constituting a part of it. If, however, there be no reference whatever to it
in the policy, nothing to show that the parties meant it to be a part of the
contract, it will be regarded merely as the act of the insurer, and not, there-
fore, binding on the insured. Id.

double insurance.] To constitute a double insurance there must be
two or more policies insuring the same property.

Id.

consignor and consignee-contribution.] A transportation com-
pany may insure the goods in its possession for transportation in its own
name for account of whom it may concern, and when it is apparent from the
amount of the insurance that the company in procuring it contemplated the
interest of the owners, the insurance in case of loss, after paying the freight
charges, will inure to the benefit of the owners. Upon the trial of an action

upon a policy issued to the transportation company, which contains the usual
clause for contribution, the court will take into account and construe any
policy held by the owners upon the goods at the time of the loss, to deter-
mine their liability, notwithstanding the companies issuing the policies to the
owners are not parties to the action. Fire Ins. Asso. of England v. Merchants',
etc., Transportation Co., Md., 906.

6. Speculative - insurance interest.] Speculative life insurance is contrary
to public policy. On entering into an agreement for the maintenance of
another, and for his own protection taking an insurance on the life of the per-
son to be maintained, is limited as to his insurable interest in the life of the
insured, to the amount he may have paid or advanced in fufillment of his con-
tract, and to the money he may have expended in taking out and maintain-
ing the policy. Siegrist v. Schmoltz, Penn., 637.

7. Life-assessments-payment of death losses.] The statute of 1880,
chapter 196, relating to assessments by beneficiary life insurance associations,
does not contemplate that death losses shall be paid out of the accumulated
or reserve fund of the association as they occur, although the accumulated
fund may be drawn upon for that purpose if the officers think proper. But
the fact that there is sufficient money in the reserve fund to meet losses as
they occur does not preclude the association from laying an assessment upon
its members. Crossman v. Mass. Benefit Asso., Mass., 570.
8. Failure to pay assessment

waiver.] The representatives of the
deceased, who just before his death had forfeited his insurance by failure to
pay an assessment when due, are not helped by the fact that the association
had previously, and presumably for sufficient cause, waived similar defaults
on the part of the assured. Id.

9. Life invalid designation.] The designation by the insured, in a mutual
relief association, that the money should go to his estate is invalid under
Pub. Stats., chap. 115, § 8. Daniels v. Pratt, Mass., 523.

10. Paid to executor - distribution.] Money paid to the executor by an
insurance association, which, by the terms of the statute, is limited to rela-
tives of the deceased, and there being no valid disposition of the same by
will, is to be distributed by the executors according to the statute of distribu-
tions. Id.

11. Life policy-assignment.] The assignment by a father of a policy of
insurance, which is made payable to his children, as collateral security for a
loan to him, is invalid, and does not affect a subsequent assignment of the
same by the children. Ferdon v. Canfield, N. Y., 318.

INTEREST.

When executor chargeable with.] An executor is chargeable with only sim-
ple interest, although he mingled and loaned the funds of the estate with his
own, when he did so in good faith, disclosing all the profits, and without
fault or want of prudence, suffered some losses, but claimed no deduction
therefor and nothing for his services, when such interest exceeds what he
actually received on the funds, and the funds had not been in business, trade
or speculation. Perkins v. Hollister, Vt., 194.

INTESTATE ESTATE.

Report of commissioners to divide - reference to intestate's deed —
presumption.] Where the report of the commissioners appointed to divide
lands of an intestate refers in the assignment of the premises to the intestate's
deed of the premises, it will be presumed that the commissioners intended to
allot the premises in the same way as described in the deed; and when a
wharf was included in a deed it will be presumed to have been intended to
pass by the assignment although not specially mentioned. Horner v. Pleas-
ants, Md., 895.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

1. Complaint.] A complaint which alleges that the defendants maintained on
June 1, 1886, and on divers days between said day and June twenty-fifth, and
on said 25th day of June, 1886, a tenement used for the illegal sale of intoxi-

cating liquors, sets out a single defense; and evidence that the defendant
kept a nuisance during any part of the time alleged is competent. Common-
wealth v. Hersey, Mass., 848.

2. Objection to complaint.] A formal objection to a complaint for violation
of the liquor law cannot be taken for the first time in the superior court.
Com. v. Hersey, Mass., 849.
3. Continuing offense-jurisdiction.] Keeping liquor for sale may be a con-
tinuing offense and may be alleged with a continuando. The place where the
offense was committed, and not where the defendant resided, determines
the jurisdiction of the court. Com. v. Hersey, 851.

4. Seizure without warrant - complaint-return-arrest.] Under the
statute an officer may seize intoxicating liquors, unlawfully kept, without a
warrant, for the purpose of keeping it in a safe place till a warrant can be
obtained. The complaint for such a warrant should allege that the liquors
were unlawfully kept,” etc. When such a warrant is obtained, the officer
may make return thereon that the liquors were seized on that warrant; and
he may arrest the person so keeping and intending unlawfully to sell the
liquors, if so alleged, on that warrant. State v. Dunphy, Me., 889.

JUDGMENT.

1. Docket-constable's return.] A judgment of a justice docketed on a con-
stable's return in these words, viz.: "I return the within execution this 25th
day of September, 1872, unsatisfied, no goods or chattels found within my
county belonging to the defendant to make any part of the debt and costs
on this execution, except that which is exempt by law," is valid. Pioneer v.
Bagnall, N. J., 53.

2. Entry of-opening of - penalty.] A., who had been convicted of deser-
tion upon a charge instituted by his wife, was sentenced to pay $4 per week
for the maintenance of herself and child, and to give bond, with sufficient
sureties, in the sum of $300 for the faithful performance of the order. A. left
the jurisdiction, and three suits were commenced on the bond; the first was,
upon payment, discontinued; in the second, judgment was entered for $34.30
for want of an affidavit of defense, and, upon payment, this judgment was
satisfied; in the third, the court refused to enter judgment, because one had
already been entered upon the bond, whereupon a petition was presented
asking for the striking off of the entry of satisfaction formerly entered, and
the opening of the judgment, and the entering of judgment for $300, the
penalty in the bond. The court opened it for the purpose of enabling the
plaintiff to move for judgment in favor of the Commonwealth for the
penalty of the bond.
Held no error. Kiehl v. Commonwealth, Penn., 471.
3. Exemplification of record -- revival execution.] July 31, 1875, A.
entered of record in Luzerne county a judgment against B.— upon a judg-
ment note no proceedings thereon were had by scire facias quare executionem
non or otherwise, but on December 17, 1884, A. took an exemplification of
record and filed it in Lackawanna county; on December 18, 1884, a fieri facias
was issued thereon and returned "nulla bona; " on January 17, 1885, an alias
fieri facias issued, and a levy was made by virtue thereof upon personal prop-
erty. Held, that the executions and levy were void and without effect. Beck
v. Church, Penn., 660.

-

A judgment against a married
liability on a contract within
property on execution issued
Fenn v. Early, Penn., 147.

4. Married woman - must show liability.]
woman which does not affirmatively show her
the statute is void, and a sheriff's sale of her
thereon will confer no title on the purchaser.
5. Married women.] Under special circumstances a wife was held bound by a
judgment at law against her husband, on the ground that she was a real,
though not a nominal, party to the litigation. Stanford v. Lyon, N. J.,

185.

6. Reversal admission of evidence.]
for an error in admitting evidence which
out, it could in no way affect the result.

A judgment should not be reversed
is so far immaterial that, if stricken
Lerche v. Brasher, N. Y., 429.

When arrested in slander suit.]

Henning v. Elliott, Md., 287.

By confession when sufficient.] See 467.

See DISCONTINUANCE, 150; RECORDING ACT, 242.

JUDICIAL SALE.

Failure to complete bid - resale- liability for difference.] If a bidder
at a public auction fails to comply with his bid, the property may be resold;
and if it brings less at the second sale than at the first, the difference may be
recovered from the first purchaser; if, however, the conditions of the second
sale are not the same as those of the first, but are less favorable to the pur-
chaser, or if the vendor shall between the first and second sale have volun-
tarily done any act affecting the title, the tendency of which shall have been
to deter or affect bidding at the second sale, the purchaser at the first sale
will be discharged from liability for such difference. Helfrich v. Freck,
Penn., 129.

JURISDICTION.

Want of jurisdiction may be taken advantage of at any stage of the cause, but if
a case is doubtful and the parties have voluntarily proceeded to a hearing,
the court will not permit an objection to its jurisdiction to prevail but will
administer suitable relief. Appeal of Adams, Penn., 137

See APPEAL, 697.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. Collateral agreement to repair-parol evidence.] Oral evidence is
admissible to prove that at the time of an agreement between the parties for
a lease of premises from the defendant to the plaintiff, which lease was sub-
sequently executed in writing, the defendant also agreed to make certain
repairs to the premises, there being nothing in the written contract incon-
sistent with such an agreement, and no reference to it. Gruffam v. Pierce,
Mass., 552.

2. Eviction -rent.] A. leased to B. two offices on Broadway, New York, for
five months from December 1, 1879. B. took possession, paying the rent
until February, 1880. In the latter part of January, 1880, he went, with his
family, to Scranton, Pennsylvania. Upon returning to his New York office,
sometime later, he found that in the early part of February, A. had removed
the locks, entered, taken away the signs and goods left by him, and was
occupying the rooms for his own purposes; this possession A. continued in
till the expiration of the five months term of the lease; later A. brought suit
against B. upon the lease to recover for rent. Held, that as the conduct of
A. had worked an eviction of B., there could be no recovery. Burr v. Catt-
nach, Penn., 662.

Renewal of lease by lessor's representatives.] Pratt v. Woolston, Md., 264.

LEASE.

1. Town of Gravesend renewal.] By resolution of the electors of the
town of Gravesend, passed at a town meeting in 1871, it was provided that
the common lands of the town should be thereafter let only at public auction
on notice, and that no lot should be let at a time more than one year prior to
the expiration of any existing lease thereon and no lot let for a longer period
than ten years. By a resolution passed in 1878 the resolution of 1871 was
amended by adding thereto the following: "The commissioners of common
lands are also authorized to renew any existing lease

upon terms
as they may deem most advantageous for said town." Plaintiffs held a lease
which expired in 1882. The commissioners renewed said lease March 1,
1880. Held, that the renewal was invalid. Tilyou v. Town of Gravesend,
N. Y., 704.

2. Steam.] An agreement contained inter alia the following:

"This indent-

ure made the day of July, A. D., 1880, between the Penn Iron Com-
pany (Limited), of Lancaster, Pa., of the one part, and Franklin Diller of the
other part, witnesseth, that the said party of the first part doth by these
presents, lease and let unto the said party of the second part, all that part of
the premises of said company on Plum street, Lancaster, and the Pennsyl-