Several acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to be taken together, and compared, in the construction of them, because they are considered as having one object in view, and as acting upon one system. This rule was declared in the cases of Rex v. Loxdale, and the Earl of Ailesbury v. Pattison; (d) and the rule applies, though some of the statutes may have expired, or are not referred to in the other acts. The object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention; and it is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one * 464 subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. Upon the same principle, whenever a power is given by a statute, everything necessary to the making of it effectual, or requisite to attain the end, is implied. Quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id, per quod devenitur ad illud.

Statutes are likewise to be construed in reference to the principles of the common law; for it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law, further than the case absolutely required. This has been the language of the courts in every age; and when we consider the constant, vehement, and exalted eulogy which the ancient sages bestowed upon the common law as the perfection of reason, and the best birthright and noblest inheritance of the subject, we cannot be surprised at the great sanction given to this rule of construction. It was observed by the judges, in the case of Stowell v. Zouche, (a) that it was good for the expositors of a statute to approach as near as they could to the reason of the common law; and the resolution of the barons of the Exchequer, in Heydon's case, (b) was to this effect. For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes, whether penal or beneficial, four things are to be considered: What was the common law before the act? what was the mischief against which the common law did not provide? what remedy the parliament had provided to cure the defect? and the true reason of the remedy? It was held to be the duty of the judges to make such a construction as should repress the mischief and advance the remedy. (c)

(d) 1 Burr. 445; Doug. 28. See, also, Vernon's case, 4 Co. 4; 4 Term Rep. 447, 450; 5 Ib. 417; Dwarris on Statutes, 569; Thompson C. J., 15 John. 380, S. P. (a) Plowd. 365.

(b) 3 Co. 7.

(c) This is especially the case as to statutes which relate to matters of public utility,

*

In the construction of statutes, the sense which the contemporary members of the profession had put upon them is deemed 465 of some importance, according to the maxim that * contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege. (a) Statutes that are remedial, and not penal, are to receive an equitable interpretation, by which the letter of the act is sometimes restrained, and sometimes enlarged, so as more effectually to meet the beneficial end in view, and prevent a failure of the remedy. They are construed liberally, and ultra but not contra the strict letter. (b) This may be illustrated in the case of the registry acts, for giving priority to deeds and mortgages, according to the dates of the registry. If a person claiming under a register deed or mortgage had notice of the unregistered prior deed when he took his deed, and procured the registry of it in order to defeat the prior deed, he shall not prevail with his prior registry, because that would be to counteract the intent and policy of the statutes, which were made to prevent and not to uphold frauds. Statutes are sometimes merely directory, and, in that case, a breach of the direction works no forfeiture or invalidity of the thing done; but it is otherwise if the statute be imperative. (c)1

as to establishments of piety, charity, education, and public improvements. Magdalen College case, 11 Co. 71 b.

(a) Where the penning of a statute is dubious, long usage is a just medium to expound it by; for jus et norma loquendi are governed by usage. The meaning of things spoken or written must be, as it hath been constantly received to be, taken from common acceptation. Ch. J. Vaughan, in Sheppard v. Gosnold, Vaugh. 169. A contemporary exposition, even of the constitution of the United States, practised and acquiesced in for a period of years, fixes the construction. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheaton, 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 264.2 (b) Dwarris on Statutes, 615 et seq.

(c) To interpret a statute strictly, is to adhere precisely to the words or letter of the law, which include, of course, fewer particulars than a freer construction. To interpret it liberally, largely, or comprehensively, is to carry the meaning of the lawgiver into more complete effect than a confined interpretation would allow. It may

1 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 259; for the force of affirmative or negative words in determining the imperative or directory character of statutes, see Savage v. Walshe, 26 Ala. 619.

Penal statutes are to be construed strictly. By this is meant only that they are not to be so extended by implication, and beyond the legitimate import of the words used as to embrace cases or acts not clearly described by such words. They are not to be made to involve an absurdity, or frustrate the design of the legislators. Rawson v. The State, 19 Conn. 299; United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheaton, 460.

2 See Myrick v. Hasey, 27 Maine, 9; Whitcomb v. Rood, 20 Vermont, 49.

507

Effect of tem

utes.

If an act be penal and temporary by the terms or nature of it, the party offending must be prosecuted and porary statpunished before the act expires or is repealed. Though the offence be committed before the expiration of the act, the party cannot be punished after it has expired, unless a particular provision be made by law for the purpose. (d) If a statute be repealed, and afterwards the repealing act be repealed, this revives the original act; (e) and if a statute be temporary, and limited to a given number of years, and expires by its own limitation, a statute which had been repealed and supplied by it, is ipso facto revived. (f) If, before the expiration of the time, a temporary statute be continued by another act, it was formerly a question under which statute acts and proceedings were to be considered

be termed the rational interpretation. Rutherforth's Inst. b. 2, c. 7, secs. 3-11. The general rule, even in the construction of a constitution is, that where it gives a general power, or enjoins a duty, it gives by implication every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one, or the performance of the other. But if the means for the exercise of the power be also granted, no other or different means or powers can be implied. Field v. The People, 2 Scam. 79.

(d) Miller's case, 1 Wm. Blacks. 451; Marshall C. J., in Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281; The Irresistible, 7 Wheaton, 551; The United States v. Passmore, 4 Dallas, 372; United States v. Preston, 3 Peters U. S. 57; The State v. Cole, 2 M'Cord, 1; Anon. 1 Wash. C. C. 84; The State v. The Tombeckbee Bank, 1 Stewart (Ala.) 347; Pope v. Lewis, 4 Ala. (N. S.) 487; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Allen v. Farrow, 2 Bayley (S. C.) 584. The same as to judicial proceedings begun under an act, and not finished when it is repealed. They cannot be pursued. 1 Wm. Blacks. 451; 4 Yeates, 392; Wharton's Dig. tit. Statutes A., n. 6; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 324. The proceeding must have been executed, and not executory, to save it from being lost by the repeal. But it seems that a seaman in the navy, put under arrest before his term of service expired, may be retained for trial by a court-martial after his term has expired. This rule of construction is indispensable to the discipline of the navy. Case of Walker on hab. corp., American Jurist, No. 6, p. 281.

(e) Case of the Bishops, 12 Co. 7; 2 Inst. 686; Doe v. Naylor, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 32; M'Nair v. Ragland, 1 Bad. & Dev. Eq. 525; Commonwealth v. Churchill, 2 Metcalf, 118; Wheeler v. Roberts, 7 Cowen, 536. A statute in Ohio, of February 14th, 1809, and of Illinois of 19th of January, 1826, abolished the rule of the common law stated in the text, as to the constructive revival of repealed statutes. (f) Collins v. Smith, 6 Wharton, 294.

8 Fenelon's Petition, 7 Barr, 173; Regina v. Inhab. of Denton, 14 E. L. & E. R. 124; Saco v. Gurney, 34 Maine, 14; State v. Youmans, 5 Porter (Ind.) 280; Eaton v. Graham, 11 Ill. 619. The repeal of a penal statute does not affect rights in penalties, vested in private individuals under the provisions of the statute. Lakeman v. Moore, 32 N. Hamp 410.

4 The original statute is revived even where it was repealed by implication only. Hastings v. Aiken, 1 Gray, 163.

as done. In the case of The College of Physicians, (g) it was declared, that if a statute be limited to seven years, and afterwards by another statute be made perpetual, proceedings ought to be referred to the last statute, as being the one in force. But this decision was erroneous, and contrary to what had been said by Popham, Ch. J., in Dingley v. Moor; (h) and all acts, civil and criminal, are to be charged under the authority of the first act. Thus, in the case of Rex v. Morgan, (i) on an indictment for perjury, in an affidavit to hold to bail, it was laid to have been taken by virtue of the statute of 12 Geo. I., which was a temporary law for five years, and which was afterwards, and before the expiration of it, continued by the act of 5 Geo. II., with some alterations. Lord Chief Justice Hardwicke said, that when an act was continued by a subsequent act, everybody was estopped to say the first act was not in force; and as the act in question was not altered in⚫ respect to bail, the offence was properly laid to have been done against the first act. In Shipman v. Henbest, (j) the King's Bench held, that if a statute be permitted even to expire, and be afterwards revived by another statute, the law derives its force from the first statute, which is to be considered as in operation by means of revival. If, however, a temporary act be revived after it has expired, the intermediate time is lost, without a special provision reaching to the intermediate time. (k)

(g) Littleton's Rep. 212.

(h) Cro. Eliz. 750.

(i) Str. 1066.
(j) 4 Term. Rep. 109.

(k) Statutes are not considered to be repealed by implication, unless the repugnancy between the new provision and a former statute be plain and unavoidable. Foster's case, 11 Co. 56, 63 a; 1 Rol. 91; 10 Mod. 118, arg.; Bacon's Abr. tit. Statute D. A construction which repeals former statutes or laws by implication, and devests long-approved remedies, is not to be favored in any case. Cowen J., 3 Hill, 472. A statute cannot be repealed by non-user: White v. Boot, 2 Term Rep. 274; Dwarris on Statutes, 529; though it is said to have been held in the Scotch law, that statutes lose their force by desuetude after sixty years. See Dr. Irving's Introduction to the Study of the Civil Law, pp. 123-127, on the doctrine in Scotland derived from the civil law, that laws may be abrogated by long disuse.

5 Commonwealth v. Herrick, 6 Cush. 465. But if the subsequent statute clearly prescribe the only rule to be observed, the former statute, though not repugnant, is repealed. Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 How. U. S. 636. Dexter and Limerick P. R. Co. v. Allen, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 15.

And it was held in O'Hanlon v. Myers, 10 Rich. Law (S. C.) 121, that an act may become inoperative from non-user and from disuse of the punishment prescribed, such as "sitting publicly in the stocks."

*If a statute inflicts a penalty for doing an act, the pen- * 467 alty implies a prohibition, and the thing is unlawful, statute penthough there be no prohibitory words in the statute. Lord alties. Holt, in Bartlett v. Viner, (a) applied this rule to the case of a statute inflicting a penalty for making a particular contract, such as a simoniacal or usurious contract; and he held that the contract was void under the statute, though there was a penalty imposed for making it. The principle is now settled, that the statutory prohibition is equally efficacious, and the illegality of a breach of the statute the same, whether a thing be prohibited absolutely, or only under a penalty. (b)1 The New York Revised Statutes, (c) make the doing an act contrary to a statute prohibition a misdemeanor, though no penalty be imposed. Whether any other punishment can be inflicted than the penalty given by the statute has been made a serious question. (d) The Court of K. B., in Rex v.

(a) Carth. 251; Skinner, 322.

(b) Bensley v. Bignold, 5 B. & Ald. 335; De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107, S. P.; Dwarris on Statutes, 536; The State v. Fletcher, 5 N. Hamp. 257. Every statute made to redress an injury, grievance, or mischief gives an action to the party aggrieved, either expressly or by implication. Van Hook v. Whitlock, 2 Edw. Ch. 304. Affirmatives in statutes that introduce a new rule imply a negative of all that is not within the purview. Hob. 298. And when a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular form, it includes in itself a negative, viz. that it shall not be done otherwise. Plowd. 206, b. Affirmative words in a statute do sometimes imply a negative of what is not affirmed, as strongly as if expressed. Nott J., in Cohen v. Hoff, 2 Tredway, 661. The word may, in a statute, means must or shall, when the public interest or rights are concerned, or the public or third persons have a claim, de jure, that the power shall be exercised. Alderman Blackwell's case, 1 Vern. 152; King v. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609; King . Inhabitants of Derby, Skinner, 370; The King v. Mayor of Hastings, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 148; Newburgh Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 113. See, also, 5 Cowen, 193; 1 Peters U. S. 64; 9 Porter, 390.2 Though penal statutes are said to be construed strictly, yet the courts are bound to give effect to their plain and obvious meaning, and not narrow the construction. They must search out and follow the true intent of the lawgiver. Buller J., in 1 Term Rep. 101; Story J., in 3 Sumner, 209; Pike v. Jenkins, 12 N. Hamp. 255.3 (c) Vol. ii. p. 696, sec. 39.

(d) If a statute creates an offence, and does not make it indictable, but prescribes a penalty, a resort to an indictment is precluded. The State v. Maze, 6 Humph. (Tenn.)

17.

1 But when the object of the law is merely to protect the revenue, the imposition of a penalty is not intended to be construed as a prohibition of the contract. Griffith v. Wells, 3 Denio, 226.

2 Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. U. S. 248.

3 In construing penal statutes, courts cannot take into view the motives of the lawgiver further than they are expressed in the statute. State v. King, 12 La. An.

593.