Holland affords melancholy examples of destructive civil war springing from the disobedience of the separate members. I will mention only a single instance to this effect, taken from the generally uninteresting annals of the Swiss cantons. By one of the articles of the Helvetic alliance, the cantons were bound to submit any difference which might arise between them to arbitrators. In the year 1440, a dispute arose between Zurich on the one side, and the cantons of Schweitz and Glaris on the other, respecting some territorial claims. Zurich refused to submit to a decision against her, and the contending parties took to arms. All Switzerland was, of course, armed against Zurich, the refractory member. She sought protection from her ancient enemy, the house of Austria, and the controversy was not terminated in favor of the federal decree, until after six years of furious and destructive war. (a)

*Had there been sufficient energy in the government *214 of the United States, under the articles of confederation, to have enforced the constitutional requisitions, it might have proved fatal to public liberty; for Congress, as then constituted, was a most unfit and unsafe depositary of political power, since all the authority of the nation, in one complicated mass of jurisdiction, was vested in a single body of men. It was, indeed, exceedingly fortunate, as the event has subsequently shown, that the state legislatures even refused to confer upon Congress the right to levy and collect a general impost, notwithstanding the refusal appeared to be extremely disastrous at the time, and was deeply regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union. Had such a power been granted, the effort to amend the confederation would probably not have been made, and the people of this coun

(a) Hist. de la Confed. Helv. par Watteville, liv. v. Planta's Hist. of Switzerland, vol. i. last chapter. The Swiss Confederation was remodelled by the federal act of 1815, and consists, at the present time, of twenty-five cantons. The federal Diet consists of one deputy from each of the twenty-two cantons, with one vote each, and with a half vote only to the three additional cantons, created on a subdivision. The powers of war and peace, alliance and commerce, reside exclusively in the general Diet, with a common army and treasury; but each canton may conclude separate capitulations and treaties relative to local and municipal matters, and retain its original sovereignty unimpaired for all domestic purposes. Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 3d edit. p. 95.1

1 For the present constitution of the Swiss Confederation, see Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 6th edit. p. 81, editor's note.

try might have been languishing to this day, the miserable victims of a feeble and incompetent union.

There was no provision in the articles of confederation enabling Congress to add a sanction to its laws. In this respect, they were more defective than some of the other federal governments which are to be met with in history. The Amphictyonic council, in Greece, had authority to fine and punish their refractory states. Lacedæmon and Phocis were both prosecuted before the council of Amphictyons, (which was a council of the representatives of twelve nations of Greece,) and all the Greek states were required by proclamation to enforce the decree. The Germanic diet, as it formerly existed, could put its members under the ban of the empire, by which their property was confiscated; and it was aided in enforcing obedience to its laws by a federal judiciary and an executive head. (a) Congress, under the old confederation, like the states general under the Dutch confederacy,

(a) The imperial chamber had appellate jurisdiction only. Its sentences were carried into execution against refractory states by the military force of the circles. Pfeffel, Abr. Chro. de l'Hist. d'Allemagne, tom. ii. p. 100; Potter's Const. Hist. p. 355. The new Germanic Confederacy, established under the acts of the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815, and modified afterwards in 1832 and 1834, consists of the sovereigu princes and free cities of Germany. It includes the great powers of Austria and Prussia, in respect to their possessions, which formerly belonged to the Germanic Empire, Denmark, in respect to the Duchy of Holstein, the Netherlands, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg, and many other lesser principalities and states, together with the free cities of Lubeck, Frankfort, Bremen, and Hamburg. The federative Diet or Congress meets at Frankfort-on-the-Main, and is represented by the respective powers by their ministers, and their votes in the General Assembly or Diet are, in point of numbers, in some degree in a ratio to their relative power. While a few of the great powers have each four votes, others of a lesser degree have respectively three or two votes, and many of the states, and, among others, the free cities, have each only one vote. It is a singular and complicated union of mixed powers, partly national and partly separate and individual. It is declared, in the solemn acts of union, to be a federal league of the sovereign princes and free cities of Germany, formed for the exterior and interior safety of Germany, and the independence and inviolability of the confederated states. In their internal relations, the states are independent between themselves, and bound to each other by reciprocal rights and duties; and in respect to their external relations, they are a consolidated sovereign power, established on the principle of political union. The General Assembly has a great mass of sovereign powers confided to it; but its federal laws do not operate distinctly on the private individual subjects of the states of the union, but only through the agency of their separate governments. Though there are very great restraints upon the internal sovereignty of the states, yet the Germanic Confederacy is essentially an alliance between independent states, though, in many important particulars, they are subject to the confederate power. The sovereign powers are so intermixed and distributed among the members of the union, between the federal head and the separate state, as to render

P

*were restricted from any constructive assumption of *215 power, however essential it might have been deemed to the complete enjoyment and exercise of that which was given. No express grant conveyed any implied power; and it is easy to perceive, that a strict and rigorous adherence to the letter of the grant, without permission to give it a liberal and equitable interpretation, in furtherance of the beneficent ends of the government, must, in many cases, frustrate entirely the purposes of the power. A government too restricted for the due performance of its high trust will either become insignificant, or be driven to usurpation. We have examples of this in the government of the United Netherlands, before it was swept away by the violence of the French revolution. While that government moved within its constitutional limits, it was more absolutely nerveless than any other government which ever existed. The states general could neither make war or peace, or contract alliances, or raise money, without the consent of every province; nor the provincial states conclude those points, without the consent of every city having a voice in their assemblies. The consequence was, that the federal head was frequently induced, by imperious necessity, to assume power unwarranted by the fundamental charter of the union, and to dispense with the requisite unanimity. This was done in the years 1648, 1657, and 1661, as well as in another strong instance in 1668, given by Sir William Temple, and of which he was the author. (a)

The former confederation of this country was defective in not

the system exceedingly complex ; but it does not fall within the province of this work to enter into detail. A more general and precise sketch is given in Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 3d edit. pp. 79-92.1

(a) Temple's Works, vol. i. pp. 115, 128, 337. In 1781, a report was made by a committee of Congress, for submitting to the states an amendment to the 13th article of the confederation then recently subscribed by all the states, in which amendment it was to be provided, that in case of refusal or neglect of any one or more of the confederated states to abide by and obey the determinations of Congress, in respect to requisitions of men and money, agreeably to the apportioned quotas, Congress might employ the land and naval forces of the United States to compel compliance by the delinquent states, and to make distress of the property of such state and its citizens, and also prohibit and prevent their trade and commerce with other states and with foreign powers. Mr. Madison, and even General Washington, perceived the necessity of such a coercive federal power. The Madison Papers, vol. i. pp. 81, 86,

1 See Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 6th edit. p. 71, editor's note.

giving complete authority to Congress to interfere in contests between the several states, and to protect each state from internal violence and rebellion. In many respects our confederation was superior to those of Germany, Holland, or Switzerland, and particularly in the absolute prohibition to the several states, *216 from any interference or concern in foreign or domestic

alliances, or from the maintenance of land or naval forces in time of peace. But in the leading features which I have suggested, and in others of inferior importance, it was a most unskilful fabric, and totally incompetent to fulfil the ends for which it was erected. Almost as soon as it was ratified, the states began to fail in a prompt and faithful obedience to its laws. As danger receded, instances of neglect became more frequent, and before the peace of 1783, the inherent imbecility of the government had displayed itself with alarming rapidity. The delinquencies of one state became a pretext or apology for those of another. The idea of supplying the pecuniary exigencies of the nation, from requisitions on the states, was soon found to be altogether delusive. The national engagements seem to have been entirely abandoned. (a) Even the contributions for the ordinary expenses of the government fell almost entirely upon the two states which had the most domestic resources. Attempts were very early made by Congress, and in remonstrances the most manly and persuasive, to obtain from the several states the right of levying, for a limited time, a general impost, for the exclusive * purpose of pro- * 217

88. But the power was never formally proposed to the states, or granted; and if it had been, it never would or could have been executed, without leading to the destruction of the Union.

(a) The efforts of Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance, in the years 1781 and 1782, to infuse some portion of life and energy into the languishing powers of the confederation were incessant, devoted, and masterly, and his appeals to the interests and honor of the states were most eloquent, but utterly unavailing. See, among others, his Circular Letters to the Governors of the States, of the dates of January 3d, February 15th, May 16th, and October 21st, 1782, and his Letters to Congress, of February 11th, and May 17th, 1782, and March 17th, 1783. Diplomatic Correspondence, edited by J. Sparks, vol. xii. Here we may say, if ever it might be truly said,

Si Pergama dextra

Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent ;

and the perusal of the original correspondence of Mr. Morris, while at the head of the financial department of the United States, cannot but awaken in the breasts of the present generation, in respect to the talents and services of that accomplished statesman, the most lively sentiments of admiration and gratitude.

viding for the discharge of the national debt. It was found impracticable to unite the states in any provision for the national safety and honor. Interfering regulations of trade, and interfering claims of territory, were dissolving the friendly attachments, and the sense of common interest, which had cemented and sustained the union during the arduous struggles of the Revolution. Symptoms of distress, and marks of humiliation, were rapidly accumulating. It was with difficulty that the attention of the states could be sufficiently exerted to induce them to keep up a sufficient representation in Congress to form a quorum for business. The finances of the nation were annihilated. The whole army of the United States was reduced, in 1784, to 80 persons; and the states were urged to provide some of the militia to garrison the western posts. In short, to use the language of the authors of The Federalist, "each state, yielding to the voice of immediate interest or convenience, successively withdrew its support from the confederation, till the frail and tottering edifice was ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins."

Most of the federal constitutions in the world have degenerated or perished in the same way and by the same means. They are to be classed among the most defective political institutions which have been erected by mankind for their security. The great and incurable defect of all former federal governments, such as the Amphictyonic, the Achæan, and Lycian confederacies, in ancient Greece; and the Germanic, the Helvetic, the Hanseatic, and the Dutch republics, in modern history, is, that they were sovereignties over sovereigns, and legislations, not for private individuals, but for communities in their political capacity. The only coercion for disobedience was physical force, instead of the decree and the pacific arm of the civil magistrate. The inevitable consequence, in every case in which a member of such a confederacy chooses to be disobedient, is either a civil war, or an annihilation of national authority.

*The first effort to relieve the people of this country *218 from a state of national degradation and ruin came Convention of from Virginia, in a proposition from its legislature in states in 1786. January, 1786, for a convention of delegates from the several states to regulate our commerce with foreign nations. The proposal was well received in many of the other states, and five of them sent delegates to a convention which met at Annapolis, in