tator, but his mind was evidently at work on the point. He gives as a reason for extending the bill of exceptions to those Courts their greater liability to error; and he anticipates the objection that a writ of error does not lie, by adding, and albeit of judgments given in them a writ of error lieth not, but a writ of false judgment in the Court of Common Pleas; yet the case being in the same or greater mischief, the purview of this statute doth extend to those inferior Courts.

"When we see the authority of so great a writer not only uncontradicted, but adopted in all the digests and text books, we can scarcely err if we adhere to his opinions."

At the time the statute was passed, the Court of Common Pleas was the principal Court of original jurisdiction over suits between party and party; and as it was to those suits the remedy was to apply, it was sufficient for the legislature to mention that Court by way of example. The mischief and the remedy being clearly expressed, and the reason of the remedy easily ascertainable, it was unnecessary, after laying down a general

principle, to run the risk of restraining it by an enumeration of the particulars it was intended to include. If the statute had been drawn on the principle upon which modern acts of parliament are constructed, it would most likely have contained a sweeping enactment, which might have comprehended the intention of the legislature, and almost any intention whatever; and, in addition thereto, it would have introduced an enumeration of all the Courts in existence, from the aula regis to the Court of pie poudre. And if from accident or ignorance any one had been omitted, the construction would have been either that the legislature, for some inscrutable reason, had intended the omission, or that it was a casus omissus, and therefore not to be supplied by construction.

In one case (q) it was resolved, that a bill of exceptions would not lie in the King's Bench upon a trial at bar, because of those words in the statute, "and if upon complaint made of the justices, our lord the king cause the record to come before him." The words

(q) Rex v. Smith, 2 Show. R. 287.

tator, but his mind was evidently at work on the point. He gives as a reason for extending the bill of exceptions to those Courts their greater liability to error; and he anticipates the objection that a writ of error does not lie, by adding, and albeit of judgments given in them a writ of error lieth not, but a writ of false judgment in the Court of Common Pleas; yet the case being in the same or greater mischief, the purview of this statute doth extend to those inferior Courts.

"When we see the authority of so great a writer not only uncontradicted, but adopted in all the digests and text books, we can scarcely err if we adhere to his opinions."

At the time the statute was passed, the Court of Common Pleas was the principal Court of original jurisdiction over suits between party and party; and as it was to those suits the remed

25

.en. The

appeal by

w it; and appeal to led by writ ¡ to repudiate by perversely ense, notwithd in another, and suppress

ery Court of civil ings are according non law, as,

C. 77; 2 Stra. 1040; Ca. temp.

supra; see per Lord Hardwicke, ubi dal, C. J., in Strother v. Hutchinson, ubi London v. Unfree Merchants, 2 Show. R. v. Hall, 2 Lev. 236; Bridgman v. Holt, 122; Skinner, 354, S. C.

ord Hardwicke, ubi supra; per Tindal, C.J., Rutter v. Chapman, 8 M. & W. 13.

C

coram domino rege being in their ordinary sense indicative of the Court of King's Bench; and the reason alleged for this resolution was, that the act could not mean that they were to overrule themselves, which would seem to be a better reason for doubting the soundness of the conclusion than for supporting it; since it would seem rather to prove that the words relied upon were not to be taken in their confined sense, than that a bill of exceptions would not lie to the King's Bench. However, this resolution, which was contrary to prior cases (r), did not prevail. The Courts were not restrained by any such literal difficulty from making a construction which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the act pro bono publico; and accordingly it was settled that a bill of exceptions would lie on a trial at bar in the King's Bench (s). The object of the legis

(r) Enfield v. Hill, 2 Lev. 236; City of London v. Unfree Merchants, 2 Show. R. 146.

(s) See per Lord Hardwicke in Rex v. Preston-on