of the moral code. In the same way nations were, until lately, frankly and brutally lawless; and some of them even now are hardly at all fettered by any moral rule. Apply to private life the mortality which in their conquests animated Alexander the Great, Pompey, Timur or Napoleon, and you will fill the gaols; and in certain modern phrases as to the "mailed fist," the "will to power," and the aspiration to "world empire," you will find, if you analyze them, the same sordid selfishness which in the individual leads to the penitentiary or the scaffold.

As to the primitive man killing and robbery were only a matter of expediency or opportunity, so is a war of conquest to a barbarous or depraved nation; and only the growth of what we call international law,-that jus commune which (as Grotius says) " is a force in regard to war and in war," makes for a better world. Its beginnings are a matter of recent history. Its precepts are first found in treaties between individual nations, differing in detail but tending toward similar ends, and crystallizing after a while in that which is rightly called a law, though a law of imperfect obligation. This happy result was largely due to the reasoning and influence of the great jurists, Grotius (whose anniversary you joined in commemorating at the Hague only a short time before the war), Vattel, Binkershoek and your Wheaton. Then there are the decisions of the judges in war time. The judgments of Lord Stowell in the Napoleonic wars and of the American judges in the Civil War are a mine of learning and of good sense, which in recent years has been fully explored in our prize courts; and it may be that a like credit will be given in the future to the decisions in our courts of the late Sir Samuel Evans and of Lord Sterndale and the opinions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as set out in the judgments of Lord Parker and Lord Sumner. The opinions of text writers and the decisions of the tribunals, which may be said to form the common law of the subject, have been supplemented by International Conventions, such as those of Berne on the treatment of the wounded and of prisoners of war, and those of the Hague on maritime law and the rights of neutrals; and behind all stands the force of justice and humanity which in most countries has fostered the growth of this part of our jurisprudence.

What, then, are the sanctions of international law? Force, or the fear of retaliation, the moral compulsion of contractual obligations, respect for the opinion of the world, the sense of what is right. From this enumeration it is at once evident that there is one sanction missing, namely, a tribunal with the power to decide disputes and (if it may be) to enforce its decrees; and on this point I shall have something to say a little later.

But let me first ask, how have the international rulers and conventions fared during the recent conflict, when in the desperate struggle to take or save life so much was thrown aside? How have they stood the acid test of war? As to this I have had some means of forming an opinion, for I was not only a law officer of the crown during a critical part of the war, but I was also at different times chairman, first of the Contraband Committee, and then of the Committee on Prisoners of War; and I am disposed to say that international law fared worse indeed than the optimists hoped, but better than the pessimists feared.

There were indeed many defections, many war crimes, even on the part of nations claiming to be civilized. I think the worst infringement of the law of nations, and I say this not for the purpose of girding at a beaten enemy, but because it should always be on record, the greatest war crime of all was the German submarine campaign. A belligerent vessel has no right to sink a neutral vessel. She has no right to sink an enemy merchant vessel unless it has been ascertained by search that she carries contraband and it is impossible to bring her to port, and not even then until the safety of all lives on board has been assured. She has no right to sink a hospital ship at all, and to drown wounded men, nurses and doctors. And yet German submarines did all these things. So on land the written and signed conventions as to the treatment of wounded combatants and prisoners of war were violated. Wounded men were in some instances maltreated by civilians and even (though this was rare) by doctors and nurses. Prisoners of war were constantly kept in the fighting zone and forced (contrary to the express terms of the conventions) to dig trenches and carry munitions of war. Many of them were vilely treated in the prison camps in Germany. I say nothing of the Turk, who in this war has forfeited forever his claim (never well established) to fight like a gentleman. And yet, in spite of

failure here, and treachery there, the rules of international law had real value and authority. Our enemies, when they thought they had a grievance, appealed to those rules. We relied on them time after time, and often with effect. Even countries which infringed the rules paid them the homage of an attempt to show that they were being observed. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, if the submarine campaign be excluded, our war experience affords an argument for and not against the maintenance and development of that branch of our jurisprudence.

How then can it be strengthened and developed? What of its future? And here let me say that I am in no way concerned today with a question upon which (as I gather) Americans are not at this moment in perfect harmony,-I mean the League of Nations. Let there be no mistake,-I am for the League. But I know that your Association takes no part in that controversy, and it would ill become me as a guest to discuss it at your meeting. But, leaving that question aside, I think there are methods by which the principles of international law may be elucidated and its sanctions increased.

First, then, I attach great value to the firm and consistent condemnation by enlightened public opinion of all infringements of that law. The submarine outrages brought, thank God! their own nemesis. They had their share in bringing the United States into the war. No one, perhaps not even Admiral Von Tirpitz, now defends them; and the retaliatory orders by which we countered that campaign are universally held to have been justified. World opinion has great weight. Let it be frankly and clearly expressed whenever an opportunity occurs, and it will form a strong barrier against similar attempts in the future

Secondly, it is surely time that all civilized nations should combine to set up a Court of International Law; and the presence at the recent conference at the Hague of an American jurist of world-wide reputation, Mr. Elihu Root, is evidence that the Government of the United States takes that view. Arbitral bodies created for the occasion are well enough, but they cannot be set up without the consent of both parties to the dispute, and one of those parties may refuse. Further, the choice of the arbiter is sometimes determined, not by individual fitness, but by someone's idea as to the line of least resistance. And lastly, proposals

for arbitration often come too late, when feelings are inflamed and judgments warped by the imminent threat of war. What is required is a standing tribunal, set up once for all in time of peace, and composed of men of outstanding ability and judicial temper. Such a tribunal should have power to act as soon as a difference between nations shows itself above the horizon, and should have authority on the application of either party to a dispute, to interpret and administer the law. It would soon gain for itself the confidence of the world, and law and precedent and reason would take the place of anger and conflict.

I hope that I am not too sanguine in believing that the foundations of such a tribunal were well and truly laid on the 24th of July last at the Hague. The scheme then adopted has been partly made public, but it may be that I can give you some additional details.

Under this Hague scheme the Court of International Justice is to be a permanent court sitting at the Hague, and is to hold at least one session in 'every year. It is to consist in the first instance of eleven judges and four supplementary judges; and, except when otherwise especially agreed, it is to sit as a full court of eleven or at least of nine members. The judges are tó be selected by the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations out of a list or panel framed for the purpose by the Arbitration Tribunal appointed under the old Hague Convention; so that, while the League will have a voice in the selection of judges, the persons from whom the selection is to be made will be nominated by an existing body not connected with the League and upon which the United States is already represented. Elaborate provisions are made for securing agreement among the electing bodies; but as a last resort, and failing agreement in any case, the judges already elected are to co-opt. Casual vacancies are to be filled in like manner. No state is to have more than one elected judge; but it is provided that when a state which is a party to a dispute has no elected judge upon the tribunal, it shall have the right to nominate a judge to sit for the purposes of that dispute. The court is to have power to adjudicate upon the usual juridical questions, which are fully enumerated in the scheme; but it is to adjudicate between states only and not between individuals. It is to be guided, not by arbitrary opinion, but by international law.

Its judgments are to be reasoned, and a judge who dissents will be able to record his dissent. The sittings will, except for some special reason, be held in public.

The scheme may appear in some parts to be somewhat elaborate; but that is not to be wondered at when so many interests and opinions had to be reconciled, and I think that (taken as a whole) it provides a working basis for the establishment of a Court of International Law.

Speaking in the United States, where the principle of the peaceful adjustment of international disputes has been long accepted, I express with confidence my strong opinion that the creation of such a court would prove to be of incalculable service to the future of the world.

I have spoken of the formal sanctions for the rules of international law. Let me conclude by a reference to that which may be an informal but is yet a potent support for those rules. I refer to the fact, evident to us all, that the English-speaking communities, the British Empire and the United States of America,are firmly resolved that lawless aggression shall if possible be brought to an end and justice shall be observed as between the nations of the world. That end can, I believe, be attained, but only if those great communities, which wield together so large a share of the strength of the world, maintain their unity of will and purpose. If that unity goes, all goes. If that holds, all holds, and hold it will and shall.

We have had our differences. In the eighteenth century we had a "scrap," as brothers do. In the nineteenth century we had "words," but we resolved upon a family settlement, which must have been a just one, for it pleased nobody. In the twentieth century real trouble came upon the family, and we fought side by side for the right; and that comradeship in battle forged for us a link stronger than brotherhood, the link which binds together men who have tried each other's mettle in common and heroic conflict with a deadly enemy. And now that the enemy is overthrown we look out together upon a world alive with warring appetites and desires, the appetites of those who would profit by the suffering of others and the desires of those who suffer. And there are those who would throw into this seething cauldron the poison of a revolutionary agitation, designed to kill all law, all