complained of was done by the defendant, not as an officer but as a man. And then the Federal Court could have determined that matter, and if it had been satisfied that the defendant was not acting as an officer, or if he was, that he was misbehaving, then the case could have been returned to the State court for trial. But if satisfied that the defendant was only doing his duty as an officer, then he could have been discharged. And from the judgment of the Circuit Court either party could have carried it to the Supreme Court of the United States.

But to this it is objected that the Federal Circuit Court has no power to do any thing with it if it were sent to it, and, therefore, why send it?

That is a mistake. If that were so, what would have been the action of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case last cited-The Mayor v. Cooper. It would have sustained the action of the court below in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction, but, instead of that, it reversed the action of the court below, and said: "An order will issue that the cause will be reinstated, and that the court below proceed in it according to law."

Why "reinstate" it if it ought not to have been there? Why "proceed in it according to law" if it could not proceed at all?

The question as to how the Circuit Federal Court will proceed, or what it should do, is not before us. If there is any defect in the machinery Congress can supply it. Nor is there any difference between criminal and civil cases so far as the power of removal is concerned, as we have already shown.

The points intended to be decided are (1) that the act of Congress under which the removal was ordered is constitutional; and (2) that the ruling of his honor, Judge Cox, was proper.

There is no error. This will be certified.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
AGENCY.

Agent cannot deal with principal's property for his own benefit.-If an agent, without the knowledge of his principal, assumes to act, the principal is entitled to all the benefits to be derived from such action. So, also, a trustee cannot profit by dealing with the property of the cestui que trust. Plaintiff, who was the owner of certain railroad bonds, hypothecated them to C., who wrongfully hypothecated them to an insurance company to secure a loan to him. Defendant was one of the trustees to buy the railroad for the benefit of the bondholders under a plan for reorganization, and was for some time the president of the road. Held, that a purchase by defendant of the bonds from the insurance company was for the benefit of the plaintiff, and a refusal by him to surrender to plaintiff the bonds purchased upon demand was tortious. Judgment below affirmed. Smith v. Frost. Opinion by Miller, J.

[Decided June 5, 1877.]

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. Parties to action have right to settle: rights of attorney: discontinuance.--The parties to an action have the right to settle and discontinue the action at any time without providing for the costs of plaintiff's attorney. He has no lien on the cause of action, and cannot intervene and insist that the action proceed for his benefit. And where it was claimed that the

attorney for the plaintiff and his client had made an agreement whereby he was to be paid out of the amount collected a fee contingent upon the recovery, and that at the time of a settlement of the action between the parties the defendant agreed that he would pay all costs to plaintiff's attorney, and the court granted a motion of defendant for discontinuance on the payment of plaintiff's costs and disbursements, to be taxed. Held, that the order was proper. If the taxable costs were not such a compensation as the attorney was justly entitled to, a remedy might be had by an action on the agreement. Order below affirmed. Wright v. Wright. (No. 1.) Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided June 5, 1877.]

2. Lien of attorney on judgment for compensation: notice to defendant: what notice necessary to nullify settlement with plaintiff.-It was agreed between plaintiff and her attorney that the attorney should receive in addition to the taxable costs as a counsel fee twentyfive per cent of the amount of any recovery in the action. Held, (1) that the attorney had a lien for the stipulated amount upon the judgment in the action, and was an equitable assignee of the judgment to that amount; (2) but in the absence of notice of that lien the defendant in the judgment had the right, acting in good faith, to pay the judgment to the plaintiff; (3) that to nullify such payment and settlement proof of the giving of notice of the lien must be satisfactory and not depend upon uncertain inferences; (4) the insertion of such notice in a stipulation of a time to answer given to defendant's attorney, which stipulation was not acted upon and was returned, and its contents were not shown to have come to the knowledge of defendant's attorney, held not sufficient to give the required notice to defendant. Order below affirmed. Wright v. Wright. (No. 2.) Opinion by Earl, J.

[Decided June 5, 1877.]

BILL OF LADING.

Mistake in quantity of goods named in, as shipped: conditions in bill not conclusive.- Defendants shipped at Milwaukee a quantity of wheat by plaintiffs' vessel. It was supposed by both parties that the quantity was 18,000 bushels. The captain in charge of the vessel had no control over the measurement, and only knew from the announcement of those employed at the elevator where the grain was, the quantity. At the request of plaintiffs, and without the knowledge or consent of defendants. the captain sigued a bill of lading for the wheat which had been prepared for him, which stated that there had been shipped and put on board of the vessel 18,000 bushels of wheat, and that, "in consideration especially of the rate of freight (i. e., twelve cents per bushel), the said carriers having supervised the weighing of said cargo on board, hereby agree that this bill of lading shall be conclusive, as between shippers and assigns and carriers, as to the quantity of cargo to be delivered to consignees at the point of destination, and that they will deliver the full quantity hereon named, or pay for any part of cargo not delivered," etc., to be deducted from the freight. The contract contained a provision subrogating the carrier to any right the shipper might have against the warehouseman from whom the cargo was taken, for deficiency, etc. The wheat, when delivered to defendants at Oswego, was found to be 282 bushels less than 18,000, but plaintiffs delivered all the wheat received at Milwaukee. Held, that, as between the original

parties thereto, the bill of lading was not conclusive as to the amount shipped, but that plaintiffs might bring an action asking for a reformation of the contract by the insertion therein of the true amount shipped, and upon the amended contract maintain an action for the freight due. Judgment below affirmed. Lynch v. Gardner. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided May 22, 1877.]

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

out issue during the life of the testator; held, that the trust for the benefit of the son never took effect, and the gift over to H. took effect on the death of testator. Judgment below affirmed. McLean v. Freeman. Opinion by Allen, J.

[Decided June 5, 1877.]

[Decided June 5, 1877.]

EVIDENCE.

Book account: copies from original entries.- A book account, which was made up of a transcript from memoranda made by others, was verified by the testimony of the book-keeper keeping it as a correct transcript, and the persons who made the original memoranda testified that they were correct. Held, that an objection to the book that it was not an original entry was properly overruled. It is not always required that the memorandum produced to aid the recollection of a witness, or to serve itself as testimony, should be the first or original note in writing of the fact. Judgment below affirmed. Wilson v. Knapp. Opinion by Folger, J.

[Decided June 5, 1877.]

VARIANCE.

Decision founded on, when not sustainable.- Plaintiff, who was entitled, under a contract with defendants, to a royalty upon certain publications proportionate upon the amount sold, brought action claiming that defendants had fraudulently rendered their accounts of sales to her, and made payments which she, believing the accounts to be correct, received, to her damage of over $5,000, and asked an accounting, and that defendants be adjudged to pay her such sums as should be found due and for such other relief as to the court should seem just. The case was referred by consent and tried. The referee found in favor of defendants, on the ground that the accounts rendered plaintiff were correct. The General Term, on appeal, affirmed the decision upon the sole ground that the cause of action stated in the complaint was an equitable one, whereas the cause of action proved was a legal one; held, that the General Term erred in basing its decision upon the ground named by it. Judgment below reversed. Williams v. Slote. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided June 12, 1877.]

WILL.

Construction of: decease of beneficiary under, before teslator: effect on bequests over. - Testator, by his last will, created a trust estate for the benefit of his son A, and upon the death of such son the estate was to go to his issue, but upon his death without issue the estate was to be transferred to H. The son died with

ABANDONMENT OF PATENTED INVENTION. THE case of Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., appellants, v. Wright, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States at the term recently closed, was one in equity brought by the appellants to enjoin the appellee from infringing a patent for an improvement in fruit jars. The answer set up several defenses, two of which were as follows:

1. That there had been "purchase, sale and prior use" of the invention "more than two years prior" to the application for the patent.

2. That the invention was abandoned to the public. These objections are founded upon the 7th section of the act of 1839. Curtis on Pat. (4th ed.) 696. The sale of a single lot of about a dozen and a half of the jars in 1859 by the patentee and the distribution of several others among his friends was shown. The patent was taken out in 1870. The court said: The statutory clause upon which the second objection is founded is in the disjunctive. The language is "purchase, sale or prior use" * ** "for more than two years prior" to the application for the patent. The phrase, "for more," as thus used, is loose and inaccurate, and is to be understood as if the language were earlier than "two years prior," etc., or as if "for" were omitted from the sentence. This omission would produce the same effect.

The defects specified are also in the singular. It follows that a single instance of sale or of use by the patentee may, under the circumstances, be fatal to the patent; and such is the construction of the clause as given by authoritative adjudications.

In Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchf. 235, Mr. Justice Nelson said: "The patentee may forfeit his right to the invention if he constructs it and vends it to others to use, or if he uses it publicly himself in the ordinary way of a public use of a machine at any time prior to two years before he makes his application for a patent. That is, he is not allowed to derive any benefit from the sale or the use of his machine, without forfeiting his right, except within two years prior to the time he makes his application." See, also, Amer. Hide and Leather Co. v. Amer. Tool Co., 4 Fisher, 291; McMillan et al. v. Barclay et al., 5 id. 189; McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 208; Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 584. The result must always depend upon the purpose and incidents accompanying the act or acts relied upon. After reciting some of the facts showing carelessness and neglect on the part of the patentee in applying for a patent upon his invention, the court continues: It is enough to say, without recapitulating the facts, that, in our judgment, the defense of abandonment to the public is also clearly made out.

He who is silent when he should speak must be silent when he would speak, if he cannot do so without a violation of law and injustice to others.

The supineness of the patentee is unexplained and inexcusable. A principle akin to the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies.

Inventors are a meritorious class. They are public benefactors. They add to the wealth and comfort of

the community, and promote the progress of civilization. A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions. There is a like larger domain held in ownership by the public. Neither an individual nor the public can trench upon or appropriate what belongs to the other. The inventor must comply with the conditions prescribed by law. If he fails to do this he acquires no title and his invention or discovery, no matter what it may be, is lost to him, and is henceforward no more his than if he had never been in anywise connected with it. It is made, thereupon, as it were, by accretion, irrevocably a part of the domain which belongs to the community at large. The invention here in question is within this category.

PATENT NOT SUSTAINABLE WHERE CLAIM IS FOR A RESULT ONLY.

THE

case of Fuller et al., appellants, v. Yentzer et al., decided by the Supreme Court of the United States at its last term, was an action for infringement upon a patent for an improvement in mechanism for marking cloth in a sewing machine, and the question whether a claim for a result could be patented arose. The court said: Patents for a machine will not be sustained if the claim is for a result, the established rule being that the invention, if any, within the meaning of the patent act, consists in the means or apparatus by which the result is obtained, and not merely in the mode of operation, independent of the mechanical devices employed; nor will a patent be held valid for a principle or for an idea, or any other mere abstraction. Burr v. Duryea, 1 Wall. 570.

Valid letters-patent undoubtedly may be granted for an invention which consists entirely in a new combination of old elements or ingredients, provided it appears that the new combination of the ingredients produces a new and useful result, but the rule is equally well settled that the invention in such a case consists merely in the new combination and that a suit for infringement cannot be maintained against a party who constructs or uses a substantially different combination, even though it includes the exact same elements or ingredients, if the combination is in fact new and useful and substantially different from the one which preceded it. Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 14.

Such an invention, if it produces a new and useful result, is the proper subject of a patent, and such a patent is valid and operative, but the right of the patentee under it differs in one respect from those of a patentee for an invention which consists of an entire machine, or of a new and useful device, as the rights of a patentee for a mere combination of old ingredients are not infringed unless it appears that the alleged infringer made, used, or sold the entire combination. Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall. 194; Prouty v. Ruggles, 15 Pet. 341; Vunce v. Campbell, 1 Black, 428.

Beyond doubt that rule is correct, but the mere substitution of another old ingredient for one of the ingredients of a patented invention is not a good defense for an infringer if the substitute performs the same function as the ingredient for which it was substituted, and was well known at the date of the patent as a proper substitute for the omitted ingredient; but the rule is otherwise if the ingredient substituted was a new one, or performed a substantially different

function, or was not known at the date of the patent in question as a proper substitute for the one omitted, as in that event the defendant does not infringe. Roberts v. Harnden, 2 Cliff. 504.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

CASES RELATING TO WILLS.

Codicil: mistaken date: revival of previous will.—A codicil referring to a previous will by its date does not necessarily revive the will referred to. A testatrix made a will and afterward a codicil in the year 1876, and subsequently revoked the will and codicil of 1876 by a will in 1877. Afterward she wished to make a codicil to the will of 1877, but, by mistake, called it in the instrument a codicil to the will of 1876. Held, the mistake, if clearly proved, did not revive the will of 1876, but was a codicil to the will of 1877. Prob. Div. and Adm. Div., Feb. 27, 1877. In the Goods of Ince, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 519; S. C., L. R., 2 P. D. 111. Conditional: clause of revocation: unfulfilled condition: earlier will admitted to probate.-A testator made his will, and subsequently with his wife started for a long journey by railway, but being afraid of an accident, he and his wife before starting made a joint will, which was to take effect if they both were killed at the same time by the same accident. The joint will contained a clause revoking all former wills and declaring the joint will to be their last will and testament. They did not meet with an accident, but returned safe home again. The husband died some years later, leaving the wife surviving him. Held, that the intention to revoke all former wills was in common with the other provisions of the joint will, subject to the condition on which that instrument had been made dependent, and that the condition not having been fulfilled, the instrument did not operate as a revocation of the earlier will, which was accordingly admitted to probate. Prob. Div. and Adm. Div., Feb. 20, 1877. In the Goods of Hugo, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 518; S. C., L. R., 2 P. D. 73.

Construction: residuary clause: general words sufficient to pass real estate: "whatever I may be possessed of at my decease."-By his will a testator, after appointing his wife executrix, and directing all his debts, etc., to be paid, proceeded to dispose of his property in these words: "First, I give and bequeath to my said wife all my household furniture, linen, glass, china, plate, farming stock, and all my personal estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, and of what nature and kind soever or whatever I may be possessed of at my decease to and for her own sole use and benefit." At the time of his death the testator, besides his personal property, was possessed of some cottages and gardens for an estate of inheritance in fee simple in possession. Held, that this real property passed to his wife under the latter part of the bequest. Exch. Div., Feb. 8, 1877. Evans v. Jones, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 218.

Discretion of trustees: lunacy of cestui que trust: provision by settlement: fund for maintenance.-A testator gave real and personal estate to trustees upon trust "in their discretion, and of their uncontrollable authority" to apply the whole, or such part of the income as they should think expedient for the maintenance and benefit of his wife during her life. The wife was a lunatic, and was entitled to considerable property under her marriage settlement. Held (affirm

ing the judgment of the court), that under the words of the will the trustees were justified in applying the income of the testator's estate only to supplement the wife's separate income, and not in discharge of it. H. of L., April 17, 1877. Gisborne v. Gisborne, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 564.

General devise: falsa demonstratio.-A father by will devised all that part of R. estate purchased by him, consisting of L. meadow, F. meadow, K. field, G. field, B. meadow, and M. meadow, to trustees upon trust to permit his son to receive the rents during his life, and after the son's death to the use of such of the son's children as the son should by deed or will appoint. The son by will appointed that "all that part and parts of the property comprised in and devised by the hereinbefore recited will of my late father, as is and are therein described as that part of R. estate purchased by my said father, consisting of L. meadow, K. field, F. meadow, and M. meadow," should after his death go to the use of his two eldest sons, their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common. Held (affirming the decision of Jessel, M. R.), that G. field and B. meadow passed under the appointment in the son's will. Ct. App., March 23, 1877. Travers v. Blundell, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 341.

Gift of residue: precatory trust: beneficial interest. A testatrix gave the residue of her real and personal estate to trustees upon trust, to convert into money such parts thereof as might not consist of money, and after certain payments thereout, to hold the residue of the said moneys upon trust for such of her nieces, P. and T., as should be living at her death, "my desire being that they shall distribute such residue as they think will be most agreeable to my wishes." Held, that M. and T. took the residue for their own benefit. Briggs v. Penny, 3 Mac. & G. 546, commented on. Ch. Div., April, 1877. Stead v. Mellor, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 498.

‘Heirs,” meaning of: direction to divide personalty, after life estate, among "heirs:" blood relation entitled.-A testator bequeathed his personal estate to his wife S. for life, and after her decease, "to be divided among my heirs and to their children with H. R. P., share and share alike." The testator had five brothers and sisters, some of them died in his life-time, leaving issue; others survived him and died in the life-time of S., leaving issue. Held, that by the word "heirs" was meant next of kin, exclusive of the widow; that it was a gift to a class to be ascertained at the testator's death, and consisting of the brothers and sisters living at the death of the testator, the children of brothers and sisters then dead, and H. R. P., and that those persons took vested interests. Ch. Div., April 20, 1877. Re Peppitt's Estate; Chester v. Phillips, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 500.

ume will compare favorably with those of the same series preceding it. In common with every one of the volumes of the Pennsylvania State Reports, it contains many valuable opinions. Abstracts of all of these have heretofore appeared in our columns, and we need notice only a few of those worthy of mention. Pennsylvania R, R. Co. v. Morgan, p. 134. It was held that a charge in an action against a railroad company for injuring a child by running over it, that "where a child is upon the track, those in charge of an approaching train are bound to stop when seeing it, because they have no right to assume that the child knows its danger, or has the capacity to flee from it, as in the case of an adult," was erroneous, the question whether, in the given case, the railway employees were negligent, being for the jury. Thompson v. McElarney, p. 174. A license for the enjoyment of certain privileges in land obtained under an executed verbal contract, founded upon a sufficient consideration, is irrevocable by the licensor or those claiming title to the land under him. Miller v. Wentworth, p. 280. In the absence of fraud or duress upon a wife, a certificate of an acknowledgment of a deed by her is conclusive of the facts therein stated. Federal Ins. Co. v. Robinson, p. 357. Where the payment of usurious interest was made upon process of execution, and there was no allegation of actual collusion to evade the statute, it was held not recoverable in a new suit. The only remedy the defendant would have would be to apply for an opening of the judgment. Seely v. City of Pittsburgh, p. 360. The frontage rule of valuation usually applied in assessments for city street improvements held not applicable in country districts, and a law directing the application of the rule to such districts held unconstitutional. Darlington v. United States, p. 382. The United States have the right to take private property for public use under the power of eminent domain. But where the United States was endeavoring to condemn four sites for public buildings for the purpose of experimenting on the different values, held, that the proceedings to condemn the fourth site were irregular. Insurance Co. v. O'Maley, p. 400. A condition of a fire insurance policy was, "The insurance by this policy shall cease at and from the time that the property hereby insured shall be levied on or taken into possession or custody under any proceeding in law or equity;" held not to apply to real estate levied on and advertised for sale, but only to personal property which is usually seized in fact when a levy is made. Reed's Executors v. Reed, p. 420. A real estate broker who procured a person who entered into an arrangement looking to the purchase of real estate, but was prevented from completing the purchase by the sale of the premises to a third party, held entitled to the stipulated commission for the sale. Wentworth's Appeal, p. 469. In the contemplation of the act giving preference to the claims of laborers, "laborers" are those who perform with their own hands the contract they make with their employer. Hutchinson and Batchelder v. Commonwealth, p. 472. Bishop, holding accepted orders for oil upon the Union Pipe Line Company, and wishing to store the oil with H. & B., gave them the orders, that they might take the oil which was undistinguished and mingled with other oil in the pipe line company's tanks and pipes. H. & B. deposited those orders with the company, and drew the amount of oil represented by them, and used the oil in their general business, and were unable to deliver it when demanded by Bishop; held, that H.

& B. were guilty of larceny as bailees. The volume contains a good index, a table of cases cited, and is well printed and bound.

MR.

OBITUARY.

SAMUEL WARREN.

R. SAMUEL WARREN, the well-known English author and jurist, died on the 31st ult. He was born in Denbigshire, Wales, May 23, 1807, and was the son of a clergyman. He first studied medicine in Edinburgh, but abandoning the profession for that of law he entered the Inner Temple, and in 1831 began practice as a special pleader, being called to the bar in 1837. He began the publication in Blackwood in 1839 of his well-known novel "Ten Thousand a Year," which had a great immediate success, and for some time continued to be generally read. "Tittlebat Titmouse" became a familiar name even to those who never saw the book. His law writings best known are: "A Popular and Practical Introduction to Law Studies," originally issued in 1835, but subsequently rewritten and enlarged; Select Extracts from Blackstone's Commentaries; " Moral, Social and Professional Duties of Attorneys and Solicitors; "Parliamentary Election Law of the United Kingdom; Warren also published a number of pamphlets, and his complete literary notes were collected in five volumes in 1853-55. He was made Queen's Counsel in 1851, Recorder of Hull in 1854, and Member of Parliament for Midhurst in 1856. He was re-elected for the same borough in 1857, but vacated his seat upon being appointed a Commissioner of Lunacy in 1859. He will probably be best remembered by the general public by his novel, Ten Thousand a Year," and by the profession by his "Introduction to Law Studies," which by far excels every other work ever published relating to the same subject.

THE

NOTES.

Mr.

HE Notaries' Journal is a quarterly magazine, edited and published by Robert Owen, and issued at 110 Broadway, New York. It is, as its title indicates, devoted to the interests of notaries public and must be found a valuable assistant to those officers in the performance of their duties. It is published quarterly, its first issue appearing in February last. We have seen only the August number, the contents of which are an essay on The Law of Protest; The rules governing the issue of passports; an article upon the subject of Affidavits; a number of cases upon the subjects of Commercial Paper Protests, etc., from the reports old and new; Extracts from the New Code, giving the sections of interest to notaries, namely: § 842, § 844, § 923, § 924, § 925, § 937 and § 960; Mooted Questions; General Intelligence;" Recent Decisions, etc., of interest to notaries. The three numbers thus far issued contain together 108 pages, and the one before us is well printed on good paper.

Baron Bowse of the Irish bench, the other day, was trying a shoemaker who was charged with having stabbed his wife. The guilt was brought home to the prisoner beyond all dispute, and indeed the man did not deny having committed the offense. Some of the jury, however, were not convinced, and one of them sapiently observed that he "did not see any clear

evidence that the knife produced had inflicted the wound." "If you were trying the knife," said Baron Dowse, "such evidence might be very essential, but you are trying a prisoner, and the question is whether or not he inflicted the wound with that or any other knife." Then the jury began to see it, and the man was eventually convicted.

Samuel was a man of the strictest integrity. When Saul was installed sovereign, Samuel retired from his office as judge with a public testimony to his honesty, integrity and thorough uprightness. He stood forth before the assembly at Gilgal, and said: "I have walked before you from my childhood unto this day; witness against me before the Lord, and before His anointed: whose ox have I taken? or whose ass have I taken? or whom have I defrauded? whom have I oppressed? or of whose hand have I received a bribe to blind mine eyes therewith? and I will restore it to you." Then the whole assembly responded in one unanimous approval of his conduct. Thou hast not defrauded us, nor oppressed us, neither hast thou taken aught of any man's hand." Yet again Samuel put it to them, lest any haste should have led them to affirm what might be subsequently questioned. To make their utterances more solemn, he said: "The Lord is witness against you, and His anointed is witness this day, that ye have not found aught in my hand." At once the multitude responded: "He is witness." Thus, with an untarnished reputation, Samuel laid down his office.-From The Quiver for July.

In the House of Commons lately, in a discussion on the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) bill, Mr. Meldon submitted as an amendment that the office of Lord Chancellor of Ireland should be limited to members of the Irish bar; but the Attorney-General for Ireland objected, pointing out that the present Lord Chancellor of England is an Irishman, and the amendment was negatived by a vote of 202 to 106.- -A man in England wanted, the other day, to register a certain Greek word as a trade-mark for an ink which he manufactured, but the registrar refused, on the ground that a mere word" could not be a trade-mark according to law, which defines it as "a distinctive device," etc. The case was carried into court, where the plaintiff's counsel quoted Longfellow's authority for the word "excelsior" being a strange device," but the practical judge declined to recognize the poetical precedent, and judgment was given on the other side.

66

An Irish lawyer, Sullivan by name, has commenced his career at the bar by throwing up a brief. It happened a few weeks ago, when an important case coming on, a firm of London solicitors who were concerned for one of the parties gave a brief to Mr. Sullivan. He accepted it and went over to Dublin to appear in the case. When he arrived he found that

two other counsel, whom he was expected to lead, felt some, possibly pardonable, scruples about appearing in a case as juniors to a man, compared with whom, on the question of standing at the bar, they were much the seniors. Mr. Sullivan ascertained this fact, and admitting the reasonableness of the objection, at once returned his brief, preferring to sacrifice his fee rather than the feelings of other people.- There are more than a million of wills on deposit in the courts of York, England, the accumulation of upwards of five hundred years.