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PARTNERSHIP.

1. Partner cannot make assignment for benefit of creditors without consent of copartner: subsequent rati

quent selection and occupancy of the premises mortgaged, as the homestead of the mortgagor. As against such mortgage, the wife of the mortgage debtor is not entitled to an assignment of a homestead in the prem-fication.- One of the members of an insolvent firm ises mortgaged. Gibson v. Mundell.

INSURANCE.

Waiver of defense by company.-In an action against an insurance company to recover the amount of a fire policy, a defense on the ground that the insured failed to make and furnish the insurer with the preliminary proofs of loss in the manner and within the time required by the policy, is not waived by setting up and relying upon other defenses not inconsistent therewith. Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Frick.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

1. Note obtained by fraud: misrepresentation as to nature of instrument: negligence.-In an action against the maker, by an indorsee of a negotiable promissory note, who purchased the same for a valuable consideration, before maturity, and without notice of any fraud or infirmity as between the original parties, the defendant is not liable where it is shown: (1) That at the time of signing and delivering the note, he was induced, by fraudulent representations as to the character of the paper, to believe that he was signing and delivering an instrument other than a promissory note. (2) That his ignorance of the true character of the paper was not attributable, in whole or in part, to his own negligence in the premises. DeCamp v. Hamma.

2. Promissory note obtained by fraud: negligence.— In an action against the maker by a bona fide indorsee, before due and for value, of a negotiable promissory note, the defendant is liable if guilty of negligence in the execution thereof, although he did not intend to sign a note, and was induced, through fraudulent representations as to its character, to believe that the instrument executed was one of a different purport. Ross v. Doland.

3. Negligence, leaving blank estoppel.-A person who negligently signs and delivers to another a printed form of a negotiable promissory note containing blanks, without knowing it to be such, is estopped, as against a subsequent bona fide holder for value and before due, from denying authority in the person to whom it was delivered to fill the blanks. Ib.

4. Signing note without reading: estoppel: negligence. A person possessed of the ordinary faculties and ability to read, signed and delivered a negotiable promissory note without knowing it to be such, but without reading the same, having an opportunity to do so, relying solely on the representation of the payee that the paper was an instrument other than a note. Held, as against a bona fide holder before maturity for value, such maker will not be permitted to deny the due execution of the note. Winchell v. Crider.

5. Title to: defense.-The debtor of a bank, of which A was cashier, transferred a negotiable note, in payment of his indebtedness, to A by special indorsement, and thereupon the bank, to enable A to bring suit thereon, assigned its interest in the note to him. Held, that A might maintain an action on the note in his own name, notwithstanding he may be accountable to the bank for the proceeds when collected. Such indorsement and transfer having been made before maturity of the note, the same in the hands of A is not subject to any defense of which neither he nor the bank had notice at the date of the transfer. Wright v. Stanley.

cannot, either before or after dissolution of the partnership, make a valid assignment of all its effects for the benefit of creditors, against the will of a copartner, or without his assent when he is present or accessible. Where an assignment is so made against the will of the non-executing partner, or when he is present and not assenting, and he subsequently ratifies the assignment, the ratification will relate back to the time of executing the assignment, and give it effect from that date; but not so as to defeat the rights of third persons, acquired in good faith in the meantime. Holland v. Drake.

2. What constitutes. - R. and L. agreed that R. should furnish the ground for a brick yard, the clay to make bricks thereon, the lumber to protect the bricks while making, and the wood to burn them, and that L. should manufacture and burn bricks in the yard, and be at all the expense of so doing; when manufactured, each was to have a fixed proportion of the bricks, subject to a certain sum that R. was to have for every 100,000 bricks sold; the bricks were to be sold by either of the parties, and the proceeds divided according to the rights of the parties under the contract. Held, that R. and L. were partners, and jointly liable for a breach of a contract of sale made by either of them. Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Ross.

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Life interest and remainder: construction of deed.Real estate was conveyed to C. for life, and after her death to her children by E., during the life of each of the children, and after their death to E. and to his heirs, habendum to C. during life, and after her death to the "said surviving children," and after the death of each of them to E. and his heirs. Held, that the provision for the children was contingent upon their surviving their mother, and only such of the children as survived her took the estate. That E. took a vested remainder in fee, subject to the intervening contingent estate of the children. Smith v. Block.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

1. Sale of interest in land: license.- An agreement between the owner of an artificial water-course and a. railroad company, whereby the former consents that the latter, in the construction of its road, may fill the channel and divert the water into a new channel on its own land, in consideration that the railroad company will open the old channel and restore the water thereto whenever requested, is not a contract for an interest in laud within the meaning of the statute of frauds. Hamilton and R. Hyd. Co. v. Cincinnati, H. and D. R. R. Co.

2. License: estoppel ultra vires.-Where a license to fill up such water-course is obtained from a corporation in possession as owner, in consideration of a promise to reopen and restore the water-course when

requested so to do, the licensee, when sued for a breach of his promise, is estopped from setting up that the ownership and maintenance of the water-course by the corporation are ultra vires. Ib.

BENCH AND BAR.

Clerical justices have not, as a rule, proved is a very pleasant lady, and, apparently, a very happy

a success, but the Rev. Sydney Smith was an exception, according to the following sketch which we find in the Washington Law Reporter: "He set vigorously to work to study Blackstone, and made himself master of as much law as possible, instead of blundering on as many of his neighbors were content to do. Partly by this knowledge, partly by his good humor, he gained a considerable influence in the quorum, which used to meet once a fortnight at the little inn, called the Lobster House; and the people used to say they were going to get a little of Mr. Smith's lobster sauce.' By dint of his powerful voice and a little wooden hammer, he prevailed on 'Bob' and 'Betty' to speak one at a time; he always tried, and often succeeded in turning foes into friends. Having a horror of the game laws, then in full force, and knowing, as he states in his speech on the reform bill, that for every ten pheasants which fluttered in the wood one English peasant was rotting in jail, he was always secretly on the side of the poacher (much to the indignation of his fellow-magistrates, who in a poacher saw a monster of iniquity), and always contrived, if possible, to let him escape rather than commit him to jail, with the certainty of his returning to the world an accomplished villain. He endeavored to avoid exercising his function as a magistrate in his own village, when possible, as he wished to be at peace with all his parishioners. Young delinquents he could never bear to commit; but read them a severe lecture, and in extreme cases called out, 'John, bring me my private gallows!" which infallibly brought the little urchins weeping on their knees, and Oh! for God's sake, your honor, pray forgive us!' and his honor used graciously to pardon them for this time, and delay the arrival of the private gallows, and seldom had occasion to repeat the threat."

A writer on successful lawyers, in the current number of the Westminster Review, refers to Lord Justice Knight Bruce, who, he says, "struck by the dullness and gloominess of the proceedings in courts of equity, sought to enliven Lincoln's-inn by an occasional exhibition of judicial waggery. These attempts were enhanced by a sonorous voice and a solemn, sententious way of speaking." And he cites the case in which a solicitor of the court having become one of its suitors, the learned judge thus sketched the proceedings: The court," commenced the Lord Justice, "has been now for several days occupied in the matrimonial quarrels of a solicitor and his wife. He was a man hot accustomed to the ways of the softer sex, for he had already had nine children by three successive wives. She, however (herself a widow), was well informed of all these antecedents, and, it appears, did not consider them any objection to their union, and they were married. No sooner were they united, however, than they were unhappily disunited by unhappy disputes as to her property. These disputes disturbed even the period usually dedicated to the soft delights of matrimony, and the honeymoon was occupied by endeavors to induce her to exercise a testamentary power of appointment in his favor. She, however, refused, and so we find that, in due course, at the end of the month, he brought home with disgust his still intestate bride. The disputes continued, until at last they exchanged the irregular quarrels of domestic strife for the more disciplined, but expensive, warfare of Doctors'-commons and Lincoln's-inn." In a case where the question to be decided was on the construction of a will, the Lord Justice remarked: "If the spirits of the departed are ever permitted to be conscious of things which take place here below, and if the spirit of the testator has been cognizant of the discussion which has been going on here to-day, he must have been, no doubt, considerably astonished, perhaps, I might say, disgusted, at the intentions which have been ascribed to him, and the various meanings which have been put upon his words. Nevertheless, we must presume that he intended what, as lawyers, we make his words to mean, no matter whether he meant it or not."

The following statements in regard to Lord Justice Christian, of the Irish Court of Appeal, will explain many of his recent acts and remarks: "The duties of his office occupy about 100 days per annum. His leisure is, therefore, more than considerable. How do you think he employs his time? This cross, cranky, jealous potentate reads novels from morning till night. He sees no company, and accepts no invitations. He is married, and has a family. He allows his wife, who woman, to entertain as she pleases up to 6 o'clock in the evening. Then all the guests must go. He never appears until then, and he sits down to dinner in silence. He takes breakfast in his study alone, and after a certain hour in the morning no servant dare come to his level of the hall, on pain of instant dismissal. In fact, he must not be encountered on the steps. Sometimes he never leaves the house for weeks together, and then he drives out in a carriage and pair, and, flying through the streets, strikes terror to his species. He once nearly broke down, and, addressing the nearest thing to a friend, said: 'If I ever invited any man to my house, I would invite you.' And then he stopped. In contradistinction to his marvelous knowledge of law, he is reputed to be the best Shakespearean student alive in the three kingdoms. It is said he can repeat the plays verbatim. So that between the novels and the play, the law and his own sweet temper, Jonathan Christian is by no means an ordinary person. Spiteful people say he is mad; but no signs of failure have shown themselves as yet, and he is now well over sixty years of age."

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.

HOLIDAY.

Docketing judgment on.-In the absence of prohibitory legislation by the State, the docketing of a transcript of judgment on a holiday is not void, but will confer a valid lien upon the real estate of the debtor in the county where it is filed. U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Wis. In re Worthington, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 52.

JURISDICTION.

Actions to recover bankrupt's property: Federal and State courts.-Under the amending act of June 22, 1874, the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought by assignees to recover property claimed to have been transferred by a bankrupt in violation of section 5128, where the value of such property exceeds $500. By the act of June 22, 1874, the State courts were ousted of their jurisdiction over such actions pending before them at the time of its passage. N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Dept. Olcott, assignee, v. Maclean, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 79.

PRACTICE.

When interest allowed: attorney's commissions: jurisdiction: foreclosure of mortgage.-Where the assignee has sold real estate discharged of liens, he should allow interest on the liens to the date of making up his report of distribution. Attorney's commissions and costs stipulated to be paid on foreclosure are not allowable when the proceedings to foreclose are invalid. When the bankrupt court has first taken jurisdiction by ordering a sale of mortgaged premises, discharged of liens, it thereby ousts a State court of jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage. U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Pennsylvania. In re Devore, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 56.

PREFERENCE.

What amounts to procuring entry of judgment.— Where one of the members of an insolvent firm, with knowledge of such insolvency, carries a message at the request of a creditor, although unwillingly, to an attorney, directing him to enter up judgment upon a judgment note which the firm had previously given, held, that he thereby procured the entry of such judg

ment and the issuing of the execution thereon. U.S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Pennsylvania. In re Benton & Bro., 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 75.

SET-OFF.

In case of voluntary assignment: deposits in bank. A voluntary assignee is a mere representative of his assignor, and takes his choses in action subject to any existing right of set-off. Where a bank has made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, a depositor may set off a balance of deposits due him against his note held by the bank at the time of the assignment. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania. City Bank of Harrisburg v. Sherlock, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 62.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW CODE.
ELMIRA, N. Y., August 24, 1877.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:
SIR-Let me present a "point" for the considera-
tion of yourself and the professiou.

How far is chap. 416, of the Laws of 1877, obnoxious to the prohibition of art. 3, sec. 17, of the Constitution? In other words, is the new Code, as certified to by the Commissioners and the Secretary of State, as required by section two of the amendatory act, so called, unconstitutional?

This question, which, so far as I know, has not been raised before, having suggested itself to me, I send to you that I may learn how it strikes others.

The prohibition of the Constitution is in these words: "Sec. 17. No act shall be passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be applicable, excepting by inserting it in such act."

From a communication, appearing in your columns in May, 1875, I extract the following paragraph, in which the writer refers to the section above cited: "It was intended then, evidently, to prevent this kind of legislation - the kind that compels the examination of several laws to find out what one law means. In other words, was it not intended, and do not the words of the section indicate, that EVERY law passed by the legislature shall be, in so far as it goes, a complete law in itself? It seems to me, and every lawyer that I have talked with on the subject is impressed in the same way, that any law which, by implication or by words, requires a reference to some other law, in order to make clear what may or may not be done under it, is clearly unconstitutional." 11 Alb. Law. Jour. 322. Suppose the Commissioners to have been lawfully authorized by section two of chapter 416 of 1877 to do an act that ought to have been done by the legislature. The combination of chapters 448 of 1876 and 416 of 1877 has been no slight task, and the Commissioners have found the same difficulties the writer of the article referred to thought the Constitution was amended to prevent. See the Commissioners' introduction to the Code of Civil Procedure, where they use this language: "The amendatory act is so framed that confusion would probably ensue in putting it into operation, unless the text of the act of 1876 was previously actually conformed to the amendments by authority of law." Code of Civ. Pro., edition of Weed, Parsons & Co., with Throop's notes, pp. vii, et seq.; particularly, pp. xii-xiv.

Whatever the answer to the above question be, can

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NEW YORK, July 27, 1877.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIRA difference of opinion on the following legal question has arisen between several members of the bar of this city, and it has been agreed to refer the same to you for a decision:

A and Co. fail in business in 1868. They file their voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the same year, and regular proceedings follow in the shape of meetings and examinations. The matter is then dropped by the creditors, and is allowed to remain in statu quo by the debtors. In the meantime the statute of limitations has barred the various claims, more than six years having now elapsed, the question in dispute is, will a present application for a discharge in bankruptcy revive the various debts due by said debtors in case such application is refused? I think not, for the reason that the statute of limitations would form a perfect defense, despite the bankruptcy proceedings. My views are, however, controverted, and your opinion Will oblige SUBSCRIBERS.

[In Brown v. Bridges, 2 Miles (Peun.), 424, it is held that the return in an insolvent's petition of a debt, as due, is not a sufficient acknowledgment to take the debt out of the statute. See, also, Christy v. Flemington, 10 Barr, 129; Roscoe v. Hale, 7 Gray, 381; Stoddard v. Doane, id. 387; Richardson v. Thomas, 13 Gray, 381; Woodbridge v. Allen, 12 Metc. 470. The cases holding to the contrary are In re Eldredge, 12 National Bankr. Reg., and Morgan v. Meteyer, 14 La. Ann. 612. It will be seen that the weight of authority is in favor of the rule, that the debt is not revived by such an admission. - ED. A. L. J.

BUFFALO, N. Y., August 27, 1877. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR- On the 3d day of August, 1877, A made and B indorsed a promissory note for $156.58, payable in twenty days after date, at the M. & T. Bank in Buffalo, N. Y., and on that day the note was delivered to C. On August 25, the day the note, by its terms, became due, and immediately after the M. & T. Bank opened, a notary public presented the note at the M. & T. Bank and demanded payment, which was refused, and the note was then and there duly protested for nonpayment. Afterward, and about noon of the same day, A came to C, the holder of the note, and tendered to him the amount of the note, which C refused to accept, saying that the notary's fees would have to be paid. A refuses to pay the notary's fees. These being the conceded facts, I desire to ask you:

I. If C had the right to have the note protested as soon as the bank opened?

II. Can C maintain an action on that note against A and B?

An answer will greatly oblige.
Very respectfully,

J. S.

[The general rule is, that if a bill or a note be payable at a particular place, demand may be made there at any

time during business hours of the day when it is payable, and the indorser is liable on notice, although funds are placed there for payment of the note later in the day and within business hours. The maker has the whole day for payment, but, after demand and refusal, he must seek the holder and make payment to him. Parsons on Bills and Notes, 374; Oathout v. Ballard, 41 Barb. 33. The holder has a right to make demand and of course employ a notary to do so at any time during business hours of the place where payment is to be made, and it would seem to follow that the notary's charges would attach to the note, and the maker thereof be liable therefor. The custom of banks, in respect to such matters, might affect a particular case, but, apart from that, the rule we have stated would govern. The cases in relation to the subject are collected in Oathout v. Ballard, supra.-ED. A. L. J.]

THE

NOTES.

August-September issue of the Southern Law Review contains articles upon these subjects: The Unconstitutionality of the Act of Congress of February 12, 1873, Demonetizing Silver, by Hon. Thomas F. Gantt; Civil War and Life Insurance; Some Notes on Domicile, by Francis Wharton, LL.D.; A Point of the Statute of Frauds, by Hon. W. F. Cooper; Law and Insanity, by J. C. Lodge, Esq. The book reviews display the usual discrimination and ability. The notes are upon subjects of present interest, and the digest in brief of recent cases contains the syllabis of all decisions appearing in full in the various law journals, since May 25, 1877.

A very singular case was brought to the attention of a Probate Court in Massachusetts recently. A man died leaving a will which divided his property equally between his wife, his child, and a child then unborn. The unborn party proved to be twins, and the executor is sorely perplexed as to whether he shall give each of the twins one-sixth of the estate, or whether he shall carry out the testator's purpose to serve all the children alike, by giving them and the widow each one-fourth, or whether, again, he shall give the widow her third, and divide the other two-thirds among the three children. The case being wholly without precedent in this State, the court gave the executor no advice, and the conundrum is to be brought before the Supreme Court.

to the chemical analysis of each bag, or to a reckless sale of all the bags; that those in charge of the ship having destroyed the commercial value of the salt, as table salt, by the course they pursued, that the ship must respond for the damages, which would be the difference between the value of the salt in the market of New York, as table salt, and what it brought on its sale.

A judgment of great importance to the mercantile community generally has been pronounced by the Imperial Court of Germany, at Leipsic, in favor of Messrs. J. & R. Tennent, of Well-park brewery, Glasgow, and Riches-court, London, plaintiffs, against Messrs. Deetjen & Schröder, brewers, Hamburg, defendants. The present case has been before three of the courts. The Tribunal of Commerce of Hamburg, the first court before which the case was heard, pronounced an elaborate judgment on the 19th of June, 1876, in favor of Messrs. Tennent, but this judgment was reversed in the Supreme Court on the 1st December last. It was then feared that the new German trade-marks act would be ineffective in protecting foreign manufacturers, but, fortunately, those fears have been set at rest by the judgment of the Imperial Court of Leipsic. The judgment is to the effect that, as goods bearing trade-marks, after they have been distributed by commercial trade, and have been, in part, taken to circles far distant from the place where they were produced, can be quickly and easily recognized in the retail trade and by consumers. It is self-evident that the general appearance of the trade-mark is taken into consideration, and that thereby insignificant deviations- as, for example, such as are only caused by single marks added to the figures used-according to the circumstances, are of little or no consequence. The names of firms which might be used in the grouping of trade-marks have no significance, but stand in the same position as numbers, letters, or words used with the figures. It was, therefore, in the judgment of the court, only a question between the parties, whether the defendants, according to sec. 9 of the law of 1873, were entitled to a right, in competition with the plaintiffs, to the use of the trade-mark in question, for this reason, because that mark was, until the commencement of the year 1875, generally acknowledged in the trade as the mark of the defendants' manufacture. That question is, in agreement with the commercial tribunal, to be answered in the negative. As is shown by the papers of the action brought before the lower court in the years 1863 and 1864, between plaintiffs and defendants, the defendants did not then sell the beer produced by them under the trade-mark in question as their beer, but as that of the plaintiffs. They went so far as to imitate the trade-mark and labels of the plaintiffs in all their parts, even making use of their full name, as also the name of the plaintiffs' brewery, completely and exactly. They certainly had to give up the use of the name of the plaintiffs' firm in consequence of the judgment given against them, but could not then be compelled to do more. They thereupon continued to sell their

A decision was rendered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on the 25th ult., in the case of Dowell v. The Ship Niagara. The libellant in this case, in March, 1875, shipped on board the Ship Niagara, at Liverpool, to be carried to New York, 1,950 sacks of fine table salt, called Ashton salt. The ship carried on the same voyage about 100 kegs of powdered arsenic, which was stored on the main deck. During the voyage the kegs of arsenic spread, and were sifted over the sacks and impreg-produce, retaining the trade-mark of the plaintiffs, nated the salt with poison, that rendered it utterly unsafe and unfit for use, and valueless, or nearly so. The court held that it was the duty of those in charge of the ship to set apart the bags which appeared externally to have come in contact with the arsenic; that their failure to do so having driven the libellant

and leaving out the name of the plaintiffs' firm. By virtue of these and other considerations, the decision of the High Court was ordered to be annulled, and the decision of the Tribunal of Commerce reinstated, and compensation of the costs of the second and third instance was affirmed.

ALL communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication.

Communications on business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

A

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

DECISION of great importance upon the question of extradition was rendered on the 1st inst. in a Kentucky criminal court. One Hawes, who was treasurer of the city of Covington, in that State, was extradited from Canada upon a charge of forgery, and was tried and acquitted. He was then called to answer a charge of embezzlement, which is not an offense embraced within the provisions of the treaty relating to extradition. He refused to plead, and asked for a discharge without trial, and an opportunity to return to Canada. After an exhaustive argument by counsel, the court, Judge Jackson, of Louisville, delivering the opinion, granted the request. The opinion maintains that extradition is not a matter of natural obligation, but rests wholly upon express treaty stipulations, which cannot be extended by construction; that the enumeration of certain crimes in a treaty operates as an exclusion of all others, and that, without any express stipulation, there is an implied obligation to try for no crime other than those named in the warrant of extradition, and that it is the duty of courts to observe this implied obligation of a public treaty. The decision attacks directly the doctrine heretofore advocated in some of our courts, and upheld by our diplomatic officials in the Winslow case. It lays down, however, the only consistent, honest and safe rule, and the one always insisted upon by us. As the prisoner was discharged and immediately left for Canada, there is no probability that the question will be passed upon by the higher courts in this case, but we have little doubt that if it is, Judge Jackson will be sustained. The offenses for which extradition is usually allowed are numerous enough to embrace every criminal act that may be committed by an individual, independently of opportunity given by the injured party, and the government should not be put to the expense of bringing home for trial those guilty of other crimes. Besides, the rule heretofore insisted upon has led us, and is liable again to lead us, into international difficulties that embarrass the operation of the machinery designed to suppress crime. Most of the newspapers have taken strong grounds in favor of the rule we condemn, and have created an apparent popular sentiment in the same direction, VOL. 16.- No. 10.

but the decision of the Kentucky court indicates that this sentiment is not by any means prevalent, although it may be temporarily popular.

Upon the first of January next the Irish judicial system will undergo a transformation no less radical and important than that which two years ago took place in England. The new organization is to be very like the present English one. All the existing higher tribunals of Ireland, with the exceptions of the Bankruptcy Court and Court of Admiralty, are to be consolidated as "the Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland," and this Supreme Court is to be divided into a "High Court of Justice," exercising original jurisdiction, and a "Court of Appeal," exercising appellate jurisdiction. The Irish bench, under this scheme, will consist of the Lord Chancellor and two salaried appellate judges, and fifteen judges of first instance. These officials are to be reasonably well compensated - the Lord Chancellor receiving £8,000, or about $40,000 a year; the appellate judges £4,000, or about $20,000 each, and the other judges sums ranging from £3,500, or $17,500, to £5,000, or $25,000, per annum. In these new courts law and equity are to be concurrently administered, and all legal and equitable remedies are to be equally available in any division of the High Court. The "rules of court" to regulate trial and procedure are to be framed and issued in council by the Lord Lieutenants, on the recommendation of the judges or the majority of them. In other words, the Code of Civil Procedure now in force in England is to be adopted, with such modifications as may seem necessary to adapt it to the Irish courts. Thus another jurisdiction adopts the New York judicial system, and there is little doubt that other parts of the British Empire, where that system does not already exist, will soon do likewise. After that, perhaps Massachusetts and Illinois will try the Code.

In the New York Court of Common Pleas, on the 31st ult., Judge Robinson made some pertinent remarks in regard to the award of excessive fees to counsel in instances where large estates are administered by officers of the court. The case in question was one of assignment, being entitled the Matter of the Accounting of Scott, Assignee. A referee, to whom had been given the duty of passing upon the assignee's accounts, in his report awarded to various attorneys large sums for services. To an attorney who represented a creditor of the estate holding a claim of $134, was awarded the sum of $400. A special trustee of the estate was awarded $6,000, though his legal fees would amount to less than $4,000. The assignee was entitled to legal commissions of $11,392. The referee gave him $40,000, and his legal counsel $11,000. How much the referee was awarded for his own fees does not ap

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