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as a report by Mr. Bluntschli on Naturalization, the principles of which are given in an article from him in the Revue de Droit International, t. 2, 1870, p. 107.

The subject of naturalization has been fully examined in Lawrence's Wheaton, p. 891-931, and in our Commentaire sur le Droit International, t. 3, pages 183-266, and having had before me in the latter case the learned paper in question of Mr. Bluntschli, I shall content myself, so far as regards this topic, with referring for my views to the works mentioned.

The report of Mr. Asser on civil procedure (Revue de Droit International, t. 7, 1875, p. 374, et seq.), by requiring that a foreigner shall be admitted to bring a suit on the same conditions as an inhabitant of the country, meets some objectionable provisions of the French law, which creates exceptions not recognized by the jurisprudence of other States in cases which are not commercial, and where the plaintiff has not acquired from the goverment the right of domicile.

It also provides that the forms of procedure should be regulated by the law of the place where the suit is brought. The admissibility of proofs and their effect is to be determined by the law of the place where the transaction which it is intended to prove took place, and regulations are prescribed as to rogatory commissions.

treaties, many of the objectionable features of those now in force are avoided:

1st. It is incumbent on a State making a requisition to justify its competence. In case of conflict between two demands of extradition, the territorial competence should prevail over the others, and the quasi territorial competence over the personal competence. 2d. No State should be held to extradite persons under its jurisdiction (ses propres ressortissants); but in case of the refusal of extradition founded on this motive, the State on whom the requisition is made shall be held to prosecute the offenses committed by its citizens or subjects against the laws of the other party. This prosecution shall take place as soon as the demand for it shall be made, provided that the offenses indicated belong to one of the categories for which extradition is stipulated.

3d. The acts enumerated in the treaties as giving rise to extradition should be grave offenses belonging to the category of ordinary crimes or delinquencies, and should not relate directly or indirectly to political matters, nor to controversies purely theoretical, in the domain of moral, religious or social ideas.

4th. The demand for extradition should not be admitted after the prescription or limitation of the act or of the punishment is reached, according to the terms of the legislation of either of the two States.

5th. The proofs required to obtain the arrest of the accused in the territory of the State on which the requisition is made, and the other measures necessary for extradition, shall be regulated by the law and verified by the magistrates of the State making the

The article of Mr. Brocher, Études sur les conflits de législation en matierè pénale (Revue de Droit International, t. 7, 1875, pp. 23, 26 and 193), is the basis of the report on the penal laws. It commences by establishing the competency of the tribunals of every State to apply its penal laws as to the punishable acts committed upon its territory (competence territorial). It also pro-requisition. poses that the tribunals of every State should be deemed competent to punish, as it were by a quasi territorial competency, a certain number of acts which, though they happened abroad, affect rights which directly interest the State, or are found specially placed under the protection of the law of the country (competence quasi territoriale).

It is also proposed to accord to them the personal competence, so that the tribunals of every State may punish crimes or offenses committed by individuals of their own nation abroad; the punishment in that case to be according to the law of the place where the act occurred. The exercise of a competence, which, in virtue of the preceding rules, may belong, as to the same affair, to tribunals of different States, should be regulated by diplomatic conventions, sanctioning a just reciprocity, and avoiding as much as possible cumulative prosecutions or punishments on account of the same acts. The cases of personal or quasi territorial competence being from their nature more or less exceptional, should be announced, defined and regulated with care.

The report then enumerates several principles which, it says, should be sanctioned by treaties of extradition.

Having heretofore trespassed on you at much length, as well in discussing the admissibility under our institutions of extradition to foreign powers, either of citizens, or of those who have sought asylum within our territories, as in examining the conventional law of our own and other countries on that subject (see JOURNAL, vol. xiv, p. 85, vol. xv, p. 224), I deem it proper to translate from the circular the suggestions of Mr. Brocher, an authority second to none on the topics to which his pen has been applied. It will be seen that, while maintaining the power to make extradition

6th. When the extradition would have the effect of exposing the extradited person to inhuman proceedings, or those which are thoroughly outrageous, or to punishments contrary to humanity or to the municipal law of the State on which the requisition is made, it may be either refused or subordinated to the condition that such proceedings or punishments shall not be applied.

7th. The verification of the conditions, according to which the extradition may be accorded, should be confided in the first instance to the superior administration of the State on which the requisition is made, without prejudice to the right of the accused to have recourse to the tribunals of the same State.

8th. The person extradited cannot be tried without his consent, nor punished for any previous act other than that which has given rise to the extradition.

As to this latter point the circular says: "Our colleague, Dr. Von Bar, proposes the adoption in treaties of the three following rules, which form the conclusion of an article in press, and which will appear in the first number of the ninth volume of the Revue de Droit International:

1st. The extradited person cannot be prosecuted on account of a punishable act committed by him before the extradition, but not had in view in the demand of extradition, unless the Government from which the extradition was obtained gives its express consent for the special case in question.

2d. This consent should not be refused unless the new punishable act constitutes a political crime or a contravention of the laws of customs or impost. The consent shall moreover be given without regard to the greater or less degree of punishment to which the criminal act is subjected, or whether the offense is of the number of those which involve extradition. It is

for the Government from which the extradition has been obtained to decide whether it should accord its consent.

3d. The accused may adduce before the tribunals the absence of consent by means of a dilatory plea (exception dilatoire). It is not for the tribunals to decide whether the consent has been wrongfully accorded. The want of consent is no ground of opposition to provisional detention; but the competent tribunal should fix the delay for the production of the consent, after the expiration of which time, if it is not produced, the detention should cease. If the extradited individual remains at liberty for a suitable time, in the territory of the prosecuting State, the consent of the other State to the prosecution is no longer required.

The report of the second Commission relates to the treatment of private property during maritime wars, and is in furtherance of the conclusions adopted at the Hague, and which have been already given. There is an especial provision as to search, which limits it to an inspection of the ship's papers, unless they afford room for suspecting fraud, or furnish proof of it, or there are serious grounds for presuming that there are articles contraband of war. The following article would seem to be affirmatory of the decision of Sir William Scott, in the case of the Swedish convoy so much denounced by neutrals.

"The navigation of neutral vessels under a convoy of vessels of war of their nation, it says, is without effect as to the exercise of the right of search."

Though I have not, in any communication to the Institute, discussed the rights of neutrals, as affected by the decisions of our prize courts during the civil war, and which went beyond the most rigorous judgments of Sir William Scott in the British Court of Admiralty, I am indebted for the explanation of my views on the subject, to your citations from my argument in the case of the Circassian, vol. viii, p. 112 and p. 129, published under the title of "Belligerent and Sovereign Rights, as regards Neutrals," in which the British and American Mixed Commission overruled our Supreme Court. That tribunal had not only applied the rule of continuous voyages to a vessel captured on her voyage to a neutral port for which she had cleared, but assigned as a ground for the condemnation the violation of the blockade of New Orleans, which had ceased several days before the capture, by the surrender of the city and port to the federal forces. 2 Wallace, 135.

The third commission refers to the establishment of an international tribunal for maritime prizes. It owes its origin to a proposition of Mr. Westlake. At present condemnation by the prize court of a belligerent is conclusive as to the property in the ship or goods condemned, and for the absolution of the captor from personal liability as for a wrongful seizure. But it is not conclusive against neutrals as to the justice of the seizure or confiscation, for the neutral government or the neutral owner, through his government, may claim the payment of an indemnity by the belligerent government; and there are examples enough of such claims being admitted either by the direct result of negotiation or through the appointment of mixed commissions to examine and award on them.

According to Mr. Westlake, a series of treaties concluded each between two powers should stipulate, with the consent if necessary of their respective legislatures, that in case one of the contracting parties

should be engaged in a war and the other neutral, matters of prize affecting the neutral should be decided in the last resort by a tribunal sitting in the capital of the belligerent state, and composed of three judges of which one is to be named by each of the contracting parties and the third by a power or by one amongst several powers, to be designated with his or their consent in the treaty.

We have not space here to examine the merits of Mr. Westlake's proposition, which, as his suggestions always are, is entitled to the fullest consideration.

In France the prize courts are temporary tribunals, established at the commencement of every war, and their decisions are administrative rather than judicial. In England, the judge of admiralty had a special commission from the crown to judge on the prizes of war. Even that highly gifted and accomplished man (Sir W. Scott) was compelled to avow that he was bound by the King's instructions, and we all know that his decrees were liable to be reversed by the Privy Council, from whom those instructions emanated.

It had been supposed that the United States had in their constitution effectually guarded against any undue influence, even for patriotic motives, in their prize adjudications. From the grant "of all cases of maritime and admiralty jurisdiction" to the Supreme Court, the subjects of foreign powers had reason to rejoice that the decision of their rights had been vested in the same hands to which the people of this country had intrusted their dearest privileges. How far confidence has been impaired by recent events in that august tribunal, when questions of internal interest have been passed on by its members, it is not my intention here to inquire, but that the judges do not always bear in mind their international character, in cases where the interests of foreigners have come in collision with partisan prejudices, is shown in the letter dated August 4, 1873, of one of the most illustrious members of that tribunal, already published in your JOURNAL, alluding to the case of The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135, already mentioned.

"You refer," says Judge Nelson, "to the allegation on the other side, that there was but one dissent in the decision of the case in the Supreme Court. The truth is, that the feeling of the country was deep and strong against England, and the judges, as individual citizens, were no exception to this feeling. As to the feeling of hostility to England at the time, Judge Black told me that, after my dissenting opinion was read, one of the most eminent members of the bar said to him that the delivery of it was the greatest mistake of my life.'

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Now that the passions and prejudices of the hour have passed away, there are not, or cannot be, two different opinions in that case." ALB. LAW JOUR., vol. viii, p. 410.

The subject of the fourth commission relates to the conditions on which the customary law of nations of Europe is applicable to the oriental nations. To this topic I had occasion to allude when referring, in an article on Extradition in your JOURNAL, vol. xv, p. 230, to the treaty then recently published between the United States and the Ottoman power, which was the first instance, of which I am aware, in which a Christian nation had, regardless of the principle of exterritoriality, which has obtained ever since the renewal of commerce with the East, agreed to a surrender of individuals of their own civilization to be dealt with according to the imperfect jurisprudence which pre

vails in barbarous states. In the same article, I referred to the very able papers of Mr. Rolin, which suggested a species of protectorate or rather of guardianship in the Ottoman States, under the conjoint authority of the powers of Western Europe. This would seem to render inappropriate the discussion of the proposed topic under existing circumstances. In the paper to which I alluded, it was conceded that the rights of humanity required the active surveillance in the Turkish Empire of a foreign jurisdiction, the subject being treated as involving merely the question, whether that extrinsic power should be in the hands of one state alone, or of a coalition of the great European powers. The actual relations of the non-Christian States to the Christian States of the East, to which the intercourse established within a few years with China and Japan has given a vastly increased importance, form a very large portion of my commentaire," the publication of which, from causes beyond my own control, has been so long delayed, to my great regret.

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NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. Bastardy: defendant not entitled to the benefit of rea sonable doubt.-Bastardy cases are in the nature of civil redress, although the form of enforcing the remedy is by a State proceeding; notwithstanding this fact the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of reasonable doubt, applicable in criminal cases. Sup. Ct., Tennessee, January, 1877. Stovall v. State (Tenn. L. Rep.).

Contract in restraint of trade: what is not.-An agreement not to engage in photography in Charlotte for ten years is a valid contract. If such agreement was a part of the contract of sale of an establishment, it is immaterial whether the papers were signed at the same time or not. It is all part of one contract. Sup. Ct., North Carolina, June, 1877. Bumgarten v. Broadaway.

Eminent domain: transfer by corporation of right to acquire land, under power of.-A water company formed under the statutes respecting such corporations cannot prosecute proceedings for the taking of private property for the benefit of the stockholders of the company (as well as for the public use by it represented) in the name of another company. A company having commenced such proceedings cannot sell and transfer to another water company its right to prosecute them in the name of the original petitioner, or to acquire the property, nor can the latter company purchase such right. Sup. Ct., California, July, 1877. Mahony v. Spring Valley Water-Works (Pac. L. Rep.).

Grand juror: previous opinion of, does not disqualify. -The foreman of the grand jury that found the indictment in this case was one of the committing magistrates; such fact was pleaded in abatement to the indictment, urging the incompetency of the grand juror upon the ground that he had prejudged the case. The court say, we do not understand that our laws require that the grand jurors shall be free from any

previous opinion, as to the guilt of the accused." Sup. Ct., Tennessee, June 9, 1877. State v. Chairs (Tenn. L. Rep.).

Insurance: mutual insurance company: notice: assessment.-Notice by the insured to the agent of a mutual company of his desire to be no longer insured, does not destroy the relation. Such notice is not notice to the company. The insured is entitled to notice of assessments upon his premium note before suit for the same. The fact as to such notice in this case should be left to the jury. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, May 7, 1877. Buckley v. Columbia Ins. Co.

Municipal corporation: restraint of appropriation by tax payer.-While a tax payer may, perhaps, by injunction restrain the misappropriation, by corporate authorities, of moneys raised by taxation, yet, when an appropriation is to settle a disputed claim arising upon a contract not ultra vires, courts will not interfere. The fact that the remedy provided by the statute may be inadequte does not justify judicial interference. U. S. Dist. Ct., Minnesota, July 21, 1877. City of St. Paul v. McCarthy (N. W. L. Rep.).

Negotiable instrument: promissory note: signing as maker and indorser: signing as executor.--When one draws a note payable to himself, there is no contract until he indorses it to some one, and his indorsement then becomes direct, not a contingent liability. He is a maker in fact and is not entitled as indorser to notice of dishonor. The maker of a note who signs as "executor of the estate of A B," does not thereby limit his individual liability thereon. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, November 30, 1876. Aughinbaugh v. Roberts.

Negotiable instrument: indorsement in blank before delivery: presumption of guaranty: right to fill up indorsement.-If a note in the hands of the payee has upon its back the blank signature of a third person, the presumption, in the absence of proof, is, that such person indorsed as a guarantor. An indorsement in blank confers authority upon the payee of the note to write above it a guaranty, if that was the nature of the agreement and the intention of the parties. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Stowell v. Raymond.

Removal of causes: who may remove: acts of March 3, 1875, and July 27, 1876.-Under the act of March 3, 1875, the right to remove a cause from a State court to the United States Circuit Court exists in all cases where there are substantial parties, citizens of different States, on opposite sides of the cause, although there are parties on opposite sides who are citizens of the same State. The act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stat. 306), so far as it authorizes a defendant to remove a cause as to him, is not repealed by the act of March 3, 1875. A bill was filed in the State court alleging that certain property on which M. held a mortgage was subject to a trust for the benefit of the complainant, charging one G. with receiving the rents and profits, and praying an account of such receipts, and charging B., the trustee, with breach of trust. All the parties except M., who was a citizen of Pennsylvania, were citizens of the State where the bill was filed. The suit on the petition of M. was transferred to the United States Circuit Court. On a motion to remand, held, that the cause was properly transferred. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. Georgia, June, 1877. Girardey v. Moore (Cent. Law Jour.).

Removal of cause: whole suit must be removed: grounds of removal.-In the removal of a cause from a State to a Federal court, the whole suit must be removed; a fragment of a suit cannot come to the Fed

eral court for trial, because a party interested in that fragment, or some single issue, is a citizen of another State from that of the plaintiff. It is not enough that citizens of different States must be interested in the same issue or controversy, which arises in the course of a case, but they must have such an interest that when the question to which they are parties is settled, the suit is thereby determined, or the right of removal is not given. U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Illinois, June, 1877. Carraher v. Brennan (Chic. Leg. News).

Statute of limitations: trustee and cestui que trust.While the relation of trustee and cestui que trust exists, the statute of limitations does not run against the claim of the cestui que trust to the funds in the hands of the trustee. The law will presume an innocent rather than a wrongful intent, and especially will equity do so when it is necessary to preserve the rights of a beneficiary who occupies relations of confidence or dependence toward a trustee. Sup. Ct., New York, 1st Dept., June 1, 1877. Poillon v. Wilson (N. Y. Weekly Dig.).

Telegraph lines: real estate and, taxable.-Telegraph lines are considered as partaking of the nature of realty, in analogy to the new doctrine that railroads and rolling stock are so treated, and consequently under the act of March 24, 1875, such property is held by the court liable to State and county tax. Sup. Ct., Tennessee, January 20, 1877. W. U. Tel. Co. v. State (Tenn. L. Rep.).

Trial: counsel reading medical book to jury. It is not competent for counsel to read from a medical work either as part of his argument or as evidence to show that "the symptoms testified to by one of the witnesses was common in hysteria and that this latter disease was one of the exciting causes of paralysis.' Sup. Ct., North Carolina, June, 1877. Hoffman v. Click.

INFANCY AND RATIFICATION.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTSMARCH, 1877.

TOBEY V. WOOD.

H., a minor, was a partner of a firm which made certain checks in payment of goods purchased by it. H. remained a partner seven weeks after he became of age (during which time the firm retained the goods), and drew money for his own use from the firm. The firm was then dissolved. H. took an agreement from the other members that they would pay its debts. H. then supposed the checks had been paid. Held, that H. being an infant when the checks were made was not liable thereon, and his acts subsequent to arriving at age did not constitute a ratification.

Α'

PPEAL by defendant Humes from judgment in favor of plaintiff in the Suffolk Superior Court. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

MORTON, J. This is an action of contract upon two checks dated respectively December 2, 1872, and January 3, 1873, signed by Seth Wood & Co., and duly presented for payment and protested for non-payment. The defendant Humes, the only one of the signers who defends the action, was a member of the firm of Seth Wood & Co., and when the checks were drawn was an infant. His promise to pay the checks, therefore, was a voidable contract, and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that Humes, after he became of age, affirmed and ratified the contract. 2 Greenl. Ev., § 367, and cases cited; Reed v. Batchelder, 1 Metc. 559. Such ratification may be shown either by proof of an express promise to pay the debt, made by the infant after he became of age, which is not claimed

in this case, or by proof of such acts of the infant, after he became of age, as fairly and justly lead to the inference that he intended to ratify the contract and pay the debt. Boady v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517; Proctor v. Sears, 4 Allen, 95; Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 47; Pierce v. Tobey, 5 Metc. 168; Dublin & W. Ry. Co. v. Black, 16 Eng. L. & E. 558, note.

The plaintiffs contend that the facts in this case justify the finding that the defendant Humes intended to and did ratify his promise to pay these checks. These facts are, that a portion of the goods which formed the consideration of the checks remained unsold up to the time of the dissolution of the firm, which was seven weeks after Humes became of age; that during said seven weeks he drew money for his personal use, from time to time, from the firm, and that, at the dissolution, his partners, the other defendants, agreed with him that they would answer and pay all the debts of the firm. It is also agreed that at the time Humes became of age and until after the dissolution, he supposed that these checks were paid.

It has often been held that, if an infant purchases property, and after he becomes of age retains specifically the property and uses or disposes of it, it may be an affirmance of the contract by which he acquired it and deprive him of the right to avoid. Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, and cases cited. This is upon the ground that he can honestly retain the goods only upon the assumption that the contract by which he acquired them was valid, and therefore his retention and use of them, if unexplained, justly lead to the inference of a promise or undertaking to pay for them, after his incapacity to make contracts is removed. Todd v. Clapp, 118 Mass. 495.

But this rule cannot apply in the present case, because it is not shown that Humes knew that any of the goods which were the consideration of the checks remained undisposed of at the time he became of age, and it is shown that he supposed the checks had been paid. Under these circumstances there is no foundation for an inference of a promise by him to pay the checks. Smith v. Kelly, 13 Metc. 309.

The fact that Humes remained in the firm for seven weeks after he became of age, drawing money from time to time for his personal use, and that when he retired he took an agreement from his partners that they would pay all the debts of the firm, are relied upon by the plaintiffs as showing an affirmance of the checks. But we are of opinion that these facts do not afford sufficient proof of such affirmance. In this connection it must be borne in mind that Humes supposed these checks to have been paid. In the absence of an express promise to pay, an affirmance can only be shown by unequivocal acts of the defendant, after he became capable of contracting, which show his intention to pay the debt. How far those acts of Humes might tend to show an intention on his part to ratify such debts of the firm as were within his knowledge, need not be considered. It would be forced and unreasonable to infer from them an intention and promise to pay a debt which he supposed had already been paid. Crabtree v. May, 1 B. Monr. 289; Minoch v. Hadden, 25 Mich. 304; Dunn v. Stearns, 3 Cush. 372. It is argued that the taking an agreement of indemnity from his partners implies that he was liable for the debts of the firm, and is therefore evidence of a promise to ratify and pay such debts. This is not necessarily so. The contract of indemnity may have been

necessary for his protection against debts of the firm contracted after he became of age. But if this act is to be regarded as evidence that he supposed himself liable for all the debts of the firm, it is not of itself sufficient proof of a ratification. The act relied on as a ratification of a promise made during infancy must amount to or be sufficient evidence of a promise or undertaking to pay the debt. Smith v. Kelly, 13 Metc. 309.

Perhaps, if an infant member of a firm should, after he became of age, buy out his partners, take the property of the firm, and agree to pay all the debts of the firm, this might amount to a ratification of his promise to pay all the firm debts, whether known or unknown to him. It would be a clear expression of his intention and undertaking, after he became competent to bind himself, to affirm and pay such debts. But taking from his partners a promise that they will pay the debts does not imply an intention on his part to pay them. It implies that he desires and expects that they will pay the debts, and is as consistent with an intention on his part to avail himself of the defense of infancy as of the intention to waive the privilege.

Upon the whole case we are of opinion that the facts do not justify a finding that the defendant Humes, after he became of age, ratified or promised to pay the debts in suit.

Judgment for defendant Humes.

THE

BENCH AND BAR.

HE following anecdotes of the late Sir George Rose an English Barrister of some prominence, were taken by the Solicitors' Journal from a biography of that gentleman, printed for private circulation:

"In the 'High Jinks' of the circuit Sir G. Rose was a ready and clever actor, and was accepted as such on the very first evening of his accession to the circuit bar mess.

"At one of the mock courts of justice a barrister was that evening tried for some presumed and absurd offense. Of course he was found guilty, and, before commuting his punishment for a dozen of claret, he was solemnly condemned to death. Prisoner at the bar,' began the president of the mess, 'the sentence of the court is that you be taken back to the place from whence you came, and-' Rose sprang to his feet from among the assembled junior counsel: 'Mercy, mercy, my lord!' he cried, he's a Scotchman!'"

"His old friend, Mr. Becket, overtaking him one day in Chancery-lane, observed, 'I thought it was you, Sir George, walking so fast up to Southampton-buildings.'

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'Ah! you knew the Rose by the stalk!'

"At the master's office one of his clerks came into his room, exceedingly angry at the loss of his overcoat, which he more than suspected had been stolen by an attorney's clerk who was in attendance upon some cause then coming before Sir George, as master. 'Well, well, Hornidge,' remarked the inveterate joker, ‘if the suit's defective, we can't proceed!'

"In reference to his portrait, now in the board-room of the Law Fire Office, I heard him say a good thing. It was in the time of a general election that, coming unexpectedly into the board-room, he found it in the hands of the cleaners, dismantled, and his portrait turned with face to the wall: Though my canvas is neglected,' said he, 'I hope I shall be returned.'”

"When, some years ago, the practice of having daily

prayer in our churches was still a novelty, Sir George's own clergyman called upon him and asked his opinion as to its adoption. Sir George replied: 'I see no objection whatever; but I hope that in my own particular case-service at the house will be deemed good service.' Again, when a singularly matter-of-fact judge had related a story in which the listeners had failed after all their efforts to discover the faintest spark of humor, Sir George accounted for the circumstance at once. 'Don't you see?' he said; he has tried a joke, but reserved the point!'

"The fertility of his fancy never failed him, even under the most unpromising and incongruous circumstances. When he was appointed one of the four judges of the (now extinct) Court of Review, he came to Lincoln's-inn, with his colleagues, to be sworn in. Some friend congratulating him on his access of dignity, he observed, 'Yes! here we are, you see-four by honours.' In some case that was being heard before him in this court, it appeared that a picture of ‘Elijah fed by the Ravens had been given as part of some security. He handed down a note to one of the counsel in the case: "This is, so far as I am aware, the first instance on record of an accommodation bill!'

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A friend meeting him one day in Lincoln's-innfields, with his left eye greatly swollen and inflamed, remonstrated with him, adding that he was surprised Lady Rose should have let him go out of doors in such a condition. 'Ah!' replied Sir George, 'I am out jure mariti' (my right eye).

"Dining on one occasion with the late Lord Langdale, his host was speaking of the very diminutive church in Langdale, of which his lordship was patron. 'It is not bigger,' said Lord Langdale, than this diniug-room.'No,' returned Sir George, and the living not half so good."

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