note 2.

§32), include threats by private letter to the person charged with infringement; the words "or otherwise" not being restricted on the ejusdem generis principle to "or other means such as circulars or advertisements." Driffield etc. Co. v. Waterloo etc. Co., 31 Ch. D. 638.

Take by "purchase or otherwise" is authority to take by devise. Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 388.

In a provision that a county treasurer who receives any further money out of the treasury, "for fees, clerk hire or otherwise," shall be liable in an action on his bond, the words "or otherwise" comprehend every case of getting money out of the treasury other than that which the preceding section had provided should be legitimate. State v. Kelly, 32 Ohio St. 429.

It was held in Carpenter v. Mitchell, 54 Ill. 126, that the power given to married women to acquire property by descent, devise "or otherwise," was sufficiently broad to embrace an acquisition by purchase. See Haight v. McVeagh, 69 Ill. 624.

also

People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520; Re St. Philips Church v. Glasgow & London Ins. Co., 17 Ont. Rep. 95. 1. Jarm. on Wills 142.

See, however, Cheese v. Lovejoy, 2 P. D. 251; Margary v. Robinson, 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 44.

2. So the phrase in § 53, Towns Improvement Clauses act (10 & 11 Vict., ch. 34), relating to streets not theretofore paved and flagged, "or otherwise made good," refers to a process ejusdem generis with paving and flagging; i. e. otherwise made into an artificial road in a manner similar to that in which a

road is made by paving and flagging. Per BRETT, M. R., Portsmouth v. Smith, 13 Q. B. D. 184.

So the phrase "otherwise engaged in Manual Labor" (§ 10, Employers and Workmen act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 90), following, as it immediately does, an enumeration of employments exclusively manual, embraces only "people who are ordinarily known in the English language as working people

who exercise manual labor" (per BRETT, L. J.), and does not include an omnibus conductor. Morgan v. London Gen. Omnibus Co., 53 L. J., Q. B. 352; Q. B. D. 832. See also, per SMITH J., Cook v. N. Metrop. Tramways, 18 Q. B. D. 684.

The direction in the act, which is the foundation of the modern poor law (43 Eliz., ch. 2), that the poor rate is to be raised "weekly or otherwise," means "that it is to be raised at the outside annually." Per ESHER, M. R., Rex v. Christopherson, 16 Q. B. D. 7.

And perhaps one of the most instructive decisions as to the meanings of "otherwise" is that of CAVE, J., in Ex parte Tidswell, 56 L. J., Q. B. 548; 57 L. T. 416; 35 W. R. 669, wherein he analyzed the use of the word in several of the sections of the M. W. P. act, 1882, and as a result held that in § 3, a loan from a wife to her husband for the purpose "of any trade or business carried on by him-or otherwise," means trade or business carried on by him or otherwise in partnership with others or as agent, etc., and that therefore a wife is entitled to prove in competition with the general creditors of her husband for a loan advanced for private purposes wholly connected with trade or busi

ness.

cannot

Where a married woman claim a dividend in bankruptcy in respect of money lent by her to her husband for the purpose of any trade or business carried on by him "or otherwise," this does not apply to a loan for private purposes unconnected with business. Re Tidswell, 18 Co. Ct. Rep. (Pa.) 195.

The by-laws of the city of Boston provided that no inhabitant of the city, or any inhabitant of any town or city, whose dwelling house is less than twenty miles distant from said market, shall, at any time, without the permission of the clerk of said market, occupy any stand therein," with cart, wagon, sleigh, or otherwise, it was held that a stand may be occupied within

the meaning of the section by a person having a box within the limits of the market, containing articles for sale. In Commonwealth 7. Rice, 9 Met. (Mass.) 253, the court by SHAW, C. J., said: "The words are, 'with cart, wagon, sleigh or otherwise, for the purpose of vending,' etc.; and it is urged that, under a well-known maxim of construction, the word 'otherwise' can only include things ejusdem generis, and that, as all the articles in the enumeration are vehicles, capable of being moved by horses or cattle, it cannot include a box. The maxim is no doubt a sound one, but it is to be applied, with discrimination, to the subject-matter, with a view to accomplish the purposes of the act. The purpose of the by-law was to prohibit the use of a part of the market as a stand for the sale of provisions, with a receptacle capable of holding and displaying such provisions. Cart, wagon and sleigh, are specified; but it is cart, wagon or sleigh, with the horse removed, and used only for the time being as such receptacle. We believe that the species of sleigh commonly used for carrying provisions to market is usually called a lumber-box. Now the point of likeness to be regarded is, not the capacity of being moved by a horse, but the capacity of being used to hold and display provisions for sale. A box, there fore, of suitable dimensions to hold and display provisions for sale is an an article ejusdem generis, within the clause of the by-law. The same rule, we think, would apply to a bench, stall or table used for the like purpose." The foreclosure and sale of premises under a mortgage does not bar the widow's right of dower therein, though she was made a party to the foreclosure suit and suffered the billalleging her to have or to claim "some interest in the mortgaged premises as a subsequent purchaser, or encumbrancer, or otherwise" but not alluding to her as doweress-to be taken against her as confessed." The word "otherwise," according to the rule of construction adopted in all analogous cases, "means on some other like capacity." Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y. 502, 520.

clude lands descended from either parent. Roberts v. Jackson, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 322; Hoover v. Gregory, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 451; Towls v. Rains, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 357

A provision in a policy avoiding it in the case of "alienation" by sale or otherwise, does not apply to a conveyance by way of mortgage, while the mortgagor remains in possession, and there has been no entry for foreclosure. Jackson v. Massachusetts Mut. F. Ins. Co., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 418; 34 Am. Dec. 69.

A contract for the carriage of live stock which exempts the railroad company from loss and damages "in loading, unloading, conveyance and otherwise" does not exempt them from a loss occasioned by reason of the bottom of the carriage giving way. In Hawkins v. Great Western R. Co., 17 Mich. 62, the court by CAMPBELL, J. says: "The rule is usually applicable that, where no intention to the contrary appears, general words used after specific terms are to be confined to things ejusdem generis with the things previously specified. See also American Transp. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 385.

In a provision that real estate "actually purchased, or otherwise acquired," by any intestate is to descend to the father if living, or if dead then to the mother of such intestate, the words "otherwise acquired" do not in

In considering a provision that a county board may levy a county road tax on taxable property "which shall be expended under their direction in making culverts, grading, gravelling, ditching or otherwise improving such highways," the court by CASSODAY, J. says, "by a familiar rule of construction the words 'or otherwise' must be held to mean the improving such highways by the making of culverts, grading, gravelling, ditching or other improvements of a similar character, and not by the rebuilding of a bridge." State v. Wood Co., 72 Wis. 629.

So where a United States statute provided that if any person shall, by the exhibition of any false sample or by means of any false representation or device, or by collusion with any officer of the revenue, or otherwise, knowingly effect an entry of goods, wares, etc., at less than the true weight, measure, etc., such person shall be fined, etc., it was held that the words "or otherwise" must be interpreted to mean by any other fraudulent means." United States v. Bettillini, 1 Woods (U. S.) 654. See also State v. Fuller, 40 N. J. L. 330; Ham v. Missouri, 18 How. (U.S.) 126: Penfold v. Universal L. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 317; 39 Am. Rep. 660.

sonal obligation on them. Beresford v. Browning, I Ch. D. 30.

"Out of the Country;" Out of the State;" "Out of the Jurisdiction."-In a provi

sion that the statute of limitation shall not run against a person "out of the country," the words "out of the country" should be construed to mean "out of the State," not out of the United States. "When the legislature used the expression, "the country" it is natural to suppose that they meant the country for which they were legislating. Mensell v. Israel, 3 Bibb (Ky.) 514. See also Graves v. Graves, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 207.

Where it was enacted that the statute of limitation should not run in favor of a person who is "out of the State" at the time the cause of action accrued, it was held, that a person who was within the British lines during the war of 1812, and thus out of the jurisdiction of the State, was out of the State within the meaning of the statute. Sleght v. Kane, I Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 76. See also Whitton v. Wass, 109 Mass. 40.

In Meyer v. Roth, 51 Cal. 582, the court construed the phrase, "the witness out of the jurisdiction," as meaning without the State, "and so beyond the reach of any process of our courts compelling his testimony." See also JURISDICTION, vol. 12, p. 315.

Out of My Estate.-While the words "out of my estate," upon which much reliance is placed, if they stood alone, would indicate that the legacies were. to be paid from the general funds of the estate, they are controlled by the other parts of the will, and its whole general scheme. Stevens v. Fisher, 14 Mass. 114.

Out of the Profits.-An agreement to pay an annual sum "out of the profits" of a business, refers to net profits. Per PARKE, B., Bond v. Pittard, 3 M. & W.357.

Out of the Rents-A devise of an annuity for life to be paid "out of rents and profits" which prove insufficient to keep down the annuity, does not entitle the annuitant to a continuing charge upon the rents and profits after his death until the arrears are

satisfied, but only to the rents and profits during his life. Wormald v. Muzeen, 50 L. J., Ch. 776; Stelfox v. Sugden, Johns. 234. On the latter case, see Bell v. Bell, Ir. Rep., 6 Eq. 239.

Out of Term.-Under code of North Carolina, § 423, which, with regard to referee's reports, enacts that "either party during a term or upon ten days' notice to the adverse party out of term may move the judge to review such report and set aside, modify, or confirm the same." The words "out of term may move the judge," etc.. nothing further being provided in the statutory provision cited, mean out of term within the territorial jurisdiction of the judge as to that action, not beyond and outside of it, unless by the common consent of the parties. McNeill v. Hodges, 99 N. Car. 247.

Out West. Where a promissory note is not payable at any particular place and the makers have removed their place of business unknown to the holder, and on enquiry at the former place of business, the holder was referred to the agents of the makers, who informed him that they were "out west," held that this excused presentment. The common understanding of the phrase "out west" is "in the western States;" it means out of this State. Adams v. Leland, 30 N. Y. 309.

1. Lowndes on Average, II.

""Outfit' (in a fishing voyage) differs materially from what is comprehended under the term 'goods.'" Per ELLENBOROUGH, C. J., Hill v. Patten, 8 East 375

The word "outfits," in its original use as applying to ships, embraced those objects connected with a ship which were necessary for the sailing of her, and without which she would not in fact be navigable. Macy v. Whaling Ins. Co., 9 Met. (Mass.) 364.

The construction of the words "outfits" and "catchings" is, in the absence of any peculiar technical meaning thereof by the usage of trade, a matter of law for the decision of the court; and these words must have the ordinary meaning belonging to them in the language of common life and common sense, in the absence of any such

technical meaning. STORY J., Rogers 7. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 1 Story (U. S.) 603.

See also Hancox v. Fishing Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 132.

Outfitter.-A covenant not to carry on the business of a "ladies' outfitter" is not broken by a hosier selling, in the ordinary course of his business, certain articles also sold by a ladies' outfitter, although the articles so sold form a substantial part of the business of a ladies' outfitter. Stuart v. Diplock, 38 W. R. 224.

1. BRAMBELL, B., in Crosse v. Raw, L. R., 9 Ex. 209; and it was accordingly held in that case that the expense of sanitating a house, under § 10, Sanitary act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict., ch. 90), was an outgoing within a lessee's covenant to pay "taxes, rates, assessments, and outgoings." So the expenses of street paving were held within a lessee's covenant to pay "outgoings of every description for the time being, payable either by the landlord or tenant" in respect of the premises. Aldridge v. Ferne, 17 Q. B. Div. 212, in which Hill v. Edward, W. N. (85) 32 was doubted. See also Batchelor . Bigger, 60 L. T. 416.

So under an agreement for a lease at a rent "free of all outgoings," the tenant has to pay land tax and tithe rent charge, and the landlord is entitled to have a covenant to that effect inserted in the lease. Parish v. Sleeman, I De G. F. & J. 326; 29 L. J., Ch. 96; 1 L. T. 506; 8 W. R. 166; 6 Jur., N. S. 385.

The word "outgoings," in a covenant to bear burdens "is of the largest possible signification." Per BRETT, L. J., Budd v. Marshall, 50 L. J., Q. B. 26. But at the same page BRAMWELL, L. J., speaks of the word as "an awkward one:" "but the word 'outgoings' is certainly as strong as duties." Per GROVE, J., Aldridge v. Ferne, 55 L. J., Q. B. 5SS.

act, 1851, is an "outgoing" within a contract for sale of a house which provides that "all rents, rates, taxes, and outgoings shall be received and discharged by the vendor up to the time of completion." Midgley v. Coppock, 4 Ex. D. 309. So also is a liability for works done by a local board and chargeable on an owner by virtue of a statute, although the assessment by the board may not be made until after the date fixed for completing the contract for sale. Re Furtado v. Jeffries, 27 Sol. J. 466. Secus, of expenses of paving under vendor's implied covenant. Egg v. Blayney, 21 Q. B. Div. 107. But where, in a deed of gift, the tenant for life was to pay all "outgoings" during his life, it was held that that word did not comprise expenses of making up a road abbutting on the premises comprised in the deed, which work had been done by a local board in the lifetime of the tenant for life and on his non-compliance with their notice, but which expenses had not been assessed until after the death of the tenant for life. Re Boor, 58 L. J., Ch. 285. See, however, Re Bettesworth & Richer, 57 L. J., Ch. 749; 37 Ch. D. 535.

On a sale of leaseholds in which all "outgoings" are to be cleared by the vendor to date of completion, the vendor must pay a proportionate part of the rent reserved by the lease under which the premises are held. Lawes v. Gibson, L. R., 1 Eq. 135.

A bequest of leaseholds "free of all outgoings and payments except the annual and other rent" payable in respect of it, means that the testator's estate must pay the rent, taxes, and other payments in respect of the property up to his death; and after that time the legatee takes the property subject to the rents and the liability to perform the covenants. Re Taber, Arnold v. Kayess, 51 L. J., Ch. 721. 2. Bouv. L. Dict.