ies, L. R., 8 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 275; Shaw v. Morley, 3 Ex. (Eng.) 137; Bows v. Fenwick, L. R., 9 C. R. 339; Shillito v. Thompson, L. R., 1 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 12; Clapham v. Oliver, 30 L. T. (Eng.) 365; 22 W. R. (Eng.) 655; Williams v. Goldring, L. R., I C. P. (Eng.) 69; Sun Ins. Co. v. Hart, 58 L. J., P. C. 69; Young v. Getridge, L. R., 4 Q. B. 166; R. v. Shewsbury Gas Co., 2 B. & Ad. (Eng.) 216; Cork etc. R. Co. v. Goode, 13 C. B. (Eng.) 826.

American Examples.-The rule that where particular words in a statute are followed by general words, such as "and all others," the latter will be restricted in meaning to objects of like kind, will not be put into effect where it will defeat the legislative intent. State v. Williams, 35 Mo. App. 541, where it was held, that baseball was included in a prohibition against "horse racing, cock fighting, or playing at games of cards of any kind" on Sunday.

A statute authorized a county to pay a subscription "in money, lands, or other property." Held, that tax certificates were included in the words "other property." Hall v. Baker, 74 Wis. 127.

An act prescribed the fees of county judges and clerks of county courts, and made it an offence for either to receive any other or greater fees from "any guardian, executor, or administrator or other person." In a prosecution against a clerk for excessive fees in a suit, and in answer to the contention that "other person" is only some one who has paid more or greater fees than are allowed by law in some matter relating to the administration of estates, the court, while recognizing the rule for limiting general words to persons and things ejusdem generis, said: "This is but a rule of construction by which courts are to ascertain the intention of the legislature, and when that is apparent we are bound by it, and can no more disregard the intention in the exposition of a penal statute than any other." The court held that the true meaning of the act was to punish as an offence the taking of greater than the prescribed fees from any person., Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 687.

"Other estate," in a statute giving a remedy against any one suspected of having "fraudulently received, concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, effects, or other estate" of an insolvent, is not

confined to personal property, but extends to real estate. Although generally, "other" following an enumeration of particulars is construed as embracing unenumerated particulars of like nature only, yet here, the history and objects of the statute indicate that a broader use was intended. Carlo v. Tufts, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 448.

A Connecticut statute provides that where any injury is done to "a building or other property" by fire communicated by a locomotive engine, etc., the railroad company shall be held responsible. It was held, that the words "or other property" should not be confined to subjects ejusdem generis. Grissell v. Housentonic R. Co., 54 Conn. 447; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 358.

Where the constitution of a relief fund association provided for the relief of a member when disabled from following his "usual or other occupation" it was held that "other occupation" did not mean "or other of the same kind." Albert v. Order of Chosen Friends, 34 Fed, Rep. 721.

The Pennsylvania act of April 27th, 1855, § 8 (PI. 369), declares it "to be lawful for every lessee for a term of years of any colliery, or mining land, manufactory, or other premises," to mortgage his lease or term. Held, that the words "or other premises,” in view of the remedial purpose of the act, are equivalent to "other lands and tenements," and are not restricted to leases of the same or like nature as colliery, mining, or manufactory leases. Hilton's App., 116 Pa. St. 351.

In a Contract.-A contract with a reservoir company permitted the owner of a cotton mill to draw water to run his mill, or "such other mill or mills as may be erected upon his said privilege." Held, that "other mill or mills" was not restricted to objects cjusdem generis with the cotton mill, but that it applies as well to a paper mill. Phoenix etc. Co. v. Hazen, 118 Mass. 350.

Exemption Laws.-The horse, wagon, and harness, of an unmarried man, engaged in the business of assaying and sampling ores, are exempt from execution under the proviso of Gen. Sts. of Colorado, § 32, p. 602, that the tools, etc. "of a mechanic, miner, or other person," not exceeding $300 in value shall be exempt from levy and sale. Watson v. Lederer, II Colo. 577.

It was held, that a merchant's stock in trade was exempt from execution under a statute which exempts the tools, implements, working animals, books, and stock in trade, of any "mechanic, miner, or other person." Martin v. Bond, 24 Pac. Rep. 326.

In the By-laws of a Corporation.Under a by-law of a corporation providing that "the directors shall elect from their number a president, vicepresident, and such other assistants as are necessary," there is no room for the application of the principle of ejusdem generis to the words, "other assistants." Archer v. Whiting, 88 Ala. 249.

For other examples, see Collins v. Drew, 67 N. Y. 149; Ellis v. Beale, 18 Me. 337; 36 Am. Dec. 726; Brown's Case, 112 Mass. 409; Carr v. Wilson, 32 W. Va. 419; Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508; Flower 7. Witkosty, 69 Mich. 371; Higler v. People, 44 Mich. 299; Paterson v. State, 48 N. J. L. 386; Borough of Warren v. Geer, 117 Pa. St. 207; Petner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 366; State v. Solomon, 33 Ind. 450; State v. Broderick, 7 Mo. App. 19. See also 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 372, n. 1. Other Articles.-Under a policy which mentioned dried fish among articles free from average, unless general, adding also "all other articles perishable in their own nature," it was held that pickled fish were not in cluded. Baker v. Ludlow, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 289.

Other Banking Game.-The words "or any other banking game," in the statute against gaming, must be construed according to the intent of the legislature; and they include any banking game, though not named in the act. Randolph v. State, 9 Tex. 521.

Other Business.-See BUSINESS, vol. 2, p. 702.

Other Cases.-The statute (Rev. St. Wis., § 3323) relating to lien suits provides that "any issue of fact in such action shall, on demand of either party, be tried by a jury, whose verdict thereon shall be conclusive as in other cases." The "other cases" here mentioned evidently mean actions at law. Moritz v. Larsen, 70 Wis. 569.

Other Four-wheeled Carriages.-A clause in a turnpike charter, imposing

tolls upon "coaches, chariots, and other four-wheeled pleasure carriages," includes stage-coaches used for the conveyance of the mail and of passengers. Cincinnati etc. Turnpike Co. v. Neil, 9 Ohio 11. See also CARRIAGE, vol. 2, p. 737.

Other Cause.-See CAUSE, vol. 3, p. 45.

Other Device.-The words "or other device" in a statute against gaming are not so loose and vague as to be rejected. United States v. Speeden, 1 Cranch (C. C.) 535.

Other Felony.-Section 1, p. 445, Wagner's Missouri Statutes, provides that "every murder . . . which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony shall be deemed murder in the first degree." Held, that the words "other felony" here refer to some felony collateral to the homicide, and not to those acts of personal 'violence to the deceased, which are necessary and constituent elements of the homicide itself. They are merged in it, and do not, when consummated, constitute an offence distinct from the homicide. State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552.

Other Hereditary Diseases-In an Insurance Policy.-Where the question was, "Have the person's parents,

uncles, aunts, brothers, or sisters been afflicted with consumption, scrofula, insanity, epilepsy, disease of the heart, or any other hereditary disease?" it was held that the word, "other" indicated that the question was intended to be an enquiry whether any of the diseases mentioned had appeared among the relatives of the applicant in the form of an hereditary disease. Gridley v. North Western L. Ins. Co., 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 107.

Other Insurance.-See FIRE INSURANCE, vol. 7, p. 1012; LIFE INSURANCE, vol. 13, p. 631.

Other Lands and Real Estate-In a Statute.-A New Jersey statute enacts that if a husband devised to his wife any land or real estate for life, or otherwise, without expressing whether such devise to her is intended to be in lieu of dower or not, the said wife shall not be entitled to dower in any lands devised by her said husband unless she shall, in writing, express

her dissent to receive the lands so devised to her in lieu of her right of dower in the "other lands and real estate devised in and by the said will." Where testator devised lands to his wife for life on condition that she remain a widow, it was held, upon her not dissenting to the said devise, and afterwards marrying that she forfeited her right to dower in any of the lands devised by the testator, notwithstanding, the words, "other lands and real estate devised in and by the said will," from which it was contended that it was not intended to bar the right of dower in the lands devised to the widow herself. Stark v. Hunton, 1 N. J. Eq. 229.

Other Real Estate. In Gen. St. Minnesota, 1878, ch. 46, § 3, the expression "other real estate" clearly means real estate belonging to the deceased husband or wife, and the word "other" implies that the real estate which is to share with it the burden of paying debts is also the property of the deceased, which would not include property conveyed by him or her during life. Goodwin v. Kumm, 43 Minn. 403.

Other Sons. In a gift to second, third, fourth, and all and every "other sons" of A the first son, though not mentioned, is not excluded, but rather the word "other," "ex vi termini, includes the first" (per LORD BROUGHAM,

Other Memoranda.-Where a statute provides that in an action by or against an executor or the legal representative of a deceased person, in which his account books or other memoranda are used as evidence on either side, the other party may testify in relation thereto, it was held that it should be read "his account books or his other memoranda." Cary v. Herrin, 59 Me. 361.

Other Usual Projections.- Where, in a deed conveying land, there was an allowance of "steps, windows, porticos, and other usual projections appurte nant to said front wall," in a reserved space of 22 feet, it was held, that the word "other" imports that porticos are usual within the meaning of the deed, and therefore a porch falls within the exception. Atty. Gen. v. Ayer, 148 Mass. 586.

Other Valuable Articles.-See ARTICLES, vol. 1, p. 776, n.

Other Writs Necessary, etc.-A California statute provides that the supreme court "shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and all other writs, necessary or proper to the complete exercise of the appellate jurisdiction," the court following Webster's definition of "other," which is "different from that which has been specified," held, that this clause shold be construed thus: "The court shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and all writs different from those which have been specified, necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its appelative jurisdiction." Hyatt . Allen, 54

Cal. 357

167; s. c., 2 Cl. & F. 194, cited 2 Jarm. 215, 216). In Locke v. Dunlop (39 Ch. Div. 387), STIRLING, J., held, on the context, that "other son," had reference to futurity, and included only those sons who should be born after his sons who were in existence at the date of his will.

Other Terms.-Under a statute which provides that a plaintiff may discontinue as against any of the defendants upon payment of costs to them, as in case of a nonsuit, and on such other terms as the court shall direct, it was held, that the other terms spoken of in the statute have reference to the time of going to trial, the continuance of the cause, amendments of the pleading, etc., over which the court has full discretion, and does not give the court any direction upon the question of costs. Ganet v. Mears, 4 Wis. 308.

Other than.-"Other than" creates an exception. Wrotesley v. Adams, 1 Plow. 195.

Other the Issue.-In Allgood v. Blake (L. R., 7 Ex. 339; 8 Ib. 160), the words (at the end of a series of limitations in tail-special) "to the use of all and every other the issue," were read, not as excluding those before mentioned, but rather as completing a provision for all the issue, and as thus creating a vested remainder in tail-general.

Other then Surviving Children.Where a testator directs that the interest of a sum of money shall be paid to his son A for life, and on A's death that the principal shall be divided among his (the testator's) other then surviving children, and issue of any deceased child, A's issue are entitled to a share of the principal. Bell v. Smally, 45 N. J. Eq. 478.

palmistry, to impose upon the credulous." Per CLEASBY, B., in Monck v. Hilton, 46 L. J., M. C. 167. See further Ex parte A.-G., 41 J. P. 118; Rex v. Middlesex Jus., 41 J. P. 629; Re Slade, 36 L. T. 402.

Though under the county courts act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict., ch. 142, § 7), an action in the high court for an amount exceeding £50, but reduced by payment after action brought, could not be remitted to the county court under the words of the section "reduced by payment, an admitted set-off, or otherwise." Osborne v. Homburg, 1 Ex. D. 48; 24 W. R. 161; Walesby v. Goulston, L. R., 1 C. P. 567; Foster v. Usherwood, 3 Ex. D.1; 26 W. R. 91. See also Co. Co. act, 1888, § 65, and thereon Hodgson v. Bell, 24 Q. B. D. 302; yet, after issue joined, such an action, however subsequently reduced below £50, could be remitted under § 26, Co. Co. act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict., ch. 108), because in that section the words are "reduced by payment into court, payment, an admitted set-off or otherwise," and as "payment into court" must refer to something after action brought, the words "or otherwise" received their natural meaning. Gray v. Hopper, 21 Q. B. D. 246.

A provision in a private (borough) improvement act, that nothing therein contained should affect any right which the corporation might have "under the municipal corporation acts, or otherwise," is not confined to acts similar in kind to the municipal corporation acts, but extends to all acts. Taylor v. Oldham, 4 Ch. D.

395.

"A power to appoint 'by will or otherwise,' of course authorizes an appointment by deed." Sug. Pow. 211, citing Irwin v. Farrer, 19 Ves. 86; Van v. Barnett, 19 Ves. 110.

A condition of sale empowered a vendor to vacate the sale if any objection were made "as to the abstract of title, or the evidence thereof, or the conveyance, or as to compensation or indemnity or otherwise;" and WESTBURY, L. C., held that the word "oth erwise" would comprehend all other subjects as to which there might be an objection or a claim made by the purchaser. Cordingly v. Cheesebrough, 31 L. J., Ch. 621; 3 Giff. 496; 4 De G. F. & J. 379. See further judgment of ESHER, M. R., Terry v. White, 32 Ch. D. 14. So in the ordinary power

to trustees to apply capital in or towards "the advancement or preferment or otherwise for the benefit" of a person, the words italicised are not restricted by "advancement" or "preferment." Lowther v. Bentinck, 44 L. R., 19 Eq. 167. In this case JESSEL, M. R., said: "When I find the words 'or otherwise,' I am bound to say I don't know what is ejusdem generis". So a direction to make deductions from the income of a tenant for life, for all ordinary outgoings for "taxes or otherwise," was held to include cost of drainage works under § 73, 18 & 19 Vict., ch. 120. Re Crawley, 28 Ch. D. 431.

A gift of real estate, to hold "for ever or otherwise," according to the respective natures and tenures thereof, held to include leaseholds for years. Swift v. Swift, 29 L. J., Ch. 121; 1 De G. F. & J. 160.

Where a party to an action has to satisfy the court of any matter, "by affidavit or otherwise," that means by affidavit or any other sufficient means. Shelford v. Louth R., 4 Ex. D. 317.

An admission, "either on the pleadings or otherwise" (Ord. 32, R. 6, R. S. C.), may be in an affidavit. Freeman v. Cox, 8 Ch. D. 148; Porrett v. White, 31 Ch. D. 52; Laudergan v. Feast, 54 L. T. 369). Or even in a letter before action. Hamden v. Wallis, 27 Ch. D. 251. "JESSEL, M. R., used to say that one admission is as good as another." Per CHITTY, J., Hampden v. Wallis, 27 Ch. D. 251.

"Though an indictment will not lie for an offense newly created by statute where another method of prosecution is appointed, yet if the statute gives a recovery by action of debt, bill, plaint, information, or otherwise,' it authorizes a proceeding by way of indictment." Dwar. 673.

Ás to "dividends, profits or otherwise," subsec. 7, § 38, Companies act 1862, see Re Leicester Race-course Co., 30 Ch. D. 629; 53 L. T. 340; 34 W. R. 14.

Where a statute provides that "a debt due to a member of a company in his character of a member by way of dividends, profits or otherwise," shall be postponed to debts of their creditors, it was held that a director's unpaid fees fell within the proviso. In re Leicester Club, 30 Ch. D. 629.

Threats, "by circulars, advertisements or otherwise" (Eng. Patents, Designs, and Trade-Marks act, 1883,