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ORNAMENT.-See also JEWELRY, vol. 11, p. 984; BAGGAGE, vol. 1, p. 1043; ALTERING, vol. 1, p. 523, n.; TRINKETS.1

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ORNERY.—See note 2. L、velle for

ORPHAN.-A fatherless child; a minor who has lost either or

1. A will contained the following provisions: "To my niece, Louise E. Matthews I give my finger-rings and so many of my books, pictures and ornaments (not otherwise bequeathed specifically) as she shall choose to take." Held, that the word "ornaments" as used in the will was intended to include articles of jewelry, such as breastpins, bracelets, ear-rings, brooches, lockets, chains, etc., and also many articles not classified under the head of jewelry. "We have no doubt that the word "ornaments," in its general signification, and freed from any modification that might come from association in particular instances with other language, includes “jewelry" worn by women for the purpose of adding grace or beauty to their persons, or for the purpose of complying with the usages of society. Such is its meaning both in classic English and in common language. In Webster's Dictionary an illustration is given from Sir Thomas Browne, as follows: "Some think it is most ornamental to wear their bracelets on their wrists; others about their ankles." And the Jenkins of the present day in his descriptions of the costumes of ladies at evening parties writes, "ornaments, diamonds." In re Taylor's Estate, 75 Cal. 189.

Ornamental Structure.-Where a Baltimore ordinance permitted steps, porticos, or any other "ornamental structure" to extend nine feet into Mount Vernon place it was held that an inclosed porch or vestibule was an ornamental structure. Garrett v. Janes, 65 Md. 260.

Personal Ornaments.-A question arose on this phrase as used in the will of Dr. John Willis (physician to George III). He possessed an ivory toothpick case with a portrait of his father in the center, a gold pencil-case, a silver lip salve box, a gold eye-glass, a pocket-book and a case of instruments, which he usually carried about his person. LANGDALE, M. R., decided

that the pocket-book and case of instruments were not "personal ornaments." But as to the other things he said: "The question seems to be whether a thing that is ornamental and capable of being applied to useful purposes, is, or is not, to be considered as an ornament. There are some things of no personal use, a common ring, for instance, which may be set round with diamonds and be of extreme value, and yet of no use, except as an ornament; but it may be said, if you convert that into a signet ring and seal letters with it, in consequence of that useful purpose to which it is applied, it becomes an article of utility as well as of ornament. A shirt-pin is equally useful. A pencil-case certainly is useful as containing the pencil. The inclination of my opinion is, that though those things were capable of being connected with personal use, yet they were considered as personal ornaments in the sense in which the testator intended them. If you come to a minute definition, they may not be so; but at the same time they may be put in such a form and appearance that the ornamental part is paramount to the useful part, and consequently they might pass as 'ornaments.'" Willis v. Curtois, I Bea. 196. In the report of this case in 8 L. J., Ch. 106, the learned Master of Rolls is reported to have said: "I do not think that the tooth-pick case or the silver lipsalve box passed under the will." As the matter was settled between the parties, no decision was given except as to the pocket-book and case of instruments.

2. This word has not such a place in English language that any lexicographer has ventured to define it. Its use is generally to express the opposite of good qualities, and it does not in some of its uses differ from the words "common" or "mean." The court by GRANGER, J., in Wymer v. Allbaugh, 78 Iowa 79, says: "Substitute either of these words in the expression charged, and the legal

both parents.1

OTHER (See also OTHERS; OTHERWISE; OR; SURVIVOR.) Where general words follow particular ones, the rule is to construe the former as applicable to persons ejusdem generis.2 This rule, which is sometimes called Lord Tenterden's rule, has been stated, as to the word "other," thus: Where a statute, or other document, enumerates several classes of persons or things, and immediately following and classed with such enumeration, the clause embraces "other" persons or things, the word "other" will generally be read as "other such like," so that persons or things therein comprised may be read as ejusdem generis with, and not of a quality superior to or different from those specifically enumerated. Though this is generally the interpretation given to the word "other" when following an enumeration, it is not an inflexible rule, and in many cases the word has been held to be

status would not be materially different, and in such a case there would be no question as to the right of the party to prove what the understanding of the hearers was "

1. An orphan is a fatherless child. Soohan v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 9. Is one bereft of parents. Downing v. Schoenberger, 9 Watts (Pa.) 299. See also Jackman v. Nelson, 147 Mass. 300.

Orphan may be construed in remedial statute by contract and manifest intent to mean infant with living parents Ragland v. Justices, 10 Ga. 65, 71.

Though Johnson defines an orphan as "a child who has lost father, or mother, or both," yet where there was a bequest to A until 21, “provided she be left an orphan, unprovided for, and lives with part of my family," it was held, by WOOD, V. C., that though A's mother was dead, yet as her father was alive and as on him lay the obligation of providing for A, she was not an "orphan" as contemplated by the bequest. Guilmette v. Mossop, 7 L.

T. 190.

A charitable gift for the "orphans" of a place is good. A. G. v. Comber, 2 Sim. & St. 93; Russell v. Kellett, 3 Sm. & G. 264; 2 Jur., N. S. 132.

Orphan may mean either a minor who has lost both parents, or one who has lost only one. A devise for the benefit of the Roman Catholic orphans of a specified region is void for uncertainty, for the reason, among others, that it is impossible to determine whether whole or half orphans are

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Orphans' Business.-Constitutional provisions regulating the creation, powers, and procedure of courts for "orphans' business," are not necessarily confined in construction to affairs of orphans in the limited or popular sense importing death of parent. The phrase may be construed as meaning minor's business, to sustain a statute which authorizes such courts to appoint a guardian of a minor whose father is yet living. (Overruling 38 Miss. 417) Hall v. Wells, 54 Miss. 289.

Orphans Court.-In Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and perhaps in other States, the title of the court having jurisdiction to settle the estates of decedents. And. L. Dict.

The orphans court is not a court of common law, but a court partaking of the powers of a chancery and prerogative jurisdiction, instituted by law to remedy and supply the defects in the powers of the prerogative court, with regard to the accountability of execu tors, administrators and guardians. Wood v. Tallman, 1 N. J. L. 155. 2. Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. (Eng.) 99.

3. Stroud's Jud. Dict.

The principle of this rule, as regards statutes, was explained by KENYON, C. J., in Rex v. Wallace, 5 T. R. (Eng.) 379, wherein he said that if the legislature had meant the general words to apply without restriction, it "would have used only one compendious word."

In

unrestrictedly comprehensive, embracing every other sort or kind, whether ejusdem generis with the classes enumerated or not. the notes will be found a collection of cases divided into two classes first, where the ejusdem generis interpretation was followed;1 and second, where the word was held to have been used

1. Examples from English Cases of the Ejusdem Generis Interpretation of the Word "Other."-The leading case upon the ejusdem generis interpretation of "other" is Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. (Eng.) 99, in which Lord Tenterden laid down that rule of interpretation that has since been known by his name. The case was decided upon the English Sunday act, 29 Car. II, ch. 7, which enacts that "no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer or other person whatsoever" shall exercise his ordinary calling on the Lord's day. And it was held that the prohibiton did not apply to a stage coachman. This construction of the statute is all the more remarkable because the words in the act are "or other person whatsoever;" and also because the court which decided Sandiman v. Beach, 7 B. & C. (Eng.) 99, had only three years previously declared that the Sunday act "ought to receive a liberal construction, being for the better observance of the Lord's day." Ex parte Middleton, 3 B. & C. (Eng.) 164.

Following this line of interpretation it has been held that the same act did not apply to a farmer. Rex v. Sylvester, 33 L. J., M. C. 79. Nor to a solicitor nor an attorney. Peate v. Dickin, 4 L. J. Ex. 28.

In Thames etc. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 12 App. Cas. (Eng.) 484, it was held in construing the words "perils of the sea" and "all other perils, losses, misfortunes, etc.," that "other perils" must be ejusdem generis with "perils of the

sea.

An English act (11 Geo. II, ch. 19, §§ 8, 9), extending the common-law right of distress, enables a landlord to distrain upon all sorts of growing "corn and grass, hops, roots, fruits, pulse, or other product whatsoever." It was held that the general words "other product" do not include trees, shrubs and plants growing in a nursery garden Clark . Gaskarth, 8 Taunt. (Eng.) 481; Clark v. Calvert, 3 Moo. 114. And see also Rex v. Hodges, Moo. & M. (Eng.) 341.

according to rank, and general words (such as "other" persons and things) are superadded, the general words will not include persons or things of higher rank or importance than the highest named, if there be any lower species to which they can apply. Maxwell, 417, 418; Wilberforce, 183, 184. The case usually stated as illustrative of this principle is Ex parte Hill, 3 C. & P. (Eng.) 225, which decided that an English statute (3 Geo. IV, ch.71), which punished cruelty to "any horse, mare, gelding, mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, sheep, or other cattle," did not include a bull. But it may be doubted whether the rule, or the case which illustrates it, is of much practical value to-day.

For other English cases illustrating the application of the ejusdem generis interpretation of the word "other," see Irwell v. Eden, 18 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 588; R. v. De Portugal, 55 L. J., Q. B. 567; 34 W. R. (Eng.) 42; Re Parker, 29 Ch. Div. 199; 33 W. R. 541; Ex parte O'Hagan, 19 L. R. (Irish) 99; Re Robertson, 19 Q. B. D. 1; Crompton v. Jarrott, 30 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 298; Early v. Rathbone, 57 L. J., Ch. 652; Bailes v. Sunderland etc. Soc., 55 L. T. (Eng.) 808; 51 J. P. 310; Harrison v. Blackburn, 17 C. B., N. S. 678; Manchester etc. Co. v. Carr, 5 C. P. D. 507; Chasteauneuf v. Capeyron, 7 App. Cas. (Eng.) 127; Webb v. Bird, 10 C. B., N. S. 268; 13 C. B., N. S. 841; Powell v. Boreston, 18 C. B., N. S. 175; Morris v. Harris, L. R., 1 C. P. 155; Powell v. Farmer, 34 L. J., C. P. 71; Harris v. De Pinna, 33 Ch. Div. 238; R. v. Neville, 8 Q. B. 452; R. v. Mosley, 2 B. & C. 226; Holebrook v. Tickell, 4 A. & E. 916; R. v. Manchester etc. Co., 1 B. & C. 630; East London etc. Co. v. Mile End, 17 Q. B. 512; Chelsea Water Works Co. v. Bowley, 17 Q. B. 358; Casher v. Holmes, 2 B. & Ad. 592; Radnorshire v. Ibbins, 3 B. & S. 400; Reed v. Ingham, 3 E. & B. 889; Tisdell . Combe, 7 A. & E. 788; Wanstead v. Hill, 13 C. B., N. S. 479; Willis v. Thorp, L. R., 10 Q. B. 383; Merricks v. Cadwallader, 51 L. J., M. C. 20; Williams . Golding, L. R., 1 C. P. 69; R. v. Doubleday, 3 E. & E. 501; Lowther

It has been stated that when words descriptive of the rank of persons or things are used in a descending order

v. Radnor, 8 East 113; Kitchen v. Shaw, 6 A & E. 729; Bramwell v. Penneck, 7 B. & C. 536; Midgley v. Richardson, 14 M. & W. 595; Hedley v. Fenwick, H. & C. 349; R. v. Hall, 1 B. & C. 237; R. v. Spratley, 6 E. & B. 363; R. v. Dickenson, 7 E. & B. 831; Ward v. Folkstone Waterworks Co., 24 Q. B. D. 334.

Examples from American Cases of the Ejusdem Generis Interpretation of the Word "Other."-A statute gave a lien to "mechanics, tradesmen, or others" for labor or material. Held, that "others" following the enumeration of particular classes was applicable only to persons in the same category. Carlo 7. Tufts, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 453

The words "other persons," following in a statute the words "warehousemen" and "wharfinger," must be understood to refer to other persons ejusdem generis, viz: those who are engaged in a like business or who connect the business of warehousemen, etc., with some other pursuit. Bucher v. Commonwealth, 103 Pa. St. 528.

"Any works, mines, manufactory or other business where clerks, miners, or mechanics, are employed" does not include a hotel; for the general words "or other business" refer to some business ejusdem generis as works, mines, manufactory. Sullivan's App., 77 Pa. St. 107; Evans' App., 81* Pa. St. 302. The expression "other actions," following an enumeration of some wellknown common-law actions, does not include militia cases, bastardy cases, the assessment of damages under the Mill acts, nor the assessment of damages for laying out highways in the country. If all the actions enumerated are common-law actions, the maxim of noscitur a sociis is applicable, and raises a fair inference that the "other actions" were intended to be of the same description. Valentine v. Boston, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 201.

In a United States Statute.-In § 5388, Rev. Stat.U.S., which provides that every person who unlawfully cuts any timber standing upon the land of the United States, which in pursuance of law may be reserved or purchased "for military or other purposes," shall pay a fine, the words "or other purposes" must be construed as extending only to purposes ejusdem generis with military purposes. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 496: Leavenworth R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 742; United States v. Garrettson, 42 Fed. Rep. 23.

In Exemption Statutes.-The term "other person," in Rev. Stat. of Wisconsin, ch. 134, § 31, subdiv. 9, which exempts from execution the tools, etc. of "any mechanic, miner, or other person," does not include a judgment debtor who is a farmer. Bevitt v. Crandall, 19 Wis. 581. See also Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn. 89.

A statute exempted from taxation "every building erected for the use of a college, incorporated academy, or other seminary of learning." As all those enumerated were corporations, it was held that the general words "or other seminary" required that such institution should also be incorporated in order to have the benefit of the exemption. Chegaray v. Mayor etc. of New York, 13 N. Y. 220.

Clerical or Other Defects.-An act declaring that certain affidavits shall not be invalidated by "clerical or other defects," refers to "clerical or formal defects of like description." Duanesburg v. Jenkins, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 574.

In the matter of Hermanse, 71 N. Y. 481, in a statute authorizing boards of supervisors to correct any "manifest clerical, or other errors," it was held, that the term "other errors" must be treated as referring to matters ejusdem generis with the classes specified.

In Penal Statutes.-The expression "or other instrument in writing" in the Illinois Crim. Code is held to include only instruments of the same kind as those previously specified; i. e., bills, notes, checks, etc., for the payment of money, and not to apply to the case of a contract under which it was wholly uncertain whether the money would ever become payable. Shirk v. People, 121 Ill. 61.

Where a statute provides a punishment for obtaining money, goods, wares, merchandise, "or other property" under false pretences, it was held, that obtaining board and lodgings was not within the meaning of the words "other property." State v. Black, 75 Wis. 462.

Where a statute against gambling makes it a felony to carry on or conduct "a keno bank, faro bank, or other machine or contrivance, used in betting," it was held, that "other machine or contrivance" must be ejusdem generis with the keno bank or faro bank. Commonwealth v. Kammerer, 13 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 108.

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Statutes of New York, relating to offences of the nature of burglary, enact

in its comprehensive sense.1

that the term "building" includes "a railway car, vessel, booth, tent, shop, or other erection or enclosure." Held, that the general words must be limited to the same class with "erections or en closures" already specified, and that they do not include a vault intended and used exclusively for the interment of the dead. People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137.

For other American cases illustrative of the application of the ejusdem generis interpretation of the word "other," see White v. Ivey, 34 Ga. 186; Hall v. Byrne, 2 Ill. 140; Shirk v. People, 121 Ill. 61; State v. Stoller, 38 Iowa 321; Anderson v. Winfree, 85 Ky. 597; Opinion of the Justices, 52 Me. 597, 598; Levant v. Varney, 32 Me. 180; Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn. 89; Brailey v. Inhabitants of Southborough, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 142; Weld v. May, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 191; Commonwealth 7. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46; People's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 14 Gray (Mass.) 440; McDade v. People, 29 Mich. 50; American Transp. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368; Brooks v. Cook, 44 Mich. 617; McIntyre v. Ingraham, 35 Miss. 25; St. Louis 7. Laughten, 49 Mo. 559; Gumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444; King v. Thompson, 87 Pa. St. 365; Pardee's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 412; Monongahela Bridge Company's App., 17 Pittsb. Leg. Journ., N. S. 322; Renick v. Boyd, 99 Pa. St. 555; 44 Am. Rep. 126; Livermore v. Camden Co., 29 N. J. L. 248; State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 89; Cox v. Houston etc. R. Co., 68 Tex. 226; State v. Marshall, 13 Tex. 55; Stone v. Stone, 1 R. I. 425; Lynchburg v. Norfolk etc. R. Co., 80 Va. 247; Edison v. Hayden, 20 Wis. 682; State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496; Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. (U. S.) 117; Alabama v. Montague, 117 U. S. 602.

1. Examples of the Use of the Word "Other" in Its Comprehensive Sense, Embracing Persons and Things Not Ejusdem Generis with Previously Enumerated Classes. If the particular words exhaust a whole genus, the general words must refer to some larger genus. Fenwick v. Schmalz, L. R., 3 C. P. 316; Ellis v. Murray, 28 Miss. 129.

In Wills.-It would seem from the modern authorities that the ejusdem generis principle of construing the word "other" has little or no application in the construction of wills.

In Williams on Exrs., p. 1188, the ejusdem generis rule is stated as being applicable even to wills, but it is added that the rule is by no means of universal application. While Jarman, in commenting upon Lord Eldon's remark in Hotham v. Sutton, 15 Ves. (Eng.) 319, that "The doctrine appears now to be settled that the words 'or other effects,' in general, means effects ejusdem generis," declares that such a position seems scarcely to accord with the subsequent decisions. I Jarm. 757. See also Stroud's Jud. Dict., tit. Other; Theobald, 176, 177.

In Hodgson v. Jex, 3 Ch. Div. 122, it was held, that a bequest "of all my furniture, plate, linen, and other effects" comprised all the residuary estate of the testator.

And in Arnold v. Arnold, 4 L. J., Ch. 123; 2 Myl. & K. (Eng.) 365, the like effect was given to a bequest "of all my wines, and other property." See also Bunard v. Winchell, 28 L. J., Ch. 649; 1 Jarm. 751, 754, note; Johns. 276.

the

English Examples.-Within meaning of the English Prison act, 28 & 29 Vict., ch. 126, which makes it a felony to facilitate the escape of a prisoner, by conveying to the prison "any mask, dress, or other disguise, or any letter or any other article or thing," the words "any other article or thing" mean of any kind, sort, or description whatsoever; e. g., a crowbar. R. v. Payne, L. R., 1 C. Cr. (Eng.) 27.

Å statute enacted that it should be lawful for any two justices, upon complaint made upon oath that there was cause to suspect that purloined or embezzled materials used in certain manufactures, were concealed "in any dwelling house, outhouse, yard, garden, or other place or places," to issue a search warrant ordering a search of such places. It was held, that a warehouse occupied for business purposes only, and not within the curtilage, or connected with any dwelling house was a place within the meaning of the statute. Regina v. Edmondson, 2 El. & El. 77. See also Doggett v. Catterns, 17 Q. B., N. S. 669; 19 C. B., N. S. 765; Haugh v. Corporation of Sheffield, L. R., 10 Q.B. 102; Clark v. Hague, 2 E. & E. 281; Morley v. Greenhaugh, 3 B. & S. (Eng.) 374; Eastwood v. Miller, L. R., 9 Q. B. (Eng.) 440; Galloway 7. Mor

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