TABLE OF TITLES AND DEFINITIONS. See index for numerous sub-titles and definitions contained in the notes. Onus-Onus Probandi, 192 Open (to begin), 192 OPEN AND CLOSE, RIGHT TO, 194 Operate, Operating, 213 Operative, 214 OBLITERATION. See Alteration of In- OPINIONS. See Character; Expert and Opinion, Evidence; Wills. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL. See Attorney General. Opinions of the Justices, 215 OBSTRUCTION. See Impede; Logs and Opportunity, 217 Lumber; Mandamus. Opposite, 217 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW. OBITER DICTUM-See note I. OBJECT. The thing aimed at, the end sought to be accomplished; 2 whatever is presented to the mind as well as what is presented to the senses; whatever, also, is acted or operated upon affirmatively, or intentionally influenced by anything done, moved, or applied thereto.3 1. When a question is presented by a bill in equity, urged and relied upon in the argument, and passed upon by the court in the opinion, it cannot with reason be said that the point was not in volved and the opinion of the court on the question is obiter dictum. Buchner . Chicago etc. R. Co., 90 Wis. 264. Dicta are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument or full consideration of the point; are not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself. Obiter dicta are such opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside for the time from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects. Rohrback v. Germania F. Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 47, 58. See also DICTA, 5 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 661. 2. And. L. Dict. 3. Wells v. Shook, 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 257. Object Synonymous with Subject."Objects charged with internal tax" is equivalent to "subjects of taxation." Wells v. Shook, S Blatchf. (U. S.) 257. An attempt has been made by some to draw a distinction, because the act of congress used the word "object," while most of the State constitutions use the word "subject." We have seen that the 17 C. of L.-I 1 constitutions of Michigan and New Jersey use the word "object," and as the former State is the home of Mr. Cooley, that eminent jurist, in stating the purpose of all these provisions, would most likely have seen and stated the distinction, if one in fact exists. Moreover, if any distinction is to be made, it seems to me that the word "object," in the connection in which it is used, is obviously of broader significance than the word "subject." "Object may be used as having the sense of "effect"--the thing intended to be accomplished, not the means by which it is to be accomplished, which is properly the "subject." For instance, the object of the act in question was to confer the elective franchise on females; its subject was the subject matter on which, in accomplishing that object, the legis lative will operated, namely, the section of the Code defining the qualifications of electors. I do not, however, lay particular stress on the use of the word "object" instead of "subject" in our organic act. For all practical purposes the words are synonymous, as indicated by Mr. Cooley. Harland v. Territory, Wash. Ter. 131. 3 "Object of the Action" Defined and Distinguished from the "Subject of the Action."-The "subject of action" cannot be the "object of the action." The OBJECTION (See also BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, vol. 2, p. 218; MASTER IN EQUITY, vol. 14, p. 942; TENDER; TRIAL).-See note I. OBLIGATION-(See also LIABLE, vol. 13, p. 290; MORAL OBLIGATION; BONDS, vol. 2, p. 448; DEBT, vol. 5, p. 143).In a general sense, a binding; a legal recognition of a person's engagement or undertaking; an enforceable duty, assumed or imposed. In a stricter sense and much more common in practical jurisprudence, a sealed instrument containing an engagement or promise. It includes bonds and other writings similarly enforceable, but not having the form and all the characteristic incidents of bonds.3 "This word has two well defined legal meanings: one is where it is a name given to the contract itself; the other includes those cases where it refers to the duty imposed upon a person in connection with his contract, to perform it, or to a liability arising from his contract, or from his actionable tortious conduct. The "subject of action" must exist prior to the creation of the causes of action which are to be united; for the causes of action are such as "arise out of" transactions "connected with " the "subject of action." But the "object of action" is only brought into existence by the commencement of the action itself, long after both the "subject of action and the "causes of action" have had an existence. The "object of the action" is the thing sought to be attained by the action. It is the remedy demanded, the relief prayed for, and is no part of the "subject of action" or the "cause of action." Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan. 406. "Object or Refuse."-Where a testator devised a copyhold estate to A, "upon this express condition, that A should, within three months after testator's death, convey three specific leasehold messuages to A's three sisters, and if he should 'object or refuse' to make such conveyances" the devise to A to be void, and the estate to go to A's three sisters-held, that the words "object or refuse" do not necessarily express a positive act. It was assumed by the devisor that the grandson would convey if he did not object. That does not imply a request on the other side. Doe v. Crisp, 8 A. & E. 779; s. c., 35 E. C. L. 526. See also REFUSE. 1. When counsel "objected" to an instruction of the trial judge the court held, that the word objected should be regarded as having the same significance as "excepted." Elsner v. Supreme Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor, 98 2. Abb. L. Dict. See also Blair v. Williams, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 65. A valid, subsisting obligation may be said to consist of a legal debt, and the remedy to enforce it. Cocke v. Hoffman, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 112. "Obligation" is sometimes used as equivalent to "legal liability" or "legal duty." Crandall v. Bryan, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 48; Jefery v. Underwood, I Ark. 112. In its most extensive sense, synony mous with duty. And. L. Dict.; Crandall v. Bryan, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 55, 56; Sibilrud v. Minneapolis etc. R. Co., 29 Minn. 60. In its common acceptation it will embrace every duty imposed by the law, whether such be the creature of a statute, of a record, of a recognizance, of a sealed instrument, or of a simple conElasser v. Haines, 52 N. J. L. tract. IO. 3. Abb. L. Dict. See also Elasser v. Haines, 52 N. J. L. 10; State v. Campbell, 103 N. Car. 344. "Obligation' is a word of his owne nature of a large extent; but it is commonly taken in the common law for a bond containing a penalty, with condition for payment of money or to do or suffer some act or thing, etc., and a bill is most commonly taken for a single bond without condition." (Co. Litt. 172 a.) Ryland v. Delisle, 38 L. J., P. C. 67; L. Ř., 3 P. C. 17. An obligation is defined to be a deed first class formerly covered only sealed instruments, wherein the obligor was bound under a penalty to do a certain thing; but more recently it has been frequently extended to all written contracts."1 in writing, whereby one man doth bind himself to another to pay a sum of money or do some other thing. Shep. Touch., tit. Obligation, p. 367; Com. Dig., tit. Obligation (B). A deed whereby a man binds himself under a penalty to do a thing. Hargroves v. Cook, 15 Ga. 321. See also Smith v. Ellington, 14 Ga. 383. "Obligation," when taken in its legal sense, means a bond, or other writing in the nature of a bond, such as statutes, merchant and staple, recognizances, etc. If we take the word in its popular signification, as an act by which a person becomes bound to or for another, or to perform something, it will embrace every conceivable liability, written or unwritten, by which one man may be bound to another, and in regard to which there may be a several liability. To give it this extensive signification would produce serious mischief and disorder in the administration of the law. Strong v. Wheaton, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 616. 1. Exchange Bank v. Ford, 7 Colo. 314. Obligation has also a very broad and comprehensive legal significance, and embraces all instruments of writing, however informal, whereby one party contracts with another for the payment of money or for the delivery of specific articles. State v. Campbell, 103 N. Car. 344. See also Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 353; Sinton v. Carter Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 535, 538. Equivalent to Liability. In an Ohio statute, which provides that attachment may issue when the defendant has "fraudulently or criminally contracted the debt, or incurred the obligation on which suit is about to be or has been brought," obligation is equivalent to liability. Sturdevant v. Tuttle, 22 Ohio St. III. Not an Obligation but a Testamentary Paper.-"MD., September 4th, 1884.At my death, my estate or my executor pay to July Ann Cover the sum of three thousand dollars. Columbus Cover. Witness: David Engel of P. [Seal.]" The above instrument was held to be a testamentary paper and not an obligation for the payment of money, and no recovery could be had thereon. Cover v. Stern, 17 Md. 449. In Statute.-Obligation, as used in the Delaware act declaring that "an obligation or written contract of several persons shall be joint and several, unless otherwise expressed," does not apply to a negotiable promissory note. Gale v. Myers, 4 Houst. (Del.) 546. The words, bonds or other obligations, in a statute do not include promissory notes. Rippon v. Townsend, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 445. Obligation, as used in the Pennsylvania act of 1850, declaring that the assignees of an insolvent bank shall receive in payment of debts due the bank, "its own notes and obligations and the checks of its depositors at par," does not apply to a protested draft. Basehore v. Rhodes, 85 Pa. St. 44. Whenever the word "obligation" is used in a statute as the name of a contract, as it is in the sections now under consideration, an agreement in writing sealed or unsealed is referred to. Where in a legislative provision, it is used with reference to legal duty or liability, such duty or liability may arise from an oral or written contract, or in some instances from actionable tortious conduct. Exchange Bank v. Ford, 7 Colo. 314. "False, forged, and counterfeited obligation of the United States" occurring. Rev. St. U. S., § 5431. Coin is not an obligation of the United States, but is the thing itself--money. United States v. Owens, 37 Fed. Rep. 115. The term obligation, in a statute providing that persons severally liable on the same obligation or instrument, etc., may be included in the same action at the plaintiff's option, should be construed in its legal meaning. Such a provision does not embrace causes of action not evidenced by a writing. In the legal sense, "obligation" means a bond, or other writing in the nature of a bond, such as statutes merchant and staple, recognizances, etc. If the word in such an enactment is taken in its popular signification, of any act by which a person becomes bound to or for another, or to perform something, the statute will embrace every conceivable liability, written or unwritten, by which one man may be bound to another, and in regard to which there may be a several liability; which is not intended and would be inconvenient. Strong v. Wheaton, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 616. |