complainant omitted in her bill to state a number of facts which it might be material to consider when the case came on for hearing.

Held, that, as a demurrer must be founded on facts alleged by, and appearing on, the bill, if any facts are not alleged in the bill of which the respondent desires to avail himself, his proper course is not to demur to the bill, but to plead those facts, and on the facts so pleaded to ground his defence.

Demurrer therefore overruled.

It seems, also, that the ground of want of jurisdiction. ought to be made the subject of a distinct demurrer, and should not be incorporated with want of equity in one demurrer.

Vice-Chancellor Wood's Court.

EVANS v. CARRINGTON.

Divorce Marriage settlement.

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Where the English Divorce Court has dissolved a marriage, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit to declare void or vary the provisions of the marriage settlement.

Rolls Court.

PASCOE v. SWAN.

Occupation by one tenant in common-Infancy of the other tenant

Entry.

Where there were two tenants in common, one of whom (the plaintiff) was an infant when his title accrued, and the other (the defendant) had been in actual occupation of the property at the death of the infant's mother, the former tenant in common, and had continued in such occupation during the infancy of the plaintiff,

Held, that the occupation of the defendant was an entry on the estate of the infant, and therefore that he was liable to account for rents and profits, under the statute of Anne, although he had not received any rent, and that he must pay an occupation rent.

HAINES v. BURNETT.

Agreement for a lease, with conditions-Covenant not to assign. A memorandum of agreement for a lease contained a

stipulation that the lease should contain a covenant that the lessee should not assign unless to a person approved by the lessor, and also all usual covenants. The draft lease contained a condition that the lease should be determined by the lessee becoming bankrupt or insolvent, or making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or in the event of an execution being levied under a judgment against the lessee.

Held, that the conditions in the draft lease were warranted by the stipulations contained in the memorandum which prohibited assignment without license.

Exeter Quarter Sessions.

MOORE v. GARDINER.

Turnpike tolls and the Rifle corps.

Mr. Gardiner, the lessee of the turnpike tolls, and a member of the Exeter and South Devon Rifle Corps, was summoned by Captain Moore, of the first company of the battalion, for illegally taking toll, on the 9th January inst. Toby appeared for the defendant; Mr. Moore conducted his own case.

Mr. Moore said this information was laid under the 3 Geo. IV. c. 126, § 32, which exempted from toll all carriages carrying infantry volunteers to and from any place of drill, muster, or inspection, or occupied in any other duty, in accordance with the regulation of their corps.

Mr. Moore was then sworn, and stated that he was the captain of the first company of the Exeter and South Devon Rifle Battalion, which was an infantry corps. On the 9th January inst., he, in company with two other officers of the corps, in full dress, were proceeding towards Exmouth in a hired carriage. On passing through Mount Radford gate, on the Topsham road, he drew up, and said to the toll-collector, "I claim exemption as belonging to a company of infantry volunteers, and being in uniform and armed." The collector said he must have the toll, which was a shilling. Complainant said he would pay it under protest, which he did. He was on his way to Exmouth on duty. The Woodbury and Topsham Artillery were inspected there on that day, and the Exmouth Rifle Corps were also under arms. Complainant went to take part in the proceedings of the Rifle Corps.

Cross-examined by Toby.-The two officers in the carriage with him were Lieut. Vallance and Ensign Clarke. All were in full uniform. The rifle company was formed under the 44 Geo. III., and acted solely under it, with the exception of certain regulations since framed by the War Office. The Exmouth Company of Rifles were a portion of the Exeter Battalion; but they had their own captain and officers. He did not go down for the purpose of witnessing the artillery inspection, but to take the command of the rifles as senior captain. He had no command to go, but he had heard from Sir Edmund Prideaux that the Rifles would be under arms that day. He was not invited by Captain Brent, of the Artillery Company. Both the other officers were not seniors, and had no commands to go to Exmouth. They were bound to obey their commanding officer.

Toby then addressed the bench for the defendant. The Rifle Corps were, he submitted, framed under the 44 Geo. III. § 13, c. 54, which exempted field officers when on duty from the toll, provided they had their accoutrements; but he contended that they must be on horseback; and that the act which had been quoted by Mr. Moore did not apply at all in this case. That act related to a company ordered on the march, and where carriages were used for the conveying of baggage, etc. Any officer in the Rifles might put on his uniform and hire a carriage, and say he was free from toll, according to the complainant's ruling. The magistrates had decided, in the case of the Yeomanry Cavalry, that where they sent on their horses and baggage, and rode together in a trap, they were liable to pay toll. This was, he contended, a similar case: if Mr. Moore had been on horseback, he admitted he would have been free from toll. But then arose the question, Were they all on duty? If the magistrates decided against him on his ruling of the law, he (Mr. Toby) argued that, although Captain Moore (as senior captain) might have a right to go to Exmouth, the other officers were not seniors, and were under no commands, and therefore toll was legally due, they being in the carriage.

Mr. Pitman asked Mr. Moore if the other officers were on duty.

Mr. Moore.-I desired them to accompany me.

Mr. Davy said a desire was not a command.

The magistrates retired for consultation, and on their return into court,

The Chairman said the bench were of opinion that toll was legally payable in this case.

Mr. Moore said the question was one of great importance, as deciding a principle; and, as the question would probably be fought in another court, he should feel obliged if the magistrates would state on what grounds they had decided the case.

Mr. Drake (magistrates' clerk) said the bench did not consider that the present was a carriage conveying volunteer infantry within the meaning of the exemption mentioned in the act.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

REPORT OF THE CASE, PEOPLE V. WILLIAM TYLER: decided in the Supreme Court of Michigan, October, 1859. By T. M. COOLEY, State Reporter. Detroit, 1859.

This is the report of an important case turning upon the construction of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1857, in addition to an act more effectually to provide for the punishment of crimes against the United States.

The defendant was indicted in the State Circuit Court of Michigan for St. Clair County, for the murder of one Henry Jones, and the indictment set forth that said Jones was wounded by a pistol bullet, shot by defendant on board the brig Concord, then and there being on the river St. Clair,. on navigable waters without the limits of the State of Michigan, from which wound the said Jones afterwards, in the City of Port Huron, in said County of St. Clair and State of Michigan, did die. The clause of the statute of Michigan, under which the indictment was framed, is as follows: "If any ... mortal wound shall be given, or other violence or injury shall be inflicted, or poison administered, on the high seas, or on any other navigable waters, or on land either within or without the limits of this State, by means whereof death shall ensue in any county thereof, such offence may be prosecuted and punished in the county where such death may happen;" and there was no question that the State court had jurisdiction of the cause, unless it was concluded by the facts set forth in the following plea ::

The defendant pleaded to the indictment that theretofore, to wit: at a special term of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Michigan, begun and holden, &c. he, the said defendant, was indicted, convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced, for the same offence as that charged in the present indictment, and had subsequently served out the imprisonment and paid the fine then imposed upon him; that the said Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Michigan, had full power, authority, and jurisdiction to try said offence under the act of the 3d of March, 1857, which enacts that if any person or persons upon the high seas, or any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of any particular State shall, unlawfully and wilfully,

but without malice aforethought, strike, stab, wound, or shoot at any other person, of which striking, stabbing, wounding, or shooting, such person shall afterwards die upon land within or without the United States, every person so offending, his or her counsellors, aiders, and abettors, shall be deemed guilty of the crime of manslaughter, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished," being tried in the United States Circuit Court, as is further provided in said act; wherefore the defendant ought not now to be held to answer to the same cause of action.

The prosecuting attorney for replication to the plea, admitting the fact of indictment, trial, sentence, and conviction by the Circuit Court of the United States, to be true as set forth in the plea, set up that the shooting charged was done beyond the boundary line between the United States and the province of Canada, and within the geographical boundaries of said province, and of the County of Lambton in said province, without the limits of the United States, and without the boundaries of the State of Michigan and of the County of St. Clair, and without the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.

To this replication defendant demurred, and the prosecution joined in demurrer.

And thereupon the circuit judge reserved for the opinion of this court the following questions:

First. Had the United States, at the time of the said conviction and judgment, admiralty jurisdiction over that part of the waters of the river St. Clair, which is without the boundaries of the United States, and within the boundaries of the County of Lambton, in the province of Canada, within the intent and meaning of the act of Congress entitled, "An Aet in addition to an Act more effectually to provide for the punishment of crimes against the United States, and for other purposes," approved March 3, 1857.

Second. Was the shooting of Henry Jones, by the defendant, in the manner, and under the circumstances set forth in the said plea and replication, and in the place set forth, in the said replication, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, for the seventh circuit and district of Michigan, under the said first section of the act of Congress aforesaid?

The case was very thoroughly argued on these points, as appears from the report, and all the judges delivered elaborate opinions, except MARTIN, C.J. who briefly expressed his views. They unanimously answer both questions in the negative; and thus deny that the Circuit Court of the United States had any jurisdiction over the case, and regard the conviction by that court as coram non judice, which of course could not bar a subsequent indictment for the same cause.

The questions thus considered and determined are of much importance, especially in that portion of the country bordering upon the great lakes. From the action of the Circuit Court of the United States in taking cognizance of the indictment brought in that court, it is hardly to be inferred that that court formed an opinion adverse to that arrived at by the State court, as the points were not made in the Circuit Court of the United States, and jurisdiction was assumed by that court as a matter of course.

The foregoing decision having been certified to the State Circuit Court of Michigan for St. Clair County, the case was brought to trial in that court at the last November term, and defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to imprisonment in the State prison for six years. The former punishment, inflicted by the United States Circuit Court, was imprisonment for thirty days and a fine of one dollar.