As to the question of the application of the Statute of Limitation to this case, as suggested in Section 315 of the Act, our position has been stated so frequently that we will not enter into any detailed discussion at this time. The Statute does not apply to cases such as this; we refer to the following cases: Hewitt v. Ballard Knitting Co., 6 Dept. Rep. 894; O'Brien v. Chartiers, 4 Dept. Rep. 1646; Dowling v. Hurwitz, 242 December Term, 1919, Luzerne County, 6 Dept. Rep. 1087.

Concurred in by Commissioners Houck and Jarrett.

IN RE PETITION OF KOCH.

Practice, Q. S.-Fornication and Bastardy-Failure to Comply With Sentence-Discharge from Imprisonment Act 24 May, 1917, P. L. 268, as Superseding Act 4 June, 1901, Sec. 6, P. L. 404.

A defendant guilty of fornication and bastardy who has been committed to jail for failure to comply with the sentence of the Court is not entitled to a discharge from imprisonment after being confined for three months. Procedure in such cases is no longer regulated by Sec. 6 of the Insolvent Act 4 June, 1901, P. L. 404, but by Act 24 May, 1917. P. L. 268.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County.
Insolvent Docket No. 3, page 192.

Fornication and Bastardy:-Rule for discharge from imprisonment.

Leonard G. Yoder, for rule.

H. Robert Mays, District Attorney, contra.

Opinion by Endlich, P. J., June 26, 1920.-Pleading guilty to an indictment charging fornication and bastardy, the petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of $25, the costs of prosecution, lying-in expenses and maintenance to the date of sentence, and the sum of $2.00 per week for the support of the child until seven years of age, as well as to enter into a recognizance in the sum of $500 and stand committed until all this be complied with. Unable to make the payments required by this sentence, the petitioner was committed to the Berks

County Jail and has been confined there for three months. He now asks under the Insolvent Laws to be relieved from the payment of the fine, costs, and support and maintenance, and to be finally discharged from imprisonment. Upon his petition this rule was entered. It is resisted by the District Attorney.

Under sec. 6 of the Insolvent Act 4 June 1901, P. L. 404, as under sec. 15 of that of 16 June 1836, P. L. 733, a defendant convicted in a fornication and bastardy case is entitled to be discharged upon compliance with the requisitions of the statute, including an imprisonment for a certain period according to the amount of the fine; and in conformity with other portions of the statute referred to, when so discharged he is not thereafter liable to arrest in the same proceedings upon any claim existing at the time. If this were all that is to be considered in the disposition of this rule, the Court might possibly be bound to make it absolute. But the familiar principle of statutory interpretation that all enactments in pari materia are to be looked at together, requires a consideration of Act 24 May 1917, P. L. 268, which gives additional and increased powers to, and imposes further duties upon, the Court in dealings with fathers of illegitimate children upon non-compliance with the order of the Court in fornication and bastardy cases, which powers and duties are hardly consistent with an unconditional right in the defendant to a final discharge. The Court having jurisdiction is empowered, and indeed required, to exact from such defendant a bond with security, or on the failure to furnish such to commit the defendant to prison at hard labor, or discharge him upon his own recognizance in the custody of a probation officer, subject to such conditions as the Court may, in its discretion, impose. Whilst it is not perceived how the Act 11 July 1917, P. L. 773, amended by Act 21 July 1919, P. L. 1075, can affect the questions arising in this case, it seems very manifest that the powers and duties of the Court as above pointed out, under Act 24 May 1917, negative any right in the defendant to an absolute discharge under the Insolvent Law, and that the application for relief by him, and the action of the Court upon. it, must pursue the provisions of Act 24 May 1917,-as, indeed, it seems to have been ruled in Com'th vs. Ran

dolph, 66 Pittsb. L. J. 777.

The conclusion is that the prayer of the defendant's petition is too broad to be granted by the Court, that it must be refused for that reason, and that the defendant be remitted to his remedy conformably to the Act of 1917. The rule to show cause is discharged, with leave to the defendant to amend the prayer of his petition so as to conform it to the Act 24 May 1917, as pointed out in the foregoing opinion.

ing.

DAVIDSON v. DAVIDSON.

Equity-Husband and Wife-Real Estate Trusts-Account

A. files a bill against B. to compel B. to account for one half rent received from a lot of ground and for a decree compelling B. to convey one half interest in said Real Estate to A.

A. and B. were husband and wife and during a considerable part of their married career A. the husband would turn all his earnings over to B. and on other occasions would give her gifts of stock and jewelry. While living under these conditions B. the wife took title to double dwelling house and lot, at the time of passing of title certain Building and Loan stock was transferred from the husband to the wife and used by the wife as collateral for a mortgage secured on the above premises.

It was also shown that the wife had some separate earnings which she used in the purchase of this property. At the time that the property was purchased according to the evidence the cash used in making the settlement was earned by the wife, the Building and Loan stock put up as collateral was the gift on the part of the husband, therefore all of the money put into the property at its purchase was that of the wife.

Although the wife may have stated that the property was "Our houses' such declarations do not fix a trust in behalf of the husband. Besides the bill as filed alleges a one-half interest in the two houses, but the evidence on the part of A. was to the fact that title to one house was to be taken in his name, the proof and the prayer of the plaintiff. must agree.

The evidence as produced by A. failed to fix any resulting trust in his favor and all that went in to the purchase of the houses was the property of B. either by her own earnings or by gifts from her husband.

A. is further barred from recovery because of his laches, he was present at the time of settlement and the bill was not filed for more than five years after title passed.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. Equity. No. 1, February Term, 1920. Hearing on Bill, answer, replication and proofs.

A. Allen Woodruff and Clement B. Wood, Attys. for Plaintiff.

Evans, High, Dettra & Swartz, Attys. for Defendant.

Opinion by Swartz, P. J., July 19, 1920.

The plaintiff filed his bill against the defendant to compel her to account to him for one half the rents received by her from a lot of ground and dwelling house erected thereon, situate in Haverford, Montgomery County, and also for a decree requiring her to convey the one half interest in said real estate to the complainant. He alleges, in his bill, that the said property was purchased with his money, and that it was agreed between plaintiff and defendant that title should be taken, one half in his name, and the other half in the defendant's name. He avers that his wife fraudulently had the deed for the entire property placed in her own name, and that she retained all the income arising out of the same from the time of the purchase of the lot.

The defendant answers, that she purchased the real estate with her own funds and with property presented to her by the plaintiff. She also denies that there was any fraud in taking the title in her own name. She avers that the plaintiff was present at the time the conveyance was made and that she took title in her name with his knowledge and consent.

FINDINGS OF FACT.

1. The plaintiff and defendant were married on April 11, 1908. They have one child, Frances Marie, now ten years old. They lived together happily until about January, 1917, when they separated. They were divorced on June 18, 1919, and the custody of the child was awarded to the mother. The cause for the divorce was not disclosed by the evidence before us.

2. The husband was very lavish in bestowing gifts upon his wife, especially about the time of her recurring birthdays. He gave her at one birthday a diamond ring valued at $1,000. He also presented her with shares of stock. He transferred to her fifty shares of Lehigh Valley Railroad, and also shares of other corporations. These she sold and converted to her own use. He parted

with his title to all this property, having full confidence in her love and affection. No doubt he believed that she would use the same for their joint benefit, and for the promotion of the interest of their child. If their happy domestic relations had continued, it is quite evident that he would not have been disappointed in his hopes and confidence.

3. He was employed by Mr. C. A. Griscom, in the capacity of a butler, and turned over his wages regularly to his wife, saying "This is your's, Frances." She deposited the money and used the same for household expenses, and for her own purposes, and gave back to her husband any moneys he might request. Neither questioned the other as to the application of the money so expended out of the funds in the wife's custody.

4. In 1909 the husband subscribed for twenty shares of stock in the Rosemont Loan and Building Association. The wife subscribed for the same number of shares. The dues for the whole number of shares were regularly paid out of the money in the hands of the wife. These shares remained on the books of the association in the respective names of the subscribers until May 25, 1911. On that day the husband transferred his twenty shares to the wife, so that forty shares then stood in her name.

The wife testified that the twenty shares were given to her as a birthday gift. The husband contends that he was induced to sign them over to the wife because she alleged it would be more convenient, in making payment of the dues, to carry the shares in one receipt book of the association. From the fact of the legal effect of the transfer, and the prior gifts to the wife, we find that the weight of the evidence is in favor of the wife's contention. The twenty shares were a gift to her.

5. At this date, May 25, 1911, the lot with the double dwelling house was purchased from Mr. Thomas H. Walsh. The husband was present at the settlement, and execution and delivery of the deed. The money in the hands of the wife did not amount to more than about three hundred dollars, for this is the meagre cash that was raised toward the purchase money. The consideration was $5000 and a mortgage of $4700 was negotiated with the said building association to make up the balance of the purchase money. The association, for security,