that the son has an interest in the premises. We therefore direct judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff.

ESTATE OF BENJAMIN F. HENRY, DEC'D.
Trust-Termination of-Death of Husband-Divorce.

Where a testator by his will created a trust in favor of his daughter providing that the trust might be ended upon her becoming "widowed through the death of her present husband," such trust should not be terminated when the daughter obtains a divorce from her husband, that not being the testator's intention.

In the Orphans' Court of Lancaster County. Rule to show cause why trust should not be terminated.

John E. Malone, for rule.

John A. Coyle, Contra.

July 14, 1920. Opinion by Smith, P. J.

This rule was granted to permit Ida E. Caldwell, the petitioner, to show cause why the trust created in her behalf by the will of her father, Benjamin F. Henry, should not be terminated.

The testator provided that the trust might be ended upon her becoming "widowed through the death of her present husband, D. Roy Caldwell." D. Roy Caldwell is not dead, but at Chambers in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii, on the 7th day of October, 1919, a decree of divorce was entered dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Ida E. Caldwell and David R. Caldwell, to take effect from and after October 17, 1919. The decree rests on the naked allegation in the petition of the libellant, Ida E. Caldwell, that David R. Caldwell for a continuous period of two years next last past....has been habitually intemperate." The only testimony offered was that "David R. Caldwell is not in the military or naval service of the United States."

In the interpretation of a will it is a fundamental principle that the intention of the testator shall prevail; and this principle is not controverted because the will under consideration is interpreted differently from those

in Koenig's, 57 Pa. 352, and Lee's Estate, 207 Pa. 218, where it was held that divorces operate the termination of trusts during coverture as would have the deaths of the husbands. The testators' intentions, though referring to similar conditions, were expressed differently in those cases than that of the testator is in this one. That difference is the key to the distinguishing feature. The will here leaves nothing to speculation. The testator excludes all contingencies which might sustain a dissolution of the trust except the death of D. Roy Caldwell. The exploiting of a grass widow is foiled by the testator defining the widow intended by him as one whose husband is dead. In saying, "should my said daughter Ida become widowed through the death of her present husband, namely, D. Roy Caldwell, then the amount held in trust for her shall be paid over to her," the testator does not imply that the payment shall be made if the widowing is accomplished by an artificial or schematic process. The inference is diametrically the reverse. The testator's dominating purpose was to perpetuate the trust as long as D. Roy or David R. Caldwell is living. The unqualified prerequisite condition to its termination is the death of D. Roy Caldwell; and it is not difficult to find a reason for his intensity in this regard. No doubt he recognized that it would be a mere bagatelle to defeat his intention if the death of D. Roy Caldwell was not made a sine qua non. As easily could it be done as getting drunk or indulging in a prolonged spree in Hawaii; and quite as easily after the trust had been shattered could D. Roy Caldwell and Ida E. renew their previous relations, or if agreeable to them remain apart and divide the funds which the testator intended to have conserved by the trust,may be, in proportions agreed upon between them before the divorce proceedings were instituted. It was the testator's plan to frustrate just such a possible happening by locking the fund in a trust as long as D. Roy Caldwell inhabited this mundane sphere. Such was his intention, and by so finding the vested interests of remaindermen who have not had and who, it seems, ought to have had their day in Court are not jeopardized.

The rule is discharged; costs to be paid by the petitioner.

ESTATE OF RAYMOND KETCHLEDGE.

Guardian and Ward-Services of Ward-Action Against Guardian.

A guardian has no right to profit by the services of his ward; the ward may recover from his guardian for compensation paid him for services rendered by the ward to strangers.

Petition for an account. Orphans' Court of Schuylkill County.

R. S. Bashore for Petitioner.
J. O. Ulrich, Contra.

Wilhelm, P. J. May 24, 1920. On the twenty-first day of October, 1912, Frederick E. Hoppes was appointed guardian of Raymond Ketchledge, who attained his majority on the twenty-third day of March, 1918. And this is a petition on the part of the ward to compel his guardian to file an account, giving a statement of all the assets which came into the hands of the guardian.

The answer of the guardian is that there is no money in his hands belonging to his ward, because he never received from any source any money belonging to Raymond Ketchledge, and has nothing in his hands for which he should file an account.

When Raymond Ketchledge was about sixteen years of age, Frederick E. Hoppes suggested to the minor that a guardian should be appointed in order to protect the earnings of the minor from the grasping hand of a ne'erdo-well father. And with this end in view he accompanied the minor to the office of a lawyer who prepared the papers necessary to secure the appointment of a guardian, who presented the same to court, which resulted in the appointment of Frederick E. Hoppes as guardian of Raymond Ketchledge.

On the same day the bond of Frederick E. Hoppes as guardian was approved by the court. Subsequently Freaerick E. Hoppes, the guardian contracted with a firm consisting of Emanuel Hoppes and F. E. Hoppes, who were operating a farm, for the services of the ward at the rate of one hundred and fifty dollars per year, and the minor entered the services of the firm in pursuance of said contract, and continued to work on said farm during the year following. It appears that the farming operation was con

ducted upon the place occupied by the guardian, and the ward lived with his guardian. It appears also that Emanuel Hoppes, at a time subsequent to the contract concerning Raymond Ketchledge's work, by a statement made to his partner, declined to further recognize the employment of the ward, but Raymond Ketchledge continued to work on the farm during the whole of the year.

The testimony further shows that the guardian hired out his ward to neighboring farmers, and received his wages from several persons for whom the ward worked.

All of the above facts do not seem to be in dispute. It follows therefore that this guardian has in his possession, or ought to have, the wages received for his ward's services from neighboring farmers, and the money due upon the yearly contract of which he should file an account.

A guardian has no right to profit by the services of his ward. Beam's Appeal 96 Pa. 75. And a ward is entitled to compensation for valuable services rendered a stranger. Ibid.

A guardian can bind out his ward and enter into contracts for him, such as hiring out his work to others and receiving the price of his labor, and a ward can recover from his guardian for services of labor performed during his minority. And when a guardian has received compensation arising from hiring out the work of his ward to others, he is bound to give an account of all his transactions on behalf of his ward, and to answer for losses occasioned by his willful default or negligence. Denison v. Cornwell, 17 S. & R. 374.

In this proceeding it is not necessary to determine what amount, if any, is due from the guardian to the ward. It is sufficient, if it is ascertained that there were transactions on behalf of the ward that show that the guardian received or ought to have received money belonging to his ward's estate, to require him to file an account. And the exact state of the transactions and the amount due upon them can properly be inquired into upon the audit of the account.

And now, May 24, 1920, Frederick E. Hoppes is directed to file a just and true account of all his transactions on behalf of his ward Raymond Ketchledge on or before the 7th day of June. 1920.

NOLAN'S ESTATE.

Decedent's Estate-Distribution-Widow's Allotment of $5,ooo-Death of Widow Without Having Claimed AllotmentRight of Widow's Heirs to Have Same Set Apart for Their Benefit.

Under the Interstate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, section 2 (a), when a husband dies intestate leaving a widow, but no issue, the share to which the widow becomes entitled vests in her absolutely as an inheritance, and on the death of the widow, intestate, passes to her next of kin.

In such case her next of kin are entitled to have $5,000 in value of the husband's estate appraised and set apart for their benefit, although no claim therefor was made by the widow in her lifetime.

Petition for appointment of appraisers. In the Orphans' Court of Lackawanna County. No. 769. Year 1920.

Donahoe & Helfriegel, for Petitioners.

P. E. Kilcullen, Contra.

Sando, P. J., July 23, 1920.-The petitioner is next of kin of Mary Nolan, who died intestate and without issue on the 12th day of October, 1918, at 12 o'clock noon, and who at the time of her death was the widow of Anthony Nolan, who pre-deceased his wife about two hours; he having died at 10 o'clock a. m., on October 12, 1918. Anthony Nolan died intestate and without issue.

The prayer of the petition is for the appointment of appraisers for the purpose of setting apart and appraising five thousand dollars ($5,000) in value of the real estate of Anthony Nolan, deceased, for the benefit of Mary Nolan, widow and her next of kin.

The answer filed, which is in the nature of a demurrer, is to the effect that this claim must be disallowed, in that the widow made no demand in her lifetime.

The Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P. L .429, section 2 (a), is article 2 of section 1 of the Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 315, as amended by the Acts of April 1, 1909, P. L. 87, and July 21, 1913, P. L. 875, further amended so as to apply expressly to husband as well as wife, so as to be limited in cases of actual intestacy, and so as to make the estate of the surviving spouse absolute in real as well as personal property.